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Abstract 
This thesis seeks to explain how Francis Bacon promoted a materialist ontology 
whilst at the same time designating the goal of his inquiry into nature "true natural 
magic. " It attempts to establish the precise relationships among Bacon's concepts of 
matter, inquiry and magic in terms of his novel conception of nature. Baconian 
matter forms the basis of Bacon's substantive natural philosophy; it is highly potent 
and the unique source of operative power. In its unhampered or "free" state, nature 
takes the easiest and most economic route leaving a reservoir of unused possibility. 
To access the benefits of this unexploited potential, the Baconian mage 
experimentally and methodically deflects nature from its habitual course. Thus 
Baconian operational power is derived from constraining or binding nature so as to 
activate matter's dormant powers. For Bacon, magic is the artful constraint of 
nature. Through harnessing the primitive and archetypal powers of matter, Baconian 
magic would achieve what the magical and alchemical traditions had attempted 
haphazardly. Magic constitutes the capstone of Bacon's reform of natural 
philosophy and it relies fundamentally on a plenipotentiary matter. The inquiry 
prepares and guides the mind in its efforts to achieve that goal. Although these 
themes are often fragmented by commentators, they form a coherent natural 
philosophical foundation for Bacon's Instauratio magna. Their reintegration 
requires a return to Bacon's texts. A close reading of Bacon's works demonstrates a 
complex but internally coherent substantive philosophy. By placing Bacon's 
materialism centre-stage, in conjunction with thorough and detailed exegesis, long- 
standing disputes over central Baconian concepts can be resolved. 
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Abbreviations 
The following abbreviations are used for the titles of Bacon's works, parts of works 
and plans. 
AC Aphorismi et consilia 
AL Advancement of learning 
ANN Abecedarium nouum natura; 
CDNR Cogitationes de natura rerum 
CDSH Cogitationes de scientia humana 
CF Calor etfrigus 
CHP Catalogus historiarum particularium 
CS Commentarius solutus 
CV Cogitata et visa 
DAS De augmentis scientiarum 
DFRM Defluxu et refluxu marls 
DGI Descriptio globi intellectualis 
DIN De interpretatione naturce sententice xii 
DINP De interpretatione natura prcemium 
DO Distributio operis 
DPAO De principiis atque originibus 
DSV De sapientia veterum 
D UK Brief discourse touching the happy union of the kingdoms 
DVM De vfjs mortis 
Ess The essayes or counsels, civill and morall 
FL Filum labyrinthi 
GG Gesta Grayorum 
HDR Historia densi & rari (Rawley's version) 
HDR(M) Historia densi & rari (manuscript version) 
HGL Historia grauis & leuis (aditus pubished in HNE) 
HIDA Historia & inquisitio de animato & inanimato 
HIP Discourse touching helps for the intellectual powers 
HNE Historia naturalis et experimentalis 
HAS Historia soni et auditus 
ix 
HSMS Historia sulphuris, mercurii et salis (aditus published in LINE) 
HV Historia ventorum (published in HNE) 
HVM Historia vitae et mortis 
IDM Inquisitio de magnete 
ILM Inquisitio legitima de motu 
ILM(CS) Inquisitio legitima de motu (in CS) 
IM Instauratio magna 
IVDI Indicia vera de interpretatione naturce 
NA New Atlantis 
NO Novum organum 
PA Prodromi sive anticipationes philosophise secundce 
PAH Parasceve ad historiam naturalem 
Ph U Phcenomena universi 
PID Partis instaurationis secundce delineatio & argumentum 
RPh Redargutio philosophiarum 
SI Scala intellectus sivefilum labyrinth! 
SS Sylva sylvarum 
SSWN Sylva sylvarum (working notes) 
TC Thema cceli 
TDL Topica inquisitionis de luce et lumine 
TPM Temporispartus masculus 
VT Valerius terminus 
X 
The following abbreviations are used for editions and translations of Bacon's works: 
BF Farrington, Benjamin. The Philosophy of Francis Bacon (Liverpool: 
Liverpool University Press, 1964). 
Fowler Bacon, Francis. Bacon's Novum Organum, ed. Thomas Fowler, 2nd 
ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1889). 
Kitchin Novum Organum: sive indicia vera de interpretatione natura, cd. G. 
W. Kitchin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1855). 
LL Bacon, Francis. The Letters and Life of Francis Bacon, ed. James 
Spedding, vols. 8-14 (London: Longman, Green, Reader and Dyer, 
1861-74). 1 
OFB Bacon, Francis, The Oxford Francis Bacon, general eds. Graham 
Rees and Lisa Jardine, 15 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996-). 
SEH Bacon, Francis, The Works of Francis Bacon, ed. James Spedding, 
Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath, vols. 1-7 (London: 
Longman, Green, Reader and Dyer, 1859-64). 
References to work, edition, volume (in Roman numerals) and page number are 
given in footnotes. In the case of Latin works, I have cited the English translation of 
a passage. Where facing-page OFB translations are not available, I also give the 
location of the original after the corresponding reference to the translation. I have 
checked translations against the original. Where such translations obscure technical 
terms, I have either included the Latin phrase in square brackets in the text or given 
my own translation. Where no translation is available, translations are my own. 
I In this edition of Bacon's works, the Works proper appear as volumes 1-7 and the Letters as 
volumes 8-14. 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Bacon's language, like the secret things of Nature, will not unfold all its 
treasures to the hasty passer-by: he who will learn his full meaning and 
worth must first sojourn with him and become his friend. 1 
I. "True natural magic" 
This thesis seeks to explain how Francis Bacon promoted a materialist ontology 
whilst at the same time designating the goal of his inquiry into nature "true natural 
magic. "2 It attempts to establish the precise relationships among Bacon's concepts of 
matter, inquiry and magic in terms of his novel conception of nature. Paolo Rossi's 
seminal work - Francis Bacon: From Magic to Science - explored 
Bacon's 
indebtedness to major Renaissance figures who were heavily involved with the 
occult sciences of alchemy and magic .3I argue that 
Rossi's title is misleading. 
1 G. W. Kitchin, Novum Organum: sive indicia vera de interpretatione naturce (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1855), xii. 
2 Bacon, AL, OFB, IV, 90. In the Advancement of Learning Bacon expresses his intention to "reviue 
and reintegrate the misapplyed and abused Name of NATURALL MAGICKE, which in the true 
sense, is but NATVRALL WISEDOME, or NATVRALL PRVDENCE: taken according to the 
ancient acception, purged from vanitie & superstition" (AL, OFB, IV, 80). See also NO, OFB, XI, 
215. 
3 Paolo Rossi, Francesco Bacone: Dalla magia alla scienza (Bari: Laterza, 1957). English 
translation: Francis Bacon: From Magic to Science, trans. Sacha Rabinovich (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1968). See also Lynn Thorndike, "The Attitude of Francis Bacon and Descartes towards 
Magic and Occult Science, " in Science, Medicine and History: Essays on the Evolution of Scientific 
Thought and Medical Practice written in honour of Charles Singer, ed. E. Ashworth Underwood 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953), 451-454. On Bacon and alchemy: Muriel West, "Notes on 
the Importance of Alchemy to Modem Science in the Writings of Francis Bacon and Robert Boyle, " 
Ambix 9 (1961), 102-114; Stanton J. Linden, "Francis Bacon and Alchemy: The Reformation of 
Vulcan, " Journal of the History of Ideas 35 (1974), 547-560; For a more recent claim that Bacon was 
heavily indebted to the alchemical tradition see William R. Newman, "Alchemical and Baconian 
Views on the Art/Nature Division, " in Reading the Book of Nature: The Other Side of the Scientific 
Revolution, ed. Allen G. Debus and Michael T. Walton (Kirksville, MO: Sixteenth Century Journal 
Publishers, 1998), 81-90; idem., Promethean Ambitions: Alchemy and the Quest to Perfect Nature 
2 
Baconian reform was not intended as a transition from magic to science, but as a 
renovation of a corroded magic. Bacon says his task "will be like that labour of 
Hercules in purging the stable of Augeas, to separate from superstitious and magical 
arts and observations, any thing that is clean and pure natural, and not to be either 
contemned or condemned. "4 According to Bacon, the Persian Magi possessed 
wisdom "which was anciently defined to be the knowledge of things divine and 
human. "5 In De augmentis he states: 
But I must here stipulate that magic, which has long been used in a bad 
sense, be again restored to its ancient and honourable meaning. For among 
the Persians magic was taken for a sublime wisdom, and the knowledge of 
the universal consents of things [scientia consensuum rerum universalium] 
... I however understand it as the science which applies the 
knowledge of 
hidden forms to the production of wonderful operations; and by uniting (as 
they say) actives with passives, displays the wonderful works of nature [Nos 
vero eam No in sensu intelligimus, ut sit scientia qua, cognitionem 
Formarum Abditarum ad opera admiranda deducat; atque, quod dirt solet, 
activa cum passivis conjungendo magnalia naturce manifestet] 6 
Why Bacon retained the term "magic" and why he advanced the view that the 
Persian Magi had possessed a universal knowledge are questions that have not been 
answered? The answers require a detailed investigation of Bacon's complex 
substantive philosophy. 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2004), 256-271. On the various meanings of the term 
"occult, " see Brian Copenhaver, "Astrology and Magic, " in The Cambridge History of Renaissance 
Philosophy, ed. Charles B. Schmitt and Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1988), 264-300. Copenhaver is one of the very few commentators who take seriously Bacon's magic. 
4Bacon, SS, SEH, II, 641. 
S Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 362, cf. I, 568. Bacon is quoting Cicero, Tusculana; Qu estiones, iv, 26. 
6 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 366-367, cf. I, 573. The phrase "Nos vero" indicates Bacon's emphasis on 
the necessary condition for magical power, viz., the discovery of forms. The phrase "uniting actives 
with passives" is typically used to describe operative power in natural magic. Della Porta speaks of 
"the mutual and fit application of one thing to another, " Natural magick, Thomas Young and Samuel 
Speed: London, 1658, facsim. repr. (New York: Basic Books, 1957), 2. Agrippa says, "For the 
magicians, as very diligent searchers of nature, bringing the things which are prepared by nature, 
applying and setting active things to passive ones, very often bring forth effects before the time 
appointed by nature, " Of the vanitfe and vncertaintie of artes and sciences, trans. James Sanford, ed. Catherine M. Dunn (California: California State University, 1974), 125. Bacon knows precisely how 
to structure his project in these terms, especially given the success of the natural magic literature. 
7 For a contemporary genealogy of natural magic (where the Magi figure prominently in the ancient 
genealogy) see Della Porta, Natural magick, 2. According to Frances Yates, in some genealogies of 
3 
Baconian magic is a science of matter, where the goal is the systematic 
manipulation and transformation of bodies. Matter, for Bacon, is the unique 
principle of possibility. In Valerius terminus (speaking, as he puts it, "plainly and 
clearly") Bacon describes the goal of knowledge and operative power as the 
"discovery of all operations and possibilities of operations from immortality (if it 
were possible) to the meanest mechanical practice. "s Bacon's restoration of magic is 
intended to achieve that goal. Success requires a double foundation: a theoretical 
understanding of matter's hidden virtues and a true and certain method of inquiry-9 
The relationship between these two foundational themes has not been examined. 
This pressing issue in Bacon scholarship was noted more than thirty years ago by 
Graham Rees who saw the need for a fuller understanding of the interaction between 
the magical tradition it was customary to include the Persians among the originators. Ficino begins 
with the Persian Zoroaster and defends natural magic by pointing out that the ancient Chaldean, 
Persian and Egyptian priests practiced medicine on the basis of magic and astrology. Bruno ascribes a 
precedent to the Egyptians and Chaldeans, and second place to the Persian Magi; see Frances Yates, 
Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), 15, 
58,247. 
8 Bacon, VT, SEH, III, 222. Valerius Terminus of the Interpretation of Nature with Annotations of 
Hermes Stella is an early work (1603) which was not published during Bacon's lifetime. However, it 
seems likely he intended this work to be published because he made careful revisions to the 
manuscript, included a table of contents and even took the trouble to write out the full title wherever 
necessary (eighteen times in total). According to Spedding, "if he [Bacon] had been preparing the 
manuscript for the press or for a fresh transcript, he could not have done it more completely or 
carefully" (SEH, III, 209). Fulton H. Anderson comments, "the word `terminus' probably indicates 
the `limits and ends' to which investigation may proceed, " The Philosophy of Francis Bacon 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), 16; see also Benjamin Farrington, The Philosophy of 
Francis Bacon (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1964), 38-39. The venerable name of 
"Hermes" in the title of Valerius terminus carries obvious magical significance. Bacon's decision on 
the title is not merely a function of dedicatory etiquette and Bacon deliberately identifies James with 
Solomon and Hermes Trismegistus. For a discussion of James' self-perception as the "hermetic king" 
and as the "British Solomon" descended from the House of David see Vaughan Hart, Art and Magic 
in the Court of the Stuarts (London: Routledge, 1994), 26. Hart also discusses others who in works 
dedicated to James call him "Ter Maximus. " 
9 On the philological connections between method (methodos) and way (odos) see Neal Gilbert, 
Renaissance Concepts of Method (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), 48-55. Gilbert 
comments that many Renaissance thinkers (Erasmus for example) used the term "methodos" to refer 
to a short way to acquire particular discursive skills, 107. This is not Bacon's meaning; his "way" is 
long and tortuous. Hence the term "method" may not be the most appropriate to describe Bacon's 
"legitimate inquiry" (see Appendix 2). 
4 
Bacon's theory of matter and the method. '° Considering that Bacon places his whole 
endeavour on the twin pillars of matter and a radical inquisitional programme, the 
oversight is baffling. This thesis seeks to correct this oversight. 
Although Baconian magic has been ignored, Bacon's theory of matter has 
increasingly attracted scholarly attention. 11 Bacon's primary focus is the source of 
productive power which he perceives in matter's malleable potency. Baconian 
matter is appetitive, plenipotentiary, infinitely fecund, causa causarum and eternal. 12 
In Bacon's natural philosophy it is the sine qua non of all effects (natural and 
artificial). Baconian inquiry is a method of control and guidance that governs the 
way through nature's winding labyrinth. 13 The goal of transmuting an infinitely 
malleable matter is the Baconian programme. The glory of magic is restored only 
through a theoretical understanding of matter and a rigorous adherence to a 
programme of inquiry. Bacon's science of magic is the terminus of an inquiry that 
includes a purgative and regenerative regime designed to establish the union of res 
10 See, for example, Rees, "Matter Theory: A Unifying Factor in Francis Bacon's Natural 
Philosophy? " Ambix 24 (1977), 110-125. 
11 Much of this work builds on Graham Rees' groundbreaking studies of Bacon's natural philosophy 
and I refer to Rees' work throughout the thesis. For references to secondary literature on Bacon's 
matter theory (including Rees's) see Chapter 2, n. 6. 
12 There is now a substantial literature arguing vigorously for the continuing presence of an appetitive 
matter among supporters of the mechanical philosophy. John Henry holds that "the natural magic 
belief in the usefulness of an inductive knowledge of occult qualities of bodies and the necessarily 
experiential and observational discovery of precise effects of such occult virtues were all absorbed 
into the new natural philosophy of the seventeenth century, " "Magic and Science in the Sixteenth and 
Seventeenth Centuries, " in Companion to the History of Modern Science, ed. Robert C. Olby, G. N. 
Cantor, J. R. R. Christie, and M. J. S. Hodge (London: Routledge, 1990), 583-596, on 592. For 
comprehensive studies covering the diversity of matter theories in early modem Europe see Christoph 
Lathy, John E. Murdoch, and William R. Newman, eds., Late Medieval and Early Modern 
Corpuscular Matter Theories (Leiden: Brill, 2001). 
13 Analysis of Baconian inquiry is dominated by those who treat it as a "logic of discovery" or a 
nascent philosophy of science. See Rees' "Introduction" to Novum organum where he refers to the 
"anachronism" of treating Bacon as a philosopher of science, commenting that it was not Bacon's 
intention to explain the sciences "but to rebuild them" OFB, XI, xxxvii, n. 55. As an alternative to 
more traditional characterisations of the Baconian method, I use the term "cybernetic epistemology" 
to refer to Bacon's use of exclusions and negatives, and the complex procedures of feedback without 
which Baconian inquiry founders (see Chapter 3). 
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and mens (the mind and things). 14 Strict conformity to the dictates of inquiry is 
maintained through binding the mind to "things themselves. "1S The concept of 
binding is a key element facilitating the derivation of inquisitional principles and 
operative power. 16 Purgation involves an unbinding or severing of the mind from its 
spellbound fascination with useless or ersatz systems of philosophy. '? Unaided and 
left to itself, the mind deviates from engagement with things. This is why Book 1 of 
Novum organum addresses an impulse of the mind to continually deceive itself. 18 
Therapeutic recovery of the mind demands its "levelling" - in the sense of 
destruction - to purge it of its current habits. Book 2 of Novum organum presents 
strategies that guide the purified mind and serve as a secondary form of purgation by 
continually controlling the mind's tendency to declination. Bacon portrays the mind 
in Platonic terms: bound to illusory systems, the mind is fixated on idola analogous 
to the way the captives in the Platonic cave fixate on what Bacon calls "the shadows 
of things. "19 Bacon's destruction of the illusory theatre of knowledge prepares the 
way for hope. It overcomes the despair engendered by a sceptical tradition's 
exposure of all systems of knowledge without offering instruments or assistance. 
14 For the meaning of the terms res and mens see Chapter 3 and Appendix 1, n. i. 
is Bacon, IM, OFB, XI, 21. 
16 On the term "inquisition" in Bacon's writings see Kenneth William Cardwell, "Francis Bacon, 
Inquisitor, " in Francis Bacon's Legacy of Texts: 'The Art of Discovery Grows with Discovery, ' ed. 
William A. Sessions (New York: AMS Press, 1990), 269-289. 
17 This purgative regeneration of the mind is intended for epistemological and operative reform. 
Bacon's moral regimen for the mind is presented in medical and agricultural metaphors that refer to a 
husbanding of the mind, which Bacon calls "the Georgics of the Mind' (DAS, SEH, V, 5, cf. I, 715). 
For a discussion of Bacon's concept of "the Georgics of the Mind' see Ian Box, "Bacon's Moral 
Philosophy, " in The Cambridge Companion to Bacon, ed. Markku Peltonen (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 260-282, esp. 270-272, n. 10. On Bacon's horticultural language see Michele 
Le Doeuff's, "Man and Nature in the Gardens of Science, " in Francis Bacon's Legacy of Texts, 119- 
138. I discuss the connections between magic and Bacon's conception of the human sciences in 
Chapter 6. 
18 See Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 53, where he says even the dialecticians (logicians) distrust "the mind's 
inborn and spontaneous movements" 
19 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 315, cf. I, 518. According to Bacon, "every one philosophises out of the 
cells of his own imagination, as out of Plato's cave" (HNE, V, 131, cf. II, 14). 
6 
The two books of Novum organum contain in schematic form a programme to 
unbind the mind from its habitual absorption in and fascination with classical and 
theological traditions. Subtly altering the sceptical attack, Bacon represents 
traditional learning as purveying consolations or surrogates for the mind's inability 
to penetrate the darkness of matter and the intricate subtleties of nature 20 
In Bacon's philosophy there is a perfect homology between the mind's 
habitual fascinations and nature's habitual actions ("nature free"). Baconian inquiry 
begins through an interpretation of nature free, unfolding itself in its ordinary 
course. This is not for the purposes of mere description but as a point of departure to 
discover "what nature ... may be made to do. "2' Nature 
free is overridden as the 
terminal object of the understanding and "nature bound" instituted as a new focus of 
inquiry. Nature bound deviates matter from its habitual routines to engender a new 
set of possibilities: the science of magic actualises a potential alternative universe. 
Bacon's transformative science of magic demands that inquiry take the form 
of incursion into unexplored territory. The method involves a series of stages where 
the goal cannot be accessed directly because inquiry constructs the route as well as 
guiding the steps. The only signposts are given by experimental novelties and this is 
the key to Baconian inquiry: theorising on any other basis is, in Bacon's view, a 
mere moving in circles. This directional focus of Baconian inquiry constitutes a 
purposeful natural philosophy whose course is guided through nova - novel 
experiences, effects and works. Nova and purposive action are fundamental to 
Baconian inquiry, underpinning Bacon's optimistic belief that the goal (the 
20 On the key notion of "subtlety" in Bacon's philosophy see Rees, "Atomism and `Subtlety' in 
Francis Bacon's Philosophy, " Annals of Science 37 (1980), 549-571. For a discussion of Bacon's 
sources for this concept see Silvia A. Manzo, "Francis Bacon and Atomism: A Reappraisal, " in Late 
Medieval and Early Modern Corpuscular Matter Theories, ed. Christoph Lüthy, John E. Murdoch 
and William R Newman (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 209-244, on 211-213. 
21 NO, SEH, IV, 127, cf. OFB, XI, 214. 
7 
actualisation of nova) exists and that it must be kept firmly in mind. Negatives and 
failures serve to return the wandering mind to things (res) and thus provide a form of 
recursive checking. Escape from habitual darkness demands the binding of nature 
and the purgation of the mind. For Bacon, nature bound is magic because it restores 
and realises the aims of the natural magicians. The discovery of forms promises a 
way out of the cave of nature free22 Baconian magic accelerates time through 
actively focusing on the processes of generation and corruption. 23 These processes 
are vital to Baconian inquiry because they demonstrate movement away from and 
towards forms. Matter gives rise to unstable but dynamically sustained nodes of 
motions which constitute the qualities of heat, cold etc. Magic converts one thing 
into another by manipulating these conglomerations of simple motions. This is 
Baconian version or transmutation. 
Regardless of similarities of expression, Bacon's programme should not be 
confused with that of contemporary natural magicians. Bacon presents contemporary 
magic in the following manner: as a pollutant that conflates nature and the divine; 
decayed into mere formalisms; full of unfounded hope and wild enthusiasms; and 
attended by partial and accidentally successful operations where few effects are 
produced and false explanations given. 24 In contrast, Bacon's intention is to obtain 
unlimited effects based on knowledge of true causes where the only criterion of truth 
is the production of nova. Bacon's assault on the occult sciences (and on current 
philosophical and theological systems) constitutes a purificatory exercise to level the 
22 Richard Kennington rightly argues that "The ordinary course of nature is to Bacon's philosophy 
what the cave is to Plato's, " On Modern Origins: Essays in Early Modern Philosophy, ed. Pamela 
Kraus and Frank Hunt (New York: Lexington Books, 2004), 46. 
23 See Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 253 for the phrase "stealing a march on time. " In DPAO Bacon 
describes the work of creation as an abridgment of time. God miraculously produces in an instant 
what nature would take endless ages to do. In the course of ages nova will surface; prodigies are signs 
of nature's hidden potential. 
24 Of "popular and degenerate magic, " Bacon says, "in place of works [they] beget nothing else but 
empty hopes" (Bacon, DAS, SEH, N, 367, cf. I, 573). 1 discuss the importance of hope in Chapter 3. 
8 
ground for a restoration of cleansed magic. William Rawley perfectly captures 
Bacon's view of the mind's fascination with the attractions of seductive 
philosophical systems: 
And he [Bacon] knew well that there was no other way open to unloose 
men's minds, being bound and, as it were, maleficiate by the charms of 
deceiving notions and theories, and thereby made impotent for generation 
of works, but only nowhere to depart from the sense and clear experience; 
but to keep close to it, especially in the beginning. 25 
The contemporary fascination with magical and alchemical practices contributes, 
Bacon maintains, only to a muddying of the waters in which real potential is 
obscured by the raising of false hopes. The financial and psychological costs of 
unwarranted enthusiasms for potential material benefits from the occult can be seen 
in the following anecdote, recounted by Benjamin Farrington, concerning Bacon's 
uncle, Lord Burghley26 Burghley petitioned Sir John Kelly (a close associate of 
John Dee) to provide what he believed to be a "powder" capable of alchemical 
transmutation. Burghley asks that Kelly should send "in some secret box some such 
portion of his [Kelly's] powder as might be to her [Elizabeth] a sum reasonable to 
defray her charges for this summer for her navy which is now preparing for sea. "27 
Such incidents would no doubt have incensed Bacon, being a nuisance and 
detraction from the seriousness of his own programme for the transmutation of 
25 Rawley, SEH, II, 335. On the importance of "binding" (devinctio) and its association with 
weaving, knots and textures in early medieval magic see Valerie I. J. Flint, The Rise of Magic in 
Early Medieval Europe (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 226-231. It is no accident that Bacon 
continually uses the concepts of weaving, knots, bindings and threads when referring to matter's 
elemental motions. For a fuller discussion of the concept of binding matter see Chapters 2 and 5. On 
the binding of the mind see Chapter 3. 
26 Benjamin Farrington, The Philosophy of Francis Bacon, 13-14. 
27 Burghley quoted in Conyers Read, Lord Burghley and Queen Elizabeth (London: Cape, 1960), 
145-146. Unsurprisingly, Burghley ignored Bacon's letter of appeal for a special administrative post 
dedicated to philosophical reform and the rooting out of sham alchemists. The letter was written only 
a few months before Burghley appealed for alchemical financial aid (Bacon, LL, VIII, 108-109). 
9 
matter. 28 Yet commentators have been too peremptory in taking at face value 
Bacon's castigations of projects like Burghley's. 
Aware of the fate of Bruno, the reputations of Agrippa and Paracelsus, and 
the popular conceptions of witchcraft and magic, Bacon strives for a cleansed 
natural magic to divorce it from popular Faustian images. 29 Regardless of how the 
notoriety of Agrippa and Paracelsus might tarnish the image of magic or alchemy, 
Baconian goals and magical aims coincide. Bacon does not possess a programme for 
a wholly new species of transformative power; the radical nature of his magical 
programme depends only on a novel means of inquiry that realises the power 
inherent in experimental practice. Moreover, Bacon's elevation of matter to a quasi- 
divine status is reminiscent of other materialists renowned for their magical 
interests 30 
There is no shortage of first-rate scholarly discussions on the relationship of 
early modem natural philosophy to the major traditions of the occult sciences 31 
28 Ben Jonson lampoons such gullible folly, see The Alchemist, ed. Elizabeth Cook (London: A&C 
Black, 1992). On courtly enthusiasms for magic see Vaughan Hart, Art and Magic; J. S. Mebane, 
Renaissance Magic and the Return of the Golden Age (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989), 
esp. 169-171 where Mebane relates Johnson's play to Bacon's views on human nature. 
29 For Bacon's scathing comments on these individuals see Rossi, Francis Bacon: From Magic to 
Science, 31. 
30 On the basis of his elevated estimation of matter, Bacon believes he possesses a certain and 
infallible supporting ontological basis for magical operative success. In many ways his project to 
raise the status of matter bears a striking resemblance to the Brunonian elevation of matter to divine 
status. Paul Henri Michel notes that in De la causa, Bruno praises the medieval David of Dinant for 
having raised matter to the dignity of a "divine thing. " In De vinculis Bruno also praises the Arab 
Avicebron for having dignified matter to the same degree; see Paul Henri Michel, The Cosmology of 
Giordano Bruno, trans. R. E. W. Maddison (London: Methuen, 1973), 44. For relevant Brunonian 
texts, see Robert de Lucca and Richard J. Blackwell, eds., Cause, Principle and Unity (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
31 See Keith Hutchinson, "What Happened to Occult Qualities in the Scientific Revolution? " Isis 73 
(1982), 233-253; idem., "Dormitive Virtues, Scholastic Qualities, and the New Philosophies, " History 
of Science 29 (1991), 245-278; Ron Millen, "The Manifestation of Occult Qualities in the Scientific 
Revolution, " in Religion, Science and Worldview: Essays in Honour of Richard S. Westfall, ed. 
Margaret J. Osler and Paul Lawrence Farber (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 185- 
216; Brian Copenhaver, "Natural Magic, Hermeticism, and Occultism in Early Modem Science, " in 
Reappraisals of the Scientific Revolution, ed. David C. Lindberg and Robert S. Westman 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 261-301. 
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However, the presence of elements from alchemy or natural magic in the Baconian 
corpus is not the issue here. In contrast to those who either dismiss entirely Bacon's 
magical project, or characterise it as a transitional moment in early modem natural 
philosophy, I maintain that these representations are historiographically incoherent. 
Bacon's absorption of occult traditions, minus the detritus of occult nonsense, is 
represented as paving the way for the construction of modem science 32 Mary 
Horton, for example, says that Bacon excluded the usual "rag-bag collection of 
superstitious beliefs" and launched "a diatribe against that ... trio of 
degenerate 
magic, alchemy, and astrology. "33 She asks what then is left in the category "magic, " 
and was Bacon therefore "unwise" to label his operative science "magic"? 34 My 
claim is that Bacon's "true natural magic" is the terminus of a restorative and 
reformative venture per se. The neglect of Baconian magic may be plausibly 
attributed to the posthumous fortuna of Bacon's work and the subsequent rise of 
various species of `Baconianism"35 But I suggest that among the principal causes of 
neglect are the following: the idea that Bacon is best characterised as a "transitional" 
figure; the occlusion of his substantive natural philosophy; and the prioritising of 
32 Farrington echoes Rossi's view when he describes Bacon's project as the assembling of the sum 
total of artisanal knowledge or practical know-how to "facilitate the emergence of science out of craft 
knowledge, " The Philosophy of Francis Bacon, 53. Bacon uses the familiar figure of Aaron's rod 
devouring the serpents of Pharaoh's magicians (Exodus, 7: 12) to signify the consumption of a 
corroded magic by a restored form. On this topos see John C. Briggs, Francis Bacon and the Rhetoric 
of Nature (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), 138. 
33 Mary Horton "Bacon and 'Knowledge Broken': An Answer to Michael Hattaway, " Journal of the 
History of Ideas 43 (1982), 487-504, on 490. 
34 ibid. Horton confuses the terms "magical" and "supernatural" Thus, she rejects any suggestion of 
"magical" elements in Bacon. 
35 In his monumental study, Charles Webster argues for connections between Puritanism and a 
utilitarian and practical ideology, now customarily referred to as "Baconianism, " The Great 
Instauration: Science, Medicine and Reform 1626-1660 (London: Duckworth, 1975). The 
relationship between that ideology and Bacon's actual works is at times obscured by historians. A 
concentration on "Baconian" ideologies tends to blur Bacon's distinction between the fruits of 
operative power and the pursuit of a deep knowledge of matter's hidden virtues. Throughout this 
thesis the term "Baconian" refers to the philosophical views of Bacon himself. A thorough overview 
of the fortuna of Baconianism can be found in Antonio Perez-Ramos, Francis Bacon's Idea of Science and the Maker's Knowledge Tradition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 7-31. 
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context over a close reading of the Baconian corpus. As a corrective to those who 
characterise Bacon's programme as "transitional, " the exposition of the Baconian 
corpus given here depicts Bacon's science of magic in terms of his self-awareness. 
12 
II. Historiography and the occult 
It is usual to treat the occurrence of occult materials in Bacon's works as 
incorporations and departures from those traditions. From the traditions of magic 
and alchemy, Bacon (so the argument goes) appropriated all that could be 
accommodated under the rubrics of utility, observation and experimentation, while 
rejecting the rest. This historiography has no specific interest in explaining why 
Bacon used the term "magic" to describe the fulfilment of his operative goals. The 
oversight is certainly not due to a neglect of the occult sciences and their roles in the 
emergence of modem science. On the contrary, there is now a substantial volume of 
scholarly work on this broad topic 36 This salutary historiographical shift has caused 
Rossi himself to express reservations: 
What started off as a useful corrective to the conception of the history of 
science as a triumphant progress, is becoming a retrospective form of 
historiography, interested only in the elements of continuity [between the 
hermetic tradition and modem science] and the influence of traditional 
ideas. 37 
Historians of science have also taken seriously Rossi's claims for the important 
input to modem science of artisanal and technical craft knowledge 38 Subsequently, 
historians of science have noted the apparently ubiquitous presence of the occult in 
the works of principal figures in early modem science. In this revisionist 
historiography, figures such as Boyle and Newton have been represented as deeply 
36 For an overview of this topic see Robert S. Westman, "Magical Reform and Astronomical Reform: 
the Yates Thesis Reconsidered, " in Hermeticism and the Scientific Revolution, ed. R. S. Westman and 
J. E. McGuire, (Los Angeles: William Andrews Clark Memorial Library, 1977), 1-91; Charles B. 
Schmitt, "Reappraisals in Renaissance Science, " History of Science, 14 (1978), 200-218. 
37 Rossi, "Hermeticisni, Rationality and the Scientific Revolution, " in Reason, Experiment and 
Mysticism in the Scientific Revolution, ed. M. L. Righini Bonelli and W. R. Shea (London: 
Macmillan, 1975), 257, quoted in Mordechai Feingold, "The Occult Tradition in the English 
Universities of the Renaissance: A Reassessment, " in Occult and Scientific Mentalities in the 
Renaissance, ed. Brian Vickers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 73. However, 
Rossi's qualms notwithstanding, he is still rightfully regarded as a major contributor to highlighting 
unconsidered factors in the emergence of early modem science. 
38 For a wider discussion of the influence of the arts on science see Rossi, Philosophy, Technology, 
and the Arts in the Early Modern Era, trans., Salvator Attanasio (New York: Harper & Row, 1970). 
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immersed in alchemy and magic, and fully conversant with neo-Platonism and 
Hermeticism. 39 Boyle and Newton are not typically characterised as transitional 
figures, yet the case of Bacon is otherwise. 
Bacon interpretation is almost entirely focused on reconciling his occult 
interests by means of his purported transitional status 40 My principal objection to 
current Bacon historiography centres on this representation of Bacon as transitional 
figure. The neglect of Bacon's natural philosophy - and certainly of his science of 
magic - can be explained in terms of this ubiquitous trope. Bacon is often depicted 
as incongruously moving between the occult world of alchemical sympathies, 
animism and spiritus, and the emergent mechanical philosophy which (it is 
erroneously claimed) abandoned all appetitive virtues in its theory of matter. 41 
Rossi's scrupulous attention in recounting the details of Bacon's magical and 
39 See Lawrence M. Principe, The Aspiring Adept: Robert Boyle and His Alchemical Quest (New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998). On Newton's involvement in the hermetic and magical 
traditions see J. E. McGuire and P. M. Rattansi, "Newton and the Pipes of Pan, " Notes and Records 
of the Royal Society, 21 (1966), 108-143; Newton's alchemical work is famously presented in Betty 
Jo Teeter Dobbs, The Foundations of Newton's Alchemy, or 'The Hunting of the Greene Lyon' 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975); idem., The Janus Face of Genius: The Role of 
Alchemy in Newton's Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). None of these texts 
treat their subjects as transitional figures. 
40 Michael Hattaway describes Bacon as "Faustian" while attempting to explain the 
"interpenetration" of Bacon's "metaphysical" and "physical" outlook, "Bacon and `Knowledge 
Broken': Limits for the Scientific Method, " Journal of the History of Ideas 39 (1978), 183-197; for a 
response to Hattaway see Mary Horton, "Bacon and `Knowledge Broken': An Answer to Michael 
Hattaway, " 487-504. Horton rejects any suggestion of "magical" elements in Bacon and considers 
Hattaway's depiction of Bacon as "a thinker in transition" as providing "a model which has far more 
utility" than "Bacon the alchemist, mystic and `magician, "' 487. P6rez-Ramos characterises Bacon's 
"form" as a notion transitional between the "substantial forms" of late Scholasticism and the "internal 
structures" of the Corpuscularians, Francis Bacon's Idea of Science 67, see also 174, n. 11. Joshua C. 
Gregory argues "Bacon is transitional between a hylozoistically or animistically tinged version of 
inanimate nature and the Cartesian mechanical version, " "Chemistry and Alchemy in the Natural 
Philosophy of Sir Francis Bacon, 1561-1626, " Ambix 2 (1938), 93-111, on 94. Thomas S. Kuhn calls 
Bacon "a transition figure between the magus Paracelsus and the experimental philosopher Robert 
Boyle, " The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 1977), 54. Rees says "the interpretation word `transition' is vacuous for 
several reasons, and not least that philosophers do not ... see themselves as slabs on a road from one place to another, " OFB, XI, xxxii, n. 41, italics in original. 
41 John Henry corrects this erroneous view, "Occult Qualities and the Experimental Philosophy: 
Active Principles in Pre-Newtonian Matter Theory, " History of Science 24 (1986), 335-381. 
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alchemical debts has unfortunately contributed to this ill-conceived historical 
perception of Bacon. 
The second major cause of the neglect of magic is the failure to detect within 
the Baconian corpus the theoretical and operative basis for a science of magic. Apart 
from Rees's work, there appears to be little interest in uncovering Bacon's 
substantive programme. Reviewing the English translation of Rossi's celebrated 
book, Dame Frances Yates comments that Rossi's "analysis of Bacon's reactions 
against the Renaissance magical tradition to which he was at the same time indebted 
have not been explored elsewhere in such depth. "42 Almost three decades later, the 
bibliography to The Cambridge Companion to Bacon has less than a handful of titles 
concerned with Bacon and magic, and nothing whatsoever on Baconian magic 43 
The index contains three citations of the term "magic, " including the analogue form 
"magician. " The term is found in Rossi's contribution to the Companion and in 
Sachiko Kusukawa's article on "Bacon's classification of knowledge, " where she 
recounts the division of operative natural philosophy into "mechanics" and 
"magic. "44 Continuing the now familiar trope of Bacon's selectivity, Kusukawa 
states that Bacon had two meanings of the term "magic": a good sense where 
"magic" signifies the "application of hidden forms to the production of nature" and 
an opprobrious sense referring to those engaged in "superstitious practices such as 
42 Dame Frances Yates, "Bacon's Magic, " in Ideas and Ideals in the North European Renaissance, 
vol. 3 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984), 60-66, esp. 61. 
43 For bibliography see Markku Peltonen, The Cambridge Companion to Bacon, 335-364. 
Presumably it is now taken for granted that Rossi answered all possible questions relating to Bacon's 
connection with magic. 
44 Sachiko Kusukawa, "Bacon's Classification of Knowledge, " The Cambridge Companion to 
Bacon, 47-74, esp. 59-61. Kusukawa describes Bacon's classification of operative knowledge into the 
main parts of "Mechanic" and "Magic" which correspond "to the Theoretical parts of Physic and 
Metaphysic respectively, " 59. 
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alchemy and astrology" from which Bacon sought to divorce himself. 45 While 
Kusukawa provides some detail on the meaning of the term "mechanic" and its role 
within the Baconian sciences, she makes no further mention of the term "magic. " As 
an expression of the historiographical blindness to the importance of magic in 
Bacon's vision, the oversight is worth considering in more detail. 
From Kusukawa's brief descriptions and from the given taxonomy of the 
Baconian sciences, the end of Bacon's programme is magic. Natural philosophy 
offers knowledge of forms and so is a necessary condition for magical power. The 
Baconian classification therefore entails that an operator must already have attained 
the apex of natural knowledge. Moreover, no one disputes that Bacon proposes an 
inquiry into nature that will ultimately result in the capacity to purposefully 
transform matter. If power (the purposeful transformation of matter) is the fulfilment 
of the Baconian vision, then the science of magic (which is a science of power and 
control) is the culmination of Baconian reform. Yet apart from Rossi's 
demonstration of the proximity between Bacon's project and the occult traditions, 
the secondary literature has no direct analysis of Baconian magic 46 
In a recent overview of Baconian commentary, Brian Vickers displays 
extreme hostility to any suggestion that Bacon takes seriously the occult sciences 47 
It is helpful to compare the approaches of Rossi and Vickers to explain the oversight 
45 Kusukawa, "Bacon's Classification of Knowledge, " 59. See Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 366-367, cf. I, 
573. 
46 Julian Martin is an example of an astute reader who correctly interprets Bacon's natural philosophy 
as a discovery of universal laws applicable to all domains (moral, legal and natural), Francis Bacon, 
the State, and the Reform of Natural Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). He 
quotes Bacon's praise of the Persian magi as being in possession of those laws, but he writes of "affinities" and "similarities" between the laws of nature and the laws of politics, 168. According to 
Martin, "Bacon assumed there was a similarity between the nature of the common law and the laws 
of nature, " 168. Yet Bacon expressly condemns those who see the links in terms of mere "similitudes" (SEH, DAS, IV, 339, cf. I, 543). See Chapter 6 for further discussion of these themes. 
47 Brian Vickers, "Francis Bacon and the Progress of Knowledge, " Journal of the History of Ideas 53 (1992), 495-5 18, on 505-507. 
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of Bacon's substantive natural philosophy. 48 Rossi drew attention to conspicuous 
similarities between passages in Bacon and passages from the works of Agrippa, 
Della Porta, Cardano and Paracelsus (among others) 49 Using Agrippa's De 
incertitudine et vanitate scientiarum, Rossi highlights their shared aims: Agrippa's 
goals for natural magic are realised through the discovery of "the hidden and secret 
powers of nature. "50 These powers, although appropriated by artfully combining 
bodies, remain the prerogative of nature itself. Magic unites "actives" with 
"passives"; it anticipates the effects of things so as to make them appear miraculous; 
it concerns itself with the transformations of things, the attainment of eternal youth 
or immortality, and the production of new species. But the most important similarity 
is that ultimately magic derives all its operations from nature; it does not rely on 
supernatural aid, of either angelic or demonic form. 51 This list corresponds with 
Bacon's understanding of what a science of magic should achieve. 52 According to 
Rossi, Bacon also borrowed from the magical tradition the idea that science should 
be the servant of nature; that it should assist and imitate nature forcing it to yield to 
domination; and the overarching idea that knowledge brings power. 53 Rossi 
concludes that there is "an almost literal repetition of Agrippa's words" in Bacon's 
definition of magic. 54 Bacon's desire to see the occult sciences "reinstated as the 
ultimate aims of human effort" constitutes, for Rossi, "proof' that Bacon was 
48 Rossi, Francis Bacon: From Magic to Science, 1-35. 
49 ibid., 18-20. 
50 Agrippa quoted in Rossi, Francis Bacon: From Magic to Science, 18. 
51 ibid. I discuss the art-nature distinction in Bacon and how it impacts on his science of magic in 
Chapter 5. 
52 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 139. Cf. the list of Magnalia naturce appended to The New Atlantis (NA, 
SEH, III, 167-168). 
53 Rossi, Francis Bacon: From Magic to Science, 21. On the Galenic phrase ars ministra naturae and 
its links to alchemy and medicine, see Newman, Promethean Ambitions, 19,141,255. 
54 Rossi, Francis Bacon: From Magic to Science, 21. 
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"influenced" by Agrippa and other natural magicians. " Rossi also takes account of 
Bacon's criticisms and reservations about these practices, but argues that these did 
not include a critique of the practical and experimental aspects of magic or 
alchemy. 56 In this way Rossi provides an impeccable historiography of appropriation 
and absorption of the occult that contributes to the emergence of modem science. 
In contrast to Rossi's excavation of the influences of the occult sciences on 
Bacon, Vickers is vociferously critical of those who locate Bacon within the magical 
tradition. He is particularly harsh on those who draw attention to Bacon's critique of 
the "occult arts" but insist that it signifies only a plea for the reform of magic, not its 
outright rejection. For example, Brian Copenhaver (one of Vickers' targets) states 
that Bacon was merely making "certain physical and metaphysical departures from 
the post-Ficinian theory of magic"57 Vickers rejects the claim that Bacon can, in any 
sense, be identified with this tradition. In particular, he directs his critique at 
Copenhaver's interpretative procedures and his mistaken derivation of Baconian 
ideas. Tangentially, Vickers makes the salutary observation that gratuitous 
associations, constructed on a commonality of terminology, in texts dissimilar in 
other crucial respects, ought not to supply evidence for "the resemblance of Bacon's 
magical ideas to their Neoplatonic ancestors. "58 Vickers concludes, "Bacon's oft- 
repeated criticisms of the occult tradition - magic, astrology, alchemy, `signatures, ' 
55 ibid., 22. 
56 ibid., 27. 
5 Vickers, "Francis Bacon and the Progress of Knowledge, " 505. For Copenhaver's views see 
"Astrology and Magic" in The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, ed. Charles B. Schmitt 
and Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 264-300. See also Vickers' 
comprehensive survey of the terrain, "Analogy versus Identity: the Rejection of Occult Symbolism 
1580-1680, " Occult and Scientific Mentalities in the Renaissance, ed. Brian Vickers (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1984), 95-164. For a brief but valuable discussion of the relationship 
between Ficinian, Telesian and Baconian concepts see D. P. Walker, Spiritual and Demonic Magic 
from Ficino to Campanella (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), 199-202. 
58 Vickers, "Francis Bacon and the Progress of Knowledge, " 506. Vickers is certainly correct here; 
the bare resemblance of ideas in the Baconian corpus to external sources tells commentators very 
little about the substantive use of such materials. 
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and so on - for its delusory quality, its dishonesty, its appeal to human appetite for 
speedy profits without effort, " should lead us to "wonder why Copenhaver wants to 
link Bacon with the magical tradition. "59 Nevertheless, Vickers (notwithstanding his 
important methodological point about mere similarities) cannot deal adequately with 
Bacon's self-presentation and he is forced to apply retrospectively the anachronistic 
concept of scientific "mentality" to cover the Baconian ethos. 60 Vickers also 
suggests the notion of a "spectrum of beliefs and attitudes ... a continuum 
from ... 
absolutely magical to absolutely mechanistic poles, along which thinkers place 
themselves. "61 As a model for Bacon's position, this is incoherent: it implies a 
policing of the boundaries which is contrary to the Baconian concept of exploration 
and open frontiers. Paradoxically, in spite of their obvious disagreements on the role 
of the occult sciences, Rossi, Vickers and Copenhaver share similar conclusions - 
they each represent Bacon's project in terms inapplicable to Bacon's stated 
intentions and at odds with the overall tenor of the Baconian programme. All three 
represent Bacon as engaging or disengaging with various decaying or emerging 
mentalities, thereby leaving aside the more pressing engagement of his own 
substantive philosophical programme. In that sense they typify an historiography 
that considers the builder's choice and rejection of materials to be more important 
than the actual construction itself. 
Thus Bacon's substantive theories on matter, cosmogony and magical 
operation are unwittingly ignored by the very scholars who investigate the presence 
59 ibid., 506-507. 
60 See Vickers, Occult and Scientific Mentalities in the Renaissance, ed. Brian Vickers (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1984), 11. In "Analogy versus Identity, " Vickers argues that the 
defining criterion of a magical outlook is the conflation of sign and signified, or the word and the 
thing. As a definitional stance this is debatable, especially as the natural magicians considered 
operational transformation as central. For Vickers, "the only remedy [to the occult] is a science built 
not on words but on the observation of reality, developing a proper scientific method, " "Analogy and 
Identity, " 103. 
61 Vickers, "Analogy versus Identity, " 95. 
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of magical and alchemical elements in his works 62 The neglect of Bacon's natural 
philosophy has the knock-on effect that commentators disregard the precise 
connections between his science of magic and other main elements of his 
programme of reform. 63 Rossi's depiction of Bacon's goal as directed away from the 
cultural ethos of magic also facilitates a reading of Bacon's substantive contribution 
as minimal. His portrayal of Bacon as "influenced" by elements of the Renaissance 
magical traditions and the technical know-how of artisanal experience is followed by 
an almost total concentration on Bacon's theory of communication, rhetoric and 
methodical disposition, albeit to illuminate the contribution of myth and fable to 
Bacon's programmatic presentation. M 
Restoring the visibility of Bacon's natural philosophy and its culmination in 
magic requires much more than noting similarities of expression and charting 
influences and borrowings. Excellent surveys of the natural philosophical 
programmes of undoubted magicians such as Agrippa, Ficino and Bruno have long 
been available, which demonstrate that their goals are not, insofar as they seek 
material and psychological transmutations, different from Bacon's. 65 What separates 
62 Part of the difficulty in explicating Bacon's views stems from his universal appropriation (and 
subversion) of traditional learning. Moreover, Bacon's negative attitude in one place is often 
countered by a positive attitude in another - and this is especially notable in his dealings with the 
occult. 
63 For example, Farrington interprets operative and transformative power (magic) in terms of the 
finished products of the mechanical arts, Farrington, The Philosophy of Francis Bacon, 51-55. 
64 Much of Rossi's book is taken up with Bacon's theory of rhetoric and communication. He deals 
adequately with Baconian matter but there is no discussion of how it relates to inquiry and, after an 
initial location of Bacon as responding to the magical and alchemical traditions, there is no further 
discussion. 
65 See C. I. Lehrich, The Language of Demons and Angels: Cornelius Agrippa's Occult Philosophy 
(Leiden: Brill, 2003), esp. 43-67; Marc Van Der Poel, Cornelius Agrippa, The Humanist Theologian 
and His Declamations (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 51-55; D. P. Walker, Spiritual and Demonic Magic, 201 
where he discusses Bacon's comments on "fascination" and the imagination. Bacon refers to those 
who perceive "the secret passages of things, and specially of the Contagion that passeth from bodie to 
bodie, [they] doe conceiue it should likewise be agreeable to Nature, that there should be some 
transmissions and operations from spirit to spirit, without the mediation of the sences" (AL, OFB, IV, 
105). He states that an inquiry should be undertaken "to raise and fortifie the imagination, for if the 
Imagination fortified haue power, then it is materiall to know how to fortifie and exalt it" (loc. cit. ). 
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Bacon from these figures does not lie in his divergence from the magical tradition 
tout court, but in his radical claim that he alone has discovered the means to abolish 
error and deviation and to attain certainty of operation. Baconian magic rests on 
knowledge of forms and the Baconian doctrine of certainty is determined through a 
radical inquisitional procedure that has no counterpart in traditional operative magic. 
The Baconian magician is guaranteed full operative power only because he acts on 
certain knowledge: it is the uncertainty, obscurity and posturing of a corroded magic 
that the Baconian programme intends to rectify. This is why Bacon insists that the 
mind must unbind itself from its current fascinations and obsessions, and rebind 
itself to matter. 
So far I have maintained that in drawing attention to Bacon's Renaissance 
preoccupations and arguing for unsuspected features of Bacon's philosophy, Rossi, 
Farrington and others have contributed to a view that regards Bacon's programme as 
nothing other than a seizure of useful empirical materials and operations. 66 This 
view is supported by Bacon's well-documented and scathing attacks on the occult 
traditions. 67 His repeated condemnations of the notion of mage or adept controlling 
This takes place in a discussion of ceremonial magic where Bacon's only criticism is that it is not 
miraculous but requires "the price of Laboure" (loc. cit. ). Michael Kiernan (in his commentary on this 
passage) says that Reginald Scot, in his The discoverie of witchcraft (1584), relates fascination to the 
power of the imagination in casting spells; it is "an extermination or expulsion of the spirits through 
the eies, approaching to the hart of the bewitched, and infecting the same" (OFB, N, 303). The 
"Force of the imagination, either upon another body, or upon the body itself' is listed in the Magnalia 
Naturre appended to NA (NA, SEH, III, 167); see also SS, SEH, II, 641. Kiernan also notes that 
fascination was the subject of an Oxford disputation in 1600 (OFB, N, 303). Van Der Poel argues for 
the crucial importance of theology in Agrippa's programme as without faith (fides) the Agrippan 
magician is unprotected from demonic forces. The relationship between the psychological state of the 
Baconian investigator and inquiry into nature is complicated and entails consideration of the full 
extent of Bacon's materialism. Moreover, although superficial comparisons among Ficino, Agrippa, 
Bruno and Bacon should be resisted there are many overlapping features, especially on the 
connections between mind and magical binding or fascination. However, Bacon generally naturalises 
his inquiry. In the Advancement of Learning, for example, Bacon suggests a naturalised investigation 
into angels and demons (AL, OFB, N, 79-80). On Bacon and imagination see Chapter 6. 
66 Rossi, Francis Bacon: From Magic to Science, xv. 
67 For a compendious list of Bacon's castigation of Paracelsian alchemists see Vickers, "Analogy 
versus Identity, " 133-134. R. J. W. Evans claims that there is "still much of the Renaissance" in 
Bacon, in spite of what Evans takes to be Bacon's straightforward condemnations of magic and the 
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esoteric forces are also familiar. 68 The typical response (as we have seen) is to argue 
that Bacon's appreciation of magical and artisanal practices resulted from their 
common operative aims and even shared vocabularies and definitions. Bacon's 
supposed eclecticism encourages the historiography of influence and indebtedness. 
Bacon, it is argued, took the better remnants of outmoded traditions (contained in the 
works of the natural magicians, alchemists and artisans) as contributions to the 
emergence of modem science. Artisans (so the argument goes) already possessed 
desirable features that would contribute materially to the foundations of a nascent 
experimental and operative style of engagement with nature. However, interpretative 
problems arise when commentators encounter textual evidence demonstrating not 
only Bacon's interest in the practical aspects of magic, but an intense and 
substantive interest in the very "irrational" or "superstitious" materials that he 
elsewhere condemns. 69 
I reject the view that Bacon's critique of existing magical practices indicates 
ambivalence towards an occult tradition. Bacon's attacks are generally directed at an 
absence of legitimate inquisitional procedures and at the ignorance of true causes, 
occult, Rudolf II and his World: A Study in Intellectual History 1576-1612 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 
1973), 290. 
68 See Rossi, Francis Bacon: From Magic to Science, 27-35. In his comments to James I, Bacon 
shows no hesitation in associating himself with the Persian Magi. In Novum organum he refers to 
himself as "high-priest of the sense ... and learned interpreter of 
its oracles" (NO, OFB, XI, 35). 
69 To complicate matters further, there is the extensive use of myth in Bacon's writings, yet another 
indication of his Renaissance status. Bacon makes no distinction between obviously natural 
philosophical works and natural philosophy discussed through the medium of fable. For this reason, 
Rossi highlights the "absurdity" of classifying Bacon's De sapientia veterum as "mere 'literary 
exercises, "' Francis Bacon: From Magic to Science, 131. As the bearer of substantive claims, fable is 
treated here as a bona fide vehicle for the transmission of Bacon's philosophical claims. There are 
neither historiographical nor textual reasons for their later separation and it is incumbent on the 
commentator to acknowledge the importance of this genre for Bacon. On Bacon's classical sources 
see Charles W. Lemmi, The Classic Deities in Bacon: A Study in Mythological Symbolism 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1933) 49-61. The use of myth is ignored by those who place 
too much emphasis on Novum organum. For example, Horton considers that Novum organum and De 
augmentis "contain the core of Bacon's thinking on the scientific enterprise, " "Bacon and 
`Knowledge Broken, "' 488. 
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not at magic's material claims per se 70 Furthermore, I maintain that Baconian 
reform is more correctly presented as an instauration of magic, rather than as an 
institutional and methodological preparative to the emergence of modem science. 71 
Bacon's works contain the answers to many of the issues raised here and, in spite of 
their fragmentary nature, they afford internally coherent reasons for Bacon's 
restoration of magic. On this basis, I propose a shift in historiographical focus away 
from delineating Bacon's borrowings, influences and appropriations of terms and 
categories. In his flagrant appropriation of terms and concepts from the works of his 
opponents, Bacon subverts their meanings for his own ends. There is hardly a 
traditional science or body of doctrine that he does not explore, commandeer and 
utilise in far-reaching revisions. This has led commentators to concentrate overmuch 
on uncovering Bacon's sources, to the neglect of reading for internal meaning, 
coherences and clues to further interpretation. Baconian exposition would improve 
greatly were Bacon's eclecticism interpreted as a synthesising and integrating 
programme rather than a patchwork of pilfered notions 72 I argue for a shift towards 
a rigorous reading of Bacon's texts, not to disclose his programmatic aims which are 
blatantly expressed at every turn, but to extract the details of his philosophical 
70 Sylva sylvarum clearly reveals Bacon's deep absorption in magical lore. Bacon himself describes 
Sylva sylvarum as "a high kind of natural magic" (SS, SEH, II, 378). Rees comments that scholars 
have overlooked the fact that Sylva sylvarum deals not simply with a "farrago of untested data and 
fabulous phenomena" but, as Bacon says, with those particulars that "do level point-blank at the 
invention of causes" (SS, SEH, II, 507-508). See Rees, "Matter Theory: A Unifying Factor in Francis 
Bacon's Natural Philosophy? " Ambix 24 (1977), 110-125, on 119. The considerable neglect of the 
Sylva by commentators is incomprehensible. It is described by many as a loose collection of 
incoherent and isolated observations pilfered from traditional histories such as Pliny's, Aristotle's 
Problemata and Meterology, and especially from natural magicians such as Della Porta and Cardano 
(see Ellis, SEH, II, 326). Rees rejects this notion that the Sylva is "a hotch-potch of plagiarized 
scraps, " "An Unpublished Manuscript by Francis Bacon: Sylva Sylvarum Drafts and Other Working 
Notes, " Annals of Science 38 (1981), 377-412, on 377. He argues that "Bacon took great pains, 
acknowledged borrowings and drew heavily on his own extensive experimental and observational 
work, " loc. cit. I return to the Sylva in Chapter 6. 
71 Charles Whitney provides comprehensive discussion on the term Instauratio, "Francis Bacon's 
Instauratio: Dominion of and over Humanity, " Journal of the History of Ideas 50 (1989), 371-390. 
72 Oddly there are very few studies of Bacon's relationship to the figures he actually mentions such 
as Fracastoro, Telesio, Patrizi, Doni, Bruno, Severinus and Gilbert. 
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system, which are concealed and dispersed in the Baconian corpus 73 In the 
following section I argue that a textual rather than a contextual approach facilitates 
this historiographical shift. 
73 Most scholars would of course claim to read Bacon's texts closely. For example, in chronicling the 
misunderstandings of Bacon's works, Vickers notes that "one major problem - which he [Bacon] 
shares with other philosophers - is that scholars do not pay accurate attention to what the texts 
actually say, " "Francis Bacon and the Progress of Knowledge, " 499. Yet Vickers dismisses Bacon's 
"speculative philosophy" as "a cut-and-paste job ... original only in its synthesis, " "Bacon for Our 
Time, " Early Science and Medicine 9 (2004), 144-162, on 162. This despite the fact that a large 
proportion of Book 2 of Novum organum is (as Rees says) "awash" with matter theory and 
cosmology (OFB, XI, lxxxiv). Rees notes that "It is as if scholars had tacitly agreed to ignore or 
discount what failed to suit their tastes or competence" (OFB, XI, lxxvii). 
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III. Towards a new Bacon historiography 
Lamenting the disappointing uptake of Rees's work on Bacon's substantive natural 
philosophy, John Henry argues that were it not for "the power of prevailing 
historiographies ... Rees's work could and should 
have initiated a new Bacon 
historiography. "74 Here, I want to offer two reasons why there has been so little 
attempt to build on Rees's pioneering work. The first relates to the demands of close 
textual commentary, and the second to the rise in recent decades of a historiography 
that downgrades a search for explanation within the texts themselves and prioritises 
a wide-ranging contextual history. 75 Rees offered an interpretation of Bacon on the 
basis of materials contained in the Baconian corpus. There have been few efforts to 
continue that close reading. 76 The first question then is how to approach the reading 
of Bacon's texts?? 
74 John Henry, review of Francis Bacon, "The Instauratio Magna: Last Writings, " ed. Graham Rees, 
in British Journal for the History of Science 35 (2002), 108-110, on 109-110. 
75 In a recent collection, the editors comment that the old debate between "internalists" and 
"extemalists" over historiographical merits is "dead, " adding that "we are all cultural historians 
now, " J. V. Field and Frank A. L. James, ed., Renaissance and Revolution: Humanists, Scholars, 
Craftsmen and Natural Philosophers in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993), 3. 
76 One of the most thorough readings of Bacon is Antonio Perez-Ramos, Francis Bacon's Idea of 
Science and the Maker's Knowledge Tradition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988). Pdrez-Ramos 
meticulously charts Bacon's philosophical connections to the Aristotelian textbook traditions and to 
an emerging mechanical philosophy. He draws on these traditions to reinterpret crucial Baconian 
concepts such as "form. " However, there is a tendency to lose sight of Baconian themes in a welter of 
influences and connections. 
77 This thesis is not an analysis of Bacon's stylistics or rhetorical theory. For detailed studies on 
Bacon's style and the rhetoric of communication see Karl R Wallace, Francis Bacon on 
Communication and Rhetoric: Or the Art ofApplying Reason to Imagination for the Better Moving of 
the Will (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1943); Brian Vickers, Francis Bacon 
and Renaissance Prose (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968); Lisa Jardine, Francis 
Bacon: Discovery and the Art of Discourse (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974); James 
Stephens, Francis Bacon and the Style of Science (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1975); 
John C. Briggs, Francis Bacon and the Rhetoric of Nature (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1989), who analyses the rich interplay of rhetorical, natural philosophical and 
spiritual themes in the Baconian corpus. 
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Appropriating the title of Bacon's Sylva sylvarum, John Briggs portrays 
current scholarly work on Bacon in apposite Baconian terms. 78 According to Briggs, 
"the trees we see in Bacon scholarship often diminish the forest. "79 This has 
produced 
,a 
"forest of forests" and Briggs highlights "the need to return to [Bacon's] 
texts" because of the tendency to "lose touch with Bacon's particular ends and 
means. "80 Drawing inspiration from another Baconian conceit, Briggs comments on 
the way in which "the reading of Baconian texts resembles the Baconian reading of 
nature"81 Interpreting the labyrinth of nature requires recursive clues; similarly a 
reader of the Baconian corpus seeks directional signs and recursive guidance 
through the maze of Bacon's texts. These clues reside in the texts and, regrettably, 
Bacon offers little overt interpretative assistance. Whether the reader enters the 
labyrinth of the more discursive Advancement of Learning or the gnomic and at 
times impenetrable density of the aphoristic Novum organum, Briggs is clearly 
correct that "Bacon trains his careful readers not to draw conclusions with ease. "82 
Taking his cue from Stanley Fish's interpretation of Bacon's Essays, Briggs depicts 
the reading of a Baconian text as an exercise in self-abnegation. 83 In line with the 
inquiry into nature, proximate and immediate returns from individual texts are 
relinquished and the reader must go "to and fro" within the Baconian corpus 
78 Briggs, Francis Bacon and the Rhetoric of Nature, 2. 
79 ibid. 
80 ibid. 
81 ibid., 13. 
82 ibid., 14. 
83 Stanley E. Fish, Self-consuming Artefacts: The Experience of Seventeenth-Century Literature 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 78-155. 
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continually juxtaposing one text against another until Bacon's meanings or 
intentions are uncovered. 84 
"Uncovering" or "disclosing" are apt terms for describing exegesis of 
Baconian texts. Texts that contain enfolded meanings must be explicated by 
interpreting and reinterpreting passages against insights already gained through a 
recursively increasing degree of familiarity or accessibility. 85 As Briggs says, 
"Ignorant readers hold the key to his [Bacon's] works if they can devote themselves 
to numerous rereadings. "86 Even in his non-aphoristic writings, Bacon's intended 
meanings call for effortful unpacking. 87 The effortlessness of Bacon's style and his 
apparently easy fluidity can carry the unwary reader smoothly over crucial details 
containing important natural philosophical insights. Moreover, these highly 
suggestive passages are often innocuously concealed in incongruous contexts. 88 
Bacon deliberately disperses his intentions, especially in treating materials that 
84 Briggs, Francis Bacon and the Rhetoric of Nature, 14. This approach is at odds with a literary 
theory that denies access to authorial intentions and tends to defer textual meanings to a more general 
discursive cultural ethos. See Julie Robin Solomon, Objectivity in the Making: Francis Bacon and the 
Politics of Inquiry (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998). 
85 Briggs sums up this approach: "What matters here is that one not overlook, in a spirit of 
supposedly sophisticated skepticism, the possibility that Bacon's works are various mirrors of one 
another, some darker than the rest, " Francis Bacon and the Rhetoric of Nature, 12. 
86 Briggs, Francis Bacon and the Rhetoric of Nature, 10. 
87 On Bacon's taxonomy of writing methods and especially his "acroamatic" style see Wallace, 
Francis Bacon on Communication and Rhetoric, 19-20; Stephens, Francis Bacon and the Style of 
Science, 137-139. The acroamatic style is aimed at disciples or initiates - "ad Filios" - and is 
therefore exclusive. On "Acroamatic" see Bacon, DAS, SEH, N, 450, cf. I, 664-665. 
88 For example, in Book 3 of De augmentis Bacon notes how "Democritus and Epicurus, when they 
proclaimed their doctrine of atoms, were tolerated so far by some of the more subtle wits; but when 
they proceeded to assert that the fabric of the universe itself had come together through the fortuitous 
concourse of atoms, without a mind, they were met with universal ridicule" (DAS, SEH, IV, 365, cf. 
I, 571). But at the end of Book 4 of De augmentis, he refers to "Metaphysic" as "itself a part of 
Physic, or the doctrine concerning nature" (DAS, SEH, IV, 404, cf. I, 613). Earlier (in Book 3) he 
stated that "Physic supposes in nature only a being and moving and natural necessity; whereas 
Metaphysic supposes also a mind and idea. For that which I shall say perhaps comes to this" (DAS, 
SEH, IV, 346, cf. I, 550). Bacon has effectively removed mind (final causes) from natural philosophy 
(hence there is no mention of final causes in Novum organum). 
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require caution. 89 In summarising the approach required to read Bacon, Briggs cites 
a contemporary author who explains how to read those authors who "disperse" their 
meamngs: 
If in one place the Author write darkly, in some other place some particular 
thyng maie bee found that ioyned with the other may explicate the 
meanyng, for they disperse their meaning in seuerall places, to the ende 
they would be vnderstode onely of the deligent and painfull reader and not 
of the vnworthie. 90 
Briggs stipulates that Bacon's texts should be approached by searching for "hints of 
the writer's intent placed in disparate passages. "91 
Contrasted with this strategy of moving among the texts of the Baconian 
corpus is the approach taken by Rossi who argues for an evolutionary or 
developmental reading of Bacon. 92 Adopting the view that Bacon changed his mind 
many times, Rossi argues that to discover Bacon's final position it is essential to 
chart apparent changes. An example of this approach can be found in Silvia Manzo's 
wide-ranging study of Baconian matter where she plots Bacon's changing attitudes 
towards atomism 93 In contrast to Rossi and Manzo, my own reading of Bacon has 
89 The traditional trope of dispersed intentions - writing sparsim - is nicely framed in the following 
comment by Agrippa: "You therefore sons of wisdom and learning, search diligently in this book, 
gathering our dispersed intentions, which in divers places we have propounded and what is hid in one 
place we make manifest in another, that it may appear to you wise men. For, for you only have we 
written ... " quoted as the epigraph in Lehrich, The Language of Demons and Angels, iii. In De 
augmentis, Bacon includes a section entitled "doctrina de Occasionibus Sparsis" ("Doctrine 
concerning Scattered Occasions" (DAS, SEH, V, 35, cf. I, 749). Bacon draws his authority from 
Solomon. 
90 R. B[ostocke? ], The difference betwene the ancient phisicke and the Latter phisicke, 1585, lip 
quoted in Briggs, Francis Bacon and the Rhetoric of Nature, 14. Briggs adds that "hints of the 
writer's intent [are] placed in disparate passages, which can be joined together by an interpreter who 
forces himself to disregard a desire for ready clarity in order to decode the whole, " 14. See also 
Bacon's comments on the ancients and reserved doctrine (VT, SEH, III, 248). 
91 Briggs, Francis Bacon and the Rhetoric of Nature, 14. 
92 See Rossi, Francis Bacon: From Magic to Science, 85-96. 
93 Silvia Manzo, "Francis Bacon and Atomism: A Reappraisal, " in Late Medieval and Early Modern 
Corpuscular Matter Theories, ed. Christoph LUthy, John E. Murdoch and William R. Newman 
(Leiden: Brill, 2001). The problems with a developmental view can be seen in Manzo's claim that the 
early Cogitationes de natura rerum offers evidence for Bacon's one-time support for particulate 
atomism. This disregards the important discussion of motion in CDNR. Bacon states: "the business 
[of natural philosophy] is, by proper methods and a course of application suitable to nature, to acquire 
28 
not revealed modifications that impinge on central Baconian themes. On the 
contrary, Bacon tends, from his earliest philosophical writings to the later Novum 
organum and De augmentis, to repeat identical themes, dispersed throughout his 
published and unpublished works, and in a variety of literary genres. At one time 
deploying fable, at another the oracular and didactic style typical of the transmission 
of secret knowledge associated with alchemical or magical elites, at others the 
Solomonic aphoristic adage, and at others the moral and political device of the 
hortatory essay, Bacon returns again and again to the same themes: the powers and 
virtues of matter; the unity of all things (including knowledge); and the need for a 
radical regenerative programme for the mind. 
Furthermore, this heterogeneity of materials and styles can be found in single 
texts, which renders Briggs's reference to the "explicitly scientific works" of Bacon 
meaningless. 94 It would be impossible to delineate the Baconian philosophical 
corpus in this way, more especially (as Briggs fully realises) because of Bacon's 
fusing of fable, theological doctrine, moral, psychological and natural philosophical 
materials in individual works. For example, Briggs concludes his superb study with 
a reading of the thousandth and last observation of Sylva sylvarum where Bacon 
discusses magical fascination and divination, and the potential use of the controlled 
faculty of the imagination to operate on minds via action at a distance 95 Bacon 
explains how this is possible: all human minds "came forth out of one divine 
the power of exciting, restraining, increasing, remitting, multiplying, and calming and stopping any 
motion whatever in a matter susceptible of it; and thereby to preserve, change, and transform bodies 
... For it is most certain that by how much the more simple motions are discovered, by so much will 
the power of man be increased" (CDNR, SEH, V, 426, cf. III, 22). Bacon's emphasis on motion over 
material mimima never alters throughout the Baconian corpus and remains a constant theme in both 
cosmogonical and operative contexts. In the New Atlantis (1626), the Father of Solomon's House 
describes the goal of their foundation as "the knowledge of Causes, and secret motions of things" 
(NA, SEH, III, 156). 
94 Briggs, Francis Bacon and the Rhetoric of Nature, 14. 
95 Briggs, Francis Bacon and the Rhetoric of Nature, 253-254; Bacon, SS, SEH, II, 672; See, SS, 
SEH, II, 654-656 for experiments relating to the power of the imagination. 
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limbus. "96 Briggs comments that Bacon has transformed the old "white magic" into 
a "science of influence" and identifies the power of "influence" with the "rational 
will. "97 This leaves unexplained the natural philosophical basis for the "science of 
influence" which is grounded in action at a distance and the magical concept of 
binding which only makes sense in terms of Bacon's cosmogony. Bacon's account 
of the imagination is entirely consistent with his notion of appetitive matter 98 
Admittedly, Bacon's coherent natural philosophy is difficult to piece 
together from the Baconian corpus. The texts are unfinished and the programme 
itself fragmented and presented piecemeal. Moreover, the philosophical texts do not 
contain systematic treatments of any Baconian themes. 99 Hence exegesis involves a 
tortuous and convoluted exercise in extracting Bacon's enfolded meanings. Briggs is 
correct to characterise Baconian texts as reflections of the enfolded character of 
96 Briggs substitutes the "created from" for "came forth, " Francis Bacon and the Rhetoric of Nature, 
253. The term Umbus refers to a border that surrounds anything -a belt, band, girdle. Bacon's use of 
the term calls to mind his interpretation of the fable of Ccelum. Ccelum signifies "the origin of things" 
and Bacon says, "By Ccelum is meant the concave or circumference [concavum sine ambitum] which 
encloses all matter" (DSV, VI, 723, cf. 649). 
97 Briggs, Francis Bacon and the Rhetoric of Nature, 254. 
98 Briggs is among the very few who have taken seriously this invaluable Baconian text. In a recent 
paper surveying "natural history" in the period of the "Scientific Revolution, " William Ashworth 
states that "Bacon never wrote a natural history ... [the] Sylva Sylvarum is in reality a heterogeneous 
collection of random observations and suggestions for further inquiry, " "Natural History and the 
Emblematic World View, " in Reappraisals of the Scientific Revolution, ed. David C. Lindberg and 
Robert S. Westman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 303-332, on 322. For extensive 
discussion on magical binding see Bruno's De magia and De Vinculis in genere in Cause, Principle 
and Unity, ed. and trans. Robert de Lucca and Richard J. Blackwell (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 103-142,143-176. 
99 This can be seen in efforts to extract the eponymous "Baconian method" from texts that de facto 
provide minimal systemic presentation of "Baconian method. " J. R. Milton, in the opening page of 
his well known paper, "Induction before Hume, " describes Bacon as the "first really systematic 
thinker on induction, " British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 28 (1987), 49-74, on 49. But 
when he gets to Bacon's views on induction, things are not quite so straightforward. Although Milton 
recites Bacon's attack on simple enumerative induction, his account of Bacon's "method of 
exclusion" is treated against a Baconian background of "a considerable body of metaphysics, " 58. 
Milton quite correctly states that there is a "one-to-one relation between the observable natures of 
bodies and the forms which are their causes, " 58. Milton concludes that without this metaphysical 
support, Bacon will suffer his own criticisms of traditional induction; that is to say, without the 
"metaphysics" the "method" is incoherent. On Baconian induction see Perez-Ramos, Francis 
Bacon's Idea of Science, 239-269. 
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Baconian nature; reading and inquiring are perfect analogues. '00 To tease out 
systematically the dispersed interconnections among central themes in Bacon's 
programme requires careful and precise readings of the texts. Attempts to shortcut or 
outmanoeuvre Bacon's labyrinthine dispersals, or to avoid the density of his Latin 
terminology and the need for constant cross-referencing among the full range of his 
works, will be sure to encounter enigmas that confound and bewilder the reader so 
as to make interpretation a seemingly hopeless exercise. 
Much of the fragmentation in the secondary literature and failure to resolve 
Bacon's disconnected texts into a coherent and tenable programme is a hermeneutic 
failure rather than carelessness on Bacon's part, a failure that can only be repaired 
through a change in how commentators read Bacon's works. '°' Nietzsche's apt 
remarks on reading aphoristic writing could equally be applied to the full range of 
Baconian works and are worth citing here: 
People find difficulty with the aphoristic form: this arises from the fact that 
today this form is not taken seriously enough. An aphorism, properly 
stamped and moulded, has not been "deciphered" when it has simply been 
read; rather, one has then to begin its exegesis, for which is required an art 
of exegesis ... To be sure, one thing 
is necessary above all if one is to 
practice reading as an art in this way, something that has been unlearned 
most thoroughly nowadays ... something 
for which one has almost to be a 
cow and in any case not a "modern man": rumination. '02 
100 In 1593, the decade of his earliest literary efforts, Bacon's mother despaired of his enfolded 
writing. In a letter to Anthony Bacon she writes: "I send herein your brother's [Francis's] letter. 
Construe the interpretation. I do not understand his enigmatical folded writing" (LL, VIII, 245). 
101 Rees poses the question "why do most [people] seem to have stopped reading Bacon? " (OFB, XI, 
xxxviii). There are those who maintain that the Baconian project is coherent and systematic. Briggs 
cites Stanley Fish and R. S. Crane who, in Briggs' terms, "argued that the coherence of Bacon's 
complex, life-long project is evident even in the microcosm of his seemingly fragmentary and 
popular Essays, " Francis Bacon and the Rhetoric of Nature, 12. My own study of Baconian magic 
and natural philosophy fully supports this claim and is in agreement with Briggs's claim that 
"Bacon's works are various mirrors of one another, " Francis Bacon and the Rhetoric of Nature, 12. 
102 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. Douglas Smith (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996), 10. Perhaps Bacon would have appreciated Nietzsche's comment that "if this 
text strikes anyone as unintelligible and far from easy listening, the blame, as I see it, does not 
necessarily rest with me, " 9. 
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Given the above caveats on reading Bacon, it is odd that the aphoristic Novum 
organum, a text as enfolded and dense as any of Bacon's writings, should have been 
seized on as a paradigmatic model for Bacon's restorative programme. There are 
very few present-day Bacon scholars who would disagree with Rees's comment that 
"no definitive reconstruction" of Bacon's thought is possible through focusing solely 
on Novum organum. 103 It is not an exaggeration to claim that Novum organum is 
impenetrable unless it is interpreted in the light of other texts in the Baconian 
corpus. Regardless of an increasing tendency to incorporate the full range of 
Bacon's texts, Fulton H. Anderson's comments on De sapientia veterum retain the 
force of the original indictment: 
The work is unquestionably one of the most significant contributions to 
philosophy in the history of English thought. Its almost complete neglect by 
commentators is among the strangest phenomena in the history of 
philosophical exegesis. 1°4 
The focus on Novum organum is partly responsible for a neglect of Bacon's more 
substantive work on natural philosophical themes. In order to correct the imbalance, 
103 Graham Rees, assisted by Christopher Upton, Francis Bacon's Natural Philosophy: A New 
Source. A Transcription of Manuscript Hardwick 72a with Translation and Commentary (Chalfont 
St. Giles: The British Society for the History of Science, 1984), 72. 
104 Anderson, The Philosophy of Francis Bacon, 5. De sapientia veterum was first published in Latin 
in 1609. Spedding included it among the "literary" rather than the "philosophical" writings. Anderson 
was the first to call attention to the unjustified neglect of De sapientia as a source for understanding 
Bacon's philosophy. Much of the discussion of De sapientia has focused on the question of whether 
Bacon really believed that classical mythology was a consciously devised allegorical presentation of 
"ancient wisdom. " Rossi presents a complex account of the alleged stages in the evolution of Bacon's 
attitude towards classical myth, concluding that when Bacon wrote De sapientia he accepted the 
myths as allegorical, Francis Bacon: From Magic to Science, 73-134. Charles Lemmi thinks Bacon 
was in two minds on the subject, The Classic Deities in Bacon: A Study in Mythological Symbolism 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1933), 41-45. Timothy Paterson argues that De sapientia "was 
a deliberate and self-conscious attempt to present Bacon's own thoughts in the guise of a feigned 
recovery of a lost ancient wisdom, " "Bacon's Myth of Orpheus: Power as a Goal of Science in Of the 
Wisdom of the Ancients, " Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy 16 (1989), 427-444, on 
432-433. See also Lawrence Lampert, Nietzsche and Modern Times: A Study of Bacon, Descartes, 
and Nietzsche (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 21-26; Stephens, Francis Bacon and the 
Style of Science, 137-153. 
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Rees suggests that it is the Novum which requires an explanation, not what he calls 
the "speculative philosophy. "' 05 
There are forceful historiographical reasons for my decision to adopt a close 
reading of the Baconian corpus. I am not suggesting that context is unimportant or 
that ideas are free-floating entities possessed of an independence from their societal 
and intellectual backgrounds. However, as the purpose of this thesis is to clarify 
Baconian concepts, I have confined my exposition almost exclusively to the 
Baconian corpus. There is much in Bacon that can be helpfully explicated by 
contextually relevant exposition and excellent work in that vein already exists. 
Moreover, there is plausibility in the contextualist's defence that understanding 
requires a background or at least a dialectical interplay between context and text. 
But in Bacon's case I maintain that the concentration on context, without an 
absolutely clear grasp of central concepts, has misled and misdirected many 
commentators who overlook important and necessary aspects of his philosophy. And 
as much as context informs any reading, there is a tendency to subscribe to what 
Dominick LaCapra calls the "rhetoric of contextualisation": an historiographical 
ruse that can easily preclude the need for a precise understanding, and can serve as 
an excuse for avoiding the rigours of close textual and philological analysis. 106 My 
105 Rees, "Francis Bacon's Biological Ideas: A New Manuscript Source, " in Occult and Scientific 
Mentalities in the Renaissance, ed. Brian Vickers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 
297-314, on 308. 
106 Dominique LaCapra and Steven Kaplan, eds., Modern European Intellectual History: 
Reappraisals and New Perspectives (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), 14. Gordon Leff s 
comments in defence of his reading of Wiliam of Ockham appositely describe my own approach. Leff states, "I have sought to see his [Ockham's] thought whole, in its own terms, not in pedigrees or, 
save in passing, by its subsequent effects, " William of Ockham: The Metamorphosis of Scholastic Discourse (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1975), xiii. Leff goes on to say that a thinker's 
"outlook" ought to be understood before relating it to anything else. Guido Giglioni remarks that "many early modem texts have ceased to talk because their voices have been silenced by a uniform, 
monotonous, and conformist jargon made up of war cries, slogans and catchphrases, " "The Genesis 
of Francis Glisson's Philosophy of Life" (unpubl. Ph. D. diss., Johns Hopkins University, 2002), 2. 
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main objection is to the growing tendency among recent scholars to override the 
scholarly demands of close reading in favour of the current contextualist fashion. '°7 
This raises interesting historiographical and exegetical issues given Bacon's 
own quite substantial dealings both synchronically and diachronically with the 
history of thought. From his acknowledged admiration for the pre-Socratics to his 
wholesale absorption of scholastic and Renaissance views on nature, Bacon 
subverted and appropriated all knowledge as contributions to a single programmatic 
aim, viz., the unification of knowledge. My claim is that the concentration on 
sources (although illuminating) is insufficient and has left much of Bacon's 
philosophy obscure or in some cases untouched. Bacon is fully in control of his 
deployment of sources and they are always strategically governed by his overall 
intentions. Moreover, I have taken seriously Bacon's perception of himself as 
Protopirum (trailblazer). 108 In Bacon's terms, "there is no thought to be taken about 
precedents, for the thing is without precedent. "log This is not to deny that 
interpretation can be enhanced through comparisons: in the case of Baconian matter 
and magic, for example, there is much to be gained from Brunonian comparisons. "" 
But whilst acknowledging the historical functions that context serves, the aim here is 
107 Whilst recognising that strategic thinkers such as Bacon and Descartes are moulded by their 
historical environments, Lampert argues that they create context rather than reflect it, Nietzsche and 
Modern Times, 62. 
108 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 170. 
109 Bacon, DINP, LL, X, 87, cf. SEH, III, 518. 
110 The connections between Brunonian and Baconian concepts require a full examination, especially 
with regard to matter, binding and the emergence of the concept of a law of nature. Richard 
Kennington, in a series of insightful essays on Bacon, remarks that "the concept of a law of nature in 
the seventeenth century, [is a subject] upon which the history of science appears to be remarkably 
silent, " in On Modern Origins: Essays in Early Modern Philosophy, ed. Pamela Kraus and Frank 
Hunt (New York: Lexington Books, 2004), 42. See also Jane Ruby, "The Origins of Scientific 
`Law, "' Journal of the History of Ideas 47 (1986), 341-359; Edgar Zilsel, "The Genesis of the 
Concept of Physical Law, " The Philosophical Review 51 (1942), 245-279; John Henry, "Metaphysics 
and the Origins of Modem Science: Descartes and the Importance of Laws of Nature, " Early Science 
and Medicine 9 (2004), 73-114; Milton, "Laws of Nature, " in The Cambridge History of Seventeenth- 
Century Philosophy, ed. Daniel Garber and Michael Ayers, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), 680-701. 
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to remain focused on Bacon's texts, against which all my interpretations have been 
tested. When Baconian terms such as "nature, " "induction, " "experiment, " or "form" 
are treated independently of Bacon's substantive philosophical background, the 
results often distort rather than extract his intended meaning. 
What emerges from a close reading of the Baconian corpus is the 
inseparability of major themes. In response to Briggs and others who detect 
paradoxes among Baconian themes, I suggest searching for coherence rather than 
reconciling the paradoxical which is often driven more by the commentator's 
perspective than by Bacon's. This is evident in Briggs' incisive concentration on the 
religious and spiritual character of Bacon's project. The ubiquitous presence of 
Solomon, Moses and Paul leads Briggs to construct an historiography of complex 
layerings of paradoxical tensions. " However, when we distinguish the deployment 
of these materials (the use to which they are put in the presentation of Bacon's 
programme) from the goal of his programme, then Bacon's appropriation of an 
inheritance of commonplace materials can be safely distinguished from his ultimate 
goal of transmuting natural bodies to provide a wholly new nature. What is liable to 
be lost in the former exercise is the breadth of Bacon's vision. 112 
111 Many political philosophers do not take Bacon's professed Christianity seriously. For example, 
Jerry Weinberger holds that "Bacon's impiety is enormous, " Science, Faith, and Politics: Francis 
Bacon and the Utopian Roots of the Modern Age: A Commentary on Bacon's Advancement of 
Learning (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), 99. Paterson argues that "belief in the essentially 
Christian inspiration and intention of Baconian science is ... the single greatest contemporary 
obstacle to understanding Bacon's ... political philosophy as a whole, " "On the Role of Christianity in the Political Philosophy of Francis Bacon, " Polity 19 (1987), 421. On the idea that Bacon's "Holy 
War" was directed at theology see Lampert, Nietzsche and Modern Times, 67-69; see also Howard 
White, Peace among the Willows: The Political Philosophy of Francis Bacon (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1968). In a recent paper Briggs expresses doubts about the extent of Bacon's religious 
sincerity, "Bacon's Science and Religion, " in The Cambridge Companion to Bacon, 172-199, esp. 
194,196. 
112 More sceptically, Charles Whitney states that it makes little difference whether Bacon's faith was 
"fervent, mild or non-existent, " what matters is that Bacon's "program of discovery and the way he 
presents it owe something to the continuing vitality of religious images, values, ideas of change, and 
forms of expression, " Francis Bacon and Modernity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 32. 
Thus it is the deployment of Bacon's language and conceptual borrowings that are important in 
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Finally, I have adopted (and adapted it by extension to all Bacon's Latin 
works) G. W. Kitchin's advice to students of Bacon: 
The student will do well first to read all this [Novum organum] rapidly, and 
in the English; so as to obtain a general conception of Bacon's style of 
thinking and of his object: then he may take the Latin Text, (for no 
translation can do justice to it, or stand in its stead); and read it carefully 
and thoughtfully. 113 
Given that Bacon takes great care in his deployment of terms, his texts must be read 
in the original. As Lisa Jardine rightly points out, "translations tend to conceal 
recurrences of some of Bacon's favourite coinages, both within and between these 
works. "4 Recurrences of particular terms function as signposts - enabling the 
reader to navigate the labyrinth of Bacon's philosophy. When these threads are 
traced through the whole range of his works and the relevant passages juxtaposed, a 
coherent programme begins to emerge. In the following chapters I have endeavoured 
to heed Rossi's criticisms of recent Bacon scholarship: 
Perhaps Francis Bacon was right: it is impossible to eradicate all the idols 
from men's minds (IV, 27). Among the idols we have so far been unable to 
eradicate are undoubtedly the following: the propensity not to read the 
original (particularly Latin) texts; the tendency to reduce the philosophies of 
the past to some seemingly brilliant slogans; the construction on the basis of 
these of mythical philosophical portraits. tts 
It is hoped that this thesis goes some way towards righting these wrongs. Current 
conceptions of Bacon's project suffer from ill-imposed historiographical categories. 
I suggest that paying very close attention to the Baconian corpus contributes 
productively towards a more fruitful historiography. 
understanding the substance of his work. For a revisionist alternative to this historiography see 
Stephen A. McKnight, The Religious Foundations of Francis Bacon's Thought (Columbia: 
University of Missouri Press, 2006), 3. 
113 G. W. Kitchin, Novum organum: sive indicia vera de interpretatione natura, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1855), xii. 
114 Lisa Jardine, "Experientia Literata or Novum Organum? The Dilemma of Bacon's Scientific 
Method, " in Francis Bacon's Legacy of Texts: 'The Art of Discovery Grows with Discovery, ' ed. 
William Sessions (New York: AMS Press, 1990), 47-67, on 65, n. 25. 
115 Rossi, "Bacon's Idea of Science, " in The Cambridge Companion to Bacon, 25-46, on 45. Rossi's 
specific target is Peter Urbach's Francis Bacon's Philosophy of Science: An Account and a 
Reappraisal (La Salle: Open Court, 1987). 
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Chapter 2 concentrates on Baconian matter. I introduce several themes that 
aid in understanding Bacon's operational goals. These include the binary concept of 
nature free and nature bound, and the magical notion of "binding. " The term 
"binding" refers to constraints imposed on matter's habitual tendencies (nature free). 
In Bacon's cosmogony it refers to the self-constraint of matter's inordinate power, as 
a condition for the production of organised worlds. It therefore forms the bridge 
between cosmogonical and human productive acts. The concept of nature bound is 
the basis for Bacon's science of magic. 
In Chapter 3, I examine Bacon's strategies for achieving the union of the 
human mind (mens) and matter (res). I argue that Aphorism 1 of Book 1 of Novum 
organum contains an enfolded prescription for the union of res and mens. The route 
to this union is generated by Baconian inquiry. Unless the mind undergoes continual 
realignment with things, systematic transmutation of matter is impossible. I show 
how themes central to inquiry - negativity, exclusion, binding, etc. - reflect Bacon's 
materialist cosmogony. My exposition expands current notions of Baconian method. 
I suggest that inquiry is justifiably characterised as a recursive, or "cybernetic" 
epistemology. 
Chapter 4 highlights the complexity of Baconian experiment and its role in 
furthering the ascent of the mind to forms. Thus it examines the union between res 
and mens as it relates to operation. Baconian experiment has received little scholarly 
attention. This is surprising given Bacon's reputation as its most vociferous early 
modem proponent. I argue that experiment is the clue (or guiding thread) through 
nature's labyrinth. Operating recursively, experiment upholds the connection 
between the mind and things. As a paradigm experimental science, mechanics 
exhibits the productive subtlety of matter's inherent powers. Thus it is an essential 
stage in Baconian inquiry. 
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Chapter 5 investigates Bacon's doctrine of forms. Baconian forms are the 
essential operational means to unlimited transformative power. They are the sine 
qua non of his science of magic. They move the investigator beyond the inquiry into 
what nature does, to what nature can be made to do. I argue that Bacon's cosmogony 
is the interpretative key to his somewhat opaque doctrine of forms. To extract a 
coherent account of Baconian forms from the scattered discussions in Bacon's works 
is demanding. Many scholars have abandoned exposition on the grounds that the 
concept is hopelessly incoherent. I disagree: to render the notion coherent it must be 
placed within his overall speculative system. 
In Chapter 6,1 offer tentative conclusions on Bacon's vision for the universal 
explication of all action - natural, civic and religious - in material terms. Bacon's 
unity of the sciences, I argue, was a recovery of Persian magic, a universal science 
dedicated to exploring the unity of all things and promising power over minds and 
bodies. Discovery of the forms relating to the human sciences of politics, ethics and 
religion would make possible the control and ultimate governance of human 
appetites and passions. I conclude this chapter with a brief examination of Bacon's 
self-presentation to underscore the radical nature of Bacon's synthesis. I also 
highlight commentators' scandalous neglect of his Sylva sylvarum. 
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Chapter 2 
Principles and Origins 
I know not whether this inquiry I speak of concerning the first condition of 
seeds or atoms be not the most useful of all; as being the supreme rule of act 
and power [actus et potentice], and the true moderator [moderatrix] of hope 
and works. I 
In an essay entitled "Bacon's Reform of Nature, " Richard Kennington asks what is 
the origin of "the concept of mastery of nature? "2 His answer leads to a 
consideration of the natural philosophical origin of modernity and its coincidence 
with a reformation in conceptions of nature. More precisely, this transformation in 
the concept of nature was, Kennington says, attended principally by an increasing 
concentration on matter, the rise of the modem notion of scientific law and an 
identification of truth with utility, encapsulated in the marriage of knowledge with 
power. 3 In many such essays, Kennington sets out to demonstrate that "modem 
origins" should be attributed particularly to Bacon and Descartes .4 It is now 
customary to acknowledge that Bacon deserves special consideration in this 
transformation because it was, as Kennington puts it, "he who addressed [these 
1 Bacon, CDNR, SEH, V, 423, cf. III, 18. 
2 Richard Kennington, On Modern Origins: Essays in Early Modern Philosophy, ed. Pamela Kraus 
and Frank Hunt (New York: Lexington Books, 2004), 3. 
3 Kennington, On Modern Origins, 5, argues that the "goal of utility" found in Bacon's Advancement 
of Learning is replaced by "mastery of nature" in Novum organum. On Bacon's concept of law see Chapter 5. Kennington has little to say on the institutional and social reforms associated with the 
burgeoning interest of early modern thinkers in natural philosophy. These do not appear to have formed part of his historical concerns. 
4 Kennington, On Modern Origins, 1. He says "No one doubts that Bacon is the progenitor of Cartesian mastery of nature, " ibid. See also Laurence Lampert, Nietzsche and Modern Times: A Study 
of Bacon, Descartes, and Nietzsche (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 146. 
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issues] not only first but more fully than anyone after. "5 The specific issue addressed 
in this chapter is Baconian matter and its role in Bacon's reform of nature. Very few 
commentators give adequate (or even schematic) attention to Baconian matter and 
its foundational role in the early modem re-conceptions of nature. 6 The specific 
intention of this chapter is to address this oversight: in the absence of an in-depth 
study of Baconian matter, expositions of Bacon's revision of nature and its 
possibilities for human utility rest on insecure foundations. As Graham Rees says, 
"Bacon's natural philosophy cannot be epitomized, simplified, or put in a nutshell. "7 
By giving detailed attention to Bacon's natural philosophy, long-standing 
interpretive disputes over central Baconian themes (hitherto dismissed as incoherent) 
can be resolved. 
Bacon's materialism was not merely a philosophical response to the 
dominant Aristotelian natural philosophy of the schools. It was, I argue, more a 
strategic apologia on the part of matter, an elevation of matter's status to supreme 
power. This constituted a mode of persuasion rather than a detailed philosophical 
engagement with scholasticism. It was intended to effect a general alteration in 
S Kennington, On Modern Origins, 3. 
6I am particularly indebted to Graham Rees' seminal work on Bacon's matter theory. Rees first drew 
attention to this aspect of Bacon's programme in "Francis Bacon's Natural Philosophy" (unpubl. 
Ph. D. diss., University of Birmingham, 1970). See also idem., "Francis Bacon's Semi-Paracelsian 
Cosmology, " Ambix 22 (1975), 81-101; idem., "Francis Bacon's Semi-Paracelsian Cosmology and 
the Great Instauration, " Ambix 22 (1975), 161-173; idem., "Matter Theory: A Unifying Factor in 
Bacon's Natural Philosophy, " Ambix 24 (1977), 110-125; idem., "Atomism and `Subtlety' in Francis 
Bacon's Philosophy, " Annals of Science 37 (1980), 549-57 1. See also Rees' detailed introduction and 
commentary in The Oxford Francis Bacon, ed. Graham Rees and Lisa Jardine, 15 vols. (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1996-), esp. vols. VI and XIII; On Bacon's natural philosophy see Maxwell 
Primack, "Francis Bacon's Philosophy of Nature" (unpubl. Ph. D. diss., Johns Hopkins University, 
1962); idem., "Outline of a Reinterpretation of Francis Bacon's Philosophy, " Journal of the History 
of Philosophy 5 (1962), 123-132. On the foundational role of matter theory in Baconian cosmology 
see Stephen Gaukroger, "The Role of Matter Theory in Baconian and Cartesian Cosmologies, " 
Perspectives on Science 8 (2000), 201-222. For an excellent overview of the controversies 
surrounding the question of Bacon's affiliation to traditional atomist views see Silvia Manzo, 
"Francis Bacon and Atomism: A Reappraisal, " in Late Medieval and Early Modern Corpuscular 
Matter Theories, ed. Christoph Ltlthy, John E. Murdoch, and William R. Newman (Leiden: E. J. 
Brill, 2001), 209-244. 
7Rees, OFB, XI, 560. 
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cultural attitudes. To work with nature - to minister and obey nature as Bacon 
framed it - is ultimately to work with and obey the oracles of matter. 8 Knowledge of 
matter's hidden powers (or motions) is the key to Bacon's Instauration. 9 Without 
this knowledge the Baconian investigator is powerless, lacking answers to nature's 
sphinx-like riddles. The capacity to interpret these is the essential propaedeutic to 
mastery over nature. Hence the Baconian interpreter will hold the key to nature's 
hidden motions. 
Kennington's claim that the goal of mastering nature "determines the 
principles of Bacon's reform of nature" is oddly phrased. '° It is perhaps closer to the 
mark to say that the principles demonstrate that such mastery is possible. However, 
it is true that mastery implies knowledge and knowledge implies mastery. " As 
Bacon puts it, "he who understands his subject is master of his end. "12 This chapter 
explicates this claim at the level of primordial matter. The justification for a re- 
examination of Baconian matter derives from Bacon's self-proclaimed efforts to 
8 See NO, OFB, XI, 64, aphorisms 1 and 3 
9 Spedding rightly argues that Bacon "saw that all the active operations of nature were modes of 
motion, and concluded that if we could thoroughly understand the nature of motion, we should at 
once have the key to her secret processes, and therewithal the command over her powers; which was 
the true end and aim of knowledge, " SEH, III, 624. However, he suggests that "the doctrine of motion 
was ultimately remitted to a subordinate place in the Novum Organum among the Prerogatives of 
Instances, " 514. This is clearly not the case. As Rees points out, "If we read the Abecedarium back 
into Novum organum, the nineteen simple motions considered in the account of the instances of 
wrestling are among the primary objects of the Baconian natural-philosophical enterprise, " OFB, XI, 
560. 
10 Kennington, On Modern Origins, 3. 
11 On the influence of the maker's knowledge tradition on Bacon's programme see Antonio Perez- 
Ramos, Francis Bacon's Idea of Science and the Maker's Knowledge Tradition (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1988), 59. On my reading of Bacon, Perez-Ramos' claim that "The capacity of (re)producing 
Nature's `effects' was perceived as the epistemological guarantee of man's knowledge of the natural 
processes in the external world" is an inversion of the Baconian programme. Baconian magic - the 
production of effects - involves "the Deduction of Forms to Works, " DAS, SEH, V, 121, cf. I, 838. 
On Bacon's doctrine of forms and their role in his science of magic see Chapter 5. Bacon 
distinguishes between works which require knowledge of forms and works which merely require 
knowledge of works (experientia literata). The former "are called Epistemides, that is, daughters of 
knowledge, which do not come into actuality otherwise than through knowledge and pure 
interpretation since they comprise nothing obvious, " my trans., SEH, III, 788. 
12 Bacon, DSV, SEH, VI, 757, cf. 679 
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raise its ontological import. He was strident in his annunciation that matter was the 
key to his reform of natural philosophy. The elevation of matter to plenipotentiary 
(full of powers) status is the natural philosophical foundation of his Great 
Instauration. If matter holds the key to all things possible, then Bacon's all- 
encompassing programme follows logically from its foundational natural 
philosophical principles. While many commentators have remained at the level of 
philosophical or discursive analysis, I argue that it is more fruitful to link the 
Baconian goal of dominion over nature with the intricacies of what was to be the 
very stuff of that reform - the sine qua non of human operative power - an infinitely 
fecund matter which lent itself to human manipulation. Matter, I argue, is at the root 
of the Baconian vision of a natural philosophical society orientated toward "the 
effecting of all things possible" or, as Descartes has it, the production of an "infinity 
of artifices. "13 This chapter explores the ways in which Bacon sought 
programmatically to raise the status of matter to the point where shifting nature from 
its so-called ordinary course seemed possible. 
13 Bacon, NA, SEH, III, 156. See Rend Descartes, Discourse on Method, Optics, Geometry, and Meteorology, trans. Paul J. 0lscamp (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1965), 50. Descartes 
comments that this will follow when we know the "force and action" of "bodies" as "distinctly" as we know "the different skills of our artisans. " 
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I. Bacon's ontology 
A. Baconian matter 
Bacon's most detailed account of primary matter is found in De principiis atque 
originibus secundum fabulas Cupidinis & Cceli. Sive Parmenidis et Telesii 
& 
pracipue Democriti philosophia tractata in fabula de Cupidine. 14 The work 
is, as 
Rees says, "one of Bacon's most inscrutable. "15 According to Rees, "the De 
principiis lacks a context - an introduction perhaps, or a custom-built cabin 
in some 
larger literary vessel. "16 I argue that Bacon provides a context for De principiis 
atque originibus in De augmentis. There he subjoins an appendix to Physic which 
he 
terms "Dogmas of Ancient Philosophers" (Placita Antiquorum Philosophorum). 17 
He says "it will be good to peruse the several differing systems of philosophy, like 
different glosses upon nature; whereof it may be that one is better in one place and 
another in another. "18 Among the ancient philosophers, Bacon mentions Parmenides 
and Democritus. 19 Modem doctrines may also be included, such as "that of Telesius 
of Consentium, who revived the philosophy of Parmenides, and so turned the 
14 Bacon, OFB, VI, 196. DPAO remained unpublished at the time of Bacon's death and Rees 
suggests "it was very probably composed in or just after 1612, " ibid., xxv. 
15 ibid., xxix. 
16 ibid., xxx. 
17 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 357, cf. I, 562. Specifically, Placita Antiquorum Philosophorum is 
appended to the branch of Physic that deals with "nature united or summary. " See also "The New 
World of Sciences, or Desiderata, " where it is listed among the contents of Book III (DAS, SEH, V, 
121, cf. I, 838. 
18 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 359, cf. I, 563. 
19 ibid. 
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weapons of the Peripatetics against themselves. "20 But the philosophies must 
be 
presented "dissected and dismembered" (concisa et dissecta)21 He explains, "when 
a philosophy is entire, it supports itself, and its doctrines give light and strength the 
one to the other; whereas if it be broken, it will seem more strange and dissonant "22 
Much of the inscrutability of De principiis atque originibus derives from this mode 
of delivery. 
The main theme of this work is to establish the principles from which the 
current scheme of nature arises: "We ask what in reality the primary and most 
simple entities are from which the rest are derived. "23 Bacon posits a single 
principle, viz., matter: on this unique and self-sufficient cause all possible states are 
dependent. His account interweaves traditional metaphysical and natural 
philosophical terminology with the ancient myths in what he calls a "philosophy of 
the parable. "24 In particular, he compares and contrasts his reading of the parable 
with the philosophy of Democritus and Telesio. Bacon also deals with the fables of 
Cupid and Coelum in De sapientia veterum and I shall refer to both accounts here 25 
20 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 359, cf. I, 564. 
21 ibid. 
22 ibid. 
23 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 209. 
24 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 203. Bacon makes no distinction between obviously natural philosophical 
works and natural philosophy discussed via the medium of fable. Thus Spedding's and Ellis' neglect 
to include DSV among the philosophical section of the works is puzzling. F. H. Anderson rightly 
protests: "The work is unquestionably one of the most significant contributions to philosophy in the 
history of English thought. Its almost complete neglect by commentators is among the strangest 
phenomena in the history of philosophical exegesis, " The Philosophy of Francis Bacon, 57. Cf. 
Rossi, Francis Bacon: From Magic to Science, trans. Sacha Rabinovitch (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1968), 131. As the bearer of substantive claims, fable is therefore treated here as a bona 
fide vehicle for the transmission of Bacon's philosophical claims. There are neither historiographical 
nor textual reasons for their later separation and it is incumbent on the commentator to acknowledge 
the importance of this genre in Baconian exposition. On Bacon's classical sources see Charles W. 
Lemmi, The Classic Deities in Bacon, 49-61. 
25 DSV was first published in 1609. According to Rees, "the interpretation of the fable of Ccelum is 
not extant in DPAO, but there is a short interpretation in DSV ... where it precedes the interpretation 
of Cupid, " OFB, VI, 417, cf. xxviii-xxxi. Although Bacon does not appear to have much to say about 
Ccelum in DPAO, his discussion of principles allows the astute reader to piece together his account of 
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It ought to be emphasised at this point that the result is an extreme form of 
materialism, notwithstanding that Bacon's matter is appetitive. 26 In De sapientia 
veterum we are told that Cupid - the most ancient of all the Gods - signifies the 
atom and by this figuration Bacon underwrites his debt to Democritus whose atoms 
were eternal but whose cosmic systems (worlds) were transient. As we shall see, 
however, this does not entail that Bacon can be cast in the role of proto-mechanical 
philosopher. 
1. The potency-substratum distinction 
In his explication of the fable of Cupid, Bacon distinguishes between Cupid and his 
power. It should be noted from the outset that the various distinctions that Bacon 
makes do not refer to distinct entities but only to properties of the unique principle 
of matter. Cupid therefore signifies "matter itself, its power [vis] and nature. "27 
Bacon considers matter from two points of view: potency and substratum 28 This 
dual aspect of Bacon's natural philosophy is noted by Rossi: 
origins. Bacon's discussion of the origins of the world cannot be separated from his discussion of 
principles. 
26 On the theological implications of Bacon's concept of matter see Guido Giglioni, "The Darkness 
of Matter and the Light of Nature: Notions of Matter in Bacon and Comenius and their Theological 
Implications, " Acta Comeniana 17 (2003), 9-31; Silvia Alejandra Manzo, "Holy Writ, Mythology, 
and the Foundations of Francis Bacon's Principle of the Constancy of Matter, " Early Science and 
Medicine 4 (1999), 114-126. It is not my purpose here to deal with the theological ramifications of 
Bacon's portrayal of an omnipotent matter. 
27 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 199. 
28 The notion that "this principle, called matter, can be considered in two ways: first, as potency; 
second, as substratum" is found in Giordano Bruno, Cause, Principle and Unity, 65; cf. De la causa, 
principio e uno in Opere di Giordano Bruno e di Tommaso Campanella, ed. A. Guzzo and R. Amerio 
(Milan and Naples: R. Ricciardi, 1956), 369. Benjamin Farrington rightly argues that "If Bacon had a 
philosophical precursor it was ... Bruno, " The Philosophy of Francis Bacon (Liverpool: Liverpool 
University Press, 1964), 27. There is strong evidence that Bacon appropriated many features that are 
peculiarly characteristic of Bruno's matter theory: his notion of the atom; enfolded matter; nature as 
artistic production; the apophatic doctrine of matter; bodies as a union of opposites stabilised by a 
bond (vinculum); and law as a unifying principle. On Bacon and Bruno see Reid Barbour, "Bacon, 
Atomism, and Imposture: The True and the Useful in History, Myth and Theory, " in Francis Bacon 
and the Refiguring of Early Modern Thought: Essays to Commemorate The Advancement of 
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When Bacon identifies simple natures and virtues; when he conceives 
motion as an active virtue corresponding to the appetites and inclinations of 
matter; when he grants to all substances the power of perception, he is 
consistent with his theories of the Cogitationes and of the Cupid fable in De 
sapientia veterum. But when, in the De principiis, he stresses the realistic 
nature of the principles of things, he moves away from the typically 
vitalistic significance he had hitherto assigned to Cupid, and asserts his faith 
in a doctrine of reality based on a geometrico-mechanicist definition of the 
first principles. Only an analysis of Bacon's doctrine of forms could explain 
this coexistence of dynamic and mechanistic conceptions of reality. 29 
I argue that only a detailed analysis of Baconian matter can explain this dual 
perspective: this is a prerequisite to understanding the Baconian doctrine of forms. 
The potency-substratum distinction is a constant feature of Bacon's characterisations 
of matter. The treatment of Bacon's natural philosophy merely from the perspective 
of substratum has given rise to the misleading view that he was a proto-mechanical 
philosopher. 30 Figure 2.1 illustrates how key concepts in Bacon's natural philosophy 
arise out of one or other of these perspectives. Cupid signifies both the atom itself 
(substratum) and its power (potency). The latter aspect refers to "the natural motion 
of the atom ... the original and unique 
force [vis antiquissima et unica] that 
constitutes and fashions all things out of matter. "31 
Learning (1605-2005), ed. Julie Robin Solomon and Catherine Gimelli Martin (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2005), 17-43, on 31-36. More work needs to be done on Bacon's debt to the Italian naturalists. 
29 Rossi, Francis Bacon, 126. See also Ellis' preface to the philosophical works: "In stating the 
doctrine of simple motions, [Bacon] speaks as if all phenomena were to be explained by means of the 
desires and instincts of matter, every portion of which is more or less consciously sentient. But in 
other passages we find what at first appears to be a wholly different view, namely that phenomena are 
to be explained by the site, form, and configuration of atoms or ultimate particles, capable of neither 
desire nor fear, and in all their motions simply fulfilling the primary law impressed on them by 
Providence, " SEH, I, 55. 
30 See Rossi, Francis Bacon, 124-126; Perez-Ramos, Francis Bacon's Idea of Science, esp. 97-105, 
115-132; R. H. Kargon, Atomism in England from Hariot to Newton (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1966), 43-44; M. B. Hesse, "Francis Bacon, " DSB, vol. 1 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 
1970), 372-377; idem., "Francis Bacon's Philosophy of Science, " in Essential Articles for the Study 
of Francis Bacon, ed. Brian Vickers (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1968), 114-139; Charles 
T. Harrison, "Bacon, Hobbes, Boyle and the Ancient Atomists, " Harvard Studies and Notes in 
Philology and Literature 15 (1933), 191-218; Peter Urbach, Francis Bacon's Philosophy of Science 
(La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1987), 72-82; Stephen Gaukroger, Francis Bacon and the 
Transformation of Early-Modern Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 181- 
188. For an alternative treatment of this topic see Graham Rees, "Atomism and `Subtlety' in Francis 
Bacon's Philosophy, " Annals of Science 37 (1980), 549-571; Reid Barbour, "Bacon, Atomism, and 
Imposture: The True and the Useful in History, Myth, and Theory. " 
31 Bacon, DSV, SEH, VI, 729, cf. 655. See also DPAO, OFB, VI, 200. 
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Potency Substratum 
motion / vis / appetite of the atom 
sum of simple motions 1 form 
the great sum 
atom 
schematismus 
the great schematism 
Fig. 2.1. The potency-substratum distinction 
2. Primary matter and the via negativa 
According to the fable, Cupid is "quite without a parent. "32 Bacon identifies "the 
familiar and almost universal trope that parent and child denote cause and effect "33 
On Bacon's reading of the fable, primary matter has no cause - "for nothing came 
before this very thing. "34 Bacon designates matter "the cause of causes, itself 
causeless" (causa causarum, ipso incausabilis). 35 An important corollary follows: if 
matter is causeless then it cannot be known via causes. Traditionally, knowledge 
must be the result of an inquiry into the Aristotelian four causes of generation and 
corruption. Accordingly, in scholastic natural philosophy the pursuit of knowledge 
must terminate in causes. However, if Cupid is represented in the parable as "sine 
causa, " then knowledge of his ultimate nature is not possible in this mode. 36 
Because Cupid figures matter, matter is unknowable in its ultimate essence: "there 
32 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 197. 
33 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 199. Rees notes that "there is no reference to the tropis familiare in what 
Comes says about Cupid, although Comes does mention Cupid in relation to Chaos, " 417. 
34 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 199. 
35 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 198. 
36 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 198. 
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was no efficient or anything prior to it in the order of nature [nec aliquid Naturur 
notius], and consequently neither genus nor form"37 Insofar as matter is 
unknowable, we have reached what Bacon calls "the ultimate force and positive law 
of nature" (ultimam Nature vim & legem positivam). 38 Bacon has transferred the 
traditional via negativa explication of the nature of God to the inaccessible nature of 
materia prima. 39 Thus we can have no knowledge of "this [primary] matter and its 
power [vis] and operation, " even though we have demonstrated its necessary 
existence 40 In Bacon's account "it is a thing positive and beyond rational 
explanation" (res positiva est & Burda) 41 
That matter is sine causa is, Bacon says, "the greatest thing of all. "42 The 
converse of this, the greatest corruption in philosophy, is to search for causes for 
matter: the principles of things must be embraced "as if they were articles of 
experimental faith. "43 This is why Democritus is praised over all other philosophers: 
not only does Democritus set the causal terminus in the atom (matter) but he 
likewise, according to Bacon, utilised the via negativa in discussing the ultimate 
nature of matter: 
37 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 199. 
38 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 198. Bacon identifies matter's appetitive power with the summary law of 
nature. This "highest law of essence and nature ... cuts and passes right through the vicissitudes of 
things, " DPAO, OFB, VI, 201. 
39 Cf. my trans., DIN, SEH, III, 788: "But God is like only to himself, without trope. Therefore 
expect no sufficiency of light from [natural philosophy] for learning about him. " On Bacon's 
apophatic doctrine of matter see Michael McCanles, "The New Science and the Via Negativa: A 
Mystical Source for Bacon's Empiricism, " in Francis Bacon and the Refiguring of Early Modern 
Thought, 45-68; Charles Whitney, "Cupid Hatched by Night: The `Mysteries of Faith' and Bacon's 
Art of Discovery, " in Ineffability: Naming the Unnamable from Dante to Beckett, ed. Peter S. 
Hawkins and Anne Howland Schotter (New York: AMS Press, 1984), 51-64. I deal with Bacon's 
way of inquiry and the via negativa in Chapter 3. 
40 DPAO, OFB, VI, 199. 
41 DPAO, OFB, VI, 199. 
42 DPAO, OFB, VI, 199. 
43 DPAO, OFB, VI, 199. 
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Democritus made the admirable claim that atoms or seeds, and their virtue, 
were quite different from anything subject to the senses, but that they were 
remarkable for being things whose nature was entirely dark and secret 
[cczca & clandestina]. 44 
Like the atoms of Democritus and Lucretius, Bacon's atoms are very different from 
the sensory qualities of things: "atoms are not like fiery sparks, drops of water, 
bubbles of air, specks of dust, nor tiny amounts of spirit or ether. "45 Moreover, they 
cannot be incorporated into the traditional categories of all existents, nor can they be 
described under the usual qualities (for example, the four Aristotelian qualities): 
their form is not "something heavy or light, hot or cold, dense or rare, hard or soft, 
such as are found in larger bodies" 46 Bacon is emphatic that the categories and 
traditional qualities are themselves derived from materia prima, itself not 
describable in these terms. The same negative approach applies to the motion of the 
atom which is likewise incomprehensible: 
Nor, similarly, is the natural motion of the atom either that motion of falling 
bodies which is called natural, or the motion opposite to it (percussion), or 
the motion of expansion and contraction, or of impulse and connection, or 
of the rotation of the heavenly bodies, or any of the other motions of larger 
bodies simply. 47 
According to Bacon, "the parable preserves the heterogeneity and exclusion 
throughout, in both substance [substratum] and motion [potency]. "48 It is at this 
point Bacon claims that the parable philosophy and the philosophy of Democritus 
differ. While Democritus correctly terminates the search for principles in matter, he 
incorrectly gives to the atom the motions of larger bodies (principally the descent of 
the heavy and ascent of the light). In contrast, the parable preserves the 
44 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 201. The phrase "ca; ca & clandestina" is from Lucretius. Bacon cites this 
passage later: "At primordia gignundis in rebus oportet I Naturani clandestinam caecamque adhibere, " 
202. Cf. Lucretius, De rerum natura, I: 778-780. 
45 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 203. 
46 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 199. 
47 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 203. 
48 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 201. 
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heterogeneity of the atom with regard to both substratum and potency. However, 
although as the fountain of all things matter is unknowable, what issues from it is 
knowable and this is the foundation of Bacon's programme to actualise inherent 
possibilities. Bacon contrasts the essential unknowable nature of matter with its 
actions or powers, which are an emanation from it. These emanative powers or 
virtues are the constitutive elements and the origins of all natural bodies. 
Because Bacon is concerned to elevate matter's status from an abstraction to 
an actual being, he argues that actual phenomenal bodies must terminate in an actual 
being possessing all reality in a superlative way. He states: 
a clearly irresistible necessity drives men's thoughts (if they want to be 
consistent) to the atom, which is a true entity [Ens], having matter, form, 
dimension, place, resistance, appetite, motion and emanation. Likewise, 
amid the destruction of all natural bodies, it remains constant and eternal. 
For since the corruptions of the greater bodies are so many and various, it is 
absolutely necessary that that which remains as an unchanging centre 
should be something either potential or extremely small; but it is not 
potential ... Thus are we left with the idea that this immutable thing is 
extremely small 49 
The question of the cause or origin of the atom is regarded by Bacon as a non- 
question in that there is no explanation in terms of causation of that which is 
causeless. However, having reached the limits of the exclusionary account of 
matter's existence (by means of the via negativa), he turns to its positive attributes. 
To facilitate the imagination's grasp of matter as an actual being, he must first 
destroy the traditional scholastic representation of matter as pure potential. He 
depicts pure potential as no more than an abstraction: the argument rests on the 
doubtful ontological status of abstractions. The parable of Cupid also elaborates on 
matter's accessible properties, that is, the properties of primary matter which permit 
the mind to grasp it as an actual being rather than a mere potentiality. Hence the 
parable contributes to Bacon's strategic philosophical narrative. It allows him to 
49 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 253. 
50 
undermine the scholastic abstraction and secure a supreme role for a plenipotentiary 
matter. Having considered the kinds of demonstrations that are "possible with regard 
to primary matter, " he proceeds "to Cupid himself, that is, primary matter, and its 
properties [dotes]: 50 
3. Primary matter and its properties 
In the fable, matter's emergence from primordial darkness to become a distinct 
being with definite qualities is figured by Cupid's birth "from an egg laid by 
Night. "51 The figure of Cupid stands for those properties which are accessible to the 
human mind. There is no ontological difference between matter in the chaos and 
matter in the world system (the great schematism). The appetitive power of primary 
matter in the chaos is such that it spontaneously systematises itself into sustainable 
structures. Bacon is adamant that primary matter (although obscure in its chaotic 
essence) will eventually produce positive being; something which contains the seeds 
of the phenomenal world. The "certain" features of Cupid signify the deepest levels 
of matter: motion, cohesive power and action at a distance. 52 Bacon's admiration for 
Democritus rests on his willingness to reach these ultimate levels. 53 Democritus also 
lends credibility because he "agrees in most things with the authority of the most 
ancient times. 54 
When drawing on the authority of the ancients, Bacon generally favours the 
pre-Socratics who almost all held to a view of active matter: 
50 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 205. 
51 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 197. 
52 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 207. 
53 See Rees, "Atomism and `Subtlety' in Francis Bacon's Philosophy, " Annals of Science, 37 (1980), 
549-571. 
54 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 207. 
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almost all the ancients, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Anaximenes, Heraclitus 
and Democritus, though differing in other respects about primary matter, 
were as one in maintaining that matter was active, had some form and 
imparted its form, and had the principle of motion within itself. Nor would 
it be possible for anyone to think otherwise, unless he wanted to abandon 
experience altogether. Thus all these latter submitted their minds to the 
nature of things [mentem rebus submiserunt]. 55 
In his efforts to elevate matter, Bacon downplays the role of forms and shifts matter 
to centre stage. He argues that forms have gained their superior explanatory role 
because of their appeal to the human intellect. Forms "strike" the intellect more 
"forcibly" than "either matter or action. "56 They are considered to be more "manifest 
and firm" than either of the latter principles which bear connotations of flux and 
process. 57 Consequently matter is made redundant, a mere "fantasy matter" (Materia 
phantastica), void of any potency. Forms contribute the required properties and 
virtues. 58 Obviously Bacon's rejection of form is not a rejection tout court: Plato and 
Aristotle are guilty only of giving "all the best parts" to forms whereas in Bacon's 
account matter has the lead role. 59 
Bacon castigates those who attempt to satisfy the intellect's craving for 
comprehension and distinctness. Through appeals to satisfy the imagination, 
scholastic depictions of pure matter as mere potential have obscured the essential 
property of any element. The first entity must be more real than anything which 
follows from it: 
55 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 209. 
56 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 207. 
57 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 207. 
58 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 206. 
59 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 207. The theatrical imagery is interesting given the leading role of matter. 
On the use of the imagery of drama and actors in a natural philosophical context see Joe Shackleford, 
"Seeds with a Mechanical Purpose: Severinus' Semina and Seventeenth-Century Matter Theory, " in 
Reading the Book of Nature: The Other Side of the Scientific Revolution, ed. Allen G. Debus and Michael T. Walton (Kirksville: Sixteenth Century Journal Publishers, 1998), 15-44, esp. 24-26. 
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The primary entity ought to exist no less really than those that flow from it 
(ex eo fluunt], and in some ways more. For it is self-subsisting 
[Authupostatus], and other things subsist through it 60 
Scholastic matter, Bacon says, is the product of "categories and suchlike dialectical 
notions" involving mere abstractions such as "form and privation. "61 Given the 
discursive origins of this notion of matter, Bacon suggests that we dismiss the 
Aristotelian and Platonic arguments as a whole, rather than engage with them 
piecemeal. We should, he insists, recognise that abstract matter is "the matter of 
disputations, not of the universe"62 In contrast, "One who philosophizes rightly and 
in an orderly manner must dissect nature and not abstract from it. "63 Thus it is not 
philosophical argument that is required but actual engagement with "things 
themselves" (res). 64 
We are gradually being led by Bacon's narrative to see matter as a truly 
independent entity, the only being which has the quality of self-subsistence. If 
matter is a true substance - independent, uncaused and unique - then matter contains 
in seminal form everything which will subsequently emanate from it, including form 
and motion: 
Primary matter [materia prima] is united with the primary form [forma 
prima], and also with the first principle of motion [principio motus primo], 
as we find it ... But the former three things must in no way be torn apart [discerpenda] but only distinguished [distinguenda]. 65 
While Bacon makes a distinction in reason between substratum (matter) and potency 
(form and motion), these two cannot be separated in reality. Bacon further sanctions 
his account of matter by relating it to the opening chapters of Genesis. He glosses 
60 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 209. 
61 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 209. 
62 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 209. 
63 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 209. 
64 On the relationship between res and mens see Chapter 3. 
65 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 209. 
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(some might say distorts) the Creation story as a contribution to matter's eternity: 
"For it is not written that God in the beginning created matter, but that he created the 
Heaven and Earth. "66 This entails that matter was before the beginning and fits well 
with the tenor of the fable. Bacon's cosmogonical account relates that primary 
matter has form but can be formed or unformed "in the whole" (secundum toto) 67 
When primary matter is formed in the whole, there is system; when it is unformed in 
the whole, there is chaos. Cupid (primary matter with form), through his organising 
power, produces system (matter formed in the whole). In Bacon's dense 
formulation, "Chaos [the mass of matter] is formless, Cupid [primary matter] is a 
certain person. "68 This explains why chaos is depicted as "coeval" (coavus) with 
Cupid: chaos is simply the mass of matter prior to the emergence of system 69 
Turning to Genesis again, Bacon notes that before the six days works there was earth 
and water (matter with form) even though "on the whole the mass was unformed. "7° 
In addition to those who have denied definite properties to Cupid, there are 
those who have attempted to clothe him and Bacon also undertakes to explicate the 
ancient systems of those "who get it wrong (but in the opposite way). "71 He rejects 
those who clothe Cupid in forms such as, fire, air and water (he notes that no one has 
suggested earth as a candidate for ultimate principle). These latter principles are not 
irreducible elements and matter itself possesses no discernable form but contains all 
forms. In his account of the four ancient schools, Bacon favours the atomists who 
hold that "the principle of things is one in substance, a principle fixed and 
66 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 211. 
67 My trans., Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 210. 
68 My trans., Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 208. 
69 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 196. 
70 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 211. 
71 Bacon, DPAO, DFB, VI, 211. 
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invariable, but who deduce the diversity of entities from the different magnitudes, 
shapes and positions of that same principle. "72 Bacon's prioritisation of this school 
does not indicate his acceptance and support of a proto-mechanical philosophy. Of 
the four schools discussed, atomism is considered the best in a relative sense. That 
is, it is the best in so far as it depicts Cupid "as he really is, native and naked"73 
Thus it attributes no qualities to matter in its primal being: the atom retains its 
heterogeneity both in terms of material substratum and in terms of potency. Its 
properties bear no resemblance to the properties of larger bodies. In Bacon's view, 
Democritus deserves the title "magus" because he recognised an active primary 
atom which was the source of all forms yet in itself possessed no discernable form. 74 
In Democritus' account, the atom (unclothed primary matter) was the invariable 
principle of things. 
Cupid's naked and natural condition signifies the capacity of primary matter 
to manifest itself clothed in infinite forms while simultaneously retaining its 
essential fixed properties. Erecting a principle on the basis of common sensory 
experience entails the impossibility of explicating how an element with limited 
properties can account for the multifarious changes in nature. How can it both 
generate everything and sustain itself? Currently, he laments, there is no explanation 
of this mode of behaviour: 
They do not find out, indeed they do not even invent anything to explain by 
what appetite or provocation, or by what cause, means or leading, that 
principle of theirs degenerates from itself, and on the other hand recovers 
itself again. 75 
72 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 211. 
73 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 211. 
74 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 204. 
75 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 223. 
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Moreover, bodies do not return to these purported principles. For example, 
"putrefaction itself does not at all reduce things to pure and crude water. "76 Hence 
Bacon holds that "by far the greatest error" of those who clothe Cupid is that "they 
constitute a principle corruptible and mortal. "77 For Bacon, it is a necessary 
condition of an element that all things emerge from it and return to 
it, leaving it 
undiminished and unaffected in its essential nature. We shall see that Baconian 
matter can (in Bacon's view) explain the "diversity of entities": it derives 
from 
matter's inherent and unalterable productive power. 78 
4. Bacon's critique of Bernardino Telesio 
As the full title indicates, De principiis atque originibus contains a lengthy critique 
of Bernardino Telesio's De rerum natura. 79 Bacon acknowledges that "it may 
perhaps hardly seem worth while going to so much trouble to controvert Telesio's 
philosophy. "80 However, he identifies Telesio as "a corrector of certain doctrines 
[Placitorum], and the first of the new philosophers. "81 According to Bacon, Telesio 
has turned the reasoning of the Peripatetics against them. Bacon describes him as 
76 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 223-225. 
77 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 225. 
78 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 211. 
79 According to Rees, "Bacon seems to have used the 1586 edition of De rerum natura, " OFB, VI, 
423. 
80 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 259. 
81 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 259. Bacon adds that he is not concerned "with Telesio as such, but him 
as a restorer [instauratore] of the philosophy of Parmenides, " 259. According to Bacon, "the 
speculation was excellent in Parmenides and Plato (although in them it was but a bare speculation), 
`that all things by a certain scale ascend to unity, " DAS, SEH, IV, 362, cf. I, 567. In Bacon's account, 
the unique principle of matter is a unifying principle - hence he identifies the appetitive power of the 
atom with the summary law of nature. Bacon's forms unify the simple natures: "it is absolutely 
certain that [heat, redness or death] however unlike and foreign to each other, come together [coire] 
in the form or law which governs heat, redness or death ," NO, OFB, XI, 257. On Bacon's doctrine of 
forms see Chapter 5. 
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"better at knocking down than building up" (destruendo quam astruendo melior). 
82 
However, just as the Novum organum comprises a pars destruens designed to purge 
the mind of "received philosophies and doctrines, " so too does Bacon's account 
in 
De principiis atque originibus. 83 Telesio's philosophy supplies this "refutation of 
Theories. "84 Bacon's detailed critique of Telesio's system serves as the launch pad 
for his programme of reform. 
Briefly (following Bacon's reading), the active principles of Telesio are heat 
and cold: matter is an inactive or passive and receptive principle, similar to the 
prime matter of Aristotle. But Telesio's matter (unlike Aristotelian matter) 
has 
actual being and not merely potential being. In Telesio's account, matter 
is the 
corporeal principle of things and heat and cold are incorporeal. Matter supplies 
passive corporeal mass and is subject to both principles. The various qualities are all 
derived from the active powers of heat and cold. Light is a springing forth "of 
dissipated heat, which, multiplied by coming together [coeundo multiplicatus], 
becomes robust and perceptible. "85 Cold gives rise to darkness. Rarity and density 
are "the textures and as it were the webs [telas] of heat and cold" (or the operations 
82 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 224 
83 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 173: "And here too I should draw the destructive part [pars destruens] of my 
Instauration to a close, a part perfected in the three refutations, namely the refutation of Native 
Human Reason left to itself; the refutation of Demonstrations; and the refutation of Theories, or of 
received philosophies and doctrines. " I have discussed Bacon's refutation of demonstrations with 
regard to prima materia; Telesio's philosophy supplies the refutation of theories. 
84 See Jean-Marie Pousseur, "Bacon, a Critic of Telesio, " in Francis Bacon's Legacy of Texts: 'The 
Art of Discovery Grows with Discovery, ' ed. William Sessions (New York: AMS Press, 1990), 105- 
117. Posseur asks, "What new status can [Bacon's] principles assume in the new physics? " 
According to Posseur, "nothing, in the Novum Organum or in the De Augmentis, allows a direct 
answer to that difficult question", 115. I argue that the answer to that question is given in De 
principiis atque originibus. There Bacon raises the ontological status of matter: materia prima is the 
unique principle that gives rise to all the variety of things. See also Karl Schuhmann, "Telesio's 
Concept of Matter, " in Selected Papers on Renaissance Philosophy and on Thomas Hobbes, ed. Piet 
Steenbakkers and Cees Leijenhorst (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004), 99-116. 
85 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 225 
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of heat and cold, with heat thinning and cold thickening). 86 These various 
interactions result in a fourfold division of the two major contrary principles ("for 
heat and cold are the source [tons], the other things emanations"). 87 Telesio's 
"primary connatural qualities, heat, light, tenuity and mobility, and ... the quaternion 
opposed to them" constitute his philosophy of principles (see figure 2.2). 88 In 
Telesio's cosmogony "the seats and stages of the first conjugation are placed in the 
heaven, stars and especially in the Sun, of the second in the Earth. "89 The "four 
coessential and conjugate natures are, " he insists, "always together and inseparable 
[perpetuo concomitantes & inseparabiles]. "90 Hence 
the heaven, from its perfect and complete heat and its highly unfolded 
matter [materia maxime explicata], is very hot, light, rarefied and mobile. 
The Earth, on the contrary, from its complete and unrefracted cold and 
extreme contraction of matter [materia maxime contracta], is very cold, 
dark, dense, utterly immobile and dreads motion exceedingly 91 
This notion of unfolded and contracted matter (with its related tendency to motion or 
rest) will play a crucial role in Bacon's natural philosophy. 
86 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 225-227. 
87 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 227. In Telesio's account the "four coessential and conjugate natures are 
... always together and 
inseparable, " ibid. 
88 On the role of bi-quaternion theory in Bacon's natural philosophy see, Rees, "Francis Bacon's 
Semi-Paracelsian Cosmology, " Ambix 22 (1975), 81-101; idem., "Francis Bacon's Semi-Paracelsian 
Cosmology and the Great Instauration, " Ambix 22 (1975), 161-173; idem., "Matter Theory: A 
Unifying Factor in Bacon's Natural Philosophy, " Ambix 24 (1977), 110-125; idem., OFB, VI, xlii- 
xliv. 
89 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 227. 
90 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 227. 
91 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 227. Bacon subscribes to the view that the earth is "primum frigidum. " In 
SS he notes that this was the opinion of the author of De prima frigido; it was also "the opinion of 
Telesius, who hath renewed the philosophy of Parmenides" (SS, SEH, II, 370). 
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Fig. 2.2. Telesio's bi-quatemion theory 
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Darkness 
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Bacon pays particular attention to Telesio's account of the border between 
the heavens and the earth. This is the Earth's crust, the region of strife and 
mutability where contraries are at war. The above natures 
have the appetite and faculty of constantly generating, multiplying and 
spreading themselves in all directions, of occupying the whole mass of 
matter, of mutually attacking and invading one another, of dislodging and 
ejecting one another from their proper seats and establishing themselves in 
them, and besides of perceiving and apprehending the force [vim] and 
actions of another nature as well as their own and, by means of such 
perception, of moving and adjusting themselves; and from this contest 
every sort of entity, action and virtue is derived 92 
Although Telesio attributes the above appetites to incorporeal natures, Bacon says 
"in some places he seems, though briefly and with hesitation, to assign to matter 
some power [dotis] of its own. "93 According to Bacon, Telesio intimates that matter 
"is neither increased nor diminished by forms and active entities, but consists of a 
universal sum. "94 He also refers the motion of gravity or descent to it and "throws in 
something about the blackness of matter. "95 Telesio then (on Bacon's reading) 
dreams up "the way in which such fruitful and manifold [fcecunda & multiplex] 
92 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 231-233. 
93 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 233. 
94 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 233. 
95 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 233. 
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generation of entities can be induced and brought forth by this wrestling match 
[certamine & lucta]. "96 Each principle "desires, strives and fights wholly to destroy 
the other, and to impress itself and its own nature on matter. "97 Even in situations of 
apparent concord between things, this is no more than "lack of power" (omnino per 
impotentiam). 98 In Telesio's system, there are no "laws of alliance [leges fWderis] or 
concord. "99 According to Telesio, "in virtue and action everything more or less 
comes not from the regulation [moderamine] of the intensive power (which strongly 
desires a certain wholeness) but from the strike and curb [ictu & frceno] of the 
opposite nature"100 There is "absolutely no flag ... under which (as 
in Peripatetic 
doctrine) things look after each other and conspire as if by some treaty 
[concordia]"101 For Telesio, "all generation, and therefore every effect in a natural 
body is accomplished by conquest and subjugation, not by compact or covenant [non 
pacto auf fcedere]. "102 Bacon points out that "This is nothing new, since Aristotle 
also pointed out this very thing in the doctrine of Empedocles, namely that though 
Empedocles had made strife and friendship the efficient principles of things, in his 
explanation of causes he nevertheless almost always uses hostility, as if the other 
principle had slipped his mind. " 03 In contrast, Bacon's system utilises the principles 
of both strife and friendship: the presence of chaos or system is determined by the 
balance of discordia and concordia. 
96 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 233. 
97 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 235. 
98 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 234. 
99 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 235. 
100 My trans., DPAO, OFB, VI, 234. 
101 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 247-249. 
102 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 249. 
103 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 247-249. 
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Bacon subscribes to Telesio's view that "the Quantum of Nature is eternall": 
"the sum of matter remains forever constant, and is not increased or diminished. " 04 
However, Bacon believes that a "formidable mental blunder, and a truly amazing 
one at that" has infected conventional philosophic wisdom - namely, that matter's 
essential nature is passive. '05 To characterise it as "deprived of all active virtue" has, 
he says, in so far as it is an error, no equivalent. '06 He is speaking here specifically 
of the power of resistance, which is ultimately matter's appetitive virtue to maintain 
its being. In Bacon's view this "is no passive virtue but on the contrary by far the 
most powerful of all, completely unconquerable, and as it were nothing but fate and 
necessity [& veluti merumfatum, & necessitas]"107 Telesio's mistake is that 
He acknowledges a certain and definite mass of matter, but is blind to the 
virtue by which it maintains its quantity, and (sunk in the bottomless pit of 
Peripatetic darkness) ranks it as an accessory when it is the most important 
thing of all, shaking one body, moving another, solid and adamantine in 
itself, and that from which decrees of possible and impossible spring with 
inviolable authority [atque unde decreta & possibilis & impossibilis 
emanant authoritate inviolabili]. 108 
Matter's absolute status as universal cause (causa causarum) lies in its 
multiplicative potential: matter hides within its folds the power to bring into being 
all potential worlds. Hence Bacon describes the atom as "the supreme rule of act and 
power [actus et potentice], and the true moderator of hope and works. "109 In its 
generative capacity this enfolded power is explicated in a process which Bacon calls 
the multiplication (multiplicatio) of the power of the atom. 110 Bacon's concept of 
enfolded matter lies at the heart of his cosmogony: "in the atom's body exist the 
104 Bacon, AL, OFB, N, 77; DPAO, OFB, VI, 259. 
105 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 259. 
106 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 259. 
107 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 259-261. 
108 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 261. 
109 Bacon, CDNR, SEH, V, 423, cf. III, 18. 
110 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 200; See also Bacon, DSV, SEH, VI, 655. 
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elements of all bodies, and in the atom's motion and virtue exist 
the beginnings of 
all motions and virtues. " 11 
I 11 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 203. Bruno has the notion of enfolded matter: "Hence, every potency, 
every act which, in the principle, is (so to speak) enfolded [complicatio], united and unique, is 
unfolded [esplicato], dispersed and multiplied in other things, " Cause, Principle and Unity, 66; cf. 
Opere di Giordano Bruno e di Tommaso Campanella, 371. 
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B. Simple motions 
The primordial act of creation entails a process of unfolding the atom's power so 
that it becomes manifold. It is Cupid's appetitive power which draws the primary 
particles together and from the multiplication of this combinative power "all the 
variety of things arises and comes into being [confletur]. "112 Bacon's use here of the 
term conflare is deliberate: it refers to the process of fusing whereby the resulting 
bodies are entirely dissimilar from their primordial constituents: 
For there is no doubt but that the seeds of things, though equal, as soon as 
they have thrown themselves into certain groups and knots [turmas et 
nodos], completely assume the nature of dissimilar bodies, till those groups 
or knots are dissolved. 113 
The virtues (dense/rare, heavy/light, hot/cold etc. ) of larger bodies "are products of 
composition and combination [conflatcc]. "114 It would be a gross mistake to identify 
this process with a mere mechanical configuration of particles. Bacon conceives of 
the groups and knots which emerge as conglomerations of "simple motions" (motus 
simplices) unfolded out of matter's absolute power. "" Hence he speaks of the need 
to understand the "nodi et globi motuü, and how they concurre and how they 
succeed and interchaung. "116 Motions are spun together like threads - they are 
"connected together, complicated, continued, alternated, curbed, and repeated. "117 
The virtues of larger bodies are congeries of simple motions: "Surely as the words or 
terms of all languages, in an immense variety, are composed of a few simple letters, 
112 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 201. 
113 Bacon, CDNR, SEH, V, 422, cf. III, 18. 
114 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 203. 
115 Bacon, ANN, OFB, XIII, 190. 
116 Bacon, Commentarius solutus, LL, XI, 69. 
117 Bacon, ANN, OFB, XIII, 203. 
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so all the actions and powers of things are formed by a few natures and original 
elements of simple motions. "' 18 
Matter, according to Bacon, "is so adorned, prepared and formed that every 
virtue, essence, action and natural motion may be the consequence and emanation of 
it "119 In his cosmogony, all motions and virtues stem from the atom by means of a 
process of unfolding: `Between the boundaries of dense and rare there exists a fold 
in matter [Plica Materice] by which it can curl up and unwind itself [se complicat & 
replicat] without a vacuum. "120 The first unfolding gives rise to what he calls the 
"cardinal virtues. "121 The cardinal virtues of dense/rare, heavy/light, hot/cold, 
tangible/pneumatic and volatile/fixed are listed in Abecedarium nouum natura; and 
depicted as explicationes (unfoldings). 122 The first unfolding of matter gives rise to 
the above primordia of the "schematisms of matter" (schematismi materice). 
Schematism refers to matter conceived from the point of view of substratum - "the 
warp and the woof' of matter; simple motion refers to matter conceived from the 
point of view of potency (see figure 2.1). 123 The simple motions "emanate" 
(emanare) from the schematisms of matter. 124 The antithetic pairs denote polarising 
118 Bacon, CDNR, SEH, V, 426, cf. III, 22 
119 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 209 
120 Bacon, HDR, OFB, XIII, 163. When describing "Motes contractionis, sive hyles minorans 
interius, sive restrictionis" in Commentarius solutus Bacon adds "A 1'Italienne" at the end of the 
sentence, see British Library Add. MS 27278, f. 20". Spedding comments that "This is what the 
letters look likest; but can hardly be what they were meant for, " LL, XI, 71. I have consulted the 
manuscript and it is "A I'Italienne" (in Bacon's hand). This is unsurprising given that Bruno and 
Telesio explain the contraction of matter in terms of a plica materim. 
121 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 472; See also DO, OFB, XI, 38. 
122 My trans., Bacon, ANN, OFB, XIII, 174-176. 
123 Bacon, SS, SEH, II, 619. On Bacon's concept of latent schematism see Chapter 4. See also Rees, 
"Bacon's Philosophy: Some New Sources with Special Reference to the Abecedarium Novum 
Naturae, " in Francis Bacon: terminologia e Fortuna nel XVII secolo, ed. Marta Fattori (Rome: 
Edizioni dell'Ateneo, 1984), 223-244, on 238-244. 
124 Bacon, ANN, OFB, XIII, 202 
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tensions (i. e. opposing simple motions) in cosmological space. 125 The "deepest" 
schematisms of matter are the sulphur/mercury schematisms. 126 Because Bacon 
conceives of dense/rare and sulphur/mercury as polarising tensions which run 
through all cosmological space, he designates dense/rare "Explicatio Alpha" and 
sulphur/mercury "Schematismus Omega. "127 The motions which emanate from the 
sulphur/mercury schematisms determine the primary natures of things listed by 
Bacon as the "oily and watery, fat and crude, inflammable and non-inflammable, 
flamy and airy, stellar and pure ethereal, and finally ... sulphur and mercury. 
"128 
These through further combination give rise to further schematisms - fluid/stable, 
moist/dry, hard/soft, fragile/tensile etc. - which through combination give rise to this 
world (the great schematism). 
The result in phenomenal terms is that ordinary macroscopic bodies are 
nodes of complicated motions which have attained relative stability. There is no 
absolute fixity at any stage of Baconian matter other than the atom which is "a 
principle fixed and invariable. " 129 Bacon's notion of a fixed principle and an ever- 
changing flux of phenomenal being lies at the heart of his matter theory. Robert Ellis 
suggests that 
In the interval between writing this tract [De principffs atque originibus] 
and the Novum Organum Bacon's opinions seem to have undergone some 
change, as he has there [in Novum organum] condemned the atomists for 
asserting the existence of "materia non fluxa; " an obscure phrase, but which 
appears irreconcilable with the expression ... "fixum et invariabile. "130 
125 Compare this with Thomas McEvilley's discussion of Anaximander's ape frön: "the pairs of 
opposites unfold themselves out from it [the infinite] into separate polarities and recombine with one 
another to make the variety of forms, " The Shape of Ancient Thought: Comparative Studies in Greek 
and Indian Philosophies (New York: Allworth Press, 2002), 31-32. 
126 Bacon, ANN, OFB, XIII, 189. 
127 Bacon, ANN, OFB, XIII, 174,191. 
128 Bacon, ANN, OFB, XIII, 191. 
129 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 211. 
130 Ellis, SEH, III, 73. See Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 212. 
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On my reading, Bacon is entirely consistent. Ellis fails to distinguish between 
Bacon's "fixed and invariable" principle of things (the atom) and the endless flux of 
simple motions. Bacon accepts Heraclitus' notion of a process "by which things 
flowed and ebbed [fluerent & refluerent], like the tide, from variety to unity, and 
from unity to variety. "131 Bacon's natural philosophy posits a flux of simple motions 
which has its source in a fixed and unalterable substratum - the "unchanging centre" 
(centrum immutabile). 132 
In Bacon's account, the simple motions continually wrestle with one another 
for ascendancy: 
Some [simple motions] are absolutely invincible; some are stronger than 
others and bind, curb and organise them; some cast themselves further than 
others; some by time and speed steal a march on others; some cherish, 
strengthen, enlarge and speed up others. 133 
According to Bacon, "there is no true rest [Quies] in wholes or parts save in outward 
appearance. " 134 Rather, "that which is thought to be [rest] is the effect of some 
hindrance, prevention and equilibrium of motions. "135 Apparent rest occurs when 
nodes of simple motions are locked in a state of dynamic tension. He compares rest 
to a man who is pinned to the ground in a wrestling match: 
If someone is pinned to the ground in a wrestling bout [luctam], and bound 
hand and foot, or held down otherwise, and yet with all his strength still 
struggles to get up, his resistance [Nixus] is no less because it gets him 
nowhere. 136 
131 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 219. Bacon writes, "It is the flux of matter and the inconstancy of the 
physical body that requires Induction; that thereby it may be fixed, as it were, and allow the 
formation of notions well defined, " LL, XIV, 377. On induction see Chapters 3,4 and 5. 
132 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 252. 
133 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 413-415. 
134 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 417. 
135 Bacon, CDNR, SEH, V, 429, cf. III, 25. 
136 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 417. 
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Bacon takes this notion of a wrestling match from Telesio. 137 The schematisms of 
matter are products of these dynamic tensions. Schematismus is a descriptive term 
for matter which can keep its form because the simple motions are locked in a state 
of dynamic tension. Hence Bacon also denotes the schematisms of matter as the 
"forms of the first class. "138 As mentioned, schematism refers to matter viewed from 
the point of view of substratum. From the point of view of potency, schematisms are 
locked nodes of simple motions. Bacon conceives of these states of dynamic tension 
as "bonds" (vincula). 
When the simple motions are not locked in dynamic tension (i. e. when there 
is no bond) change occurs. Hence Bacon conceives of nature's processes as 
fluctuating "sums of motions" (summte motuum). 139 Corruption, putrefaction, 
growth, alimentation etc. are nodes of motions which lack dynamic stability. Bacon 
also lists conservation as a sum because it too comprises a node of motions, albeit 
with dynamic stability: 
Nowhere do we come across conservation that can keep things unaltered in 
a straightforward way, but we do find one that can retard, blunt, and balance 
motions and changes for the worse with other motions and changes of a 
wholesome kind. 140 
The "great sum" (summa magna) comprises all these lesser sums - in other words, 
all nature's processes. '4' Hence Bacon describes this as "the great sum ... 
concerning the vicissitudes of things. "142 In De Interpretatione Naturae Sententice 
AN, Bacon expresses this same thought when he speaks of "the true, eternal and 
137 However, Bacon's system has a role for consent (see Chapter 5). 
138 Bacon, ANN, OFB, XIII, 191. On the Baconian doctrine of forms see Chapter 5. 
139 Bacon, ANN, OFB, XIII, 202. 
140 Bacon, ANN, OFB, XIII, 207. 
141 Bacon, ANN, OFB, XIII, 220. 
142 Bacon, ANN, OFB, XIII, 220. 
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most simple motions of nature, from whose ordered and most calculated progress 
this infinite variety of both the present age and of every age emerges. "43 
143 My trans., Bacon, DIN, SEH, III, 787. 
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II. Creation ex Chao 
Matter - as the principle from which all things are generated - underpins Bacon's 
discussion of the origins of the world, that is, the current system of things. In the 
beginning there was chaos, "a confused [inconditam] mass or congregation of 
matter. "144 We have seen that Cupid and chaos should not be taken as terms for 
distinct entities. In the beginning there is materia prima and its appetitive power 
(signified by Cupid). The chaos refers to matter's lack of form in toto: in the whole, 
chaos is dark, mysterious and incomprehensible. However, Cupid is a person with 
identifiable characteristics by which Bacon intends that the materia prima has form 
within this chaos. While there is chaos, matter is unformed in toto but there can be 
attempts at worlds. In Bacon's terms, "the agitations and motions of matter produced 
at first imperfect and ill-compacted structures of things, that would not hold 
together, - mere attempts at worlds [imperfectas et male cohcerentes rerum 
compages produxisse, et veluti tentamenta mundorum]. "las The motions of matter 
produced compages which did not cohere and nothing held its form. During this 
time, matter's productive power is unrestrained, hence nothing lasts. Things are 
generated and immediately devoured. For Bacon, chaos refers to a time of 
"continual and transitory changes" in toto. 146 As he puts it, "For so long as in the 
universal frame of matter discord was stronger than concord and prevailed over it, 
144 My trans., Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 199. 
145 Bacon, DSV, SEH, VI, 723, cf. 649. 
146 Bacon, DSV, SEH, VI, 724, cf. 649. 
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there could be no change except of the whole together [mutatio per totum necessario 
facta est, atque in ipsafabrica integrali]. "147 
But there comes a point when concord becomes "powerful and 
predominant. "148 Cupid's "principal and peculiar power [Vis] is effective in uniting 
bodies; and the keys of ether, land and sea were also entrusted to him. "149 Cupid's 
appetitive power gave rise to the Earth, or as Bacon's gloss has it, "in process of 
time a fabric was turned out which could keep its form. " 5° According to Bacon, the 
generation of the Earth marks the establishment of schematism or system: 
The most ancient wisdom set down the Earth next to Chaos, and made it 
first the parent, then the bride of Ccelum, from which union all things have 
sprung. But it is not therefore to be understood that the ancients had ever 
established the Earth as the principle of essence, but as the principle, or 
rather origin, of schematism or system. lst 
Given that chaos represents matter unformed in toto, the first act of order, as a result 
of Cupid's cohering power, is to bring this totality under a primary system. This 
formation of matter in toto, Bacon calls "the great schematism" (schematismus 
magnus). 152 The Earth is described as the parent of Coelum because the generation of 
the Earth is the cause of system. The presence of chaos or system is determined by 
the balance of discordia and concordia. When discordia is prevalent, matter is 
unformed in toto. Upon the formation of the Earth, concordia becomes prevalent. 
The great schematism is a balance of contrary powers, a polarity anchored at both 
ends (dense Earth/rare Heaven). There is a dynamic balance of opposing forces. 
147 Bacon, DSV, SEH, VI, 724, cf. 650. 
148 Bacon, DSV, SEH, VI, 724, cf. 650. 
149 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 197. 
150 Bacon, DSV, SEH, VI, 723, cf. 649. 
151 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 211-213. 
152 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 250. See also ANN, OFB, XIII, 220. 
70 
Bacon suggests the Earth as the anchor of the system must be immobile, otherwise 
"the System comes apart and disperses. "53 
Matter's appetitive power is a source of both concordia and discordia. 
Hence, the fable of Cupid pertains to the "cradle" (cunabula) of nature. '54 Matter has 
a restless desire to change but while concordia has the upper hand, this destructive 
impetus is repressed: 
With regard to the audacity of Pan in challenging Cupid to fight, it refers to 
this, - that matter is not without a certain inclination and appetite to 
dissolve the world and fall back into the ancient chaos; but that the 
overswaying concord of things (which is represented by Cupid or Love) 
restrains its will and effort [malitia et impetus] in that direction and reduces 
it to order. And therefore it is well for man and for the world that in that 
contest Pan was foiled. 155 
The contest between Pan and Cupid refers to that between discordia (Pan) and 
concordia (Cupid). The stability of the world depends upon Cupid's winning this 
fight. The great schematism will be preserved for so long as concordia is dominant. 
Following the establishment of the great schematism when the world became 
"settled in respect of its mass and moving force [vi], " there was a period of lesser 
chaos. '56 The "common bond of the System" constrains matter's destructive 
impulses, binding the great schematism with an adamantine chain: 
The same thing is alluded to in that other circumstance of the catching 
[implicato] of Typhon in a net: because however it be that vast and strange 
swellings (for that is the meaning of Typhon) take place occasionally in 
nature, - whether of the sea, or the clouds, or the earth, or any other body - 
nevertheless all such exuberances and irregularities are by the nature of 
things caught and confined [implicat et coercet] in an inextricable net, and 
bound down as with a chain of adamant [et veluti catena adamantina 
devincit]. 157 
153 Bacon, TC, OFB, VI, 179. 
154 Bacon, DSV, SEH, VI, 655. 
155 Bacon, DSV, SEH, VI, 712-713, cf. 639. 
156 Bacon, DSV, SEH, VI, 724, cf. 650. 
157 Bacon, DSV, SEH, VI, 713, cf. 639-640. 
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The "inextricable net" is "the common bond of the System" (commune vinculum 
Systematis) which binds down the destructive force of matter, preventing the great 
schematism from relapsing into chaos. 158 Bacon suggests that "things settled at last 
into a more durable state of consent and harmonious operation"159 In the end, there 
was "repose" (otium). 160 
Bacon draws attention to "the opinion of Democritus that the world might 
yet relapse into its ancient confusion and intervals of no government. "161 The import 
of the fable of Coelum is, as Bacon says, the eternity of matter and the transience of 
worlds. In De principiis atque originibus he states: 
Were there only one principle of things, it ought to provide a nature equally 
inclined towards the generation of things and to their dissolution. For the 
nature of a principle is that things should resolve themselves into it as 
readily as they should be produced out of it [Tam enim est principii, ut res 
in illud solvantur, quam ut res ex fllo gignantur]. 162 
Bacon has identified Cupid as "the original and unique force" (vis antiquissima et 
unica) and so Cupid must have a tendency both to give birth to things and to 
dissolve things. 163 We have seen that Baconian matter does indeed have "an appetite 
to dissolve" as well as an appetite to procreate. The balance of concordia or 
discordia is the pivot upon which the world turns. 
Once the world has form in toto, "change proceeds part by part only, the total 
fabric remaining entire and undisturbed [inconcussa]. "164 The transition from change 
through the whole to change through the parts constitutes the change from chaos to 
system. In De sapientia veterum, Bacon says Cupid himself "out of chaos begot all 
158 Bacon, TC, OFB, VI, 192. 
159 Bacon, DSV, SEH, VI, 724, cf. 650. 
160 My trans., Bacon, DSV, SEH, VI, 650. 
161 Bacon, DSV, SEH, VI, 724, cf. 650. 
162 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 223. 
163 My trans., Bacon, DSV, SEH, VI, 655. 
164 Bacon, DSV, SEH, VI, 724, cf. 650. 
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things, the gods included. "165 Cupid's appetitive power is eternally present in the 
chaos and matter, "by the power originally given to it" (ex vi primo indita), gathers 
and turns itself into the great schematism. '66 De principiis atque originibus begins 
with the statement that Cupid himself "mingled with Ccelum begat both the gods and 
all things" (cum ccrlo mistus, & Deos & res universas progenuit). '67 Cupid himself 
has the power to fashion all things out of chaos but in order for his generative (rather 
than destructive) power to be expressed, system or schematism is required. Cc lum 
signifies system and the union of Cupid (matter's power) and Cc lum (system) gives 
rise to all things. 168 We will see in Chapter 5 that the artful manipulation of bodies 
involves a recapitulation of the original binding activity of Cupid. 
165 Bacon, DSV, SEH, VI, 729, cf 655. 
166 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 252. 
167 My trans., Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 196. Ellis proposes substituting chao for ccelo and this 
emendation is confirmed by Spedding and Rees (SEH, III, 67,79; OFB, VI, 196). I reject their 
grounds for making this correction. Spedding notes that "this [Ellis's] conjecture is confirmed by the 
corresponding passage in the De Sap. Vet., where for cum cceolo mistus we have ex chao, " SEH, III, 
67, n. 3. In DSV Bacon states: "And himself [Cupid] out of Chaos begot all things, the gods included 
[Ipse autem ex Chao et deos et res universas progenuit]" (DSV, SEH, VI, 729, cf. 655). However, 
Bacon's use of the phrase "mingled with" ("cum ... mistus") 
in DPAO determines that the term chao 
is inappropriate here. It makes sense for Bacon to say that Cupid begot all things ex chao because 
Love is the organising principle. But it does not make sense for him to say that Cupid mingled 
himself cum chao because chaos and Cupid are not distinct entities - chaos merely refers to materia 
prima (Cupid) unformed in toto (DPAO, OFB, VI, 197). Moreover, it is unsurprising that Bacon 
should mention Ceelum in the opening of DPAO which treats of principles and origins "According to 
the Fables OF CUPID AND CtELUM" (DPAO, OFB, VI, 197, emphasis in original). In DSV, the 
fables of Cupid and Ccelum are treated separately. 
168 Interestingly, Barbara Carmen Garner points out that for Natalis Comes (whose Mythologia was 
well known to Bacon), "Creation ... is both ex chao and ex nihilo. Chaos is ordered by divine will 
(Mercury) and brings forth Coelus, who in turn becomes a creator. Coleus brings forth strife and 
friendship, the two forces necessary to generation, and Saturn (Time) is created. Then God intervenes 
directly to bring forth the elements ex nihilo and subsequently various unions take place. The whole 
of this creation, including chaos, is known as Pan or universal nature, " "Francis Bacon, Natalis 
Comes and the Mythological Tradition, " Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 33 (1970), 
264-297, on 267. In Bacon's account, God's intervention is notably lacking. 
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III. Nature free and nature bound 
One termination of the unfolding of matter manifests as the current world, 
haphazardly arrived at and sustained by habit. This is nature "free" (libera), Bacon 
says, "follow[ing] her ordinary course of development [cursu consueto se 
explicans]; as in the heavens, in the animal and vegetable creation, and in the 
general array of the universe. "171 He conceives of nature as rising to a point like a 
pyramid: 
Individuals, which lie at the base of nature, are infinite in number; these are 
collected into Species, which are themselves manifold; the Species rise 
again into Genera; which also by continual gradations are contracted 
[contrahuntur] into more universal generalities, so that at last nature seems 
to end as it were in unity [ut tandem natura tanquam in unum coire 
videatur]. 172 
This unity of nature is the primary impulse or desire of materia prima to cohere, 
giving rise to the infinity of individual things through a process of unfolding. The 
germinal elements of everything that can possibly be are contained in enfolded 
matter. The move from the one to the many, characterised by the pyramidal figure, 
involves a successive constraint on the absolute power of primary matter in so far as 
it is a unity. This move, although a contraction in terms of potency, entails a 
concomitant outward expansion of generative power. We have seen how this 
restraint on matter's potency occurs via a process of binding. The multiple powers of 
matter, already inherent in the unformed chaos, are organised and restrained by 
Cupid's primary quality, viz., love or desire. It becomes Cupid's function, through 
this binding capacity, to maintain a dynamic tension within the great schematism. 
This dynamic tension also pertains to individual bodies where stability is always a 
171 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 295, cf. I, 496. 
172 Bacon, DAS, SEH, N, 321, cf. I, 525. 
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matter of the dominance of some motion (or motions) over others. Putrefaction, for 
example, illustrates how at the local level this tension is altered through an upheaval 
in the internal dynamics among the motions of individual bodies, while at the 
cosmic level the great schematism retains coherence. 
The most significant feature of Bacon's discussion of principles lies in the 
possibility of an "alternative universe ... of things. "173 The cosmogonical process of 
binding the absolute power of matter, the fount of all things, entails that not all 
things are produced. Successive limitations constituting the currentfabrica of nature 
leaves infinite possibilities requiring alternative limitations on matter. It is this 
concept of possibility which marks out Bacon's material monism as distinct from 
other renaissance matter theorists. The point can be brought out more clearly by 
examining once again Bacon's critique of Telesio. His detailed and positive 
exposition of Telesio's system culminates in a crucial departure from it. Telesio 
faltered when he considered the structure of the world "simpliciter. "174 For this 
reason, Bacon calls Telesio's philosophy a "pastoral philosophy" - the result of calm 
consideration on the actual state of things as if the actual state were the only possible 
state. 175 Telesio mistakenly considered the world "as if in idleness. "176 His greatest 
error, says Bacon, is that "he sets up such a system as may seem eternal, and 
supposes neither Chaos nor changes in the great schematism. "177 In the foregoing 
discussion, I have maintained that chaos is central to Bacon's cosmogony because it 
exhibits matter's unrestrained powers. In that condition no system can possibly be 
sustained. Hence a limitation of this primordial power is necessary if matter is to 
173 Bacon, PAH, OFB, XI, 455. 
174 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 250. 
175 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 251. See also AL, OFB, N, 93. 
176 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 251. 
177 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 251. 
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produce any system at all: the current system is not a teleological necessity but only 
one possible state. Telesio considered matter to be ultimate but saw the world in 
terms of finality. In contrast, - Bacon argues that "a person who philosophizes. 
according to the sense alone may assert the eternity of matter but deny the eternity of 
the world as we see it. "178 This is of course Democritus' view and the view which 
Bacon expresses in his interpretation of the fable of Coelum. Telesio's philosophy 
applies only to the ordinary course of nature - the current system of things. The 
powers of matter, Bacon insists, are not fully utilised in this world, leaving a 
remainder of endless possibilities. Bacon is attempting a radical transformation of 
the concept of nature itself. Nature's ordinary course (the current world) represents 
only a single facet of the possible faces which nature could present. This leads to the 
striking tenet that forms the cornerstone of Bacon's programme, namely, that the 
artful manipulation of bodies involves a recapitulation of the original binding 
activity of Cupid. In Bacon's programme, art refers to the shifting of the current 
system out of its habitual course in order to actualise hidden facets of nature. In 
brief, art for Bacon is the operative analogue of the primary cosmogonical 
contraction exercised in Cupid's restraining and binding of matter's absolute 
potency. 
Indications of the hidden facets of nature are evidenced by the occurrence of 
marvels. Hence in The Advancement of Learning Bacon says he wants "a 
substantiall and seuere Collection of the HETEROCLITES, or IRREGVLARS of 
NATVRE" because these are "workes of Nature, which haue a Digression, and 
Deflexion from the ordinary course of Generations, Productions & motions. "179 
These illustrations of deviation are important in his natural history programme 
178 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 251. 
179 Bacon, AL, OFB, IV, 63. 
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because, as he puts it, bordering instances are useful for "leading the intellect from 
what does exist to what may exist. "180 Marvels or "Pretergenerations" are of 
particular interest to Bacon because they demonstrate that matter's powers can come 
into play even in fixed systems. 181 He concludes that marvels are the result of 
"impediments. " 182 These impediments are additional limits, caused by a self-binding 
occurrence in matter's activities, giving rise to unusual manifestations - signs that 
nature has left its customary pathways. In other words, nature acts in such a way as 
to limit its own power. For the Baconian investigator, marvels offer immediate 
sensory confirmation that nature's fecundity extends beyond its ordinary course and 
that the dynamical network of motions is not irrevocably stabilised and is therefore 
capable of further distortion via human operative power. 
However, it is the mechanical arts which indicate the true extent of matter's 
potential. Telesio's account of the world would have been "likely, " Bacon says, if 
nature were considered in isolation, that is, removed from the effects of men and the 
mechanical arts which both "vex matter. "183 A clear example of the connection 
between binding and operative possibility can be seen in Bacon's analogy between 
Proteus' deployment of his unused powers when bound and nature's capacity to 
"transform itself' into new species when vexed. 184 Left to his own devices, the 
pastoral Proteus conforms to Telesio's "pastoral" account: 
180 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 301. 
181 Bacon, PAH, OFB, XI, 454. 
182 Bacon, DGl, OFB, VI, 100. 
183 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 251. 
184 On Bacon's interpretation of the Proteus myth see Newman, Promethean Ambitions, 263-265; 
Peter Pesic, "Wrestling with Proteus: Francis Bacon and the `Torture' of Nature, " Isis 90 (1999), 81- 
94; Briggs, Francis Bacon and the Rhetoric of Nature, 32-40,142-150; Lemmi, The Classic Deities 
in Bacon, 91-98. None of these accounts relate the Proteus myth to Bacon's wider programmatic 
aims, viz., his concept of nature bound as a complement to nature free. 
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Proteus... was herdsman to Neptune [Neptuno pastorem] ... [and] it was his 
custom every day at noon to count his flock of seals then go to sleep. And if 
any one wanted his help in any matter, the only way was first to secure his 
hands with handcuffs, and then to bind him with chains [vinculis 
constringeret]. Whereupon he on his part, in order to get free, would turn 
himself into all manner of strange shapes - fire, water, wild beasts, &c., till 
at last he returned again to his original shape. '85 
In Bacon's philosophical reading of the myth, Proteus unconstrained represents the 
ordinary course of nature, that is, "nature free. " The current world, sustained by 
habit, is signified by Proteus' custom of counting his flock then going to sleep. The 
ordinary course of nature's regularities preserves its otiose state. Bacon's reference 
to Telesio's system as merely a "pastoral" philosophy makes sense because the latter 
focused solely on matter's lazy, habitual course. As Bacon puts it, 
The herd or flock of Proteus, seems to be nothing else than the ordinary 
species of animals, plants, minerals, etc. in which matter may be said to 
diffuse and use itself up; insomuch that having once made up and finished 
those species it seems to sleep and rest [dormire et quiescere] as if its task 
were done; without applying itself or attempting or preparing to make any 
more. And this is what is meant by Proteus counting his herd and then 
going to sleep. '86 
In Telesio's account, matter rests "as if its task were done" and hence the world 
terminates in a finality. In contrast, Bacon suggests that this world, the ordinary 
course of nature, manifests a single aspect of nature's multifaceted possibility. 
Matter's powers are not used up, hence 
If any skilful Servant of Nature shall bring force to bear on matter, and shall 
vex it and drive it to extremities as if with the purpose of reducing it to 
nothing, then will matter (since annihilation or true destruction is not 
possible except by the omnipotence of God) finding itself in these straits, 
turn and transform itself into strange shapes [in miras rerum 
transformationes et effigies se vertit]. 187 
185 Bacon, DSV, SEH, VI, 725, cf. 651. 
186 Bacon, DSV, SEH, VI, 725, cf. 651. 
187 Bacon, DSV, SEH, VI, 726, cf. 652. 
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The eternity of matter implies neither further creation nor destruction of its original 
quantum. It is a fundamental principle of Bacon's vision that this quantum will make 
further use of its hidden powers when vexed or "bound" (constricta). 188 
The significance of the central Baconian concept of nature bound, as a 
complement to nature free, has been utterly overlooked. Nature bound refers to the 
shifting of nature out of its ordinary course. Bacon maintains that nature limits its 
operations so that its manifestations arrange themselves in customary or habitual 
modes of action, leaving other pathways unused. This notion underpins the 
following passage: 
Natural is ... set against artificial; these are potentialities for being but by a 
particular efficient, namely by nature itself or by the hand of man. For it is 
not possible for the majority of artificial bodies to exist except by the hand 
of man [Non enim possibile est vt pleraque artificialium existant nisi per 
manum hominis]. 189 
The precise formulation of Bacon's words is important: the alternative universe that 
he has in mind comprises novel bodies which cannot "exist except by the hand of 
man" (my emphasis). In figure 2.3 the dark grey area on the left represents the 
ordinary species of animals, plants, minerals, etc. - those produced by nature free. 
The light grey area of overlap comprises imitations of nature (imitationes natura) - 
bodies which can be produced both by nature free and by the hand of man (nature 
bound). For example, pure gold can both be found in sands (in which case it belongs 
to the category of naturalia) and be refined by a furnace (in which case it belongs to 
the category of artificialia). Hence, all the bodies represented by the circle on the 
left can exist without human intervention. This is why Bacon says that "it is not 
possible for the majority of artificial bodies to exist except by the hand of man" (my 
188 Bacon, DGI, OFB, VI, 98. 
189 My trans., ANN, OFB, XIII, 218. I have given a literal translation to bring out Bacon's use of the 
partitive genitive. The majority of the class of artificial bodies depend upon man's intervention for 
their existence. Only a small subset of the class of artificial bodies (the imitationes nature) do not depend upon man's intervention. 
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emphasis). There is a small subset of artificial bodies (for example, refined gold, 
artificial rainbows etc. ) which can also come to exist as natural productions without 
human intervention. 190 However, it is the unshaded part of the diagram which Bacon 
is interested in - the large number of artificial bodies which cannot "exist except by 
the hand of man" (my emphasis). Without man's intervention, these bodies will 
never come into being. True nova lie outside of nature's ordinary course - as Bacon 
puts it, "the magnalia of nature generally lie out of the common roads and beaten 
paths. s191 The fact that Bacon considers these bodies to be both great works of 
nature and artificialia is crucial. By paying strict attention to Bacon's formulations, 
disputes over Bacon's stance on the art-nature relationship can be resolved. For 
Bacon, artificial bodies are simply bodies produced by nature bound, that is, nature 
constrained by art. His operative science of magic (Bacon's designation) is a science 
of deviation. This science engages in the systematic production of heteroclites or 
marvels through the precise application of impediments resulting in things which lie 
outside nature's habitual paths. In Novum organum he says, "nature of herself 
190 There is a crucial issue here concerning the status of imitationes naturce in terms of the 
relationship between human knowledge and operative power. Following Perez-Ramos, Newman 
argues that producing such imitations as the artificial rainbow and artificial gold "is the foundation of 
Bacon's famous maker's knowledge, for it is the identity of the natural and the artificial product that 
allows man to certify his knowledge of the former's causes by creating the latter, " (Promethean 
Ambitions, 261). On my reading of Bacon, knowledge of forms is proven only by systematically 
producing nova, "things of the kind which neither the vicissitudes of nature, nor hard experimenting, 
nor pure accident could ever have actualised, or human thought dreamed of' (Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 
203). Although imitations play a crucial role in the Baconian programme, they do not fulfil the 
criterion of true nova. As I discuss in Chapter 5, imitations demonstrate knowledge of material and 
efficient causes: "by the knowledge of Phisicall causes, there cannot faile to followe, many 
indications and designations of new particulars, if men in their speculation will keepe one eye vpon 
vse & practise. But these are but Coastings along the shoare, Premendo littus iniquum" (AL, OFB, IV, 
89; cf. Horace , Od. II. x. 3). According to Bacon, knowledge of material and efficient causes 
"carrieth men in narrow and restrained waies, subiect to many accidents of impediments, imitating 
the ordinarie flexuous courses of Nature. " In contrast, knowledge of forms "doth enfranchise the 
power of Man vnto the greatest libertie, and possibilitie of workes and effects" (AL, OFB, IV, 85). 
For the view that Bacon envisioned man's domination over nature, not imitation of nature, see 
Benjamin Farrington, The Philosophy of Francis Bacon (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 
1964), 27-29. For an alternative reading, see Peter J. Zetterberg, "Echoes of Nature in Salomon's 
House, " JHI43 (1982), 179-193. 
191 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 420, cf. I, 632. 
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supplies these sparingly, but what she may do when her folds have been shaken out 
time will show. "' 92 
Fig. 2.3. The relationship between naturalia and artificialia 
192 Bacon, NO, SEH, IV, 245; cf. OFB, XI, 442. 
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At the level of matter's hidden or occult powers, unused possibility denotes, 
for Bacon, unrealised combinations of motions. The simple motions are "composed, 
decomposed, and composed again in manifold ways. 99193 The production of new 
species depends upon producing new combinations of motions. The more composed 
and decomposed the motions are, the more wonderful the virtues of the body. Hence 
Bacon describes man as the most mixed body: 
It is most true that of all things in the universe man is the most composite 
[omnium rerum quas universum complectitur hominem rem maxime 
compositam esse et decompositam], so that he was not without reason called 
by the ancients the little world. For though the Alchemists, when they 
maintain that there is to be found in man every mineral, every vegetable, 
&c., or something corresponding to them, take the word microcosm in a 
sense too gross and literal, and have so spoiled the elegance and distorted 
the meaning of it, yet that the body of man is of all existing things both the 
most mixed [maxime mistum] and the most organic, remains not the less a 
sober and solid truth. And this is indeed the reason it is capable of such 
wonderful powers and faculties; for the powers of simple bodies, though 
they be certain and rapid, yet being less refracted, broken up, and 
counteracted by mixture, they are few; but abundance and excellence of 
power resides in mixture and composition [virtutis autem copia et 
excellentia in mistura et compositione habitat]. 194 
Through the multiplication of the primary impulse or desire to cohere, matter 
expresses its creative tendency via the combining and recombining of its primordial 
powers. Until all possible combinations have been tried out, matter's potential has 
not been realised. In the creation of the world, Cupid "has very little providence; but 
directs his course, like a blind man groping, by whatever he finds nearest. s195 In 
other words, the primordial powers randomly combine. The ordinary species of 
things were formed when nodes of motions haphazardly fused in dynamic tension. 
Thus it is through "the aggregation and control [dispensatione] of the simple 
motions" that the production of nova is achieved. 196 The creation of new species - 
193 Bacon, CDNR, SEH, V, 426, cf. III, 21. 
194 Bacon, DSV, SEN, VI, 747, cf. 671. 
195 Bacon, DSV, SEH, VI, 731, cf. 656. 
196 Bacon, ANN, OFB, XIII, 203. 
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trivially, as Bacon laments, signified by the term "art" - depends upon reconfiguring 
these nodes of motions. 
Bacon's vision was nothing less than a harnessing of nature's appetitive 
power in order to create nova opera (new works) by discovering new ways of 
binding nature, restricting its inherent power, and thereby causing it to transform 
itself into new schematisms: 
We should investigate those appetites and inclinations of things by which 
all that variety of effects and changes which we see in the works of nature 
and art is made up and brought about [conflatur et emergit]. And we should 
try to enchain Nature, like Proteus; for the right discovery and distinction of 
the kinds of motions are the true bonds of Proteus. For according as 
motions, that is incentives and restraints [incitationum et cohibitionum], can 
be spurred on or tied up [stimuli et nodi adhibentur], so follows conversion 
and transformation of matter itself. 197 
Discovery of the "true bonds of Proteus" - the simple motions - is the key to 
nature's metamorphic potential. For Bacon, art is nothing other than a goading and a 
holding in restraint of sums of motions. The phrase "incentives and restraints" is an 
apt and succinct description of Cupid's appetitive power. Cupid both excites and 
goads whilst restraining and holding back in stabilised structures (schematisms). In 
the artful manipulation of bodies, matter's power is constrained. The simple motions 
are the locus of all power because change supervenes on motion. Hence Bacon 
describes "the transformation [versionis] or metamorphosis of bodies" as "a really 
noble and rare sum [of simple motions] ... a most powerful effect in nature and one 
by which human power is ... raised to the highest degree. "198 The key to matter's 
appetitive power is knowledge of forms - the laws determining matter's 
behaviour. 199 This terminus of knowledge can be seen in the following passage: 
197 Bacon, CDNR, SEH, V, 425, cf. III, 20-21. 
198 Bacon, ANN, OFB, XIII, 209. 
199 Knowledge of consenting bodies requires knowledge of forms. For a detailed treatment of Bacon's doctrine of forms see Chapter S. However, it should be emphasised that a Baconian form is 
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For the principles, fountains, causes, and forms of motions, that is, the 
appetites and passions of every kind of matter, are the proper objects of 
philosophy; and therewithal the impressions or impulses of motions, the 
restraints and reluctations, the passages and obstructions, the alternations 
and mixtures, the circuits and series; in a word, the universal process of 
motions 200 
Although Bacon uses the scholastic term "motion" (motus) to refer to the 
causes of change, he is very clear on how his concept of motion differs from the 
scholastic notion. Bacon's science of magic is nothing less than total understanding 
and control of motions so that it becomes possible 
By proper methods and a course of application suitable to nature [ministerio 
nature convenientia], to acquire the power of exciting, restraining, 
increasing, remitting, multiplying, and calming and stopping any motion 
whatever in a matter susceptible of it; and thereby to preserve, change, and 
transform bodies 201 
The scholastics (in Bacon's view) deal only with observable changes (generation, 
corruption etc. ) and regard these as expressions of motion. In Bacon's account 
phenomenal change is a consequence of sums of motions: these sums of motions are 
conglomerations of simple motions. Cataloguing the observable properties, the end 
points of change, is merely a description of nature's effects. In order to produce 
effects we must deal directly with the simple motions - the fundamental appetites of 
bodies. According to Bacon, the scholastics reflect solely on the "static principles - 
whence [ex quibus] - and not the moving ones - whereby [per quce] - things 
occur. 11202 The former, he argues, refer to measures of change, the latter to the 
process of change itself: 
These things [generation, corruption etc. ], if you examine them more deeply 
and carefully, are the measure of motion, and periods or courses and as it 
not a recipe. For Bacon, a form describes the limitation of nature's power which gives rise to a given 
simple nature. 
200 Bacon, CDNR, SEH, V, 426, cf. III, 21-22. 
201 Bacon, CDNR, SEH, V, 426, cf. III, 22. 
202 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 105 (italics in original). 
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were tasks of motions; not real differences [verse d jerentice]; for they point 
out what has been done, but scarce intimate the manner of doing it 203 
The scholastic "generalities" concerning motion "are nothing but spectres and 
appearances that float and play on the surface of things, as on water. 11204 
In contrast, the object of Bacon's inquiry is knowledge of "the ways and 
means of ... mutations and transformations" of things. 205 The Baconian investigator 
seeks out knowledge of how specific arrangements of matter (schematisms) have 
come about: which simple motions bring about which conjunctions of properties. In 
Bacon's view, knowledge of material configurations without knowledge of "by what 
force [qua vi] or in what manner they come together" is useless. 206 By way of 
illustration he asks, "is a man who knows the simple ingredients of treacle, able for 
certain to make that compound? "207 Principles that tell us merely "of what [ex 
quibus] things are made up [conflentur] and consist" are, he says, "dead 
principles. "208 In Bacon's vivid imagery, we should investigate nature's "living 
faculties and powers, " not her "corpse. "209 We will see in Chapter 5 that Bacon 
identifies form with natura naturans (nature creating)210 The natural philosopher 
"should investigate those appetites and inclinations of things by which [a quibus] all 
that variety of effects and changes ... is made up and brought about [conflatur et 
emergit]. "211 Knowledge of the simple motions which lie at the "root" (radix) of 
203 Bacon, CDNR, SEH, V, 425-426, cf. III, 21. 
204 Bacon, CDNR, SEH, V, 425, cf. III, 20. 
205 Bacon, CDNR, SEH, V, 424, cf. III, 19. 
206 Bacon, CDNR, SEH, V, 424, cf. III, 19. 
207 Bacon, CDNR, SEH, V, 424, cf. III, 20. 
208 Bacon, CDNR, SEH, V, 424, cf. III, 19-20. 
209 Bacon, CDNR, SEH, V, 424, cf. III, 20. 
210 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 200. 
211 Bacon, CDNR, SEH, V, 425, cf. III, 20. 
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manifest properties will permit man to direct change. 212 This is the real import of the 
purported Baconian phrase "knowledge is power. "213 The simple motions and their 
hidden possibilities constitute the material basis of Bacon's programme: "It is most 
certain, " he says, "that by how much the more simple motions are discovered, by so 
much will the power of man be increased ... and strengthened for the production of 
new works [nova opera]. "214 
212 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 356; cf. I, 560. 
213 In NO Bacon says "Human knowledge and power come to the same thing, for ignorance of the 
cause puts the effect beyond reach, " OFB, XI, 65. 
214 Bacon, CDNR, SEH, V, 426, cf. III, 22. Rees notes that "The process of assimilating these [simple 
motions] ... to our knowledge of [Bacon's] philosophy still has some way to go, and ought to come high on the list of suitable cases for further investigation, " OFB, XI, lxxxix. Chapter 5 elaborates on the role of Bacon's doctrine of simple motions in his programme of reform. 
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IV. Conclusion 
In the epigraph to this chapter, Bacon tentatively singles out the inquiry into "the 
first condition of seeds or atoms" as "the most useful of all. " The atom (primary 
matter) is nothing less than "the supreme rule of act and power, and the true 
moderator [moderatrix] of hope and works. " Moderatrix denotes that which rules, 
governs and directs. Bacon could not have chosen a more apt description of 
plenipotentiary matter: the term demonstrates the superlative position to which he 
raises the atom. In his efforts to draw out the potential hidden within nature's folds, 
Bacon's elevation of matter would not only have upset theological orthodoxies - 
there was also, as he points out in Novum organum, an endemic scepticism regarding 
the powers of human cognition and the powers of art. In the preface, he contrasts 
"the arrogance of dogmatism" with "the hopelessness of Acatalepsy. "215 The "more 
ancient of the Greeks, " that is, the pre-Socratics, "wisely steered a middle course" 
between this Scylla and Charybdis. 216 This chapter demonstrates the foundational 
importance Bacon attaches to matter and its properties. The middle course between 
dogmatism and scepticism could not be achieved through philosophical disputation 
but only by strategically leading the mind to grasp the potential contained in matter. 
Bacon's main criticism of Telesio's system illustrates the role that the 
restoration of matter's potency played in Bacon's programme. Although Telesio's 
account of the primordial principles was close to the mark, he made the fatal error of 
treating this universe as the only possible universe. Bacon refers to Telesio's system 
as merely a "pastoral philosophy" - the philosophy of an idle spectator. Bacon is 
215 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 53. 
216 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 53. On Scylla and Charybdis see DSV, SEH, VI, 754-755, cf. 676-677. 
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attempting a radical transformation of the concept of nature itself. Nature's ordinary 
course represents only a single facet of nature's multifaceted potential. It is the 
production of an alternative universe that Bacon's account of principles and origins 
is intended to further. Likewise, Bacon's emphasis on motions rather then ultimate 
material minima was intended to rescue the science of magic and its search for 
occult powers. 
Bacon's critique of Telesio highlights the extreme optimism generated by 
bringing matter into the limelight. In his engagement with Telesio, Bacon notes that 
Telesio "finishes up in despair and wishful thinking"217 He focuses on Telesio's 
lament that "although both the power and amount of heat, and the disposition of 
matter" can be known "grossly and in the round" it remains the case that their "exact 
and precise relations" are "beyond the threshold of human inquiry"218 However, in 
spite of his despair, Telesio "does not stop hoping and praying. "219 Bacon quotes a 
lengthy passage from De rerum natura concluding with Telesio's plea: 
If only people who have the time and better minds, and the chance to 
investigate the nature of things in perfect tranquillity, would find this [the 
powers and gradations of matter] out, so that men may not only get to know 
all but pretty well become masters of all! 220 
This is one of the few places where Bacon quotes an author extensively. Telesio has 
inadvertently summed up the Baconian goal of mastery of nature. Knowledge of the 
true nature of things will lead to dominion over nature. De principlis atque 
originibus strategically elevates matter, persuading the reader that "in these very 
things [the powers and gradations of matter] ... we ... find the very summit of 
217 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 247. 
218 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 247. 
219 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 247. 
220 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 247. 
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human knowledge and power. '221 The source of Bacon's optimism is, I argue, his 
belief in a plenipotentiary matter. 
We have seen that Bacon's portrayal of a plenipotentiary matter necessitated 
an attack on Aristotelian concepts, not solely as a philosophical response, but as a 
strategic move in drawing attention to matter as the unique source of operative 
power. Matter's powers (the simple motions) constitute the raw materials out of 
which he constructs his systematic science of magic. Bacon regarded the study of 
motion in terms of discursive distinctions as futile. The Baconian operator seeks to 
manipulate the simple motions. In Bacon's terms, human power derives from 
nature's reservoir of unused possibility. The dichotomy of nature free and nature 
bound was Bacon's answer to despair, beautifully explicated in the myth of Proteus. 
The cosmogonical fables of Cupid and Ccelum depict nature as an emanation from 
prime matter - nature continues in its ordinary course for so long as the relatively 
stable webs (schematisms) of its cosmological structures can be sustained. This 
cosmic theme also contributes to Bacon's optimism. As we shall see in Chapter 5, 
the creative power of human artifice recapitulates the natural generative processes 
which gave rise to the current order of nature. In brief, Bacon's goal was to access 
the occult storehouse of matter's powers by means of the artful manipulation of 
matter itself - the ground of all possibility. 
221 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 247. 
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Chapter 3 
Res and Mens 
Man, the minister and interpreter of nature, does and understands only as 
much as he has observed, in things or in the mind [re vel mente], concerning 
the order of nature; beyond that he has neither knowledge nor power. ' 
This chapter examines a hitherto neglected area in Baconian commentary, viz., the 
relationship between Bacon's material ontology and the so-called method? Having 
outlined Bacon's conception of matter in Chapter 2, here I argue that Baconian 
matter determines the characteristics of the mind, and the procedures necessary for 
an inquiry into nature. Alongside his radical concept of nature, Bacon proposed a 
regenerative and therapeutic reform of the human mind. This purgative programme 
is intended to curb the mind's unlimited freedom through binding it to "things 
themselves" (ipsissimce res). 3 In its free condition, the mind is spellbound; it fords 
all things - its self-constructions and matter - "as it were enchanted" (incantata). 4 
Baconian purgation is aimed at breaking the spell. 
1 My trans., Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 65 (Book 1, aphorism 1); "Homo Natura; minister, & Interpres, 
tantum facit, & intelligit, quantum de Naturce Ordine, re vel mente, obseruauerit, nec amplfüs scit, 
autpotest, " 64. For a discussion of issues relating to the translation of this aphorism, see Appendix 1, 
endnote 1. For Bacon, res refers to the ipsissimce res, that which is "existens, " "interius" and "in 
ordine ad universum" (NO, OFB, XI, 236). Bacon is not talking about "the observation of the 
external world" in the sense of "things, facts, effects in the Universe" but the essences of things (Cf. 
Kitchin, 8). For other instances of the res-mens pairing see IM, OFB, XI, 2,6; DO, OFB, XI, 36; NO, 
OFB, XI, 270,442; DPAO, OFB, VI, 208; RPh, SEH, III, 583; TPM, SEH, III, 538. 
2 Rees rightly points out that "Bacon never used the term [method] in Novum organum or anywhere 
else, to mean `scientific method, "' OFB, XI, lxxii. According to Rees, "method means rhetorical 
method, " OFB, XIII, 278. See also Lisa Jardine, Francis Bacon: Discovery and the Art of Discourse 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 171-173. 
3 Bacon, IM, OFB, XI, 21. 
4 My trans., Bacon, DIN, SEH, III, 786. 
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Part I considers Bacon's critique of the mind free, his destructive attack on 
"Native Human Reason left to itself. "5 This corresponds to the "pars destruens" of 
his Instauration (Book 1 of Novum organum), with its attendant emphasis on the 
purgation of the mind. 6 In Part H, I examine Bacon's constructive moves for the 
regeneration of the human mind. Section IIA focuses on Bacon's reasons for hope 
and the ontological grounds for the mind's corrigibility. Hope, for Bacon, forms part 
of a network of assumptions, and these are given detailed examination to 
demonstrate further that his conception of matter must be taken in earnest. Section 
IIB deals with the concept of negativity - its role in disciplining the mind, and its 
function in the purgative and governing aspects of inquiry. This analysis continues 
the Baconian conception of matter as unknowable and ties Bacon's purgative 
programme to his appropriation of terms and concepts from via negativa theology. 
The aim of this chapter is to extend Bacon's programmatic vision beyond customary 
concentration on logical reform. It is odd that a single moment in Baconian inquiry, 
namely induction, should have come to designate that programme? Bacon's expose 
of how the unaided mind is unfit for an engagement with things goes far beyond a 
reform in logical technique. 8 
5 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 173 (italics in original). 
6 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 172. Bacon states: "And here too I should draw the destructive part of my 
Instauration to a close, a part perfected in the three refutations, namely the refutation of Native 
Human Reason left to itself; the refutation of Demonstrations; and the refutation of Theories, or of 
received philosophies and doctrines" (NO, OFB, XI, 173). 
7 The literature on Baconian induction and the logical aspects of the method is vast. For a 
comprehensive overview, see Mary Horton, "In Defense of Francis Bacon: A Criticism of the Critics 
of the Inductive Method, " Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 4 (1973), 241-278; Mary 
Hesse, "Francis Bacon's Philosophy of Science, " in Essential Articles for the Study of Francis Bacon, 
ed. Brian Vickers (Connecticut: Archon Books, 1968), 114-139. 
8 Commentators usually address this topic when dealing with Bacon's "refutation of philosophies" 
alongside his doctrine of the idols. Since the literature on these topics is huge, I do not offer an 
overview here. For an historical overview of the doctrine of the idols, see W. H. O'Briant, "The 
Genesis, Definition, and Classification of Bacon's Idols, " Southern Journal of Philosophy 13 (1975): 
347-357. See also Perez Zagorin, "Francis Bacon's Concept of Objectivity and the Idols of the 
Mind, " British Journal for the History of Science 34 (2001), 379-393. 
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Baconian inquiry depends for its success on a constant interplay between 
truth and error - it is essentially a programme of error-correction. In the opening of 
his Instauratio magna, Bacon states that "he knew for a fact that the human intellect 
was the author of its own difficulties. "9 These difficulties prevent the mind's 
"commerce" (commercium) with things, a union that Bacon regards as incomparably 
the greatest of all "earthly" ventures. 10 In his dedication to James I, Bacon highlights 
both the novelty and the ancient lineage of his proposals: "And the things I speak of 
are certainly quite new in their very kind, but are framed on an extremely ancient 
archetype, i. e. the very world itself, and the nature of things and of the mind [Natura 
Rerum & Mentis]"11 These two elements - res and mens - are the only possible 
partners in inquiry. However, before the mind can unite with the "world itself, " it 
must undergo purgative preparation. Our minds, Bacon says, "need healing before 
they can be exercised; the site must be cleared away before it can be built upon. "12 
Bacon's therapeutic goal is nothing less than a total regeneration of the mind 
through a discipline that enforces constant governance and direction. 
Baconian reform begins from the certainty of things and the uncertainty of 
the mind. Bacon discounts claims that certainty is attained through the sine qua non 
of logic (the formal machinery of the mind), whose function is to analyse the 
validity and soundness of argumentative schemes. Furthermore, Bacon considers 
formal systems of demonstration as mere verbal distraction: valid or legitimate 
inquiry should focus on things (res), not discourse (verba). Even as remedial 
9 Bacon, IM, OFB, XI, 3 
10 Bacon, IM, OFB, XI, 3. The opening of Instauratio magna and the corresponding opening 
aphorism of Novum organum state (in a densely enfolded form) the purpose of Novum organum. As 
Rees puts it, these "very brief introductory aphorisms ... crackle like lightning and cut like steel, " OFB, XI, 1. 
11 Bacon, IM, OFB, XI, 7. See A. C. Howell, "Res et Verba: Words and Things, " ELH 13 (1946), 
131-142. 
12 Bacon, RPh, BF, 109, cf. SEH, III, 563 
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devices, Bacon insists that existing dialectical or logical remedies aim only to 
correct discursive errors. 13 To return the focus to things, requires far more than 
verbal piecemeal corrective measures: there must be, as Bacon puts it, "a wholesale 
Instauration of the sciences, arts and all human learning, raised again on proper 
foundations. "14 The proper foundations, as aphorism 1 of Novum organum makes 
clear, are the human mind (mens) and things (res). 15 In proposing a unique route to 
things, Bacon's Instauration demolishes existing methods of certainty; he must 
therefore offer the mind a reassurance of certainty in its inquiry. Thus along with a 
doctrine of error, Bacon also provides a criterion of truth. In Baconian terms, truth is 
not discovered through discursive argumentation but depends on operative 
(experimental) criteria grounded in the production of nova - novel experiences, 
effects and works. 16 The mind accesses truth via Baconian matter and its 
possibilities: certainty derives from operation, not from demonstration. '7 Baconian 
reform repudiates existing criteria of truth because they have divorced themselves 
13 Bacon recognises that the syllogism was intended as a therapeutic contribution to the mind's 
desperate need to prevent "the fluctuations and dizziness [vertigines] of the understanding" generated 
by the bewildering array of things (DAS, SEH, IV, 429, cf. I, 641). However, logic, according to 
Bacon, is an attempt to respond to the symptoms of the mind's illness; it fails to address the cause of 
disease, viz., matter's sheer obscurity and the mind's tendency to anticipate. 
14 Bacon, IM, OFB, XI, 3 (italics in original). 
15 See epigraph, p. 89. 
16 Perez-Ramos discusses Bacon's criterion of truth in terms of "maker's knowledge. " He refers to it 
as a "constructivist criterion of truth" and I will comment on this in Chapter 5. See Perez-Ramos, 
Francis Bacon's Idea of Science and the Maker's Knowledge Tradition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1988), esp. chapter 10,106-108. 
17 In DO Bacon states: "the end set down for this science of mine is not the discovery of arguments 
but of arts; not what agrees with principles but the principles themselves, not probable reasons but 
pointers to works in embryo. And different aims beget different effects. For one aims to beat an 
opponent in debate; the other to bend nature to works [Illic enim aduersarius Disputatione vincitur & 
constringitur; hic Natura, Opere]" (OFB, XI, 29). In my view the final line of this passage has been 
wrongly translated. It should read: "For through the one an opponent is bound and constrained by 
argument; through the other, by nature and action. " The phrase "vincitur & constringitur" occurs in 
Cicero's Tusculan Disputations. For example, "illa pars animi vinciatur et constringatur amicorum 
custodiis, " 2,21,48. According to Lewis and Short, this is "a favorite trope of Cicero; " hence Bacon 
would have had it in mind, A Latin Dictionary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1879), 439-440. Moreover, 
in Roman law the head of the household was obliged to bind and constrain a lunatic of the family. 
Bacon conceives of the method as a means of binding the lunatic mind to nature. 
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from the source (things themselves). I will deal with the criterion of truth in Chapter 
4; here I concentrate on Bacon's doctrine of error. 
The Baconian doctrine of error targets the imagination (phantasia) as the 
principal cause of error. Although the causes of error and delusion run deep, they are 
not incorrigible and Bacon assumes that the mind, protected from impediments 
generated by the imagination, possesses potentially the capacity to interpret nature. 
Interpretation is a natural progression of the understanding, which Bacon contrasts 
with what he calls "anticipation. "18 Bacon aptly describes the haphazard 
interpretations and confident anticipations of the ungoverned mind: 
Take a man who understands only his own vernacular. Put into his hands a 
writing in an unknown tongue. He picks out a few words here and there 
which sound like, or are spelled like, words in his own tongue. With 
complete confidence he jumps to the conclusion that their meaning is the 
same, though as a rule this is very far from true. Then, on the basis of this 
resemblance, he proceeds to guess the sense of the rest of the document 
with great mental exertion and equal licence. 19 
However, the declination into error is through accidental causes only: "all 
Anticipation is but a deflexion or declination by accident. "20 This is an extremely 
important assumption on Bacon's part because otherwise the Baconian assault on 
traditional learning is no different from the sceptical attacks which it also seeks to 
circumvent. Without the belief in the purged mind's fitness for the task, all hope 
would have to be abandoned. 
18 In the preface to Novum organum Bacon states: "Let there then (since it is favourable and fortunate 
for both) be two sources and two dispensations of learning, and likewise two tribes or clans of 
thinkers or philosophers ... [and] let there be one policy for cultivating the sciences but another 
for 
discovering them ... And so that I may be better understood, and make matters more familiar 
by 
giving them names, I have grown used to calling the one policy or way Anticipation of the Mind, the 
other the Interpretation of Nature" (NO, OFB, XI, 57-59). Bacon does not hide his contempt for the 
former when he says, "to those who are better pleased by the former [Anticipation] from haste or the 
concerns of civil life or because they lack the mental capacity to take in and embrace the latter (which 
will necessarily be the case for most people), I hope that they achieve their ambitions in what they are 
doing and get what they are after" (NO, OFB, XI, 59). 
19 Bacon, TPM, BF, 69, cf. SEH, III, 536. 
20 Bacon, VT, SEH, 111,251. 
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According to Bacon, there are only two paths to knowledge. The first way 
"rushes up [advolat] from the sense and particulars to axioms of the highest 
generality, " and from these principles it judges things which are discovered in 
middle axioms21 The problem, as Bacon perceives it, is that our general principles 
(the most general axioms) are based on consensual acceptance of ill formed notions. 
Additionally, while our judgements are deductively obtained, the middle axioms are 
already a product of the known and so nothing new can be discovered in this way. 
22 
The second way (Bacon's way), is to begin from the senses and particulars and step- 
by-step to navigate the middle ground (the source of new knowledge) in an 
"unbroken ascent" arriving finally at general axioms 23 Bacon calls the former the 
"Anticipation of the Mind" and the latter the "Interpretation of Nature. s24 On a 
superficial reading, it is easy to identify the latter with current notions of eliminative 
induction. But much more needs to be incorporated into a discussion of the nature of 
Baconian inquiry. Michel Malherbe's superb reading connects Bacon's "critique of 
logic" with his reform of human nature. 25 While Malherbe offers an account of 
21 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 71 
22 Bacon claims that the syllogism is not a method of "invention" but only of "judgment" (DAS, SEH, 
IV, 428-429, cf. I, 640-641). These terms constitute the main divisions of renaissance dialectical 
theory and are closely related to the three divisions in rhetorical theory - invention, judgement and 
disposition. Bacon's inductive approach combines invention and judgement: to discover (invent) the 
thing is to judge and one cannot judge without finding. See Michel Malherbe, "Bacon's Method of 
Science, " in The Cambridge Companion to Bacon, ed. Markuu Peltonen (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 75-98, esp. 79-81. Perez-Ramos provides a concise account of the syllogistic 
notion of "middle terms. " The middle term is "the one linking the terms of the conclusion to a term in 
both premises, " Francis Bacon's Idea of Science, 118. For Bacon's criticisms of the use of middle 
terms see DO, OFB, XI, 31. 
23 Bacon's attack on the Aristotelian logic concentrates on the leap from particulars to principles 
without traversing the middle ground. The inductive programme is designed to establish the 
intermediate steps by focusing on "middle axioms" (NO, OFB, XI, 71,161). 
24 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 59 (italics in original). See n. 18. 
25 I am indebted to Malherbe's brilliant discussion of Baconian logic. Malherbe refers to Bacon's 
"altogether other ambition" than that of Aristotelian logic, viz., "of renewing, from its roots, human 
nature itself, " "Bacon's Critique of Logic, " in Francis Bacon's Legacy of Texts: 'the Art of Discovery 
Grows with Discovery, ' ed. William Sessions (New York: AMS Press, 1990), 69-87, on 69; See also, 
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Bacon's formal reasons for the abandonment of Aristotelian logic, his discussion of 
the logical aspects of Baconian method takes seriously the reformation of the mind. 
He also emphasises that comparisons between the "old logic" and the "new" are 
made all the more problematic given that Bacon considered his method and the 
method of the Aristotelians to be incompatible due to the "radical originality" of his 
reforms26 
Whatever position is taken on Baconian induction, it is often forgotten that 
Bacon identifies the process of induction with the natural capacities of the mind, 
which utilises a gathering and distilling procedure in its everyday encounter with 
things. According to Bacon, "the mind does of herself by nature manage and act an 
induction much better than logicians [contemporary Aristotelian logicians] describe 
it. "27 Bacon takes this natural capacity as the basis from which-the declination of the 
mind originates, partly through the mind's impositions and partly through the 
bewildering display of matter's fecundity. The restoration of a natural logic of 
induction is best explained by locating it within Bacon's conception of the whole 
process of inquiry. As Bacon nowhere provides adequate discussion of what his 
logic is, and on the grounds that Baconian inquiry not only exposes error but utilises 
it as a positive governing procedure, I have chosen to label Baconian inquiry a 
"cybernetic" epistemology. 28 
idem., "Bacon's Method of Science, " in The Cambridge Companion to Bacon, ed. Markuu Peltonen 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 75-98. 
26 Malherbe, "Bacon's Critique of Logic, " 69. 
27 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 410, cf. I, 620. 
28 This is given by the term's etymology - from the Greek Kvßspvr T% (kybernetes, steersman, 
governor, pilot, or rudder - the same root as government). Bacon's feedback strategy cannot be 
predetermined but is responsive to specific contexts. This, according to Bacon, is what is absent in 
traditional systems of dialectic. For this reason, commentators should be cautious in translating 
Baconian inquiry into more familiar but ill fitting formalised or methodical moulds. The classical 
sceptical notion of "zetetic inquiry" is more appropriate and closer to Baconian inquisitional 
procedures than modem conceptions of eliminative induction. Given that Baconian inquiry is 
heuristic, it could be appropriately named a "zetetic heuristic. " There are many classical sources for 
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Bacon's way of inquiry is lengthy, convoluted and above all recursive: what 
Bacon envisages is a constant zigzagging between the purified mind and things 
(operation on nature). In contrast to a typical axiomatic system, there is no linear 
progression from a minimal set of self-evident axioms and definitions to certain or 
even highly probable propositions. 29 Baconian inquiry is guided by dependable 
markers or guidelines that offer continual assurances that the inquirer is on the right 
path. If such markers cease, one has strayed from the path. Because at any juncture 
error and misdirection is possible, these signs compensate in the cybernetic sense of 
correcting through a feedback system. Bacon's way of inquiry "fixes its gaze not 
only on the motion and discourse of the mind (as the common logic does) but also 
on the nature of things. "30. Bacon's winding way mirrors nature's labyrinthine 
windings: 
to the human intellect reflecting on it, the fabric of the universe looks in its 
construction like a labyrinth, where we find everywhere so many blind 
alleys, such deceptions and misleading signs and such oblique and intricate 
convolutions and knots of nature 31 
Baconian inquiry employs a feedback method of cybernetic control that operates on 
the principle of continual approximation. Nature's pathways are convoluted, hence 
there is no direct route to her hidden powers (res). Given that the term "cybernetic" 
denotes recursive governance, and in view of its ancient provenance, I thought it 
appropriate to Baconian inquiry. 
the term "cybernetic. " For Greek sources, see Homer, Odyssey, Bk. 11, line 10; Sophocles, Oedipus 
Tyrannus, 922; Euripides, Suppliants, 879; Aeschylus, Suppliant Women, 769; Plato, Gorgias, 51 Id, 
where he speaks of the "steersman of the soul"; Aristotle, Politics, 1279a. For the Latin equivalent 
gubernator, see Caesar, De bello civili, 1,58,1; Cicero, Epistuke ad familiares, 2,6; Suetonius, De 
vita Caesarius, 10,4; Plautus, Miles gloriosus, 4,4,40. This list is found in Flo Conway and Jim 
Siegelman, Dark Hero of the Information Age: In Search of Norbert Wiener, the Father of Cybernetics (New York: Basic Books, 2005) 372-373. 
29 The standard work on method is N. W. Gilbert, Renaissance Concepts of Method (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960). 
30 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 191. 
31 Bacon, IM, OFB, XI, 18. 
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What are the grounds for Bacon's optimism? For Bacon, the goal is 
attainable because inquiry takes for granted consent between the senses and the 
hidden causes of phenomenal traits (or qualities) in matter. The process of exclusion 
involves a narrowing of the range within which the target can be found. 32 Because 
there are no direct routes through nature's winding labyrinth, the Baconian inquirer 
requires continual signs which are given more by error and negative instances than 
by successes. As Bacon puts it, "wherever a case is established of negation, 
privation, or exclusion, there is some light given towards forms. "33 These negative 
instances are fed back into an interpretative loop whose output (in the form of 
axioms) provides further operative guidance, encouragement and direction. This 
error-correcting and self-targeting system of inquiry is the basis for Bacon's 
optimism. The senses and the hidden causes of qualities (the forms and schematisms 
of matter) are already engaged - experience testifies to that union. For Bacon, 
declination into error is merely an accident. The legitimate inquiry is an Organon 
precisely because it is an instrument of self-governance, in the way a geometer's 
compass continually corrects the wavering and uncertain movements of the hand. 
The several themes examined in this chapter uncover the rationale behind 
Baconian inquiry. The reasons for binding the mind to things are twofold and derive 
not only from the mind's tendency to error but from Bacon's materialism. Bacon 
asserts that the need for governance comes "not just from the recesses of the mind 
but from the very innards of nature" (non tantüm ex Mentis penetralibus, sed etiam 
32 Ellis unwittingly describes the cybernetic nature of Baconian inquiry when he states: "And this 
process [of exclusion] when carried far enough will of necessity lead us to the truth; and meanwhile 
every step we take is known to be an approximation towards it. Ordinary induction is a tentative 
process, because we chase our quarry over an open country; here it is confined within definite limits, 
and these limits become as we advance continually narrower and narrower" (SEH, I, 35). 
33 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 419, cf. I, 631. 
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ex Naturae visceribus). 34 Bacon's restored science of magic constrains nature's 
uncontrolled and unstructured power. This extends to the human mind: the source of 
error is the uncontrolled power of the imagination. Bacon describes the unpurified 
mind as driven by a "mad impulse" (malesanus impetus) 35 Legitimate inquiry 
applies appropriate restraints, binding and weighting down the mind's imaginative 
leaps to protect it from its fascination with idols and pure discursivity. Baconian 
inquiry provides the thread (filum) which guides "the frail and crippled faculty of 
human intellect ... through a labyrinth. "36 Its sole purpose is to "lead [men] to the 
things themselves [ad res ipsas] "37 
Rather than focusing on eliminative induction, I offer a reinterpretation of 
the Baconian method as the investigative instrument for overcoming the separation 
of res and mens. Graham Rees has drawn attention to what appears to be a 
"contradiction between the speculative and methodological" aspects of Bacon's 
programme 38 Rees correctly inverts the traditional emphasis and suggests "that it is 
the existence of the method rather than the speculative philosophy that needs 
explaining. "39 He also proposes that the problem of how matter and method are 
linked in Bacon's programme, which "has so far proved singularly resistant to 
treatment, " could prove tractable if the questions were correctly framed 40 This 
chapter attempts to lay the necessary groundwork for answering some of Rees' 
34 Bacon, DO, OFB, XI, 32. 
35 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 55. 
36 Bacon, PhU, OFB, VI, 5-7. 
37 Bacon, IM, OFB, XI, 21. 
38 Rees, "Matter Theory: A Unifying Factor in Francis Bacon's Natural Philosophy? " Ambix 24 
(1977), 110-125, on 121. 
39 Rees, "Francis Bacon's Biological Ideas: A New Manuscript Source, " in Occult and Scientific Mentalities in the Renaissance ed. Brian Vickers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 
297-314, on 308. 
40 ibid. 
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questions: I concur with Rees that the prioritisation of method over matter has 
seriously misled commentary thus far. Chapter 4 will examine in more detail 
Bacon's concept of experiment as the operative means to govern and maintain the 
union of res and mens. 
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I. The mind free: the separation of res and mens 
The cognitive goal of Bacon's legitimate inquiry is knowledge of "the real dividing 
lines of nature" (veras Sectiones Naturce) 41 Bacon cites the well-known passage 
from Plato's Phcedrus: "he who knows well how to define and divide, is to be 
counted as a god. "42 However, the unaided understanding is "no match for the 
subtlety of nature" and therefore the mind imposes imaginary divisions on nature 43 
The mind free, says Bacon, "sets up distinctions between things according to the 
measure of man and not according to the measure of the universe" (constituant 
lineas rerum ex analogiä Hominis, & non ex analogid Vniuersi). 44 The success of 
Bacon's project depends on rectifying the mind so that it mirrors the order of the 
universe; this will prevent it from "mingl[ing] its own nature with the nature of 
things. "45 Only then, as Malherbe puts it, will "the boundaries drawn by the mind 
fade away in favor of the true divisions of things such as they are prescribed by 
nature itself. "46 The greatest obstacle to this is the "mad impulse" of the mind under 
the tyranny of the imagination. The reign of the imagination (phantasia) forms the 
core of Bacon's doctrine of error 47 
41 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 311. Bacon is referring to the Platonic aim "to be able to cut up each kind 
according to its species along its natural joints, and ... not to splinter any part, as a bad butcher might do, " Phaedrus 265E, trans. Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff (Indianapolis and Cambridge: 
Hackett Publishing Company, 1995), 64. 
42 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 289 (italics in original). 
43 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 69. 
44 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 359. 
45 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 81. 
46 Michel Malherbe, "Bacon's Method of Science, " in The Cambridge Companion to Bacon, ed. 
Markku Peltonen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 75-98 on 96. 
47 John M. Cocking rightly notes that "Bacon uses imaginatio and its associated words for `good' 
imagination and phantasia and its derivatives for its vicious use in thinking, or its comparatively 
101 
In Book 1 of Novum organum, Bacon discusses the imagination's 
incapacitating effects on the understanding, rendering the mind enslaved to Idola 
and false notions which are subsequently entrenched in the human understanding 48 
According to Bacon, the causes of these idols are "either extrinsic or innate. "49 
Whereas the former causes can be expunged with difficulty, the latter are 
ineradicably rooted in the mind and must be constantly restrained. This internal 
disposition of the mind accounts for its being the source of its own difficulties and is 
what gives the mind its "corrupt complexion. "50 The genesis of the corruption can be 
found in a basic human desire to "satisfy the mind, " a desire catered to by the 
faculty of the imagination. 51 The faculty of the imagination feeds this need by 
trivial use in poetry, " "Bacon's View of Imagination, " in Francis Bacon: terminologia efortuna net 
XVII secolo, ed. Marta Fattori (Rome: Edizioni dell'Ateneo, 1984). See also Marta Fattori and M. 
Bianchi eds., Phantasia-Imaginatio: V° colloquio internazionale del lessico intellettuale Europeo 
(Rome: Edizioni dell'Ateneo, 1988). 
48 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 78. The imagination is an innate faculty but its rule is accidental, not 
necessary. However, its dispositional qualities are so powerful that they effectively generate an 
intrinsic impediment and a continual source of error. Bacon is not antagonistic to the imagination per 
se, but to its uncontrolled freedom. In other contexts he expresses keen interest in the possibility of 
using the imagination in the magic of "fascination. " On the binding of thoughts see SS, SEH, II, 642, 
654,655,659,668. 
49 Bacon, DO, OFB, XI, 35. On the distinction between Idola Adscititia and Idola Innata, see 
Spedding, SEH, I, 116-117. 
50 Bacon, DO, OFB, XI, 35. 
51 Bacon's account of the imagination is given its most detailed treatment in De augmentis. However, 
this work can be mistakenly read as containing a systematic Baconian psychology. This is due to 
Bacon's appropriation of existing terms, which he subverts and utilises for his own ends. Scholars are 
indebted to Wallace's extensive explication of Bacon's scattered discussions on human 
"psychology. " See Karl R. Wallace, Francis Bacon on the Nature of Man: The Faculties of Man's 
Soul (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1967), esp. chapter 5, "Imagination, " 69-95. Wallace also 
offers an in-depth treatment of the function of the imagination in persuasive communication, see 
Francis Bacon on Communication and Rhetoric: or, the Art of Applying Reason to Imagination for 
the Better Moving of the Will (Chapel Hill: the University of North Carolina Press, 1943). Wallace's 
close reading of Bacon's works demonstrates that there are in fact significant divergences from 
traditional faculty psychology in Bacon's thought. Because of Bacon's departures from tradition, 
Wallace is forced to remark habitually on Bacon's ambivalence, reticence, and even silence. He 
strives to fill Bacon's lacunae with background materials drawn from a disparate range of 
contemporary psychological treatises covering a wide time span. Thus Wallace's assumption that 
Bacon can be situated within the confines of faculty psychology tends to obscure Bacon's distinctive 
take on human psychology by reducing all views to a generic faculty psychology, when it is doubtful 
that such an entity can be historically validated over such an extensive period. For alternative 
readings, see John M. Cocking, "Bacon's View of Imagination, " in Francis Bacon: terminologia e fortuna net XVII secolo ed. Marta Fattori (Rome: Edizioni dell'Ateneo, 1984), 43-58; Eugene P. 
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deviating the mind from everyday experience to look for "a more ample greatness, a 
more perfect order, and a more beautiful variety than it can anywhere (since the 
Fall) find in nature. "52 This tendency (Bacon claims) is especially prevalent in 
religion and the writing of poetry. Hence Karl Wallace suggests that we can obtain 
"further insight" into the imagination's activities through an examination of Bacon's 
account of poetry. 53 
In terms of the subject matter of poetry, there is no constraint on the 
imagination - as it is not bound to things, it can fictively combine and separate 
elements of nature at pleasure. 54 As Bacon puts it, 
The imagination: which beeing not tyed to the Lawes of Matter; may at 
pleasure ioyne that which Nature hath seuered: & seuer that which Nature 
hath ioyned, and so make vnlawfull Matches & diuorses of things. 55 
In contrasting poetry and history, Bacon states that "Poesy seems to bestow upon 
human nature those things which history denies to it" in order "to satisfy the mind 
with the shadows of things when the substance cannot be obtained. "56 The 
imagination constructs satisfying fantasies rather than undergoing the discipline of 
things themselves. Whether it deals with history or nature, the work of the 
imagination inclines the mind to unbind itself from things and to find solace and 
comfort in the fantastic and shadowy world of illusion. According to Bacon, the 
mind willingly co-operates due to an internal striving that seeks in poetry a flight 
McCreary, "Bacon's Theory of the Imagination Reconsidered, " Huntington Library Quarterly 36 
(1973), 317-326; John L. Harrison, "Bacon's View of Rhetoric, Poetry, and the Imagination, " in 
Essential Articles for the Study of Francis Bacon, ed. Brian Vickers (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon 
Books, 1968), 253-271. 
52 Bacon, DAS, SEN, IV, 315-316, cf. I, 518. 
53 Wallace, Francis Bacon on the Nature of Man, 76-78. 
54 McCreary notes that it is the "creative impulses" of the imagination which present Bacon with his 
"most serious" obstacle, "Bacon's Theory of the Imagination Reconsidered, " 317-326. Bacon regards 
the imagination as the source of the mind's uncontrolled theorising, a consequence of the 
imagination's absolute freedom to speculate. 
55 Bacon, AL, OFB, IV, 73 
56 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 315, cf. I, 518 
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from the everyday: in philosophy this striving leads to hastily constructed 
explanations. The imagination frees the mind from the bonds of nature and, 
abrogating reason's power, it governs the combination of images supplied by the 
senses. Thus the imagination overrules what Bacon in Novum organum calls "the 
tribunal of the intellect. "57 As Wallace says, the cause of this is a tendency of the 
human mind to attain to "a more perfect nature than pure reason, operating alone can 
discover. "58 Bacon explains how the mundane spectacle of human and natural 
history lacks "sufficient grandeur" and "wearies the mind with satiety of ordinary 
events, one like another. "59 To overcome this dissatisfaction, the human mind allows 
the imagination to provide a more grandiose spectacle which raises the mind so that 
it approximates the divine. Under the influence of dramatic poesy, the imagination 
"raises the mind and carries it aloft, accommodating the shows of things [rerum 
simulacra] to the desires of the mind. "60 Bacon's perception of the power of poetry 
demonstrates the potential influence of the imagination: "Dramatic poesy, which has 
the theatre for its world, would be of excellent use if well directed. For the stage is 
capable of no small influence both of discipline and corruption. "61 Wallace appears 
to take at face value Bacon's statement that poetry "may be fairly thought to partake 
somewhat of a divine nature. "62 But from the overall tenor of the passage there can 
be little doubt that in this particular case Bacon offers a cause of error, whilst at the 
same time indicating the potential arising from the tendency of the imagination to 
57 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 217 (italics in original). 
58 Wallace, Francis Bacon on the Nature of Man, 77. According to Bacon, "The human intellect is 
constitutionally prone to supposing that there is more order and equality in things than it actually 
finds" (NO, OFB, XI, 83). Bacon attributes this to "the evenness [cequalitate] of the substance of the 
human spirit'- a Telesian notion (NO, OFB, XI, 89). 
59 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 316, cf. I, 518. 
60 Bacon, DAS, SEH, N, 316, cf. I, 519. 
61 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 316, cf. I, 519. 
62 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 316, cf. I, 519. 
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free the mind from things 63 Thus what is important here is that Bacon regards the 
autonomy of the imagination as furthering the desire in human nature for things 
more "agreeable to the spirit of man. "M In this way the imagination motivates the 
mind's separation from things. Reason and history, however, have the effect of 
"buckling and bowing down the mind to the nature of things"65 Thus Bacon's 
doctrine of error has its genesis in human nature, and particularly in an inherent 
human need to always go further than the reality of things permits. 
This genetic explanation for the mind's insanity is a consequence of Bacon's 
doctrine of the soul. In De augmentis Bacon confidently proclaims that the best 
division of the soul's functions is into memory, imagination and reason. 66 These 
map onto the disciplines of history, poetry and philosophy respectively. According 
to Bacon, there can be no other divisions. These three are master categories under 
which all sciences (theological, natural, civic and moral) are to be partitioned. When 
functioning unimpeded, the mind respects the boundaries of these general 
categories. The breakdown occurs when the imagination, as Bacon says, "usurps no 
small authority in itself. "67 As a spur to action, the imagination legitimately and 
necessarily acts as a messenger between reason and the passions - the end must be 
imagined before the action is considered worthwhile. But the imagination, 
responding to the mind's inherent desires to amplify its powers, turns from its 
legitimate role as messenger into that of tyrant. To reinforce his depiction of the 
63 Bacon's claims that poetry and religion are governed by the imagination would indicate that 
theology is antithetical to any inquiry into nature. Hence it is unsurprising that Bacon repeatedly 
urges a separation of philosophy and theology: "In the final place I advise you, my son, of what needs 
above all to be done, namely that, with mind illumined and sober, you separate the interpretation of 
things divine and natural and do not allow these in any way to be joined together" (my trans., DIW, 
SEH, III, 788). 
64 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 315, cf. I, 518. 
65 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 316, cf. I, 519. 
66 See Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 292-293, cf. I, 494495. 
67 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 406, cf. I, 615. 
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capacity for usurping power possessed by the imagination, Bacon cites Aristotle's 
apt analogy: 
For it was well said by Aristotle, "That the mind has over the body that 
commandment which the lord has over a bondman; but that reason has over 
the imagination that commandment which a magistrate has over a free 
citizen, " who may come also to rule in his turn 68 
Thus the body will (in so far as it can) respond to the mind's commands and this 
relationship is fixed. But the imagination's sphere of activity is neither fixed nor 
bound to reason: their roles can easily be exchanged so that the tribunal of the 
imagination replaces the tribunal of reason. 69 Wallace maintains that Bacon regards 
the imagination as "normally" under the "restraint of reason. "70 On Wallace's 
reading, it is only "occasionally" that the imagination will "slip off its shackles" 
from whence it "springs up, free and powerful. "71 Wallace is referring to rhetorical 
contexts where the passions are aroused or attenuated by powerful speech. However, 
Bacon considers the unbounded domination of the imagination to be the norm. 
According to Bacon, it exercises a governing force in cognitive as well as emotive 
matters, clearly illustrated by the state of traditional learning. Thus the role of the 
imagination is not confined to moving the passions to practical action in morals or in 
68 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 406, cf. I, 615; Aristotle, Pol. i, 3 
69 Bacon has the senses registering directly to memory, whereas it was traditional to have them report 
via the imagination to reason or memory. Bacon insists that memory is an accurate register of the 
senses' reports. The understanding can then work directly on the memory. For a general discussion of 
faculty psychology see Katherine Park and Eckhard Kessler, "The Concept of Psychology, " in The 
Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy ed. Charles B. Schmitt and Quentin Skinner 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 455-463; see also Katherine Park, "The Organic 
Soul, " in The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, 464-484. On Bacon's divisions of the 
soul, see Wallace, Francis Bacon on the Nature of Man, 12-14; Grazia Tonelli Olivieri, "Galen and 
Francis Bacon: Faculties of the Soul and the Classification of Knowledge, " in The Shapes of 
Knowledge from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment, ed. Donald R. Kelley and Richard H. Popkin 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991), 61-81. 
70 Wallace, Francis Bacon on Communication and Rhetoric, 31. 
71 Wallace, Francis Bacon on Communication and Rhetoric, 31. Bacon's various discussions of 
rhetoric are complex and relate to different contexts. Here, Bacon is defending rhetoric against the 
attacks of Plato. For a general overview of Bacon's views on rhetoric see Brian Vickers, "Bacon and Rhetoric, " in The Cambridge Companion to Bacon, ed. Markku Peltonen (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996) 200-231. 
106 
civic duty; it also holds sway in intellectual matters. Consequently, unless the 
imagination is subjected to stringent constraints, progress in inquiry is impossible. 
McCreary (unlike Wallace) detects that the method is linked to restraining 
the imagination's absolute freedom: 
The restraints and bonds Bacon wants to impose on imagination do not arise 
merely from contemporary theories of hierarchical faculty psychology that 
he undoubtedly shared, but from his full realization that imagination as the 
source of human freedom, spontaneity, and unpredictability would be a 
prime suspect 72 
McCreary suggests that Bacon has a more sustained attack on the imagination than 
Wallace admits: the mind, unprotected and unconstrained by methodical 
containment, is always subject to the tyranny of the imagination. Commentators are 
often dismayed when Bacon apparently seeks to curtail the imagination's influence 
in acts of creativity in the physical sciences and tend to shift the discussion onto the 
role of the imagination in rhetorical and persuasive contexts. Granted, Bacon's 
account of its persuasive power in rhetorical contexts is unambiguous: 
it is no small dominion which imagination [phantasia] holds in persuasions 
that are wrought by eloquence; for when by arts of speech men's minds are 
soothed, inflamed, and carried hither and thither, it is all done by 
stimulating the imagination [phantasia] till it becomes ungovernable, and 
not only sets reason at nought, but offers violence to it, partly by blinding, 
partly by incensing it. 73 
As Wallace explains, Bacon clearly acknowledges that rhetorical power is essential 
in soothing "the sauage and vnreclaymed desires" of men, and in maintaining social 
72 McCreary, "Bacon's Theory of the Imagination Reconsidered, " 318. McCreary concentrates on 
what he calls Bacon's "legal and monarchical analogies, " where the imagination is characterised as 
an errant and radical subject, 318. According to McCreary, Bacon uses these analogies to "frame all 
of human experience, " 318. McCreary's agenda is not a close reading of Bacon's texts. His main 
purpose is to defend the role of the imagination in forming "hypotheses, " and the "significant 
function" that it plays in "scientific method, " 322. McCreary offers a critique of Bacon's constraints 
on imaginative theorising: he grasps Bacon's project to restrain and bind the imagination but objects 
to it. McCreary ignores the fact that in Baconian psychology, subjection to the imagination is a form 
of intellectual slavery, entirely at odds with Bacon's emphasis on the senses, and hence no basis for 
framing solid axioms. 
73 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 406, cf. I, 615. 
107 
and political stability. 74 In addition, Bacon himself makes significant use of fables 
and parables, and has substantive roles for the imaginative devices of analogy and 
metaphor. Clearly, in a rhetorical context the imagination functions in moving the 
will to good or harmonious action so long as reason dominates. But when it comes 
to the internal dynamics of the mind, the relationship between reason and 
imagination is (as Aristotle says) not one of bondsman to master, but of free citizen 
to magistrate. In that relationship the free citizen can at any time become master 
regardless of whether the context is rhetorical or cognitive. Bacon imposes strict 
limits on the activity of the imagination: it must be confined to areas where it can 
exercise its freedom and where it does not matter that "it commonly exceeds the 
measure of nature. "75 In its legitimate domains it can legislate: in nature's realm, the 
freedom of the imagination engenders in the mind the wild and ungovernable 
spontaneity of a lunatic. The only reason this insanity escapes general notice is that 
all under its sway are mad in the same way. Thus in castigating this condition of 
contemporary learning, Bacon states that "even if men went mad in the same 
copycat way, they could still agree among themselves well enough. "76 
Consequently, institutions of learning sustain this shared cultural insanity. 
In order to understand the severity of the mind's self-imposed impediments, 
it is necessary to consider briefly Bacon's characterisation of the fervent adherence 
to traditional knowledge, and why he treats it as a form of insanity. The tyranny of 
the imagination and the spellbinding effect of its fantasies give rise to a combination 
of pointless philosophical systematising and inflated pride. Bacon states: 
74 Bacon, AL, OFB, IV, 38-39; Wallace, Francis Bacon on Communication and Rhetoric, 32, esp. n. 14. Wallace is drawing particularly on the fable of Orpheus who through the power of sweet music 
quells the savagery of warring animals. See also Bacon, DSV, SEH, VI, 720-722, cf. 646-648. 
75 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 292, cf. I, 494. 
76 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 75. 
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I add further that the more intelligent a man is, if he too soon deserts the 
light of nature, that is to say, the enquiry into particulars and the evidence 
drawn therefrom, the more steeply does he plunge into the obscure and 
tortuous recesses and caverns of the imagination [in obscuriores et magis 
perplexos phantasiarum recessus et quasi specus] and the more difficult 
does he make it to get out 77 
In the preface to his Instauratio magna, Bacon castigates those who have done 
"terrible damage" to philosophy through overconfidence, ambition and pride. 78 It is 
at the juncture of philosophical nonsense and pride that Bacon best depicts human 
folly: this is the point at which current institutional madness exhibits its worst 
excesses. Whereas the imagination is the source of erroneous philosophical 
materials, it is not the sole problem. In his view, "the real truth is that the obstacle to 
the course I propose lies not in its obscurity or difficulty but in pride [superbia]. "79 
In seeking a union with things, Bacon reserves particular contempt for "one kind" of 
pride, the "disdain of dwelling and being conversant much in experiences and 
particulars, specially such as are vulgar in occurrency, and base and ignoble in 
use. "80 This intellectual vice acts contrary to what is most needful, and diverts the 
mind from things onto "higher mysteries of pride" that ostentatiously exhibit more 
"dignity and solemnity" because they remove the mind from "familiar actions"81 
According to Bacon, these higher mysteries 
have less affinity with arts mechanical and illiberal, in that they are not so 
subject to be controuled by persons of mean observation, in that they seem 
to teach men that they know not, and not to refer them to that they know. 
All which conditions directly feeding the humour of pride, particulars do 
want. That the majesty of generalities, and the divine nature of the mind in 
77 Bacon, RPh, BF, 118, cf. SEH, III, 572. 
78 Bacon, IM, OFB, XI, 53. 
79 Bacon, RPh, BF, 120, cf. SEH, III, 574. 
80 Bacon, YT, SEH, III, 250. 
81 Bacon, VT, SEH, III, 250. 
109 
taking them (if they be truly collected, and be indeed the direct reflexions of 
things, ) cannot be too much magnified. 82 
Driven by pride, the mind's insane defence of useless systems of learning is under 
the control of the affections (or passions). 83 Error is not only a constitutional effect 
since it arises from pride in imaginative fantasy. Yet in Bacon's account these 
factors (albeit powerful) are accidental: "interpretation is the very natural and direct 
intention, action, and progression of the understanding delivered from impediments 
... all Anticipation is but a deflexion or declination by accident. "84 The link between 
pride and imagination, and the resulting insanity and declination of the mind is the 
substance of Bacon's doctrine of error. The spell of the mind's own productions 
must be broken. 
Bacon opposes pride with humility, pride's moral counterpart. In Redargutio 
philosophiarum he states: 
In the verdict they pass on me they will be right to deny that anything I have 
done is great. But they will be wrong if they ascribe to daring what is due to 
humility, to humility, I say, and to the absence of that human pride which 
has ruined all by conferring the title sacred upon certain fleeting 
meditations instead of reserving it for the divine signature on things ... only 
on this account do I hold myself happy and well-deserving of the human 
82 Bacon, VT, SEH, III, 251. We will see in Chapter 4 that the history of mechanical arts plays a 
crucial role in Bacon's "natural and experimental history ... for the building up of philosophy" (PAH, OFB, XI, 451). 
83 Ian Box comments that even intellectual shortcomings "really amount to moral failings more than 
methodological errors, " "Bacon's moral philosophy, " in The Cambridge Companion to Bacon, ed. 
Markku Peltonen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 260-282, on 279-280. According 
to Box, Bacon's method was intended for moral recovery and he explores the medical "metaphors" 
used in Bacon's account of the mind's illness. However, Box's account does not address the 
ontological root of the mind's problems and he therefore fails to perceive the extent of the mind's 
declination. Instead, he concentrates on the vice of indolence and sees the method as a way to 
overcome this. But he notes that the "methodological directives prescribed in the Novum organuni are 
not only rules to guide investigation, but serve equally as a moral and intellectual discipline, a kind of `mental hygiene' for the diseased mind, " 280. Bacon refers to the mind's moral governance as "Georgics of the Mind, " drawing on Virgil's account of husbandry in the Georgics, 3,289 (see 
Bacon, DAS, SEH, VII, 5, cf. I, 715). In a similar vein, James Stephens highlights the degree of 
reform required for the recovery of the mind when he points out that Bacon wished to prepare men "to enter the kingdom of knowledge intellectually in a `naked' state, " Francis Bacon and the Style of Science (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1975), 58. 
84 Bacon, VT, SEN, III, 251. 
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race, that I have shown the power inherent in a true and proper humbling of 
the human spirit. 85 
The characteristic of humility in natural inquiry perfectly mirrors its spiritual 
counterpart, in that both are paradoxically the grounds for enhanced power. The 
regeneration of the mind requires a self-acknowledged ignorance on the part of the 
inquirer involving the eradication (or levelling) of currently held views. According 
to Bacon, under this regime of humiliating purgation the mind can be made 
receptive to things: 
In the present mental climate I cannot safely entrust the truth to you. Your 
understandings must be prepared before they can be instructed; your minds 
need healing before they can be exercised; the site must be cleared before it 
can be built upon ... Undoubtedly, sons, there is in the human soul some 
portion of our understanding, however preoccupied and beset, which 
welcomes truth, and there is a path which leads down thereto by a gentle 
incline. 86 
I have taken pains to emphasise Bacon's perception of the severity of the problem 
because commentators tend to overlook Bacon's complete lack of faith in the mind 
"left to itself. "87 As he puts it, "Men are very far from realising how strict and 
disciplined a thing is research into truth and nature, and how little it leaves to the 
judgement of men. "88 
Notwithstanding Bacon's critique of the spell of traditional learning and the 
mind's resulting madness, he expresses a high level of hope drawn from the 
certainty of things. Traditionally, scepticism (the philosophical counterpart to 
cognitive pride) had opposed the inflated claims of dogmatism but in such a way 
that its critique terminated in the abandonment of all hope. As we saw in Chapter 2, 
Bacon presents his method as a "middle way" (via media) to protect the mind from 
both the excesses of dogmatism and the pits of sceptical despair: 
85 Bacon, RPh, BF, 132-133, cf. SEH, III, 585. 
86 Bacon, RPh, BF, 109, cf. SEH, III, 563. 
87 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 55. 
88 Bacon, RPh, BF, 119, cf. SEH, III, 573. 
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My way and the reasoning of those who maintained Acatalepsy are rather 
alike in their beginnings but end up being very far apart and opposite to 
each other. For the latter insist simply that nothing can be known, whereas I 
say that not much in nature can be known by the way now in use. But 
thereafter they destroy the authority of the sense and intellect, whereas I 
think up and furnish helps for them. 89 
In following this middle way, Bacon praises the pre-Socratics who "wisely steered a 
middle course between the arrogance of dogmatism and the hopelessness of 
Acatalepsy "90 Their merit lay in their refusal to argue the point, thinking it better to 
test it by "involving themselves with nature" (Naturre se immiscere). 91 However, he 
claims that ultimately they too invested "everything in ... ceaseless mental activity 
and agitation. "92 The problems generated by unaided mental activity - "the mind's 
inborn [natiuum] and spontaneous movements" - underlie Bacon's praise for those 
who recognised that "props for the intellect" such as dialectic were essential. 93 
However, "this remedy comes too late. "94 Dialectic is the work of the mind after it 
"has been invaded by the habits, hearsay and depraved doctrines of daily life, and 
beset by the emptiest of Idols. "95 In Bacon's terms, "the art of dialectic bolts the 
stable door too late and cannot recapture the horse"; it "entrenches" error and 
illusion rather than extirpating it 96 In opposition to existing methods, Bacon sets 
89 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 79. On the method as via media see DSV, SEH, VI, 754-755, cf. 676-677. 
90 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 53. According to Liddell and Scott, the term äxara%ijxVia is found in the 
sceptical writings of Sextus Empiricus, and refers to the incomprehensibleness of things, A Greek- 
English Lexicon, compiled by Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1861), 38. 
91 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 53. 
92 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 53. 
93 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 53. 
94 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 53. 
95 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 55 (italics in original). 
96 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 55. 
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forth his "one way to ... sanity. 
"97 We must, he proclaims, begin afresh the work of 
the mind and curtail the mind's freedom from the outset. As he puts it, 
There remains but one way to health and sanity: to do the whole work of the 
mind all over again, and from the very outset to stop the mind being left to 
itself but to keep it under control, and make the matter run like clockwork 
[ac Mens, iam ab ipso principio, nullo modo sibi permittatur, sed perpetuö 
regatur; ac res, veluti per machinas, conficiatur] 98 
To prevent the free play of the mind (and encourage hope), Bacon offered his New 
Organon -a machine or instrument to aid the mind 
in a task so vast that neither 
individually, nor severally through a union of many minds, could it accomplish 
anything of worth in its naked state 99 To drive home this point, he compares 
attempting to undertake work for the intellect with "the naked force of the mind" to 
men attempting a hopeless task - the moving of a huge obelisk "with their bare 
hands. "°° A spectator would regard the latter as an "act of madness "°' Those 
engaging in such a task would be considered "madder still" if they tried to overcome 
physical obstacles purely by the addition of more men, irrespective of how athletic 
they were. 102 In the same way, Bacon says, men's reliance on the native intellect 
(regardless of the mental gymnastics of traditional learning) is a mark of insanity. 
The uniting of individual powers (mental or physical) unregulated and without 
proper instruments is the height of folly. In true Erasmian style, Bacon humiliates 
97 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 55. 
98 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 55. 
99 On the relationship between hope and the Bacon's Organon see Michele Le Doeuff, "Hope in 
Science, " in Francis Bacon's Legacy of Texts: 'The Art of Discovery Grows with Discovery, ' ed. 
William Sessions (New York: AMS Press, 1990), 9-24. Le Doeuff argues for a close connection 
between hope and the negative instance where the latter performs a "rectification ... which partakes 
of the very nature of the soul, " 18. 
100 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 55. 
101 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 55. 
102 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 55. Rees says "Bacon surely has in mind the obelisk in St Peter's Square, 
and probably Fontana's images of the engineering that set it up, " OFB, XI, li. 
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the mind and his portrayal of human posturing has the ultimate intention of elevating 
its powers. 103 
Through paying attention to Bacon's perception of the severity of the mind's 
pathological condition, it becomes apparent that the methodological function of 
Novum organum has a centrally important role in regenerating the human 
understanding. Bacon nowhere proposes an independently objective Organon that 
automatically generates truth. The purified mind is a necessary component in 
legitimate inquiry and by referring to his method as a "machine of the intellect, " 
Bacon is not suggesting that it produces results independently of the condition of the 
investigator's mind. '04 The need for intellectual aids arises from Bacon's belief that 
"little [should] be left to sharpness and force of wits. "los The corollary of this is that 
all "wits and intellects be put on much the same footing [ere exxquet]. "lob 
Commentators have seized upon Bacon's notion of levelling men's wits as a form of 
democratic practice on the cognitive level. For example, Mary Hesse states "once 
the method is learned ... men's wits are 
leveled; anyone can do science. "107 
103 See Desiderius Erasmus, The Praise of Folly and Other Writings: A Norton Critical Edition, ed. 
and trans. Robert M. Adams (New York: Norton, 1989). 
104 Bacon, ANN, OFB, XIII, 173; ILM(CS), SEH, III, 625. 
105 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 97. 
106 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 97. 
107 Mary Hesse, "Francis Bacon's Philosophy of Science, " in Essential Articles for the Study of 
Francis Bacon, ed. Brian Vickers (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1968), 123. In the 1857 
General Preface to Bacon's Philosophical Works, Robert Ellis writes: "Absolute certainty, and a 
mechanical mode of procedure such that all men should be capable of employing it, are ... two great 
features of the Baconian method. His system can never be rightly understood if they are neglected, " 
SEH, I, 23-24. In contrast, Farrington rightly says, Bacon's reference to levelling men's wits has 
"caused much misunderstanding. He did not think every Tom, Dick, or Harry could be a scientist. 
The constitution of Solomon's House in his New Atlantis, and passage after passage in his other 
writings, make clear how rare a thing in his opinion a great scientist was, " BF, 119. That Bacon has a 
doctrine reserved for the "sons of science" is clear from many passages. For example, in TPM he 
speaks of tables which are "a compliment reserved to some of the choicer spirits among you whom I 
hope to win thereby" (BF, 69, cf. SEH, III, 535). See also VT, SEH, III, 248. In the final aphorism of 
Book 1 of Novum organum, Bacon says that he has "purged, raked and levelled [ccquata"] the seed- 
bed of the mind" (NO, OFB, XI, 173). This seems to capture Bacon's meaning of the term 
"levelling. " 
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However, Bacon's programme is not egalitarian; the purported levelling of men's 
" wits is merely a side-effect of his remedy for the "corrupt complexion" of the 
mind. '08 As the familiar Baconian analogy states: "For in the same way that much 
depends on steadiness and practice if you want to draw a straight line or perfect 
circle by hand alone, and little or nothing if you use a ruler or compasses, so it is 
with the view that I take. "109 Just as the compass disables uncontrollable 
physiological movements, Bacon's method regulates the "mind's inborn and 
spontaneous movements" Because Bacon's method leaves "little or nothing" to the 
mind, it disables men's natural inclinations and governs and directs the will to act 
for future goals rather than immediate ends. The mind is too eager and, as a result, 
the understanding is subject to a dominating abuse by the passions which persuade 
the will to assent to more pleasing and immediate goods. This is important and is 
often overlooked in accounts of Baconian psychology: the imagination and the 
passions are as much at work in rational knowledge as they are in the moral and 
civic. The tendency for private passions to dominate even in rational knowledge lies 
behind Bacon's statement that "the disabling of man's knowledge (entertained in 
Anticipations) is well to be allowed. " 110 In natural knowledge, the term 
"anticipations" is used by Bacon to refer to "the voluntary collections that the mind 
maketh of knowledge; which is every man's reason. "111 In Stephens' terms this is 
because the "arts of logic and rhetoric had conspired to equip it [the understanding] 
with false forms, more pleasing and more easily grasped than reality itself. "112 
108 Bacon, DO, OFB, XI, 35. 
109 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 97. 
110 Bacon, YT, SEH, III, 244. 
111 Bacon, VT, SEH, 111,244. 
112 Stephens, Francis Bacon and the Style of Science (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1975), 58. The best discussion of Bacon's complex relationship among the three main functions of 
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Anticipations are all the more dangerous when they masquerade as rational, and 
receive further sanctions from the prevailing formalisms of logic. The power of the 
imagination to dictate to reason, through its fantastic distortions of reality 
represented in false systems of philosophy, is thus on a par with the power of the 
imagination to govern passionate action through rhetorical persuasions. 113 
The compass and rule analogies are persuasive devices intended to illustrate 
the futility of attempting to inquire into the truth of things by the force of the naked 
understanding. The obelisk analogy signifies that the naked intellect is powerless 
notwithstanding that it gives the appearance of action. Its unaided actions are 
like 
the ranting of a lunatic whose manic strivings are futile. Like the lunatic, the unaided 
mind is at the mercy of some inner ungovernable passion. Before the mind can be 
corrected from its "corrupt and deeply-rooted habits, " we must (Bacon insists) 
recognise that its current condition entails that we do not "command" ourselves but 
are subject to the tyranny of the imagination. 114 Reason has submitted to idols 
whereas it ought to have "submitted ... to things. " 
115 Only by subjecting itself to 
"harsh laws and extreme discipline" can the mind be made "receptive to things"116 
As Rossi says, "the products of the `free' mind are but idols, namely ineffectual and 
arbitrary opinions ... only where the 
human mind forsakes its state of arbitrary 
freedom (i. e., the state of being `left to itself) and learns to make use of specific 
techniques of inquiry, will it be able to arrive at the knowledge of natural facts in 
the mind (the will, memory and reason) is found in Wallace, Francis Bacon on the Nature of Man, 
for a summary see 153-164. 
113 Brian Vickers calls this ceaseless strife among the mind's faculties "psychomachia, " "Bacon and 
Rhetoric, " in The Cambridge Companion to Bacon, ed. Markku Peltonen (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 220. In Chapter 6I relate this internal warring of the appetites to Bacon's 
doctrine of simple motions. 
114 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 61. 
115 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 85,171. 
116 Bacon, IM, OFB, XI, 3. 
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their objective form. " 7 The central concern of Book 1 of Novum organum is 
therefore to persuade the mind to "forsake its state of arbitrary freedom. " To "make 
ready" the mind, Bacon in Book 1 of Novum organum delivers the "destructive part 
of my Instauration, that comprises the three refutations: "the refutation of Native 
Human Reason left to itself; the refutation of Demonstrations; and the refutation of 
Theories, or of received philosophies and doctrines. "118 I have concentrated here on 
Bacon's refutation of native human reason to show that it demands not merely 
logical reorientation but a humiliating regime of correction. In the following section 
I shall analyse Bacon's grounds for hope. 
117 Rossi, Philosophy, Technology, and the Arts in the Early Modern Era, trans. Salvator Attanasio 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1970), 160. 
118 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 173. 
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II. The mind bound: the union of res and mens 
A. Bacon's metaphysical assumptions 
In an early paper Rees comments that "Bacon's metaphysical assumptions have 
never been investigated either singly or collectively, in the context of Bacon's 
philosophy. " 119 Elsewhere Rees justifiably raises the question, "why did Bacon 
bother to write the Novum organum at all if he believed he already possessed the 
makings. of a creditable and credible body of positive science"? 120 I propose that 
these separate questions must be combined into the single question of how Bacon's 
metaphysical assumptions underpin the method of Novum organum. I argue that a 
distinction should be maintained between Bacon's metaphysical assumptions (his 
cosmogony) and what Rees calls Bacon's "semi-Paracelsian cosmology. "121 
According to Rees, 
119 Rees, "Matter Theory: A Unifying Factor in Francis Bacon's Natural Philosophy? " Ambix 24 
(1977), 110-125, on 113. When Rees raised the question of Bacon's metaphysical assumptions, he 
proposed to deal "only with those assumptions which provide clues to the question posed, " 114. The 
particular question posed is: "what relationship obtains between the entities of the semi-Paracelsian 
bi-quaternion theory and the other elements of the matter theory - notably the attached spirits? " 113. 
In an earlier paper Rees argued that "the bi-quaternion theory was an `elaboration' of Bacon's `basic 
theory of matter, " 113. See "Bacon's Semi-Paracelsian Cosmology, " Ambix 22 (1975), 81-101. Here 
he says "Subsequent reflection on Bacon's metaphysical assumptions led me to see that the bi- 
quaternion theory is not an `elaboration' but ... the main structural features upon which everything 
else in the theory of matter hangs, " 113. Insofar as the bi-quaternion theory is part of Bacon's 
cosmogony, I agree with Rees' latter statement. 
120 Rees, "Francis Bacon's Biological Ideas: A New Manuscript Source, " in Occult and Scientific 
Mentalities in the Renaissance, cd. Brian Vickers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 
297-314, on 308. 
121 Rees defines metaphysical assumptions as "assumptions about what is `real' or `relevant' in the 
flux of experience with which the natural philosopher is confronted. They determine his basic choices 
- about, for instance, what principles of explanation are appropriate, what entities exist in the 
universe or what governs the relationship between those entities, " "Matter Theory: A Unifying Factor 
in Bacon's Natural Philosophy? " 114. In Bacon's case there is one unique principle, viz., matter. 
Hence Bacon's metaphysical assumptions are ontological assumptions, i. e. they refer to the ultimate 
attributes of matter. 
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Francis Bacon's natural philosophy may be viewed as a single philosophy 
with two aspects or as two philosophies each with its peculiar character ... 
On the one hand, his philosophy appears as a programme for constructing a 
body of scientific knowledge that would yield practical benefits ... 
On the 
other, it appears as a strange corpus of theory, a speculative recreation ... 
In 
its first guise Bacon's philosophy appears as a set of methodological 
recommendations ... 
In its second manifestation Bacon's philosophy 
comprehends a complete but provisional system of knowledge about the 
workings of nature. 122 
What Rees calls "Bacon's speculative philosophy" seems to straddle both 
cosmogony and cosmology. I hold that Bacon's cosmology is an elaboration of his 
cosmogony and that the distinction is crucial if we are to answer Rees' question on 
the relationship between matter and method. This section is taken up with outlining 
Bacon's metaphysical assumptions and their relationship to his method. 
Before examining the signs along Bacon's tortuous way of inquiry, it is 
necessary to have some understanding of the grounds for Bacon's optimism 
underpinning the constructive part of his method (outlined in Book 2 of Novum 
organum). Bacon's grounds for hope rest on various ontological assumptions: the 
unity of matter; his concept of radiative or emanative matter; his doctrine of consent; 
and his view that the senses are linked by rays to matter's hidden powers. 123 This set 
of assumptions forms the basis for the relationship between Bacon's theory of matter 
and his way of inquiry. Thus Baconian optimism is based on a set of ontological 
assumptions that motivate hope. We have seen that Bacon directed his destructive 
attack on current learning through exposing what he considered a de facto sickness, 
or insanity, of the mind. Bacon's disclosure of the mind's pathological state should 
122 Rees, OFB, VI, xxxvi. 
123 We will see that Bacon's concept of a single principle viz., matter - the unique source of 
operative power - underlies his other assumptions. This is clear in Novum organum when Bacon 
presents his grounds for hope. He states: "we should have every hope that nature's recesses still 
conceal many secrets of excellent use which are quite unrelated to and unparalleled by anything 
already discovered" (NO, OFB, XI, 167-169). On the role of hope in Bacon's programme, see Le 
Doeuff, "Hope in Science, " in Francis Bacon's Legacy of Texts: 'The Art of Discovery Grows with Discovery, ' ed. William A. Sessions, (New York: AMS Press, 1990), 9-24, on 16. On Bacon's 
"Grounds for Hope" in Novum organum, see Rees, OFB, XI, lxi-lxvii. 
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terminate in a condition of ignorance. From that point of "innocence, " Baconian 
inquiry begins the process of uniting the mind and things. 
I will begin with the unity of nature, and then discuss consent and its 
dependence on radiative matter. From there I argue that the human mind and the 
organs of the senses are incorporated in this radiative network and this is why Bacon 
accepts the adequacy of the senses and the power of the mind to interpret under the 
right conditions and with proper guidance and helps. Although Baconian inquiry 
begins from the bewildering multiplicity of things, it ends in the discovery of an 
underlying unity - "forms of the first class" (a minimal set of elements). 124 
At the level of phenomenal reality, the unity of nature is sustained in a 
complex network of radiative matter: the human composite of mind and body is 
immersed in this radiative network. 125 In Bacon's terms, 
The body of nature is elegantly and truly represented as covered with hair; 
in allusion to the rays of things [propter rerum radios]. For rays are as the 
hairs or bristles of nature, nor is there anything which is not more or less 
radiant [atque omnia Pere vel magis vel minus radiosa sunt]. This is seen 
most evidently in the faculty of sight, and no less in all magnetic virtue, and 
every effect which takes place at a distance. For whatever produces an 
effect at a distance may be truly said to emit rays [Quidquid enim operatur 
ad distans, id etiam radios emittere recte dici potest]. 126 
Throughout nature, emanative matter radiates its motions linking bodies in a 
malleable network of powers. The organs of the senses are bombarded by a 
bewildering display of nature's fecundity. Though matter's emanations are unlimited 
qualitatively, its active elemental powers are restricted quantitatively: with the 
124 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 361, cf. I, 568. 
125 This illustrates how Bacon's cosmology is underpinned by his cosmogony. On Bacon's 
cosmology see Rees "Francis Bacon's Semi-Paracelsian Cosmology, " Ambix 22 (1975), 81-101; 
idem., "Francis Bacon's Semi-Paracelsian Cosmology and the Great Instauration, " Ambix 22 (1975), 
161-173. The radiative and emanative cosmos is explicated from enfolded matter. As we saw in 
Chapter 2, the schematisms of matter emanate simple motions. Bacon's concept of emanative power 
ontologically guarantees the unity of nature which (as I discuss below) guarantees that the senses are 
minimally reliable. 
126 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 322, cf. I, 525. 
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corollary that its forms comprise a limited set. This minimal set of elements, acting 
in accordance with necessary laws, by combination gives rise to the whole variety of 
things. As Bacon puts it, "Forms of the First Class ... (like the 
letters of the 
alphabet) are not many and yet make up and sustain the essences and forms of all 
substances. "127 Thus the forms underlying phenomenal reality retain the primordial 
unity, and this is the main reason why the mind possesses the ability to interpret 
nature. For Bacon, all activity in nature (including sensation, cognition, and the 
passions) retains an imprint of matter's primary Unity. 128 
127 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 361, cf. I, 568 (italics in original). 
128 Rees states that "whether human memory and imagination are functions of the spirit, are moot 
points. The evidence is contradictory, though on balance Bacon does appear to assign some of the 
higher faculties in man to the activity of the vital spirit, " "Francis Bacon's Biological Ideas, " 302.1 
argue that Bacon attributed all faculties to the vital spirit. Bacon states: "The faculties of the soul are 
well known; understanding [Intellectus], reason [Ratio], imagination [Phantasia], memory, appetite, 
will; in short all with which the logical and ethical sciences deal. But in the doctrine concerning the 
soul the origins of these faculties ought to be handled, and that physically, as they are innate and 
inherent in the soul" (DAS, SEH, IV, 398-399, cf. I, 607, my emphasis). According to Ellis, Bacon 
follows Telesius, ascribing sensation and imagination to the anima sensibilis and "leaving the higher 
faculties, and especially the moral sense as the portion of the anima rationalis" (SEH, I, 606). 
However, the passage does not support Ellis' interpretation. Bacon says that all the faculties of the 
soul "with which the logical and ethical sciences deal ... ought to be handled, and that physically, as 
they are innate and inherent in the soul. " As they are to be handled physically, "sour' here must refer 
to the material anima sensibilis and not the immaterial anima rationalis. Ellis even notes that "Donius, 
to whom Bacon refers a little further on, in effect rejects the anima rationalis altogether; admitting, in 
apparently insincere deference to received opinions, that it may exist; but holding that, if it does so, it 
is incognisable by human reason" (SEH, I, 606). Bacon's interpretation of the fable of Pan shows that 
he follows Donius (the following passage is omitted from DSV): "Pan delights in the nymphs, that is 
in the spirits; for the spirits of living creatures are the delight of the world. And with reason is he 
styled their leader, for each of them follows its own nature as a guide, round which after their own 
fashion they leap and frisk in endless variety and constant motion. And therefore one of the modems 
has ingeniously referred all the powers of the soul to motion [Itaque acute quidem ex recentioribus 
facultates animos omnes ad Motum reduxit], and remarked on the conceit and precipitancy of the 
ancients, who in too eagerly fixing their eyes and thoughts on the memory, imagination, and reason, 
have neglected the Thinking Faculty [Vis Cogitativam], which holds the first place. For he who 
remembers or recollects, thinks; he who imagines, thinks; he who reasons, thinks; and in a word the 
spirit of man, whether prompted by sense or left to itself, whether in the functions of the intellect, or 
of the will and affections, dances to the tune of the thoughts; and this is the frisking of the Nymphs" 
(DAS, SEH, IV, 324-325; I, 528). According to Bacon, memory, imagination and reason (as well as 
the will and affections) are motions of spirit. The Vis Cogitativa derives from plenipotentiary matter. 
Ellis notes that the modem referred to in the above passage "is A. Donius. See his De Naturd 
Hominis, 1581, the title of the twenty-first chapter of the second book which is Omnes Operationes 
Spiritus esse Motum et Sensum, " adding that "as might be supposed, Donius is altogether a 
materialist" (SEH, I, 528). According to Olivieri, "Bacon's choice of the three faculties of memory, 
imagination, and reason as classificatory principles points in the direction of Galen and the Galenic- 
Nemesian tradition of the three faculties of the rational soul and the three ventricles of the brain, " 
"Galen and Francis Bacon, " 73. He says, "This tradition, although controversial, was still quite alive 
121 
The importance of the unity of nature in Bacon's programme cannot be 
overstated. 129 Katherine Park points out that even though Bacon rejected "the 
fanciful sympathies and antipathies of the magical and alchemical writers, " this does 
not preclude his conception of a unity of nature. 130 Park concentrates on the analogy 
of the mind as an "enchanted glass, " and on the more general and literary use of 
analogy to demonstrate Bacon's acceptance of a positive role for the imagination. In 
contrast to Park's depiction of Bacon's use of analogy, I argue that there are natural- 
philosophical reasons for reading Bacon's description of the mind as mirror in much 
more literal terms. Bacon appropriates the traditional image of the mind as a mirror 
or reflector that when suitably disposed will capture the radiative virtues of things. 
Thus, in glossing Ecclesiastes' praise of the divine wisdom as manifest in creation, 
Bacon comments that Solomon there "Declar[es] not obscurely, that God hath 
framed the minde of man as a mirrour, or glasse, capable of the Image of the 
vniuersall world, and ioyfull to receiue the impression thereof, as the Eye ioyeth to 
receiue light. "131 Moreover, Bacon states that this act of praise should not be limited 
to contemplative worship, pointing out that the passage confirms how man is 
"raysed also to finde out and discern the ordinances and decrees which throughout 
in Bacon's times and provided Bacon with an essential physiological basis from which to study man, 
in his highest powers of knowledge, from an experimental point of view" (ibid. ). 
129 On the centrally important concept of unity in Bacon's programme, see Robert Forbes McRae, 
"The Unity of the Sciences: Bacon, Descartes, Leibniz, " Journal of the History of Ideas 18 (1957), 
27-48. The section on Bacon is expanded in McRae's The Problem of the Unity of the Science: Bacon 
to Kant (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961), 24-45. The truly insightful work of McRae has 
been ignored in Bacon scholarship: there is no mention in The Cambridge Companion to Bacon, ed. 
Markku Peltonen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and oddly in Julie Robin Solomon 
and Catherine Gimelli Martin's recent collection of essays on the topic of Bacon's concept of the 
unity of the sciences, McRae's name does not appear either in the general index or in the individual 
articles, Francis Bacon and the Refiguring of Early Modern Thought (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005). I 
will return to McRae's work in Chapter 6. 
130 Katherine Park, Lorraine J. Daston, and Peter L. Galison, "Bacon, Galileo, and Descartes on 
Imagination and Analogy, " Isis 75 (1984), 287-326, on 294. 
131 Bacon, AL, OFB, IV, 6. 
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all those Changes are infallibly obserued. "132 The authority for this Solomonic 
endorsement is given, says Bacon, by the scriptural text itself: "God hath made all 
thinges beautifull or'decent in the true returne of their seasons. Also hee hath placed 
the world in Mans heart, yet cannot Man finde out the worke which God worketh 
from the beginning to the end. "133 There is no doctrinal prohibition on discovering 
"the worke which God worketh" and there are no divine limitations on man's 
legitimate inquiries. 134 However, even though the mind is naturally disposed to 
reflect the nature of things, this potential remains unrealised. The obstacle is a self- 
imposed darkness through the bondage of the understanding to illusory notions: 
For the mind of man (dimmed and clouded [obducta et obfuscata] as it is by 
the smooth covering of the body), far from being a smooth, clear, and equal 
glass (wherein the beams of things reflect according to their true incidence 
[quod rerum radios sincere excipiat et reflect at]), is rather like an 
enchanted glass [speculi incantati], full of superstition and imposture"135 
The unity of nature gives rise to instances of conformity whereby things that 
resemble each other share deeper affinities. Moreover, conformity occurs between 
bodies animate and inanimate, and this is clearly seen in cases where the organs of 
the senses and the bodies which produce "reflections upon the sense" have 
132 Bacon, AL, OFB, IV, 6. 
133 Bacon, AL, OFB, IV, 6. Cf. Eccles. 3: 11 
134 This is clear in Valerius terminus where Bacon states: "To conclude then, let no man presume to 
check the liberality of God's gifts, who, as was said, hath set the world in man's heart. So as 
whatsoever is not God but parcel of the world, he hath fitted it to the comprehension of man's mind, 
if man will open and dilate the powers of his understanding as he may" (VT, SEH, III, 221). Benjamin 
Milner comments that in Novum organum (1620) Bacon declares that "Natural philosophy does not 
borrow its authority or receive its limits from theology: it is self-authenticating, " "Francis Bacon: The 
Theological Foundations of Valerius Terminus, " Journal of the History of Ideas 58 (1997), 245-264, 
on 264. According to Milner, Bacon sets aside Valerius terminus (1603), "abandon[ing] his 
theological foundation for natural philosophy ... since natural philosophy, as such, possesses a 
standing worthy of divinity, " 264. In my view, the passage cited above shows that Bacon did not 
change his mind; it is clear in Valerius terminus that there are no divine limitations on man's 
inquiries into nature. 
135 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 431, cf. I, 643. 
123 
comparable structures. 136 Conformity of structure rests on similarity of forms and 
schematisms - the source of consent among bodies. For Bacon, "consent lies in 
nothing other than the mutual symmetry of forms and schematisms. "137 Moreover, 
consent between similar schematisms is the basis for human sensation. According 
to Bacon, there is no difference in the. consent between the organs of the senses and 
their respective qualities, and the consent among other bodies. Thus Bacon's 
ontology entails that there is no distinction between the material of the human 
composite and any other composite body except in terms of the complexity of their 
respective schematisms. Sensation is limited only by limitations on the number and 
structure of the sense organs: were they enhanced or more intricately structured 
there would be a corresponding increase in the range of perceptions. 138 The 
following passage contains a detailed summary of Bacon's thinking on conformity 
of structure, and on the consent of the senses with external schematisms: 
The following are instances of correspondence [Instantkk Conformes]: the 
mirror and the eye, and likewise, the structure of the ear, and places with an 
echo. And from this correspondence [Ex quo Conformitate], besides the 
observation of resemblance [Similitudinis] itself which is useful in many 
ways, it requires little extra effort to infer and fashion this axiom, i. e. that 
the organs of the senses and bodies which give rise to reflections upon the 
sense are of like nature. This moreover prompts the intellect to rise 
effortlessly to a certain more exalted and noble axiom - namely that there is 
no difference between the consents and sympathies of bodies furnished with 
sense and of inanimate things without sense, save that in the former animal 
spirit is added to a body so disposed, but in the latter the spirit is absent. 
Thus there may be as many senses in animate bodies as there are consents 
in inanimate, so long as there are perforations [perforationes] in the animate 
body to allow for animal spirit to disperse itself into a member properly set 
up, as into a suitable organ. And again, there may no doubt be as many 
motions in an inanimate body, where animal spirit is absent, as there are 
senses in animal ones; though it must be that there are many more motions 
in inanimate bodies than senses in animate, because of the small number of 
sense organs. Now we see a very good example of this in pains. For while 
136 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 291. 
137 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 437. 
138 Rees points out that "Bacon seems to have believed that the shape of an organ (ventricular "geometry") modified the action of the spirits within it, " "Matter Theory: A Unifying Factor in 
Bacon's Natural Philosophy, " 123, n. 27. 
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there are many kinds of pain in animals and many different manifestations 
of each of them (e. g. the pain of burning is one thing, bitter cold another, 
stabbing another, pressing another, racking another, and so on), it is 
absolutely certain that, as far as motion goes, all these exist in inanimate 
bodies, as in wood or stone when burnt, squeezed by ice, or stabbed, cut, 
bent, beaten, and so on, save that here they do not impinge on sense because 
the animal spirit is absent. 139 
It is through the action of consent between the organs of the senses and res (matter's 
emanative powers) that the mind receives phenomenal qualities which are the basis 
for all human knowledge. Thus the metaphor of the mind as mirror carries much 
more philosophical (and materialist) import than is generally acknowledged. As if to 
anticipate future treatments of this notion solely in metaphorical terms, Bacon asks 
rhetorically: 
Are not the Organs of the sences of one kinde with the Organs of Reflexion, 
the Eye with a glasse, the Eare with a Caue or Straight determined and 
bounded? Neither are these onely similitudes, as men of narrowe 
obseruation may conceyue them to bee; but the same footesteppes of 
Nature, treading or printing vppon seuerall subiects or Matters. 140 
The complexity of the human composite determines its capacity to consent 
with matter's infinite variety. Bacon's deployment of the macrocosm-microcosm 
trope explains how the human composite of mind-body is so constructed that it can 
mirror nature. He states: 
It is most true that of all things in the universe man is the most composite 
[maxime compositam esse et decompositam], so that he was not without 
reason called by the ancients the little world. For though the Alchemists, 
when they maintain that there is to be found in man every mineral, every 
vegetable, &c., or something corresponding to them, take the word 
microcosm in a sense too gross and literal, and have so spoiled the elegance 
and distorted the meaning of it, yet that the body of man is of all existing 
things both the most mixed [maxime mistum] and the most organic, remains 
not the less a sober and solid truth. And this is indeed the reason it is 
capable of such wonderful powers and faculties; for the powers of simple 
bodies, though they be certain and rapid, yet being less refracted, broken up, 
and counteracted by mixture, they are few; but abundance and excellence of 
139 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 291. 
140 Bacon, AL, OFB, IV, 78. See also DAS, SEH, IV, 339, cf. I, 542-543. 
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power resides in mixture and composition [virtutis autem copia et 
excellentia in mistura et compositione habitat]. 141 
Elsewhere Bacon describes the mind of man as forma formarum because it 
comprises all other forms. 142 It is the mind's complexity that renders it capable of 
mirroring the world. Thus Bacon's use of the microcosm-macrocosm trope coheres 
perfectly with Ecclesiastes' proclamation that God "hath placed the World in Mans 
heart. " For Bacon, consent guarantees that phenomenal qualities (simple natures) 
provide the link to an originating form and schematism of matter. The task of 
inquiry is to chart a route from the phenomenal qualities of experience to the fons 
emanationis in matter. 143 Consent underpins the potential of the mind to interpret, 
and the guarantee of successful inquiry is directly related to the emanative power of 
nature's active virtues. Under the fundamental appetitive power of Cupid, consent is 
the naturally occurring linkage of schematisms or organisational structures. External 
schematisms of matter emanate motions that resonate on the senses and are reflected 
in internal schematisms. The rays linking the internal and the external schematisms 
are not ontologically distinct from any other form of consent. 
However, the senses are limited, and the mind does distort reality. Matter's 
elemental structures account for both the strengths and weaknesses of the senses. 
But Bacon is clear on the distinction between his views and the sceptical attack on 
the unreliability of the senses: 
But heere was their [skeptics] cheefe Errour: They charged the deceite 
vppon THE SENCES; which in my Iudgement (notwithstanding all their 
Cauillations) are verie sufficient to certifie and report truth (though not 
141 Bacon, DSV, SEH, VI, 747, cf. 671. 
142 Bacon, DSV, SEH, VI, 748, cf. 671. See also DAS, SEH, IV, 407, cf. I, 616; AL, OFB, IV, 107. 
Although this is an Aristotelian formulation, Bacon is speaking of his own forms which are 
"determined in matter" (Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 443). See Aristotle, De anima, iii, S. For Bacon, mind 
and body are material. See n. 128. 
143 In the opening aphorism of Book 2 of Novum organum Bacon lists fors emanationis, natura 
naturans and vera differentia as the terms which "comes closest to what [he] means" by form (NO, 
OFB, XI, 200-201). 
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alwayes immediately, yet by comparison; by helpe of instrument, and by 
producing, and vrging such things, as are too subtile for the sence, to some 
effect comprehensible, by the sence, and other like assistance. But they 
ought to haue charged the deceit vpon the weaknes of the intellectual 
powers, & vpon the maner of collecting, & concluding vpon the reports of 
the sences. This I speake, not to disable the minde of man, but to stirre it vp 
to seeke helpe; for no man, be he neuer so cunning or practised, can make a 
straight line or perfect circle by steadinesse of hand, which may bee easily 
done by helpe of a Ruler or Compass. 144 
In contrast with the sceptical assault on knowledge, Bacon's matter theory explains 
how the senses are reliable. According to Bacon, "the consents of the senses with 
their objects ... are very obvious, 
have been well noted and keenly scrutinised. "las 
Although limited, the senses are a reliable starting point for the inquiry into nature. 
For Bacon, the unreliability of the senses is not merely a problem of 
corruption or distortion, but arises from a naturally determined state of limitation 
with regard to the infinite subtlety of matter's radiative powers. 146 In order for 
sensation to occur, matter's emanations have to register with the animal spirits and 
this requires suitable organs. 147 As Bacon explains, there must be "qualified 
perforations for the [animal] spirits to pass. "148 In the absence of these perforations, 
144 Bacon, AL, OFB, IV, 111 (italics in original). 
145 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 439. 
146 Bacon's concept of radiative matter is taken up again in Chapter 6 where I discuss the unity of the 
sciences. The whole issue of Bacon's notion of the "orb of virtue" and action-at-a-distance needs to 
be thoroughly investigated (ANN, OFB, XIII, 195). For William Gilbert's notion of the orb of virtue 
see De mundo nostro sublunari philosophia nova, Amsterdam, 1651 (Amsterdam: Menno 
Hertzberger, fac. repr. 1965), 47-48,56-57,61. Oddly, Marie Boas makes no mention of Bacon's 
appropriation of Gilbert's orb of virtue, "Bacon and Gilbert, " Journal of the History of Ideas, 12 
(1951), 466-467. 
147 Rees rightly says that, according to Bacon, "Animals are capable of sensation ... 
because the vital 
spirit, channeled throughout the body in the nerves and sinews, communicates with a ventricular 
concentration of spirit" in the brain, "Francis Bacon's Biological Ideas, " 302. Penelope M. Gouk 
observes that "To Bacon himself ... his ideas about sound, hearing and perception were not caps of diverse philosophies assembled like a jigsaw puzzle. They formed part of a single, coherent natural 
philosophy, " "Music in Francis Bacon's Natural Philosophy, " in Francis Bacon: Terminologia e 
fortuna nel XVII secolo, ed. Marta Fattori (Rome: Edizioni dell'Ateneo, 1984), 139-154, on 144. She 
says that for Bacon, "The effects of musical sound on the listener ... arise from the similarity between the species of sound and the spiritus, " 145. However, she fails to mention Bacon's doctrine 
of consent. 
148 Bacon, SS, SEH, II, 556. 
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the animal spirits cannot register matter's emanations. 149 The senses are limited to 
five because there are only five organs which have the necessary perforations "for 
the spirits to pass. " Were there more then five suitable organs, there would (Bacon 
says) be a correlative expansion in the range of perception. As he puts it, 
The organs of the senses qualify the motions of the spirits; and make so 
many several species of motions, and pleasures or displeasures thereupon, 
as there be diversities of organs. The instruments of sight, hearing, taste, 
and smell, are of several frame, and so are the parts for generation ... and 
if 
there were any other differing organs, and qualified perforations for the 
spirits to pass, there would be more than the five senses. 150 
Hence the animal spirits are cut off from a multitude of motions which would be 
accessible if things were otherwise conformed. In Bacon's view, "The subtlety of 
nature far surpasses the subtlety of sense and intellect . "151 The operation of spirit 
contained in tangible matter and the more subtle metaschematisms in gross bodies - 
the sine qua non of operative power - do not strike the senses. If knowledge. of 
matter's hidden activities is a necessary condition for operative power, then without 
149 Bacon identifies two exceptions to this: "the affecting of the spirits immediately, and (as it were) 
without an organ, is of greatest pleasure; which is but in two things; sweet smells, and wine and the 
like sweet vapours" (SS, SEH, II, 556). 
150 Bacon, SS, SEH, II, 556. This leads Bacon to consider "whether some beasts and birds have not 
senses that we know not" (SS, SEH, II, 556). He notes that "the very scent of dogs is almost a sense 
by itself' (ibid. ). In Novum organum he discusses "Summonsing Instances" which lead down the non- 
sensible to the sensible" (my trans., NO, OFB, XI, 346). When "the object is incapable of making an 
impression on the sense, " we must find ways of summoning the object to appear before the sense 
(ibid. ). For example, if we are inquiring into the nature of "Heat or Cold or at any rate its degrees 
which the senses because of their weakness cannot make out, " a calendar glass will make these 
perceptible (NO, OFB, XI, 355). He explains: "The air's sense, as far as hot and cold is concerned, is 
so subtle and exquisite that it far surpasses our faculty of touch, so much so that a sunbeam, or the 
heat of the breath or even more the heat of the hand placed on top of the glass, immediately and 
manifestly makes the water sink. Yet I think that the spirit of animals has a still more exquisite sense 
of heat and cold, save that the bodily mass blocks and blunts it" (NO, OFB, XI, 251). Hence "It is ... 
a subject of a very noble inquiry, to inquire of the more subtle perceptions; for it is another key to 
open nature, as well as the sense; and sometimes better" (SS, SEH, II, 602). Alternatively, 
"sometimes reduction [Deductio] does not take place in human sense but in that of some other animal 
whose sense in certain cases outdoes human capacities, as for instance in the dog when it comes to 
smell, or in the cat, the owl and suchlike creatures with night vision when it comes to the hidden light 
that lingers when the air is not illuminated by an outside source" (NO, OFB, XI, 357-359). 
151 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 67. Bacon repeats this on many occasions - for example, in Valerius 
terminus he writes, "the subtilty of words, arguments, notions, yea of the senses themselves, is but 
rude and gross in comparison of the subtilty of things" (VT, SEH, III, 242). On the key notion of 
"subtlety" in Bacon's philosophy see Rees, "Atomism and `Subtlety' in Francis Bacon's 
Philosophy, " Annals of Science 37 (1980), 549-571. 
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this knowledge we are "as stupid as any star-struck imbecile. "152 The infinite 
subtlety of nature allied to the knowledge that our senses are the only connecting 
thread to nature's hidden powers, entails that Bacon's major concern is to overcome 
the limitations of the senses. Bacon's account of the Idols of the Tribe highlights the 
limitations of the senses: 
But by far the greatest hindrance and distortion of the human intellect stems 
from the dullness, inadequacy and unreliability of the senses, so that things 
which strike the senses outweigh those which, even if they are more 
important, do not strike them immediately. Reflection therefore almost 
stops where sight does, and so things invisible attract little or no 
attention. 153 
Bacon's position here is no mere empiricist theory of perception, but confirms his 
view that from cosmogonical beginnings the great schematism - the outcome of the 
balancing of all categories of nature - includes perceptual and subjective 
psychological categories. Within this cosmogonical framework, Bacon accepts that 
the qualities reported directly by sense (Hot, Cold, White, Black etc. ) can be taken 
as reliable so long as the key aspect of a provision of helps is fulfilled. 154 Bacon's 
simple natures retain the names of commonplace qualities (Hot, Cold etc. ) because 
the task of metaphysics is to define the name after refining the notion. 155 Corrupt 
notions cannot be purified through redefinition, and any further purported 
clarification of terms only compounds the confusion. Bacon's cure for the confusion 
generated by traditional names is to institute a science of definitions, materially 
generated from the signs and markers uncovered through inquiry. Because the 
organs of the senses (albeit unreliably) present phenomenal qualities, Bacon 
152 Bacon, NDR, OFB, XIII, 71. 
153 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 87. 
154 See Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 69. 
155 As Bacon explains in a letter to Father Redemptus Baranzano (1622), "It is the flux of matter and the inconstancy of the physical body which requires Induction; that thereby it may be fixed, as it 
were, and allow the formation of notions well-defined, " LL, XIV, 377. 
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postulates that terms describing qualities can be used to label matter's fundamental 
powers. This explains why the schematisms of matter and "forms of the first class" 
underlying simple natures (phenomenal qualities) share the same names. The 
perception of qualities such as hot and cold indicates consent between the organs of 
the sense and the originating forms and schematisms of matter. Current names for 
individual bodies and their qualities denote a confused mingling of elemental 
motions. Nonetheless Bacon utilises these names as the analytical threads to pursue 
whatever it is in matter that gives rise to a particular phenomenal quality (or simple 
nature). The experimental programme of exclusion resolves component qualities 
active in the latent schematisms of concrete bodies until a single source can be 
traced - the Fons emanationis or form. '56 
Consent guarantees that phenomenal qualities provide links to an originating 
simple nature in matter but inquiry relies on judgement, the work of the mind. The 
natural bond between our inner schematisms (the organs of the senses) and external 
schematisms in nature is so important for Bacon that he characterises the consent of 
the senses with their corresponding simple natures as a template applicable to all 
forms of consent. According to Bacon, "the consents of the senses with their objects 
... may also shed considerable 
light on other consents which lie hidden. "157 The 
limitations of the senses refers only to their unreliability in terms of nature's 
subtlety; the imagination overrides this impediment and supplies fantastic 
explanations to overcome the mind's inability to directly access nature's hidden 
156 The human composite is linked to res through sensation - the links are the rays whose source of 
emanation (tons emanationis) is matter. For a possible source for Bacon's notion of radiative matter 
see Stephen Clucas, "Corpuscular Matter Theory in the Northumberland Circle, " in Late Medieval 
and Early Modern Corpuscular Matter Theories, ed. Christoph Lüthy, John E. Murdoch and William 
R. Newman (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 181-207. Silvia Manzo also associates Bacon with the 
Northumberland Circle, "Francis Bacon and Atomism: A Reappraisal, " in Late Medieval and Early 
Modern Corpuscular Matter Theories, 209-244. 
157 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 439. 
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virtues. Hence Bacon states, "And this is the very thing which I am preparing and 
labouring at with all my might, - to make the mind of man by help of art a match for 
the nature of things. "158 The task of inquiry is to stop the mind acting directly on the 
unreliable input of the senses. 
According to Bacon, the unreliable data supplied by the senses undergoes 
further distortion in the mind's efforts to compensate for its inability to directly 
engage with the subtlety of nature. Bacon refers to this as the "grand deception of 
the senses" In Novum organum he states: 
For the deceptions of the senses should be held over to the specific 
investigations concerning sense and the sensible, save for that grand 
deception of the senses that sets up distinctions between things according to 
the measure of man and not according to the measure of the universe 
[exceptä illä magna Fallaciä Sensuum, nimirüm quöd constituant lineas 
rerum ex analogiä Hominis, & non ex analogiä Vniuersi] -a weakness 
which can only be put right by reason and universal philosophy. 159 
The senses are to be acknowledged as mediator between things and the mind, but 
restored to their legitimate function: the imagination is to be constrained so that the 
mind truly judges their input. If the mind accepts unreliable information, any 
subsequent judgement amplifies ignorance. Bacon clearly states his position on this 
traditional distinction and the error is classified under the Idols of the Tribe: "For 
people falsely claim that human sense is the measure of things, whereas in fact all 
perceptions of sense and mind are built to the scale of man and not universe [ex 
analogiä hominis, non ex analogiä Vniuersi. "160 The blame lies with the mind which 
"is to the rays of things like an uneven mirror [instar speculi incequalis ad radios 
rerum] which mingles its own nature with the nature of things and distorts and stains 
158 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 412, cf. I, 622. 
159 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 359. 
160 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 79-81. 
131 
it "161 What Bacon seeks is a legitimate expansion of sensory range whilst 
simultaneously contracting the current judgemental freedom of the mind to interpret. 
To achieve a reduction of the senses to their proper function and the control 
of the mind's anticipations, Bacon demands a "disentangling" of the composite 
structures delivered to the mind via the organs of the senses. 162 The latter are 
incapable of providing the distinct and separate causes of things. What the inquirer 
ultimately seeks to discover is the terminus in matter of that single cause or form 
which generates a given phenomenal effect (simple nature). The senses register 
concrete bodies as conglomerations of qualities; perception deals with composites 
but the elements of these composites (their originating forms) are simple. The task 
of inquiry is to chart the route from the phenomenal qualities of experience (simple 
natures) to the originating forms and schematisms of matter. Although the organs of 
the senses are the termini of a consenting material network, sensory data transmitted 
through this network requires informed interpretation. In Bacon's terms, the oracular 
pronouncements of the senses are "wrapped in obscurity. "163 Experiment supplies 
helps for the senses: "the minute differences of things ... are either laid bare to sense 
or forced into the light by evidence which can be submitted to sense. "164 This is 
evident in the famous remark that "the sense judges only the experiment while the 
experiment judges nature and the thing itself [re ipsä] "165 The inquiry offers a way 
to overcome the limitations of the senses which are ministered to by what Bacon 
161 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 81. 
162 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 213. 
163 Bacon, RPh, BF, 106, cf. SEH, III, 560. 
164 Bacon, RPh, BF, 130, cf. SEH, III, 583. 
165 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 87. 
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calls "instances" and "apt and appropriate experiments. "166 But this will not 
overcome the "grand deception of the senses": inquiry must bridge the gulf between 
res and mens. Bacon states: "I present myself as high priest of the sense (from which 
all natural knowledge should, unless we prefer madness, be derived), and learned 
interpreter of its oracles; so that whereas others merely claim to watch over and 
cherish the sense, I do so in fact"167 
In order to interpret the oracles of the senses, one requires a "key to 
Interpretation" (clauis Interpretationis). 168 Without this key, men will remain 
"wrapped in eternal night. "169 The key is "true and legitimate Induction" which 
works to segregate composites through exclusion and comparison. '70 For Bacon, 
induction is a process of disentangling concrete bodies into their simple components. 
We will see in Chapter 5 that the analysis or disentangling of complex bodies is the 
work of metaphysics. As Bacon puts it, "the evidence drawn from things is like a 
mask cloaking reality and needs careful sifting"171 Under normal circumstances, 
human perception recognises the species of things and labels them consistently. The 
mind rests satisfied that its cognitions carve or delineate nature and therefore reflect 
nature's true divisions. Baconian science is based on access to more fundamental 
components and the composite must be analysed into its constituent parts: inquiry 
166 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 87. Farrington notes that "The word `Instance' needs a definition. It is more 
than a mere phenomenon of nature. It is an observed fact that has entered into and formed part of a 
logical structure, " BF, 99, n. 2. Pdrez-Ramos has a detailed footnote on the term, Francis Bacon's 
Idea of Science and the Maker's Knowledge Tradition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 246, n. 8. 
Perez-Ramos ties the notion to a forensic context, and hence to Bacon's notion of a "Tribunal of the 
Intellect. " 
167 Bacon, DO, OFB, XI, 35. 
168 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 217. See also CV, BF, 101, cf. SEH, III, 620. 
169 Bacon, RPh, BF, 106, cf. SEH, III, 560. 
170 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 215-217 (italics in original). 
171 Bacon, TPM, BF, 66, cf. SEH, III, 533. 
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seeks individual qualities and ultimately an elemental alphabet of powers. In 
Bacon's terms: 
He who has not mixed, confused and reduced to a mass the whole 
distinction of things which is manifest in species popularly established, or 
even in the names bestowed, will not see the unity of nature, nor the 
legitimate lines of things, <and> he will not be able to interpret. 172 
Through experimentally excluding all that is extraneous to the simple nature, or all 
that fails to produce operative success, an ascent in theoretical knowledge is 
guaranteed. Beginning with the disentangling of sensory phenomena, there is a step- 
by-step narrowing of the domain of investigation and a homing in on the target of 
inquiry (res). Bacon's account of inquiry as a retracing of the path from the 
phenomena of simple nature to its source in matter (i. e. from what is better known to 
man to what is better known to nature) is determined by his doctrine of consent. We 
can now appreciate why Bacon's metaphysical assumptions establish that an 
analysis or sifting of nature's complexities will lead to elemental qualities. 
Bacon does not claim to have exact cartographic knowledge of the terrain of 
inquiry, and says he "merely bear[s] the part of a guide. "173 His vision of "what 
nature may be made to do" and his implicit belief that, as he puts it, "the art of 
discovery grows with discovery" determines his self-correcting strategies. 174 
Tactically speaking, this is diametrically opposed to the traditional procedures of 
both deductive and inductive logic. It is much more akin to the Socratic mode of 
dialectical questioning where argument through exclusion and negatives is 
paramount. Baconian inquiry is based on the decisive assumption that there is 
172 My trans., Bacon, DIN, SEH, III, 785. 
173 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 57. 
174 My tram., Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 197. 
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something to find irrespective of an absence of finalised and clear-cut directions. '" 
Just as the concept of unknowing typical of the via negativa determines the contours 
of the spiritual journey in spite of a substantive lack of description, so Bacon's 
strategies direct to a goal that is known to exist via an uncharted route. In both cases 
what is absolutely known is that there is a goal. This explains the primary place 
given to negativity in his way of inquiry: proceeding through eliminations and 
exclusions redirects inquiry in accordance with the signs given by the cosmogonical 
architecture of a dark and unknowable matter. 176 
Bacon's foundational strategies for overcoming the vices of learning are 
often ignored by commentators in favour of a more specific concentration on logical 
details. Alternatively, I have highlighted the more programmatic reforms of the 
senses and the mind. These reforms can justifiably be termed Bacon's philosophy of 
humility. Any attempt to bolster existing logic or techniques of demonstration 
without an understanding of how matter and the senses conspire in the production of 
knowledge will cause further deviations from the correct route. In Bacon's terms, 
"to put the matter simply ... 
in as much as a lame man on the road will outstrip an 
athlete who is off it, the case is altered. "177 Without experimentation there can be no 
175 In Plato's Meno, Meno proposes a paradox that relates to Baconian inquiry. The paradox states 
that there is no point in inquiring for what we do not know, since we would not recognise it if it were 
found; if we already recognise it, then there is no point in inquiring. See Plato, Meno, 80d-e in Five 
Dialogues: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Meno, Phaedo, trans., G. M. A. Grube (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Co., 2002). Malherbe inadvertently summarises the paradox with respect to Bacon. 
"How, " Malherbe asks, "is it possible to invent truth and produce works methodically, and not by 
chance, since either we do not know what is to be found, and therefore we do not know where to 
search ... or we 
do know what is to be found and therefore there is nothing to search for? " "Bacon's 
Method of Science, " 76. The paradox of inquiry is resolved by Bacon because the goal is certain 
notwithstanding that the route is only established through inquiry itself. This is, more or less, 
Socrates' response to Meno's paradox. 
176 In the following section I argue that the darkness of matter motivates Bacon to formulate his 
method around a central core comprising the concepts of negativity and exclusion. 
177 Bacon, RPh, BF, 118, cf. SEH, III, 572 
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corrective as the route is only marked out by operation and effects. The humiliating 
reduction of the mind is the price for entry into the kingdom of knowledge: 
in inquisition of nature they have ever left the oracles of God's works, and 
adored the deceiving and deformed imagery which the unequal mirrors of 
their own minds have represented unto them. Nay it is a point fit and 
necessary in the front and beginning of this work without hesitation or 
reservation to be professed, that it is no less true in this human kingdom of 
knowledge than in God's kingdom of heaven, that no man shall enter into it 
except he become first as a little child. 178 
Entry into the kingdom of knowledge - and its corollary, viz., access to nature's 
unlimited bounty - requires purgation. 179 Bacon's comparisons of natural inquiry 
with the conditions necessary for spiritual regeneration indicates the level of reform 
required in reducing the mind to a state of primitive ignorance. As Bacon puts it, he 
"yearn[s] for some secret of initiation which, like the coming of April or of Spring, 
might avail to thaw and loosen ... fixed and frozen minds. "180 In the following 
section I argue that Bacon appropriated a whole range of spiritual analogies in the 
form of apophatic theology and its attendant spiritual askesis, known generally as 
the via negativa. The dispositional proclivity to error and the tendency to premature 
theorising is so endemic in human nature that Baconian inquiry exacts a severe 
disciplining of the mind's freedom. In terms of methodical inquiry into nature, the 
apophatic approach is perfectly integrated with Bacon's ontological and 
epistemological assumptions. 
178 Bacon, VT, SEH, III, 224 (italics in original). See also, ANN, OFB, XIII, 173. Rees translates 
Abecedarium nouum naturm as A New Abecedarium of Nature (in contrast to the SEH translation "an 
alphabet of nature"). He argues that the term abecedarium refers to "an alphabet book, child's primer, 
or absey book, " OFB, XIII, 305. As he puts it, "to restore human authority over nature we must ... be humble, become like children and work hard on our ABCs (abecedaria), " OFB, XIII, xl. 
179 Book 1 and Book 2 of Novum organuni are entitled "Aphorisms concerning the Interpretation of 
Nature, and the Kingdom of Man. " (NO, OFB, XI, 65). 
180 Bacon, RPh, BF, 128, cf. SEH, III, 580-581. 
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B. Ignorance and the via negativa 
In Chapter 2,1 presented Bacon's concept of matter. Although beyond 
comprehension in essence, matter is the unique source of the current world which 
manifests a single facet of nature's multifaceted potential. Nature free results from a 
limitation of matter's absolute power (natura naturans). Inquiry into nature must 
begin with "what nature does" (nature free) before it can move to "what nature ... 
may be made to do" (the science of magic). 181 Baconian ontology and epistemology 
depend on binding and exclusion, and so produce what can reasonably be called an 
apophatic approach to science. 182 The apophatic approach fulfils two functions: first, 
it combats the anticipations of the mind and is therefore purgative in itself; second, 
in terms of methodical inquiry into nature, the apophatic approach with its emphasis 
on the via negativa vigilantly scrutinises crude affirmations. The incomprehensible 
nature of dark and unknowable matter determines many of the strategies of 
legitimate inquiry. Many of Bacon's more positive procedural devices emerge out of 
his prioritisation of the role of ignorance and exclusion. In analysing the components 
of Baconian inquiry, the concept of negativity cannot be overstated and Bacon's 
position on its pre-eminence is unqualified: 
The human intellect ... suffer[s] from the peculiar and permanent error of being moved and excited more by affirmatives than negatives, when it 
ought to pay heed in a proper and systematic way to both equally; indeed, in 
the true setting up of every axiom, the power of the negative instance is 
actually greater. 183 
181 NO, SEH, IV, 127, cf. OFB, XI, 214. 
182 The term "apophatic" refers to knowledge of God obtained by way of negation. The terms 
"negative theology, " "via negativa" and "apophatic theology" are interchangeable. 
183 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 85. According to Bacon, the mind's restlessness explains its pursuit of 
affirmatives - there is a "straining for what is further off' (NO, OFB, XI, 85). This is also the 
explanation for the mind's pursuing "final causes" (see NO, OFB, XI, 85-86). 
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Bacon constantly refers to the actions of purging and purifying, making it difficult to 
ignore his interminable borrowings from the language of spirituality and the 
asceticism of his disciplinary programme for the mind. '84 
Although matter in itself is beyond conceptual parameters, its powers are 
manifest through their effects and in this way the senses and the understanding 
acquire a passing familiarity with nature's potency. But the mind's overconfidence 
in its ability to grasp the hidden powers underlying nature's phenomenal 
manifestations is the source of error. In this condition it misinterprets not only what 
matter is, but what it does and what it can be made to do. Bacon's project endorses a 
transition from current ignorance to a state of unknowing, in the positive sense of 
"learned ignorance. "185 For Bacon, our ignorance of what nature can do is corrigible 
precisely because matter's cosmogonical story involves a move from darkness and 
chaos to light and system: natura naturata (matter organised) is the only route back 
to "the innards of operation" (natura naturans). 186 The process of inquiry is a return 
journey into the darkness of matter: 
Now this Cupid [primary matter] is truly an egg hatched by Night, for all 
knowledge of him (all that may be had) proceeds by exclusions and 
negatives. But proof made by exclusion is a kind of ignorance, and as it 
184 On Bacon's use of religious language, see John C. Briggs' brilliant study, Francis Bacon and the 
Rhetoric of Nature (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989). There he argues that "Bacon 
calls on the authority of Solomon, Moses, Paul, and Democritus to conceive a new persuasion, a way 
of understanding nature and mankind in terms of a code to be broken and exploited through self- 
abnegation and an assiduously analytic inquiry undertaken for the sake of charity, " vii. However, in a 
later paper Briggs expresses doubts about the sincerity of Bacon's "quasi-religious readings, " - see 
"Bacon's Science and Religion, " in The Cambridge Companion to Bacon, ed. Markku Peltonen 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 172-199, on 185. For example, he asks, "Does this 
highest Baconian endeavour - the prolongation of life - arise from and perhaps extend the reach of 
religion and charity, or is it more simply a useful, perhaps debased, secular adaptation of religious 
concerns and doctrines of salvation? " 194. Briggs rightly argues that many studies fail to "do justice 
to the complexity of Bacon's debt to, and use of, religion. They do not adequately account for the 
tension between Bacon's solemnity, which moderns tend to underestimate, and the nearly grotesque, 
perhaps deeply subversive pretension of the New Atlantis's appropriation of religion for the sake of 
the new sciences, " 196. To date, Briggs is the only commentator to do justice to this tension. 
185 See Jasper Hopkins, Nicholas of Cusa on Learned Ignorance: A Translation and an Appraisal of 
De docta ignorantia (Minneapolis: The Arthur J. Banning Press, 1985). 
186 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 181. 
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were Night, with regard to what is included in it [... ]But the parable further 
suggests that there is some end and limit to these exclusions ... for Night 
does not incubate forever. Certainly it belongs to God alone, that, when His 
nature is inquired of by the sense, exclusions shall not end in affirmatives. 
But here the case is otherwise, that is, that after due exclusions and 
negatives something is affirmed and established, and an egg hatched, as it 
were, after an appropriate period of incubation; and not only is it that the 
egg is hatched by Night but also that the person of Cupid is hatched from 
the egg, that is, not only some notion of this matter drawn and extracted out 
of ignorance, but also a distinct and definite notion. 187 
As we saw in Chapter 2, the Cupid fable contains "the doctrine concerning the 
principles of things and the origins of the world. "188 The principles of things are the 
hidden powers of matter (natura naturans) and the phrase "origins of the world" 
signifies the processes that culminate in this particular world (natura naturata). In 
Bacon's ontology, other worlds are possible but there is only one ultimate principle, 
figured by Cupid who depicts matter's appetitive power and holds the keys to the 
union and dissolution of bodies. Cupid's unitive power is also the fount of human 
operative power, but appropriating "the power of the keys, which binds and loosens" 
depends upon discovering the real lines of union and division in nature. 189 This 
involves an investigation into things that are (in all of their dynamic processes) 
beyond the reach of the human senses. The inaccessibility of matter (res), allied to 
the fact that the human mind (mens) is full of phantasmal smog, idols and illusions 
explains the scale of the task of regenerating the mind. 190 In order for the union of 
187 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, V1,201-205. 
188 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 197 (italics in original). This has already been alluded to in Chapter 2 
where I introduced the cosmogony/cosmology division. A failure to heed this distinction has misled 
much of the commentary on Baconian matter. This distinction has to be kept in mind if we are to 
understand Bacon's optimism that "there be remaining so great an abundance of works most fruitful 
and utterly unknown" (my trans., DIN, SEH, III, 787). 
189 Bacon, HDR, OFB, XIII, 129. See Matt. 16: 19,18: 18. 
190 As Bacon puts it, "the island of truth is lapped by a mighty ocean in which many intellects will 
still be wrecked by the gales of illusion [idolorum]" (TPM, BF, 69, cf. SEH, III, 536). On the various 
meanings of the term idola see Michele Le Doeuff, "Hope in Science, " in Francis Bacon's Legacy of 
Texts: `The Art of Discovery Grows with Discovery, ' ed. William Sessions (New York: AMS Press, 
1990), 9-24. Le Doeuff concentrates on the religious and cultic meanings of the term idola, but points 
out that even its epistemological meaning as "fallacies" has theological resonances. She says that on 
three occasions Bacon contrasts the "humanae mentis Idola" with the "divinae mentis ideae, " 14-15. 
139 
res and mens to be consummated, the understanding must be delivered from its 
corrupt notions and "drag[ged] back to [its] primitive ignorance. "191 From that 
purified state of ignorance, the mind is gradually reintroduced to nature beginning 
with the natural histories (natura naturata), which provide materials for the mind's 
commerce with nature. According to Bacon, there is a symbiotic relationship 
between erasing the old and writing in the new: 
If I should ask you to grapple immediately with the bewildering 
complexities of experimental science before your mind has been purged of 
its idols, beyond a peradventure you would promptly desert your leader. 
Nor, even if you wished to do so, could you rid yourself of idols by simply 
taking my advice without familiarising yourself with nature. On waxen 
tablets you cannot write anything new until you rub out the old. With the 
mind it is not so; there you cannot rub out the old till you have written in 
the new. 192 
The process of erasing to a state of learned ignorance is traditionally associated with 
the via negativa. We have already seen that Bacon rejects the sceptical terminus, but 
does not reject the aim of sceptical thinking, viz., the reduction to an acknowledged 
ignorance. I argue that there is much to be gained from examining how the via 
negativa contributes both destructively (as a strategy in Bacon's pars destruens) and 
constructively (as the core of his strategy in Book 2 of Novum organum) to the 
regeneration and continual governance of the intellect. 
As discussed, Bacon's optimism is all the more noteworthy given that 
matter's schematisms are no less mysterious than its essential power. Our senses are 
too gross for nature's subtlety and the mind is shrouded in delusion and fantasy. 
Despite these obstacles, Bacon maintains the existence of a path that leads "to the 
The idols (in a theological sense) are those things which have ousted "things in themselves" in favour 
of false gods that are nothing but illusions generated by the mind. See Bacon, PID, SEH, III, 549; 
NO, OFB, XI, 73,187. 
191 Bacon, DGl, OFB, VI, 111. 
192 Bacon, TPM, BF, 72, cf. SEH, III, 539. This is why Book 1 and Book 2 of Novum organuni must 
work in tandem. See also RPh, BF, 103,132, cf. SEH, III, 558,584. 
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fountains of things"193 This optimism is sustained notwithstanding that the precise 
contours of the route are unknown. My explanation for this prima facie incongruous 
optimism is based on Bacon's promotion of the via negativa. In Chapter 2,1 drew 
attention to Bacon's view that because matter per se is beyond any positive 
designation, it can only be referred to by way of negatives. Hence Bacon praises 
Democritus' rejection of all similarities between sensory qualities and the qualities 
of atoms. However, in its uncontracted primordial condition, matter holds all 
possible explications. The contraction of matter's power and the subsequent 
production of a cosmology commit Bacon to further emphasising limitation and 
exclusion: matter limits its power in its self-contracting and organising mode, and in 
the process other possibilities are perforce excluded. Correspondingly, the mind 
limits its anticipations and its ultimate freedom with a view to endless operative 
possibilities. Thus the reasons for Baconian optimism are understood when we grasp 
Bacon's conception of the power of negativity and limitation: they operate at all 
levels of matter's activities and so provide the methodological analogue to his 
cosmogonical architecture. Baconian inquiry and the pursuit of infinite operative 
possibility are the consequences of matter's primordial contraction but the clue to its 
delineations can only be found in its manifestations. Unfortunately (as discussed), 
this reliance on phenomenal qualities further contributes to the mind's delusions. 
The method of exclusion is, in Bacon's terms, a way of putting right "the corrupt 
complexion of that very faculty [the intellect], which simply cannot avoid being 
tainted and stained, and then perverted and twisted by the daily invasion of ordinary 
experience. "' 94 This essential connection between matter's obscurity and the 
exclusionary procedures of the method is never alluded to in Baconian commentary, 
193 My trans., Bacon, PA, OFB, XIII, 260. 
194 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 307. 
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and thus a major feature of the way of inquiry has been overlooked. It is not 
surprising - given Bacon's radical alignment of ontology and 
inquiry - that he 
refuses to argue over philosophical detail: all former systems are wrongly conceived 
as they rest on two fatal errors. 195 First, they have not taken matter as the hidden 
fount of all things. Second, they have wrongly assumed that the senses and the 
naked mind can aspire to knowledge of things better known to nature (notior 
natura; ). In contrast, Bacon's operative dialectical programme requires that mind 
and matter are in constant interplay: this synergism of mind and matter is the 
essence of Baconian inquiry. 196 
In its current state of confusion and fascination with nonsense, the mind will 
mistake signs for things themselves and so "anticipate" by leaping to false 
explanations. In that case it has already left the path of inquiry. The continual 
regeneration of the mind (delivered in Book 1 of Novum organum) is only possible 
through constant guidance and "directions" on how to navigate "the dark and 
difficult tracts of nature" (outlined in Book 2 of Novum organum). 197 These are the 
twin supporting pillars of Bacon's Instauratio. Under the Baconian regime, 
legitimate anticipations are permitted so long as there remains experimental contact 
with things themselves. The union of the mind and things is, I argue, conceived by 
Bacon through the appropriation of the language and concepts traditionally ascribed 
to the union between the soul and the divine in via negativa theology. The 
conditions underpinning both are a purification and cleansing of existing knowledge 
195 Malherbe points out that it is "not only for simplifying and tactical reasons that Bacon refuses any 
disputatio with earlier philosophies and that he prefers to conduct a redargutio rather than a 
confutatio. All philosophies reactivate the same natural tendency; all rest on the arbitrary act of a will 
which scorns the search for truth; and all offer, as a warranty, their demonstrative form, the order of 
which does not vary ," "Bacon's Critique of Logic, " 73. 
196 It is worth noting that the division into negative and positive procedures is purely heuristic: in 
procedural terms they do not stand in isolation from each other. If the negative is the constant 
companion of the Baconian investigator there is also the positive generation of axioms. 
197 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 51; DO, OFB, XI, 29. 
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with a consequent reduction to ignorance. In this way the mind is rendered capable 
of mirroring things as they are: the method removes impediments that obscure 
nature's true delineatons. Before expanding on this claim, and to further support my 
insistence on the importance of the via negativa in Baconian inquiry, I will provide a 
brief outline of traditional negative theology. 
According to Denys Turner, the term "apophatic" (and its antonym 
"cataphatic") are derived from the Latin traditions of Neoplatonic mysticism most 
fully developed in the writings that have come down to us under the authorship of 
Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite. 198 Apophaticism refers to a way of theologising 
grounded in an acceptance of human ignorance with respect to the being and/or 
attributes of God. In the words of Aquinas: 
The most perfect [state] to which we can attain in this life in our knowledge 
of God is that he transcends all that can be conceived by us, and that the 
naming of God through remotion [per remotionem] is most proper ... The 
primary mode of naming of God is through the negation of all things, since 
he is beyond all, and whatever is signified by any name whatsoever is less 
than that which God is. 199 
This approach (with its prioritisation of human ignorance) receives incisive 
treatment in Nicholas of Cusa, where apophatic procedures culminate in what is now 
famously translated as "learned ignorance" (docta ignorantia). 200 As Turner points 
out, this is not a "pre-critical" stance which has the possibility of an eventual 
knowing but is more a condition of "unknowing. "ZO' The author of The Cloud of 
Unknowing, for example, deploys the term "unknowing" (an invented transitive 
198 See Denys Turner, The Darkness of God: Negativity in Christian Mysticism (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), 20. 
199 Aquinas, Super Librum Dionysii De divinis nominibus, cited in A Companion to Philosophy in the 
Middle Ages, ed. Jorge J. E. Gracia and Timothy B. Noone (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), 648. 
200 See Jasper Hopkins, Nicholas of Cusa on Learned Ignorance: A Translation and an Appraisal of 
De docta ignorantia (Minneapolis: The Arthur J. Banning Press, 1985). 
201 Denys Turner, The Darkness of God: Negativity in Christian Mysticism (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), 19. 
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verb-form) to describe the alteration in human cognition from presumed knowledge 
to a state of absolute ignorance via the purgative removal of all knowing. 202 
Bacon's procedures for the mind's purgation and purification involve 
reducing or levelling its presumed abilities by systematically confronting it with its 
own ignorance. We saw that Bacon drew attention to the striking parallels between 
his own approach to knowledge and the way of Acatalepsia favoured by the 
sceptics. In a recent study Michael McCanles attempts to construct historical 
connections between Bacon's empiricist epistemology, late medieval Ockhamist 
nominalist semantics, and the negative theology of traditional Christian mystical 
spirituality. 203 As a general strategy, Bacon deploys this confluence of philosophical 
and theological devices in response to dogmatic and sceptical claims that he 
considers unfounded. 204 For example, Baconian epistemology demands that the 
investigation of matter's properties requires stringent discipline (askesis) governing 
theorising. 205 Moreover, that Bacon consciously drew on the via negativa is clear 
202 It is this conceptual and terminological background which, some argue, feeds into late medieval 
nominalism with its emphasis on parsimony and extreme forms of empiricism and fideism associated 
with Ockham and his followers. As it concerns Bacon, see Michael McCanles "The New Science and 
the Via Negativa: A Mystical Source for Baconian Empiricism, " in Francis Bacon and the Refiguring 
of Early Modern Thought, ed. Julie Robin Solomon and Catherine Gimelli Martin (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2005), 45-68; idem., "From Derrida to Bacon and Beyond, " in Francis Bacon's Legacy of 
Texts: 'The Art of Discovery Grows with Discovery' (New York: AMS Press, 1990), 25-46. 
203 See McCanles, "The New Science and the Via Negativa, " 45-47. According to McCanles, Bacon 
inherited the vocabulary and approaches of late medieval nominalism, which had itself been 
constructed on the mystical theology of Pseudo-Dionysian spirituality and applied to wider 
philosophical and theological issues. 
204 There are innumerable instances throughout the Baconian corpus where Bacon integrates spiritual 
and inquisitorial or methodical concepts. See Briggs, Francis Bacon and the Rhetoric of Nature for 
an interpretation that links Baconian themes to Solomonic, Platonic and Pauline wisdom. As 
discussed, Briggs presents Bacon's work as a regenerative spiritual programme involving paradoxical 
interconnections between the exploitation of nature and self-abnegation. See n. 184. 
205 McCanles focuses on epistemological and semantic issues and has little to say about the operative 
aspect of Baconian inquiry. Bacon is presented as someone concerned solely with disciplining the 
mind's "concept- and language-making powers, " "The New Science and the Via Negativa, " 53. 
Baconian control of the formation of notions and definitions cannot be divorced from Baconian 
ontology and cosmogony and certainly makes no sense in the absence of a discussion of 
experimentation. McCanles is correct that Bacon imposed limitations and constraints on the mind's 
epistemological excesses, but that in itself is only part of the intention of Baconian constraint. 
144 
from its explicit use in De principiis atque originibus. 206 In brief, there are 
convincing textual and internal conceptual grounds for acknowledging Bacon's 
utilisation of the tradition of negativity, scepticism and learned ignorance. 
We have seen that Bacon regards the human mind as insane; its madness 
expresses itself in its presumptive knowledge and inveterate pride. This highlighting 
of intellectual pride and the need for a corrective discipline of humiliation are 
central features of the via negativa. Hence, I began this discussion by echoing 
Bacon's own starting point, namely, that the mind must accept the move from 
knowing to unknowing. Without the recognition of current ignorance and insanity, 
Bacon proclaimed, no method can possibly offer correction because all methods will 
prolong the pathology of the mind (since they are themselves products of the 
unregenerated understanding). Madness is a consequence of the mind's strivings to 
overcome its confrontation with the darkness of matter by the construction of 
imaginative fantasies posing as philosophy. Bacon therefore regards these methods 
to console the mind as mere palliatives. Ultimately, the mind's confusion and 
corruption rests on its refusal to face up to the incomprehensibility of matter. 
Bacon's legitimate inquiry has the purgative power to cure both ignorance and its 
consequence - madness. In contrast to the palliatives of existing methods, Bacon's 
method demands a severe curtailment and expurgation of all existing knowledge. 
This askesis (or discipline) is extraordinarily harsh and Bacon was fully aware of its 
severity, seen in his advancing a surreptitious strategy of inveigling his programme 
into the human mind: 
206 There is no textual evidence for a direct connection to an Ockhamist tradition. There may in fact 
be more immediate sources for Bacon's material here. Bruno, for example, identifies the darkness of 
matter and negativity. Moreover Bruno's debt to Cusa is well known. We have already seen (in 
Chapter 2) Bacon's use of Cusa's concept of complicatio-explicato, which was directly taken from 
Cusa by Bruno and probably appropriated by Bacon. On Bruno's frequent references to Cusa, see 
Paul Henry Michel, The Cosmology of Giordano Bruno, trans. R. E. W. Maddison (London: 
Methuen, 1973), 45. 
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Borgia said of the French expedition into Italy, that they came chalk in 
hand to mark up their lodgings and not sword in hand to break their way in. 
In the same way I plan to ease my doctrines into souls suitably qualified and 
capable of understanding them. For when we are at odds about the 
principles and notions themselves, and even about the forms of 
demonstrations, attacking opposing arguments is of no use at all207 
However, Bacon's purported gentle and non-antagonistic strategy should not 
obscure the sheer severity of Baconian discipline where the mind "is driven ... 
by 
harsh laws and extreme discipline. "208 The reduction to ignorance and the promotion 
of the negative instance provide a healing purification. Without the practical 
implementation of Bacon's therapeutic programme, there is no Baconian project: the 
mind will relapse into its habitual insanity - sustained through anticipation and 
reckless theorising -a process made invisible by the fact that, as Bacon puts 
it, all 
are mad in the same way. 
The interpretation of Baconian inquiry in terms of the via negativa can be 
further illustrated. By substituting knowledge of material causes for divine 
proximity, and operative success in producing novel effects for spiritual progress, 
the parallels are striking. Bacon's union of the knower (mens) and the known (res) 
closely parallels the mystical union of the purified soul and the divine vision. Both 
promise real effects and the only true criterion for success is to be found in operative 
power to produce effects: the one in the soul of the mystic, the other in the works 
207 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 77. In a letter to Thomas Bodley after he had sent him Cogitata et visa (see 
below) Bacon writes: "You are, I bear you witness, slothful, and you help me nothing ... I can say no 
more to you, but non canimus surdis, respondent omnia sylvcz. If you be not of the lodgings chalked 
up (whereof I speak in the preface) I am but to pass by your door" (LL, X, 366). In CV Bacon says, 
"he could not forget that inveterate prejudices, like the delusions of the insane [tanquam 
phreneticorum deliramenta], must be artfully circumvented rather than exacerbated by violent 
opposition. Accordingly, to avoid fanning rather than quenching the flames of contention ... he 
recognised the desirability of a certain measure of prudent conformity. To this end he proposed a 
work on the interpretation of nature and on nature itself, designed to eradicate errors with the least 
possible offence and thus to effect a peaceable entry into the apprehensions of men" (CV, BF, 100, cf. 
SEH, III, 619). See also TPM, BF, 62, cf. SEH, III, 529; NO, OFB, XI, 149; DAS, SEH, IV, 371, cf. I, 
578. 
208 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 85. This is one of the few places where Bacon is completely candid about 
the effects of the method on the intellect. His tables of discovery bind and restrain the understanding 
in order to prevent it anticipating similarities among divers things. 
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derived from the science of magic. 209 There is therefore ample crossover between 
the purging and purifying of the soul for the vision of divine things and the purging 
of the mind for its encounter with matter (res). In expository terms there are 
revealing analogues at work here that are not to be explained as a coincidence of 
terminology and a mere similarity of strategies. Knowledge (either of Baconian res 
or of the divine things) must be of what is and not of what is imagined. Both ways 
begin with a necessary levelling process to produce a salutary ignorance; they both 
demand purification and purgation as propaeduetics for entry into their respective 
mysteries. Bacon concludes Temporis partus masculus, "Take heart, my son, and 
give yourself to me so that I may restore you to yourself. "210 
In contrast to commentators such as Michael McCanles and John Briggs who 
see purgation as having conceptual or moral goals per se, I argue that Bacon's 
strategic deployment of the via negativa serves material transformative ends. 211 The 
209 There are further conflation between the divine and the material. Bacon applies the terms "Actus 
purus" and "natura naturans, " terms normally reserved for God, to matter: both God and matter are 
deemed the inaccessible cause without cause (causa causarum). The isomorphism between matter 
and God seems complete in view of Bacon's explicit elevation of matter in De principiis atque 
originibus. See Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 88,200. Charles T. Harrison writes that "Bacon's basic 
metaphysical sympathies were with materialism. Expediency made him perform lip-service to 
religion, and one can hardly doubt after reading his essay "Of Atheism" that he held to some kind of 
belief in God. Yet nowhere in his writings does he attempt an examination of God's nature or assign 
God a r81e in the universe, " "Bacon, Hobbes, Boyle, and the Ancient Atomists, " Harvard Studies and 
Notes in Philology and Literature 15 (1933), 191-218, on 193. 
210 Bacon, TPM, BF, 72, cf. SEH, III, 539. 
211 The investigation into nature's secrets - the pursuit of high knowledge - was seen by many as 
antagonistic to traditional theological and moral demands. Bacon's defence of the probity of 
investigating nature forms part of the design of VT and AL. For this reason, I have reservations about 
a literal interpretation of Bacon's "moral" reform. For example, McCanles makes much of the 
mystical "moral perfection of the knower" as a necessary condition for "knowledge aimed at, " "The 
New Science and the Via Negativa, " 51. As mentioned, Briggs locates Bacon's programme in a 
lineage indebted to Solomonic, Pauline and Timaeic traditions which emphasise the need for 
purgation, humility and moral purity, Francis Bacon and the Rhetoric of Nature (see n. 184). Box 
detects contradictions between Bacon's moralising in AL and his more Machiavellian tone in other 
places, "Bacon's Moral Philosophy, " 260-282. Perhaps Bacon's aims should be considered before 
paradoxes and contradictions are taken as symptomatic of his incoherence. On the cultural 
contradictions generated by the pursuit of "high" things see Carlo Ginzburg, "High and Low: The 
Theme of Forbidden Knowledge in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, " Past and Present 73 (1976), 28-41. For a discussion of Bacon's strategy for dealing with the difficulties caused for his Instauration by the dubious status of curiosity see Peter Harrison, "Curiosity, Forbidden Knowledge, 
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exclusionary approach is necessitated by Bacon's conception of matter and its 
contraction into the current world (nature free). Bacon's emphasis on the darkness of 
matter motivates the contours of his inquiry because of his foundational assumption 
that a path can be charted into matter's elemental activities. His via negativa 
removes the "shifts of ignorance" obscuring man's vision of what "nature can be 
made to do "212 To help the mind confront its own ignorance, Bacon tactically 
exploits the language and concepts of the via negativa. He deliberately appropriates 
theological terminology when speaking of matter; he time and again appropriates 
moral or doctrinal language in promoting his method and his vision of reform; even 
the traditional dichotomy of potentia absoluta and potentia ordinata maps precisely 
onto his cosmogonical and cosmological vision. His strategies for dealing with the 
mind are the same as those for dealing with matter. The binding of the mind 
enhances understanding and increases knowledge; likewise experimentation 
generates operative power through constraining matter. Thus the constraining of 
matter and mind coincide in Baconian inquiry. In Chapters 4 and 5 we will see that 
the construction of tables and the experimental testing of axioms contribute to the 
binding and restraining of the mind by clearing away extraneous details: 
As the army of particulars is so vast and so scattered and dispersed that it 
dissipates and confounds the intellect, we should have no good hopes for 
the latter's cursory sorties and ineffectual flights, unless the particulars 
relating to the subject under investigation be marshalled and drilled by 
appropriate tables of discovery, well drawn up and ready, so to speak, for 
action, and unless the mind buckle down to the organised assistance made 
ready by these tables. 213 
and the Reformation of Natural Philosophy in Early Modem England" Isis 92 (2001), 265-290. 
Harrison argues that "Bacon's proposals for the instauration of knowledge were an integral part of a 
process by which curiosity underwent a remarkable transformation from vice to virtue over the 
course of the seventeenth century, " 265. 
212 Bacon, SS, SEH, II, 614. 
213 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 159-161. 
148 
In De principfis atque originibus Bacon utilises the via negativa to rid the mind of 
false preconceptions about the nature of matter. But although Bacon's apophatic 
approach depicts matter as dark and incomprehensible, he offers an ontology of 
infinite possibility. Paradoxically, access to nature's infinite bounty requires a 
programme of self-abnegation. Hence the mind's reduction to ignorance is a 
substantive part of the Baconian method. Book 1 of Novum organum is an exercise 
in purification which does not have ethical or spiritual ends but epistemological and 
operative ones. The less the mind intervenes and imposes its ill-disposition the 
better: 
I am emphatically of the opinion that men's wits require not the addition of 
feathers and wings, but of leaden weights. Men are very far from realising 
how strict and disciplined a thing is research into truth and nature, and how 
little it leaves to the judgement of men 214 
Human nature in its present cognitive state evinces an extreme self-aggrandisement. 
In its unregenerated state the mind is subject to the tyranny of the imagination, to 
principles wrongly established, to the short-term interests of the passions, and to an 
institutional authority reluctant to relinquish its power. These conflicting interests 
are reflected in the knowledge and methods used by the intellect to guarantee truth. 
Instead of undergoing the demands of the via negativa, the mind expands its 
imaginary dominion over things, whereas real dominion demands a subjection of the 
mind to things. Certainty in knowledge depends on operative success in shifting 
matter from what it presently does to what it can be made to do. Baconian inquiry 
lacks cogency unless there is the recognition that it maps perfectly onto Bacon's 
conception of matter. 
214 Bacon, RPh, BF, 119, cf. SEH, HI, 573. See also NO, OFB, XI, 163. 
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III. Conclusion 
This chapter has drawn attention to important correspondences between Bacon's 
concept of nature free/nature bound and his notion of the mind free/bound. The 
theme of freedom versus constraint offers salutary insight into Baconian inquiry. 
Bacon's remedy for the madness of the unfettered mind parallels the experimental 
act of binding matter's free and unfettered power. Binding facilitates the union of 
res and mens. By means of constraints, Bacon proposed to break the spell of the 
double labyrinth of mind and matter. Bacon's various ontological assumptions 
underpin his hopes for operative success. Baconian matter entails that the mind and 
things are implicated in the material unity of all things. The Baconian method, I 
argue, is a consequence of Bacon's cosmognony - not a shift in the nature of logical 
argumentation. 
We have seen the importance of negativity as an inquisitional aid to the 
intellect in uniting the mind with things. Negativity is related to Bacon's philosophy 
of humility, illustrated by his incorporation into natural inquiry of the language and 
concepts of the via negativa. Bacon's discipline of constant correction was designed 
to strip the mind of extraneous and obstructive materials in order to render it capable 
of mirroring reality. These overarching strategies sustain a material union between 
the mind and things by way of a cybernetic epistemology. Negative instances (in the 
form of experimental feedback) offer a governing and self-correcting guidance 
ensuring certainty in reaching the target. Although it is impossible to know the 
contours of inquiry in advance, Bacon's concept of radiative matter guarantees a 
route from human perception to the origins or causes of phenomenal qualities. This 
is achieved by pursuing the resolution of complex phenomenal qualities of sensation 
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into their respective components. In this way, Baconian inquiry ultimately arrives at 
a limited number of elemental causal powers. 
Having outlined Bacon's programme to unite the mind with things, the 
following chapter will focus on the practical implementation of his programme. The 
union of res and mens is hindered by the overwhelming complexity and bewildering 
fecundity of matter. Experimentation -a hitherto neglected aspect of Baconian 
inquiry - is the clue to nature's intricate labyrinth. Moreover, it sustains the union of 
res and mens. 
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Chapter 4 
The Clue of Experiment 
"For the several employments and offices of our fellows; we have twelve 
that sail into foreign countries, under the names of other nations, (for our 
own we conceal; ) who bring us the books, and abstracts, and patterns of 
experiments of all other parts. These we call Merchants of Light. 
"We have three that collect the experiments which are in all books. 
These we call Depredators. 
"We have three that collect the experiments of all mechanical arts; 
and also of liberal sciences; and also of practices which are not brought into 
arts. These we call Mystery-men. 
"We have three that try new experiments, such as themselves think 
good. These we call Pioners or Miners. 
"We have three that draw the experiments of the former four into 
titles and tables, to give the better light for the drawing of observations and 
axioms out of them. These we call Compilers. 
"We have three that bend themselves, looking into the experiments 
of their fellows, and cast about how to draw out of them things of use and 
practice for man's life, and knowledge, as well for works as for plain 
demonstration of causes, means of natural divinations, and the easy and 
clear discovery of the virtues and parts of bodies. These we call Dowry-men 
or Benefactors. 
"Then after divers meetings and consults of our whole number, to 
consider of the former labours and collections, we have three that take care, 
out of them, to direct new experiments, of a higher light, more penetrating 
into nature than the former. These we call Lamps. 
"We have three others that do execute the experiments so directed, 
and report them. These we call Inoculators. 
"Lastly, we have three that raise the former discoveries by 
experiments into greater observations, axioms, and aphorisms. These we 
call Interpreters of Nature. 1 
In the preceding chapter, I outlined Bacon's way of inquiry in terms of his 
programme to unite the mind with things. In this chapter, I focus on the details of 
how this union is implemented and maintained. This involves a detailed discussion 
of Bacon's concept of experiment. Although Bacon has a reputation as "the first 
philosopher of experimental science, " there is surprisingly no thorough exposition of 
1 Bacon, NA, SEH, III, 164-165 (my emphasis). 
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the Baconian concept of experiment .2 This chapter therefore provides such an 
exposition, adhering strictly to Bacon's precise meanings, and allowing him 
wherever possible to speak in his own terms. 
I argue further that experiment is the clue that guides the interpreter through 
nature's labyrinth .3 It 
forms the core of Baconian inquiry. Each phase of inquiry 
prioritises experiment. Bacon's generic distinction between experiments fructifera 
and experimenta lucifera is commonly treated in the literature: the former give rise 
to artefacts for immediate utility or pleasure, while the latter are "of no use in 
themselves but ... only contribute to 
the discovery of causes. "4 What is not 
recognised is that, at different levels of inquiry, the terms experimenta fructifera and 
experimenta lucifera have quite specific meanings. This oversight stems from a 
tendency to conflate three distinct types of mechanics, which have very different 
functions in the Baconian programme. 5 First, there is the mechanics of the artisan, 
whose techniques and operations have mostly been discovered by chance. Second, 
2 Ian Hacking, Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural 
Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 246. According to Peter Pesic, Bacon 
"envisioned the emergent character of experimentation, " "Wrestling with Proteus: Francis Bacon and 
the `Torture' of Nature, " Isis 90 (1999), 81-94 on 81. 
3 Bacon refers to the filum experientm in the fable of "Daedalus, or the Mechanic" (DSV, SEH, VI, 
660, cf. 735). Spedding's translation - "the clue of experiment" - is justified given that the phrase 
occurs in the context of a discussion of mechanics. Bacon states: "Pulcherrima autem allegoria est de 
labyrintho, qua natura generalis Mechanicce adumbratur. Omnia enim mechanica, quce magis sunt 
ingeniosa et accurata, instar labyrinthi censeri possint; propter subtilitatem et variam implicationem, 
et obviam similitudinem, quce vix ullo judicio, sed tantum experientice filo, regi et discrirninari 
possunt. Nec minus apte adjicitur, quod idem ille qui labyrinthi errores invenit, etiam fill 
commoditatem monstravit. Sunt enim artes mechanicce veluti usus ambigui, atque faciunt et ad 
nocumentum et ad remedium, et fere virtus earum seipsam solvit et retexit" (DSV, SEH, VI, 660). 
Elsewhere Bacon remarks, "mere experience ... is called accident if it happens by itself, but 
experiment if it is deliberately sought out" (NO, OFB, XI, 131). 
4 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 157-159. On experimenta fructifera and experimenta lucifera see Rees, OFB, 
XI, lvii, lxiii, 530,565. 
5 Baconian mechanics is not to be confused with the emergent discipline of the geometrical study of 
motion outlined in W. R. Laird, "The Scope of Renaissance Mechanics, " Osiris 2 (1986), 43-68. For 
further evidence of Bacon's departures see George Ovitt, Jr. "The Status of the Mechanical Arts in 
Medieval Classifications of Learning, " Viator 14 (1983), 89-105. For a brief discussion of the 
historiographical issues see J. A. Bennett, "The Mechanics' Philosophy and the Mechanical 
Philosophy, " History of Science 24 (1986), 1-28, esp. 9. 
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there is a form of mechanics which proceeds "by extending or transferring or putting 
together former inventions. "6 Bacon terms this experientia literata. The third 
variety, Bacon defines as the operative counterpart to his science of physics: physics 
extracts axioms from experiments, and the science of mechanics extracts new 
experiments from axioms. The first is utterly without art or method, the second 
possesses nascent ordering, but the third forms the core of Baconian inquiry - it 
integrates physics and mechanics by a constant feedback process, a form of inquiry 
which I have labelled "cybernetic. "7 At the level of natural history and experientia 
literata, experimenta fructifera are artisanal works, while experimenta lucifera are 
procedures which help to illuminate causes. At the higher level of physics, 
experimenta lucifera are "experiments of a higher light, more penetrating into 
nature, " while in mechanics, experimenta lucifera test axioms (hypotheses). 8 The 
prioritisation of experimenta lucifera plays a determinate role in maintaining the 
union of the mind with things. At all levels of inquiry, experimenta lucffera feed 
back into the experimental history so that "the art of discovering will grow as the 
number of things discovered grows. "9 
6 Bacon, DAS, SEH, N, 366, cf. I, 572. 
7 On the meaning of the term "cybernetic, " see Chapter 3. 
8 Bacon, NA, SEH, III, 185. 
9 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 197. 
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I. Natural and experimental history 
Baconian inquiry begins with the collection of "A Natural and Experimental History 
of a Kind Fit to Serve as a Plan for the Basis and Foundations of the True 
Philosophy. "10 The success of the Baconian method depends upon the quality of the 
natural and experimental history. Bacon refers to this as the "Mother history" 
because its purpose is "to illuminate the discovery of causes and nourish philosophy 
with its mother's milk. "" We saw in Chapter 2 that Bacon's natural philosophy 
presents us with a threefold division of nature. Nature, according to Bacon, "is either 
free and unfolds itself in its ordinary course [& cursu suo ordinario se explicat]; or 
it is torn from its course by the crookedness and arrogance of matter and by the 
violence of impediments; or it is restrained and moulded by art and human 
agency. "12 This division is reflected in the mother history: it must accordingly deal 
with "the liberty of nature, or its errors or its bonds. "13 Hence Bacon divides the 
mother history into "History of Generations, of Pretergenerations and of Arts, the 
last of which, " he says, "I have also got used to calling Mechanical and 
Experimental. " 14 According to Bacon, inclusion of the mechanical arts in the project 
of natural history is essential: 
The raison d'etre of a natural history drawn up for its own sake is one 
thing, but one compiled systematically to inform the intellect for the 
building up of philosophy is quite another. And these two kinds of history 
10 Bacon, PAH, OFB, XI, 451. 
11 Bacon, PAH, OFB, XI, 453; DO, OFB, XI, 39. 
12 Bacon, PAH, OFB, XI, 455. 
13 Bacon, PAH, OFB, XI, 455. 
14 Bacon, PAH, OFB, XI, 455. On Bacon's innovations in natural history see Paula Findlen, "Francis 
Bacon and the Reform of Natural History in the Seventeenth Century, " in History and the Disciplines: The Reclassification of Knowledge in Early Modern Europe, ed. Donald R. Kelley (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 1997), 239-260. 
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differ in many respects but above all in this: that the first takes in the variety 
of natural species but not the experiments of the mechanical arts. 15 
An entry in Commentarius solutus (Bacon's notebook) also shows his preoccupation 
with mechanical history: 
To procure an History mechanique to be compiled wt` care and diligence 
(and to professe it that is of the experin and observations of all 
Mechanicall Arts. The places or thinges to be inquyred are; first the 
materialls, and their quantities and proportions; Next the Instrumv and 
Engins requesite; then the use and adoperation of every Instrumt; then the 
woork it self and all the processe thereof wt' the tymes and seasons of doing 
every part thereof. Then the Errors woe may be comytted, and agayn those 
things wb conduce to make the woorke in more perfection. Then all 
observacions, Axiomes, directions. Lastly all things collaterall incid` or 
intervenient. 16 
An explanation of why the mechanical arts contribute so powerfully to the inquiry 
into nature forms the main theme of this section. Bacon's appraisal of the 
mechanical arts, then it is apparent, has little to do with the elevation of the role of 
the artisan. The role of mechanics is principally derived from the manner in which it 
brings matter's hidden powers to the surface. 
The demand that a natural history should contribute to the growth of 
philosophy by mirroring nature's "threefold condition" allows us to see that the 
mechanical arts are correlated with nature bound. 17 We saw in Chapter 2 that, for 
Bacon, the ordinary course of nature manifests a single aspect of nature's 
multifaceted possibility: "the universe with its several species according to their 
ordinary frame and structure, is merely the face of matter unconstrained and at 
liberty [non constrictcz auf devincta, ]. "18 Matter's powers are not used up, hence 
If any skilful Servant of Nature shall bring force to bear on matter, and shall 
vex it and drive it to extremities as if with the purpose of reducing it to 
nothing, then will matter (since annihilation or true destruction is not 
possible except by the omnipotence of God) finding itself in these straits, 
15 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 157. 
16 Bacon, LL, XI, 65-66. 
17 Bacon, DGl, OFB, VI, 99. 
18 Bacon, DSV, SEH, VI, 726, cf. 652. 
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turn and transform itself into strange shapes, passing from one change to 
another till it has gone the whole circle and finished the period; when, if the 
force be continued, it returns at last to itself. 19 
It is a fundamental principle of Bacon's conception that matter will make further use 
of its hidden powers when vexed or bound. Bacon maintains that nature limits its 
operations so that its manifestations arrange themselves in customary or habitual 
modes of action, leaving other pathways unused. Whereas the primordial powers 
randomly combine, the manipulation of motions in the mechanical arts is through an 
agent's intention. Even the most basic artisanal operation actualises hidden facets of 
nature. Artisans, Bacon thinks, are already engaged in the project of disclosing 
matter's potential. In the actions of the smith or the potter, nature "is restrained, 
moulded, completely transformed and as it were made new by art. '20 
Mechanics is utterly reliant on the hidden powers or motions of matter. Its 
operations spur on or tie up motions, from which follows "conversion and 
transformation of matter itself. "21 Bacon illustrates this idea in Sylva sylvarum under 
the heading "Experiments ... touching motion of bodies upon their pressure. "22 
There he makes it clear that mechanical arts are based on the utilisation of matter's 
hidden motions. He describes the experiment of pressing a solid body so as to cause 
"an inward tumult in the parts. "23 Under this constraint, the parts seek to free 
themselves from the compression and this, according to Bacon, "is the cause of all 
violent motion. "24 Although this motion of compression is "of all motions the most 
19 Bacon, DSV, SEH, VI, 726, cf. 652. 
20 Bacon, DGI, OFB, VI, 101. 
21 Bacon, CDNR, SEH, V, 425, cf. III, 21. In simple everyday mechanical operations such as dyeing 
or glazing, the apparent simplicity of operation obscures the import of the natural-philosophical 
causes - the hidden processes of motions are no less significant because the operation is routine and familiar. 
22 Bacon, SS, SEH, II, 342. 
23 Bacon, SS, SEH, II, 342. 
24 Bacon, SS, SEH, II, 342. 
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common, and the chief root of all mechanical operations, " it has, he says, "never 
been observed nor inquired. 1125 In his account, "This motion worketh in round at 
first, by way of proof and search which way to deliver itself; and then worketh in 
progress, where it fmdeth the deliverance easiest. "26 This calls to mind Proteus' 
manoeuvrings: he "in order to get free, would turn himself into all manner of strange 
shapes. "27 For Bacon, this experiment demonstrates that bodies will not endure 
compression passively, and that motions seek the easiest route to recovery. 
Mechanics is the site where the production of artificial things has availed itself of 
the powers inherent in matter. When subjected to compression, propulsion etc., 
bodies seek escape and display hidden motions more accessibly "than when in 
enjoyment of [their] natural liberty. "22 The mechanical arts display matter's 
transformative powers, but their role in the mother history is to aid the discovery of 
the causes of transmutation - the moving principles "whereby [per quce] ... things 
occur. 'n9 
In order to grasp why a manifestation of nature's hidden facets is so 
important for a mother history intended for the building up of natural philosophy, we 
need to examine Bacon's concept of the ascent of knowledge and its dependency on 
the derivation of axioms of increasing generality. The purpose of Bacon's ascending 
scale of axioms is to arrive at knowledge of primary axioms or forms - the laws 
25 Bacon, SS, SEH, II, 342. 
26 Bacon, SS, SEH, II, 342. Because of their habitual tendencies, motions seek to return to their 
former pathways (for example, when a spring is stretched). Bacon intends to compile a chart of 
history "On the powers of habit and novelty in motion" (De viribus Consuetudinis et Novitatis in 
Motu) (My trans., ILM, SEH, III, 635). 
27 Bacon, DSV, SEH, VI, 725, cf. 651. 
28 Bacon, CV, BF, 99, c£ SEH, III, 617-618. 
29 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 105 (italics in original). 
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which unify natura naturata. 30 According to Bacon, "the speculation was excellent 
in Parmenides and Plato ... `that all things 
by a certain scale ascend to unity. "131 
Baconian inquiry proceeds 
by collecting and uniting the axioms of sciences into more general ones, 
and such as may comprehend all individual cases. For knowledges are as 
pyramids, whereof history and experience are the basis. And so of Natural 
Philosophy the basis is Natural History; the stage next the basis is Physic; 
the stage next the vertical point is Metaphysic. As for the cone and vertical 
point ("the work which God worketh from the beginning to the end, " 
namely, the summary law of nature) it may fairly be doubted whether man's 
inquiry can attain to it 32 
These "three ... true stages of knowledge" mirror the unfoldings of matter giving 
rise to nature's phenomenal fecundity. 33 In his representation of nature as rising to a 
point like a pyramid, Bacon provides the following description: 
Individuals, which lie at the base of nature, are infinite in number; these are 
collected into Species, which are themselves manifold; the Species rise 
again into Genera; which also by continual gradations are contracted 
[contrahuntur] into more universal generalities, so that at last nature seems 
to end as it were in unity 34 
This unity of nature is a reflection of the primary impulse or desire of materia prima 
to cohere. Through a process of unfolding, this unity is retained in the multiplicity of 
individual things. This is why Bacon can chart the return journey from multiplicity 
to a termination in forms: individuals are never truly separated from that unity, and 
(at the cosmogonical level) the germinal elements of everything that can possibly be 
are already contained in enfolded matter. The move from the one to the many, 
characterised by the pyramidal figure, involves a successive constraint on the 
30 Forms are "laws of pure act" because they are independent of instantiation in specific bodies (NO, 
OFB, XI, 119-121). The summary law of nature - the source of all forms - is absolutely unspecified 
and therefore the ground of all possibility. Bacon identifies forms with possibility precisely because 
they cut across species. The experiments of the mechanical arts are instrumental in displaying the 
unity of nature insofar as they contribute to the mother history for the building up of natural 
philosophy. 
31 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 362, cf. I, 567. 
32 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 361-362, cf. I, 567. 
33 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 362, cf. I, 567. 
34 Bacon, DAS, SEH, N, 321, cf. I, 525. 
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absolute power of materia prima in so far as it is a unity. This move, although a 
contraction in terms of potency, entails a concomitant outward expansion of 
generative and organisational power: in this way unity gives rise to multiplicity. 
Commentators have overlooked that the purpose of Bacon's method is to make the 
pyramid of knowledge (mens) a perfect reflection of the pyramid of nature (res) (see 
figures 4.1 and 4.2). The inquiry inverts the primordial emanation from unity to 
multiplicity. Bacon is in no doubt that 
The true philosophy ... echoes most faithfully the voice of the world itself, 
and is written as it were from the world's own dictation; being indeed 
nothing else than the image and reflexion [simulacrum et re 7exio] of it, 
which it only repeats and echoes, but adds nothing of its own. "35 
Thus whilst the multiplicity of nature (natura naturata) displays a bewildering 
fecundity, Bacon is able to identify the underlying simple forms with natura 
naturans (the supreme potency of matter). 
35 Bacon, DSV, SEH, VI, 714, cf. 640. 
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Fig. 4.1. The pyramid of knowledge 
Fig. 4.2. The pyramid of nature 
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It is well known that Bacon's natural history supplies "the stuff and variety 
[supellex atque sylva] of the true and legitimate induction. "36 But it is not well 
understood that the ascending scale of axioms is intended to unify natura naturata 
in an ever closer approximation to primary axioms (forms). The further the ascent 
from the multiplicity of natural history (natura naturata), the more the axioms 
expand their scope proportionately. As we move from unity towards the base level 
of natural history, the scope of the axiom is diminished proportionately. This 
summarises the relationship between bare particular and form. The mind must not 
rest content at any intermediate level but use its interaction with things to expand the 
sphere of activity of its axioms. Hence Bacon says: 
In the history which I expect to find and am intent on we must see above all 
that it has a wide range and is made to the measure of the universe. For the 
world is not to be tailored to the slenderness of the intellect (which is what 
has been done hitherto) but the intellect should be stretched and opened up 
[sed expandendus Intellectus, & laxandus] to take in the image of the world 
as we really find it. For this habit of taking in just a few things and making 
assertions on the basis of them has ruined everything 37 
In Bacon's severe castigation of traditional learning, he derides "the axioms in 
current use. "38 They have, he asserts, been produced "from a handful of slender 
experiences" based on the casual investigation of "particulars which crop up 
often. "39 These particulars are then forced to fit the understanding so that experience 
is narrowed to the demands of prevailing theories. Axioms generated in this way 
have no footing in the reality of things themselves. As he puts it, men "have simply 
given up Natural History in the sense of a perambulation of the world. Instead they 
have based themselves in everything on the agitation of their own wit, content to 
circle round and round for ever amid the darkest idols of the mind under the high- 
36 My trans., Bacon, DGI, OFB, VI, 104. 
37 Bacon, PAH, OFB, XI, 459 (italics in original). 
38 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 73. 
39 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 73. 
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sounding name of contemplation. "40 On that basis, of convenience and 
accommodation, where things are "pretty much made and tailored to fit" the mind's 
preconceived categories, Bacon concludes, "it is no wonder if they [axioms] do not 
lead to new particulars. "al 
In order for axioms to be fruitful, they must have an increasingly wide 
applicability; they must be drawn from a wide range of particulars inclusive of all 
the main divisions of nature. This entails a concomitant expansion of the mind from 
its customary observations. In its expanded purview, the mind is able to produce 
axioms made to the measure of the universe and not to the measure of man. The 
history of generations is merely a record of a single facet of nature's possible faces. 
The experiments of the mechanical arts, however, increase this record of natura 
naturata. By forcing matter to exhibit actions that it would not otherwise have done, 
they have unveiled alternative facets. Thus Baconian inquiry is a search for axioms 
with a wide applicability - axioms that will unify particulars drawn from nature free, 
nature erring and nature bound (the mechanical arts). As he says, 
Once ... the History has been finished of all those things I have mentioned 
- of Generations, Pretergenerations and of Arts and Experiments - it seems 
to me that we will lack nothing we need to equip the sense for informing the 
intellect. Then no longer shall we, like people bewitched, tread out our 
narrow round; instead we shall bestride the walls of the world 42 
The mother history supplies the human mind with "the basic material [primae 
materix] of the sciences. "43 Because the mother history equips the sense, Bacon 
conceives of it as a "ministration to sense. "44 
40 Bacon, CV, BF, 82, cf. SEH, III, 600-601. 
41 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 73. 
42 Bacon, PAH, OFB, XI, 461-463. 
43 Bacon, DGI, OFB, VI, 97. 
44 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 215. The mind cannot generate effects but only recognise and respond to them. As it depends on the senses for its stock of effects, the more the senses are assisted in expanding their range of experience, the more the mind is equipped for the ascent to axioms. The 
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Having outlined how all material effects - whether "natural, " "deviant" or 
"artificial" - are equally manifestations of matter's potency, we are now in a 
position to understand why the inclusion of the mechanical arts in the mother history 
is essential. However, although matter is the common cause, Bacon prioritises the 
history of arts over and above the history of generations and pretergenerations and 
this is a highly revealing move in Baconian inquiry. "The use of History Mechanical 
is, " he says, "of all others, the most radical and fundamental towards natural 
philosophy. "45 Bacon offers further reasons for the inclusion of the mechanical arts 
in the project of natural history. Not only do the mechanical arts shake out nature's 
hidden folds, but they also display "the passages and variations of nature. "46 The 
more traditional histories are on a par with a descriptive, "pastoral" philosophy. 47 
They "reflect on nature by fits and starts, and after bodies have finished off what 
they are doing" when what is most needful is an engagement with bodies "while 
they are still operating. "48 This form of active inquiry, in contrast to passive 
observances, is facilitated by the mechanical arts. 
Bacon prioritises the history of mechanical arts because he recognises them 
as modes of operation which "betray" matter's hidden powers or motions: 
For just as in affairs of state we see a man's mettle and the secret sense of 
his soul and affections better when he is under pressure than at other times, 
main obstacle to inquiry is the current fascination of the mind with the limited experiences delivered 
to it by the senses. As Bacon puts it, the corrupt intellect "simply cannot avoid being tainted and 
stained, and then perverted and twisted by the daily invasion of ordinary experience" (NO, OFB, XI, 
307). 
45 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 297, cf. I, 500. 
46 Bacon, AL, OFB, IV, 65. The concept of "display" here differs from the way in which a 
geometrical modelling of mechanical forces displays a model of interactions among bodies. Bacon 
seeks a literal display, not a model and his axioms are intended to lead the mind to operatively access 
motions, not to represent them schematically. 
47 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 251. See also AL, OFB, N, 93. 
48 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 359. 
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so nature's secrets betray themselves [produnt se] more through the 
vexations of art than they do in their usual course a9 
The history of mechanical arts "strips the mask and veil from natural things which 
generally lie concealed or hidden beneath a variety of shapes and outward 
appearances. "50 The analogy between the vexing of Proteus and the mechanical 
manipulation of matter is overtly stated when Bacon draws attention to a 
fundamental property of matter, viz., that under duress it will exhibit its internal 
appetites and potencies: "the vexations of art are indeed like the chains and manacles 
of Proteus which betray the ultimate strivings and exertions of matter [quce vltimos 
Materice Nixus & Conatus produnt]. "51 Bacon's notion of nature betraying itself 
underpins his interest in the above experiment touching the strivings of bodies under 
pressure. In Sylva sylvarum he points out that this motion whereby bodies strive to 
deliver themselves from compression "is visible" in liquids: "for all liquors strucken 
make round circles, and withal dash; but in solids (which break not) it is so subtile, 
as it is invisible; but nevertheless bewrayeth itself by many effects. "52 Bacon is 
convinced that "the same nature, which seems to be hidden and secret [latens & 
occulta] in some things, is manifest and almost palpable in others. "53 Because matter 
49 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 157. Ursula Klein points out that Boerhaave, "Like Bacon and Boyle before 
him, ascribes to experiments the role of displaying the latent peculiar powers of bodies that cannot be 
observed directly by our senses. Chemical art `discovers and lays before our eyes the very 
instruments whereby that powerful agent [nature] produces her effects, and thus leads us in her most 
secret ways, and often wisely directs them to our own uses, "' "Experimental History and Herman 
Boerhaave's Chemistry of Plants, " Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical 
Sciences 34 (2003), 548. 
50 Bacon, PAH, OFB, XI, 463. 
51 Bacon, PAH, OFB, XI, 463. 
52 Bacon, SS, SEH, II, 342. 
53 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 143. Bacon's favourite example is the water bubble: "Water-bubbles seem to 
shut themselves up in little hemispherical membranes; the force by which they do this strikes us as 
something mysterious and ingenious. The force which holds wood or stone together we take for 
granted, and give them the name solid, " CV, BF, 91, cf. SEH, III, 609. 
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will make further use of its hidden powers when vexed or bound, the mechanical arts 
(Bacon thinks) reveal "secret motions of things. 54 
We saw in Chapter 3 that Bacon's method is a product of "prolonged 
examination both of the state of nature and the state of the human mind. "55 
Considered from the point of view of the human mind, the mechanical arts are 
"trustworthy interpreters of causes"56 Man's intervention in nature in the 
mechanical arts increases his understanding of nature's processes. " As Bacon puts 
it, "Can it be said that anyone had just happened to explain the nature of lightning or 
a rainbow as clearly before the principles of each had been demonstrated by artillery 
or the artificial simulacra of rainbows on a wall? "58 In the mechanical arts the mind 
is focused on how things come about; the structure of artificial things is simpler and 
their history can be witnessed as they come into being. 59 According to Bacon, 
Nature of its own accord, free and shifting, disperses the intellect and 
confuses it with its variety, but in mechanical operations the judgement is 
concentrated, and we see nature's modes and processes [& naturce mod! & 
processus cernuntur], not just its effects. 60 
54 Bacon, NA, SEH, III, 156. 
55 Bacon, TPM, BF, 62, cf. SEH, III, 528. 
56 Bacon, PhU, OFB, VI, 9. 
57 Farrington rightly points out that, for Bacon, "The secret workings of nature do not reveal 
themselves to one who simply contemplates the natural flow of events. It is when man interferes with 
nature, vexes nature, tries to make her do what he wants, not what she wants, that he begins to 
understand how she works and may hope to learn how to control her, " Francis Bacon: Philosopher of 
Industrial Science (London: Macmillan, 1951), 109. But Farrington fails to uncover the deeper 
intentions of this Baconian principle. According to Bacon, vexing nature will not of itself bring about 
the understanding required to control nature. Bacon's artful control of nature depends upon the 
discovery of forms - the laws unifying nature's behaviour. 
58 Bacon, PhU, OFB, VI, 9. 
59 Bacon's concept of witnessing should not be confused with Steve Shapin's and Simon Schaffer's 
account of virtual witnessing, Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life 
(Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1985), passim. Indeed, Boyle's discussion of the 
Baconian distinction between experimenta lucifera and experimenta fructifera cited below indicates 
that Boyle had notions of experimentation other than the paradigmatic social witnessing expounded 
in Shapin's and Schaffer's account. 
60 Bacon, PhU, OFB, VI, 5 
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When speaking of the mechanical arts in Commentarius solutus, Bacon takes it for 
granted that we can observe the "woork it self and all the processe thereof wth the 
tymes and seasons of doing every part thereof. " In Novum organum he writes, "if 
anyone wanted to explore and study the industry and skill of any artisan, he would 
want not only to see just the raw materials of the art and then the finished product 
but rather to be there while the artisan was doing his job and carrying his work 
forward. "61 In the mechanical arts, the manner "of making and working" artefacts 
"is generally plain to see, whereas in ... nature 
it is often much less obvious. "62 The 
crucial point is that in mechanical contrivances, "nature's modes and processes" are 
made visible: we see "things in motion" (Res in Motu) 63 Bacon explains that 
"among the arts we should prefer those which display, change and prepare [exhibent, 
alterant, & prcvparant] natural bodies and material things, for instance agriculture, 
cookery, chemistry, dyeing, the manufacture of glass, enamel, sugar, gunpowder, 
pyrotechnics, paper, and the like. "M In their delineation of how phenomenal things 
have come about, artificial things are assigned "the leading roles in shedding light 
on nature. "65 
Most importantly (as it throws light on matter's hidden powers), Bacon's 
mechanical history focuses not only on the products of the arts (experimenta 
fructffera) but also on what he calls experimenta lucifera: on what, in Commentarius 
solutus, he describes as "things collaterall incidt or intervenient. " Kenneth Cardwell 
refers to Bacon's promise that "when the natural history and its `auxiliary and light- 
61 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 359. 
62 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 301. 
63 Bacon, PAH, OFB, XI, 463. 
64 Bacon, PAH, OFB, XI, 463. Bacon's interests here have led commentators such as Farrington and 
Rossi to draw biographical links between the famous French potter Bernard Palissy and Bacon. On 
the possible connections see Rossi, Francis Bacon, 8; Farrington, BF, 33; idem., Francis Bacon, 13- 
15. 
65 Bacon, Ph U, OFB, VI, 9 
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giving experiments' are in hand, `the inquisition of nature and of all sciences will be 
the work of a few years. "'66 To illustrate the importance that Bacon attributes to 
experimenta lucifera, consider his discussion of redness as it applies to alteration 
during mechanical operation: 
In the whole mass of this History of the Arts, we must observe one thing 
especially and remember it all the time, namely that we must adopt not just 
Experiments of Arts which lead directly to the purpose of the art in question 
but also those that crop up in the process. For instance, the fact that mud- 
coloured lobsters and crabs turn red when cooked means nothing to the 
diner, but this very instance is still very useful for inquiring into the nature 
of redness, since the same thing happens to baked bricks 67 
The history of mechanical arts, in Bacon's terms, "will give a more true and real 
illumination concerning the investigation of causes of things and axioms of arts, than 
has hitherto shone upon mankind ... "68 Crucially, the experiments of the mechanical 
arts are "not to be judged by their intrinsic worth but by how they can ... fertilize the 
field of philosophy. "69 Bacon has in mind that "streams of experiments of the 
mechanical arts should flood on every side into the sea of philosophy. "70 We will see 
in the next section that experientia literates extends the experimental history, 
supplying philosophy with further experimenta lucffera. 
66 See Kenneth Cardwell, "Francis Bacon, Inquisitor, " in Francis Bacon's Legacy of Texts, ed. 
William Sessions (New York: AMS Press, 1990), 269-289, on 271. Cardwell's paper offers an 
excellent account of the connections between the juridical notion of inquisition and Bacon's use of it 
in the investigation of nature. Among the many insightful points made by Cardwell, he draws 
attention to the emphasis Bacon places on "the testimonies of experience" and "heaped up evidentia, " 
in contrast to a juridical display of rhetorical "argument, " 280. In the questioning of nature, there is 
no argument because, as Cardwell says, Bacon's inquisitorial strategies are based in experience, 
natural histories, and the testimony of nature itself - all of which obviate the need for adversarial 
argument. These inquisitional procedures are also recursive: any answer received from nature can be 
immediately fed back into the inquisitional process as the response of a perfectly trustworthy witness. 
67 Bacon, PAH, OFB, XI, 463. 
68 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 297-298, cf. I, 500. 
69 Bacon, PAH, OFB, XI, 465. 
70 Bacon, PAH, OFB, XI, 465. 
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II. Experientia literata 
In De augmentis Bacon identifies three modes of discovery: chance, the raising of 
axioms by means of Novum organum, and experientia literata. As he puts it, 
All inventions of works which are known to men have either come by 
chance and so been handed down from one to another, or they have been 
purposely sought for [aut de industria qucesita]. But those which have been 
found by intentional experiment have been either worked out by the light of 
causes and axioms [the New Organon], or detected by extending or 
transferring or putting together former inventions [experientia literata] 71 
This section will examine the role of experientia literata (literate experience) in 
Baconian inquiry. 
According to Bacon, "almost all mechanical arts have sprung from small 
beginnings presented by nature or chance. 72 The same is true of the alchemists' 
findings: "if, in the course of their devious wanderings through the jungle of 
experience, they now and then lighted on something useful, this was by good luck 
rather than good guidance. "73 Bacon compares the alchemists' case to the fable of 
the old man who bequeathed to his sons gold buried in a vineyard, pretending not to 
know the exact spot - the sons dig the vineyard and, although they fail to find the 
gold, the vintage is made more plentiful by their digging. In the same way, "the Sons 
of Chemistry, searching for gold which may or may not be there, have by their 
bustle and stir been of no small profit and service to mankind. But their discoveries 
take their rise and bear their fruit on no higher intellectual plane than those of the 
71 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 366, cf. I, 572. 
72 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 416, cf. I, 627. 
73 Bacon, TPM, BF, 67, cf. SEN, III, 534. 
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Mechanical Arts. They depend on mere experience. "74 In Bacon's view the 
mechanic, "caring nothing for investigating the truth, does not give his mind or 
reach out his hand to anything apart from what helps him in his work. "75 Hence he 
characterises the mechanical arts as "merely empirical and operative. "76 For the 
most part, the alchemists are no better; "they, being faithful disciples of the furnace, 
... never got 
beyond their art. "77 However, among the alchemists Bacon identifies "a 
valuable group, " not utterly devoted to their theoretical systems, who try, by 
noticing the varying contexts to which a more "subtle application of mechanics" can 
extend, to enlarge "the range of discoveries. 78 In Bacon's eyes, "such a one was 
Roger Bacon. "79 Bacon's concept of experientia literata facilitates this "subtle 
application of mechanics" exemplified by Roger Bacon. 80 
Experientia literata refers to the mother history drawn into "titles and 
tables. "81 The tables bring "all the experiments of all the arts ... collected and 
arranged [collecta & digesta] ... within one man's 
knowledge and judgment. "82 By 
offering craftsmen a storehouse of previously scattered materials, experientia 
literata dissolves the boundaries of proprietorial and professional interests. 
According to Bacon, 
74 Bacon CV, BF, 87, cf. SEH, III, 605. The term "experience" as used here refers to the limited 
experience obtained in the practice of a single craft where habitual routines are encouraged. Bacon's 
aim is to break such habits through the cross-fertilisation of the arts. 
75 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 157. 
76 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 365, cf. I, 572. 
77 Bacon, TPM, BF, 67, cf. SEH, III, 534. 
78 Bacon, TPM, BF, 67, cf. SEH, III, 534. 
79 Bacon, TPM, BF, 67, cf. SEH, III, 534. 
80 On Roger Bacon see William R. Newman, "The Philosopher's Egg: Theory and Practice in the 
`Alchemy of Roger Bacon, " Micrologus: Nature, Sciences and Medieval Societies 3 (1995), 75-101. 
81 Bacon, NA, SEH, III, 164. 
82 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 161. 
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If men could only bring themselves not to fix their thoughts too intently on 
the consideration of the subject before them, rejecting everything else as 
irrelevant [parerga] ... they would never 
be so dull as they are wont to be, 
but by a free passage and transference of their thoughts they would find 
many things at a distance which near at hand are concealed [sed 
transferendo cogitationes suas et discurrendo, plurima invenirent in 
longinquo qucegrope latent]. 83 
This is the force of experientia literata; it facilitates the drawing of connections, 
similarities, analogies and differences that transcend the seclusion and isolation of 
the various arts. As Lisa Jardine puts it, "experientia literata is the material of the 
natural history organised in such a way as to suggest to a perceptive mind the 
possibilities for enlarging [experimental] knowledge by applying techniques 
successful in one field in similar fields, or by applying experiments successful on 
one type of material to similar materials"84 Experientia literata puts the mechanic's 
natural sagacity to better informative and indicatory use by incorporating the 
mechanical history within tables and thereby overcoming his narrow concentration 
on operations and techniques peculiar to his specific art. 
Bacon identifies eight ways of extending the mechanical history: "The 
method of experimenting proceeds principally either by the Variation, or the 
Production, or the Translation, or the Inversion, or the Compulsion, or the 
Application, or the Conjunction, or finally the Chances [Sortes], of experiment. "85 
83 Bacon, HV, SEH, V, 194-195, cf. II, 73. Parerga is a term meaning "incidentals" - it is used to 
describe deeds that were not one of the twelve great labours of Hercules but were incidental to the 
actual labour (such as finishing Antaeus). 
84 Jardine, Francis Bacon: Discovery and the Art of Discourse (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1974), 144. 
85 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 413, cf. I, 624. For a detailed account of Bacon's methods of experimenting 
see Jardine, Francis Bacon, 143-149; William Eamon, Science and the Secrets of Nature (Princeton, 
N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), 285-291; James Stephens, Francis Bacon and the Style of 
Science (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1975), 92-96; F. H. Anderson, The Philosophy of 
Francis Bacon (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948), 284-288. 
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Although Bacon here includes chance among the methods of experimenting, chance 
and experientia literata should not be conflated. 86 As Bacon explains, 
A man may proceed on his path in three ways: he may grope his way for 
himself in the dark; he may be led by the hand of another, without himself 
seeing anything; or lastly, he may get a light, and so direct his steps; in like 
manner when a man tries all kinds of experiments without order or method 
[serie auf methodo], this is but groping in the dark; but when he uses some 
direction and order in experimenting, it is as if he were led by the hand; and 
this is what I mean by Learned Experience. For the light itself, which was 
the third way, is to be sought from the Interpretation of Nature, or the New 
Organon. 87 
Chance as a form of experimenting "is merely irrational and as it were mad, when 
you have a mind to try something, not because reason or some experiment leads you 
to it, but simply because such a thing has never been attempted before. "88 Bacon 
retains a role for chance because "the magnalia of nature generally lie out of the 
common roads and beaten paths, so that the very absurdity of the thing may 
sometimes prove of service. "89 However, experientia literata - "the transference and 
application of processes already known" - will not bring to light magnalia naturce. 
As Bacon says, 
no one contemplating the siege-engines and catapults of the ancients would 
ever, even if he spent a lifetime straining every nerve, have stumbled on the 
invention of weapons worked by gunpowder ... Hence all the discoveries 
which we regard as more noble have (if you think about it) been brought to 
light not by minute elaborations and extensions of the arts [experientia 
literata], but entirely by chance 90 
Bacon's praise of printing, gunpowder, and the compass is well known 91 According 
to Benjamin Farrington, "To the sixteenth century these three discoveries - printing, 
gunpowder, and the compass - were the symbols of what mechanical inventions 
86 Bacon lists chance among the methods of experimenting because he has earlier divided the Art of 
Indication into two parts (notwithstanding that "a man may proceed ... in three ways") (DAS, SEH, IV, 413, cf. I, 622). 
87 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 413, cf. I, 623. 
88 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 420, cf. I, 632. 
89 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 420, cf. I, 632. 
90 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 303. 
91 See Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 195. 
172 
could effect ... "92 Yet 
for Bacon, only printing can be deemed a mechanical 
invention; gunpowder and the compass (which "rest on the hidden properties of 
things") are due to chance 93 As he says, "Printing involved nothing more than the 
combination of things already known, things that lay on the surface, as one might 
say. "94 For Bacon, printing "gives ground for hope that a vast number of inventions 
depend, not on the ferreting out of mysterious operations, but on the transference 
and application of processes already known [experientia literata]. "95 However, no 
great matter can be hoped from that. In Bacon's terms, "the rule is that what 
discoveries lie on the surface exert but little force. The roots of things, where 
strength resides, are buried deep. "96 Hence it is essential to distinguish between 
chance and experientia literata as modes of discovery. If we fail to do so, we cannot 
explain why Novum organum is required at all. Chance, he says, "scatters her 
blessings on mankind only after tedious and tortuous wanderings. "97 No man, for 
example, would "have ventured to imitate thunder and lightning, if it had not been 
suggested by the pot lid of the monkish chemist suddenly flying up with great force 
92 See also Rossi: "These [mechanical arts], he [Bacon] says, unlike theoretical sciences, will not be 
set up as idols of perfection, for they are continually thriving, growing, advancing, and alive to the 
needs of humanity; we have already seen this happen in the case of printing, artillery, and navigation. 
These achievements were made possible because many minds collaborated to one end: in the 
mechanical arts there can be no dictators but only `senates' of free and equal workers, " Francis 
Bacon, 9. Rossi's comments here show the care that must be taken when reading Bacon. Rossi's 
mistake is that he has not paid sufficient attention to the divisions and phases of Baconian inquiry as 
clearly delineated by Bacon. The distinctions are important because the whole system of inquiry 
depends on them for its coherence. Perez-Ramos makes the same error, Francis Bacon's Idea of 
Science and the Maker's Knowledge Tradition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 80. 
93 Bacon, CV, BF, 97, cf. SEH, III, 615 
94 ibid. 
9s ibid. 
96 Bacon, CV, BF, 93, cf. SEH, III, 612. Bacon's point is all the more significant because the topos of 
the "three great discoveries" is repeatedly cited as Bacon's evidence for what can be achieved 
through focusing on experiment and observation. 
97 Bacon, CV, BF, 73, cf. SEH, III, 591. 
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and a loud report. "98 According to Bacon, "nothing anticipates or gets ahead of 
chance (whose custom is to work only over long ages) except the discovery of 
forms. "99 We will see in Chapter 5 that Bacon's science of magic "applies the 
knowledge of hidden forms" so that the magnalia of nature "can be speedily, 
suddenly and simultaneously anticipated and made manifest "loo 
Not only have commentators conflated chance and experientia literata, but 
also experientia literata and physics. I deal with the relationship between Bacon's 
doctrines of physics and mechanics in Part III. Here I am concerned only to define 
and delimit experientia literata. Bacon states: 
Indication either proceeds from one experiment to another; or else from 
experiments to axioms; which axioms themselves suggest new experiments. 
The one of these I will term Learned Experience [Experientiam Literatam], 
the other Interpretation of Nature, or the New Organon. lol 
Bacon is absolutely clear in his demarcation of experientia literata and Novum 
organum. Experientia literata "proceeds from one experiment to another. " It does 
not "extend so far as to the invention of any axiom. For all transition from 
experiments to axioms, or from axioms to experiments, belong to that other part, 
relating to the New Organon. "102 Yet William Eamon argues that "Bacon 
characterized learned experience as an inductive methodology. "103 According to 
Eamon, 
Bacon's learned experience ... was essentially an attempt to define a 
rigorous methodology for conjecturing from the seen to the unseen aspects 
of nature, and from causes to effects ... He wanted to reduce cunning to a 
98 Bacon, DAS, SEH, N, 416, cf. I, 627. 
99 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 303. 
100 Bacon, DAS, SEH, N, 367, cf. I, 573; NO, OFB, XI, 169. 
101 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 413, cf. I, 622-623. 
102 Bacon, DAS, SEH, N, 413, cf. I, 624. 
103 Eamon, Science and the Secrets of Nature, 287. 
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rule, and to provide an orderly and systematic way of proceeding from 
particulars to axioms. 104 
This cannot possibly be the case given that Bacon says experientia literata does not 
"extend so far as to the invention of any axiom. " Lisa Jardine comes closer to the 
mark when she states that "experientia literata ... is merely a stage on the way to 
forms. "los However, she too conflates experientia literata and physics. For example, 
she states: 
All the techniques described by Bacon for discovering order and regularity 
in nature prior to application of the perfected inductive method fall within 
the investigations of physics ... They are techniques 
for collating, 
transferring and extending knowledge of cause and effect derived from 
unsystematic observation, rather than from knowledge of the essential 
nature of bodies. 106 
In fact, all the techniques described by Bacon for discovering order and regularity in 
nature prior to application of the inductive method fall outside the investigations of 
physics. Jardine misrepresents the role of physics, whose essential function lies 
precisely in the application of the inductive method and is dedicated to the raising of 
axioms. She fails to recognise that physics forms part of the scala intellectus - the 
raising of axioms. As such, physics properly belongs to mens, and experientia 
literata belongs to the senses, or to res: the former is the provenance of Novum 
organum but the latter is not. '07 Consequently, the techniques to which Jardine refers 
104 Eamon, Science and the Secrets of Nature, 290. 
105 Jardine, Francis Bacon, 147. 
106 Jardine, Francis Bacon, 141. 
107 This is a common misconception. Novum organum is unfinished; we only have two of nine 
intended books. Book 3 ("Rectification of Induction") was to have dealt with latent process and latent 
schematism. On the unfinished condition of Novum organum see Rees, OFB, XI, xcii-xcvii. Rees 
states that, "As for Rectification of Induction, the only clue to the content of this topic may be 
Bacon's remark that insufficiencies of the senses `need rectifications. ' That apart, I find nothing to 
tell us what this third further section of Novum organum was designed to do" Rees notes "merely 
that at the end of the work when Bacon refers back to the list of topics still to be covered, he slips in 
several extra items not mentioned before: after Rectification of Induction he means to proceed `to 
things concrete, and both Latent Processes, and Latent Schematisms, and to the rest set forth in due 
order in Aphorism 21, " OFB, XI, xciii. However, Valerius terminus offers further evidence to support 
Rees' view. There (after describing "whiteness fixed and inherent") Bacon speaks of the need for "a 
reduction back to certainty or verity; for it is not all position or contexture of unequal bodies that will 
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belong to experientia literata. Perhaps the confusion arises from treating Bacon's 
notion of experimentum as if it were easily transferable to our modem conception. '°8 
However, Bacon uses the term to refer to the fortuitous discoveries of the 
mechanical arts, experientia literata, and the systematic discoveries of physics and 
mechanics. Experiment cannot be used as a determining criterion of the character of 
the operation unless we are clear about its rationale (or lack thereof). In the New 
Atlantis, all thirty-six fellows of Solomon's House concern themselves with 
experiments, yet Bacon distinguishes nine phases of inquiry. '09 
A further misunderstanding stems from Bacon's request that experience 
should "at last becom[e] literate. "' 10 According to Farrington, experientia literata is 
a learned presentation of materials. For Farrington, Agricola's De re metallica is 
"the perfect example of what Francis Bacon later called experientia literata, or 
dumb practice which has been to school and learned to express itself in writing. "1 i1 
However, Bacon describes Agricola's work as an example of "that mechanic which 
is connected with physical causes. "112 Because Agricola's treatise is concerned with 
causes, it falls "outside the limits of learned experience. "113 In Bacon's classification 
of the sciences, De re metallica belongs to the science of mechanics. This confusion 
arises because commentators have failed to grasp what Bacon signifies by the use of 
the term literatum. The term here refers to the recording of observations and 
produce colour; for aqua fortis, oil of vitriol, &c. more manifestly, and many other substances more 
obscurely, do consist of very unequal parts, which yet are transparent and clear" (VT, SEH, 111,237- 
238). Thus Rectification of Induction depends upon the investigation of latent process and 
schematism. 
108 On the important distinctions between experimentum and experientia see Charles B. Schmitt, 
"Experience and Experiment: A Comparison of Zabarella's View with Galileo's in De Motu, " Studies 
in the Renaissance 16 (1969), 80-138. 
109 See epigraph, Bacon, NA, SEH, III, 164-165. 
110 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 159. 
111 Farrington, BF, 33. 
112 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 366, cf. I, 572. 
113 Bacon, DAS, SEH, N, 419, cf. I, 631. 
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experiments in writing. Experience becomes literate in the sense that data 
formerly 
held in the memory is put in writing. 114 
Having defined Bacon's concept of experientia literata (and distinguished it 
from the doctrines of physics and mechanics which belong to Novum organum), the 
remainder of this section will examine the role of experientia literata in Baconian 
inquiry. I argue that experientia literata contributes to Baconian inquiry in two 
ways: (1) it supplies experimenta lucifera which feed back into the mother 
history; 
(2) it functions as a ministration to memory. Experientia literata also has a third 
benefit - it generates useful inventions 
(experimenta fructifera) - but this is 
incidental to Bacon's programme. 
The crucial role of experientia literata in supplying experimenta lucifera has 
been overlooked. "" Bacon continually urges that "experiments of Light are even 
more to be sought after than experiments of Fruit. "116 Hence "no one should be 
disheartened or confounded if the experiments which he tries do not answer his 
expectation. For though a successful experiment be more agreeable, yet an 
unsuccessful one is oftentimes no less instructive"117 In Some Considerations 
Touching the Usefulnesse of Experimentall Naturall Philosophy, Robert Boyle 
expresses concern that Bacon's prioritisation of experimenta lucifera may lead men 
to overlook so-called experimenta fructffera which - although not executed for the 
114 In PAH Bacon says the mother history should be "set down briefly and concisely ... For no one 
collecting and storing materials for shipbuilding or the like bothers (as shops do) about arranging 
them nicely and displaying them attractively; rather this sole concern is that they are serviceable and 
good, and take up as little space as possible in the warehouse. And this is just what should be done 
here" (PAH, OFB, XI, 457). This is a far cry from Agricola's De re metallica. 
115 Although Jardine notes that "Experientia literata shares close links with the prerogative 
instances, " she does not mention experimenta lucifera in her discussion of experientia literata. See 
Lisa Jardine, Francis Bacon, 147; idem., "Experientia Literata or Novum Organum? The Dilemma of 
Bacon's Scientific Method, " in Francis Bacon's Legacy of Texts: 'The Art of Discovery Grows with 
Discovery, ' ed. William Sessions (New York: AMS Press, 1990), 47-67. 
116 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 421, cf. I, 633. 
117 Bacon, DAS, SEH, N, 421, cf. I, 632-633. 
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purpose of furthering knowledge - may nonetheless be of service to natural 
philosophy. He points out that 
Though that famous Distinction, introduc'd by the Lord Verulam, whereby 
Experiments are sorted into Luciferous and Fructiferous, may be (if rightly 
understood) of commendable Use; yet it would much mislead those that 
should so understand it, as if Fructiferous Experiments did so meerly 
advantage our interests, as not to promote our Knowledg; or the 
Experiments called Luciferous, did so barely enrich our Understandings, as 
to be no other waies useful. For though some Experiments may be fitly 
enough call'd Luciferous, and others Fructiferous, because the more 
obvious and immediate Effect of the One is to discover to us Physiological 
Truths, and of the other to enable us to perform something of Use to the 
Possessour; yet certainly there are few Fructiferous Experiments, which 
may not readily become Luciferous to the attentive Considerer of them. For 
by being able to produce unusual Effects, they either hint to us the Causes 
of them, or at least acquaint us with some of the Properties or Qualities of 
the things concurring to the production of such Effects. And on the other 
side those Experiments, whose more obvious use is to detect to us the 
Nature or Causes of things, may be, though lesse directly, and in somewhat 
a remoter way, exceedingly Fructiferous. 118 
It is worth citing this passage in full because it highlights the complexity of Bacon's 
concept of experiment. Bacon of course knew that so-called fructiferous experiments 
could "promote our Knowledg. " This is why the mechanical arts must be included in 
the mother history. However, Bacon (unlike Boyle) did think luciferous experiments 
were, for the most part, in "no other waies useful. " According to Bacon, what was 
needed was "a class of experiments ... which no one who was not pressing forward 
on a certain and direct road to the discovery of causes would have thought to 
investigate. "119 Experiments which "in themselves ... have no great use, and are 
quite obviously not sought out for their own sake but stand in the same relation to 
things and works as the letters of the alphabet do to speech and words"120 Bacon's 
problem was to find a way of directing men's attention towards experimenta 
118 Robert Boyle, The Works of Robert Boyle, ed. M. Hunter and E. B. Davis, vol. 6 (London: 
Pickering & Chatto, 1999), 433-434. As I pointed out above (n. 59), Boyle's comments here seem at 
odds with Shapin's and Schaffer's account which emphasises virtual witnessing. Boyle does not 
appear here to use experiment as a way of establishing a consensually agreed "fact, " but as something 
that leads the mind to the hidden properties of things - exactly what an experiment of light should do. 
119 Bacon, DO, OFB, XI, 41. 
120 Bacon, DO, OFB, XI, 41. 
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lucifera. His distinction between luciferous and fructiferous experiments is a product 
of his insight into the nature of men. As he says, 
The Interpretation of Nature, rightly conducted, ought in the first steps of 
the ascent, until a certain stage of Generals be reached, to be kept clear of 
all application to Works. And this has in fact been the error of all those who 
have heretofore ventured themselves at all upon the waves of experience - 
that being either too weak of purpose or too eager for display, they have all 
at the outset sought prematurely for works, as proofs and pledges of their 
progress, and upon that rock have been wrecked and cast away. 121 
We will see in Part III that experimenta fructifera play no role in the Interpretation 
of Nature (the ascent to axioms); at the level of experientia literata, they are 
incidental to Baconian inquiry. 
Bacon does not rule out experiments of fruit - they have obvious economic 
benefits. The financial demands of the method are significant; the construction of the 
mother history "is a thing of exceedingly great mass and could not be accomplished 
without enormous effort and investment, for it requires an army of workers. "lu In 
the New Atlantis, half the fellows of Solomon's House contribute to the collection of 
the mother history. 123 Hence Bacon states: 
If ... a man is fitter and handier for the mechanical arts, and is good at hunting out works solely as a consequence of being conversant with 
experiments, I allow and leave to him the job of culling from my history 
and tables the many things that lie as by the wayside, and of applying them 
to works, and as it were acquiring interest for a time, until the capital can be 
had. But I, striving for greater prizes, renounce all precipitate and premature 
121 Bacon, LL, X, 86. 
122 Bacon, PAH, OFB, XI, 451. In 1620 Bacon writes to James I asking for help with the collection 
of the natural history. He says he "hope[s] further, that your Majesty will be aiding to me, in setting 
men on work for the collecting of a natural and experimental history; which is basis totius negotii ... that even in your times many noble inventions may be discovered for man's use. For who can tell, 
now this Mine of Truth is once opened, how the veins go, and what lieth higher and what lieth lower? " (LL, XIV, 130). 
123 According to Bacon, "the materials for the intellect are so widely spread out that they ought to be 
sought out and gathered in (as if by agents and merchants) from all sides" (PAH, OFB, XI, 451). On 
the role of merchants of light in the New Atlantis see Charles C. Whitney, "Merchants of Light: Science As Colonization in the New Atlantis, " in Francis Bacon's Legacy of Texts: 'The Art of Discovery Grows with Discovery, ' ed. William Sessions (New York: AMS Press, 1990) 255-267. 
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delays in this matter as if (as I generally say) they were Atalanta's 
apples. 124 
Interestingly, the Physiological Remains include "experiments for profit. "125 For 
example, Bacon concludes his experiments "about weight in air and water" by 
noting, "It is a profitable experiment which sheweth the weights of several bodies in 
comparison with water. It is of use in lading of ships and other bottoms, and may 
help to show what burden in the several kinds they will bear. "126 As one might 
expect, Bacon himself never turns a blind eye to experiments for profit. 127 His notion 
that men should "keep their eyes continually turned to the nature of things on one 
side, and to the uses of man on the other" shows that experimenta fructifera are 
never ruled out. 128 As he explains, 
The best chance of bringing down as from heaven a shower of inventions at 
once useful and new, is to bring within the knowledge of one man, or of a 
few who may sharpen one another by conference, the experiments of a 
number of mechanical arts; that by this translation (as I call it) of 
experiments the arts may mutually cherish and as it were kindle one another 
by mixture of rays. For though the rational method of inquiry by the 
Organon promises far greater things in the end, yet this sagacity proceeding 
by Learned experience will in the meantime present mankind with a number 
of inventions which lie near at hand, and scatter them like the donatives that 
used to be thrown among the people. 129 
In the New Atlantis dowry-men or benefactors "bend themselves, looking into the 
experiments of their fellows, and cast about how to draw out of them things of use 
and practice for man's life and knowledge, as well for works as for plain 
demonstration of causes, means of natural divinations, and the easy and clear 
124 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 177. On the fable of "Atalanta, or Profit" see Bacon, DSV, SEH, VI, 743- 
744, cf. 667-668. 
125 Bacon, Physiological Remains, SEH, III, 821-822. 
126 Bacon, Physiological Remains, SEH, III, 821. 
127 Lisa Jardine and Alan Stewart show that "throughout his entire life he [Bacon] was to be dogged 
by financial difficulties and the ever-present necessity of expending his energies on extricating 
himself from them, " Hostage to Fortune: The Troubled Life of Francis Bacon (London: Gollancz, 
1998), 48. 
12& Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 419-420, cf. I, 631. 
129 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 417, cf. I, 628-629. 
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discovery of the virtues and parts of bodies. "130 Hence the Bensalamites reap the 
fruits of experientia literata. 131 However, no great matter can be hoped from that. 
The mechanic, Bacon says, "is apt to think himself as among the great inventors, if 
he has had the good luck to give a finer finish or enhanced elegance to some old 
invention, to combine in one what was previously separate, to make a fruitful 
application to practice of something already known, or to reproduce a familiar model 
on a bigger or smaller scale. "132 However, for Bacon, the "extension of a thing 
already invented [experientia literata] ... 
does not merit the name of a new 
invention"133 The following passage highlights the lowly status of the works 
(experimenta fructifera) generated from experientia literata: 
He [Bacon] felt driven to condone the strange practice of the Egyptians. 
Like other ancient peoples they deified their inventors; and if they set up 
images even of brute beasts in their temples, well, they had the excuse that 
the irrational animals have discovered almost as many of nature's 
operations as men have done. Men indeed have failed to use their 
prerogative of reason to this end. 134 
130 Bacon, NA, SEH, III, 165. 
131 More work needs to be done on Bacon's notion of charity. Kennington rightly argues that "upon 
closer scrutiny it becomes clear that it is not Christian charity that persuades Bacon to endorse 
mastery of nature. Bacon's version of charity is much too wordly to be considered peculiarly biblical 
or Christian. As possible fruits of scientific mastery it features the extremes of pleasure, great engines 
of warfare, and indeed the pursuit of immortality of the body in this life. Baconian charity is 
thoroughly humanistic, " On Modern Origins, 5. Timothy Paterson points out that purely selfish 
motives lead the Benefactors of Solomon's House "to act as if they were in fact the humane and 
charitable scientist-saints of Baconian legend, " "The Secular Control of Scientific Power in the 
Political Philosophy of Francis Bacon, " Polity 21 (1989), 457-480. For an alternative reading see 
Brian Vickers, "Bacon's So-called `Utilitarianism': Sources and Influences, " in Francis Bacon: 
terminologia e fortuna net XVII secolo, ed. Marta Fattori (Rome: Edizioni dell'Ateneo, 1984), 281- 
313; Masao Watanabe, "Francis Bacon: Philanthropy and the Instauration of Learning, " Annals of 
Science 49 (1992), 163-173. 
132 Bacon, CV, BF, 74, cf. SEH, III, 592. 
133 My trans., Bacon, DIN, SEH, III, 788. He criticises those who "descend to the level of calling 
every petty addition or improvement to the practice of the crafts a new invention" (CV, BF, 74, cf. III, 
593). 
134 Bacon, CV, BF, 90, cf. SEH, III, 608 
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Experientia literata does not use the "prerogative of reason. " It is "rather a sagacity 
and a kind of hunting by scent, than a science. "135 Those who participate in this 
activity are no more inventors than are the irrational animals. True inventions (the 
magnalia of nature) belong to the science of magic. 
Bacon's distinction between experimenta fructifera and experimenta lucifera 
allows him to promote the status of the latter. According to Bacon, mechanics are of 
all men, those most troubled by envy. 136 By promoting the status of experimenta 
lucifera, Bacon hopes to appeal to their vanity. As Laurence Lampert rightly argues, 
"Bensalamite society [in the New Atlantis] is calculated to feed the envious natures 
of the Daedaluses [mechanics]. "137 Bacon repeatedly states, "I do not chase like a 
child after golden apples [experimenta fructifera], but stake everything on a victory 
for art in its race against nature; nor do I rush off to mow the moss or green corn but 
wait for the ripened crop. "138 According to Bacon, "If gunpowder had been 
discovered, not by good luck but by good guidance, it would not have stood alone 
but been accompanied by a host of noble inventions of a kindred sort. "139 Whereas 
"chance discovereth new inventions by one and one, " forms will discover them "by 
knots and clusters"140 There is, he says, "not one of the sciences or arts which 
follows the true and legitimate course constantly forth till it reach its end; but it 
perpetually happens that arts stop in their undertakings half way, and forsake the 
135 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 421, cf. I, 633. Artisans have not attained the purification of mind required 
to interpret nature. They cannot therefore arrive at knowledge of forms. This poses difficulties for 
Perez-Ramos' claim that, for Bacon, "to know, in brief, means to make, " Francis Bacon's Idea of Science, 292. 
136 See Bacon, DSV, SEH, VI, 734-735, cf. 659. 
137 Laurence Lampert, Nietzsche and Modern Times: A Study of Bacon, Descartes, and Nietzsche (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 36. See also Timothy Paterson, "The Secular Control of Scientific Power in the Political Philosophy of Francis Bacon, " Polity 21 (1989), 457-480, esp. 472. 
138 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 177. 
139 Bacon, TPM, BF, 71, 'cf. SEH, III, 538. 
140 Bacon, VT, SEH, 111,247. 
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course, and turn aside ... after profit and commodity. 
" 41 Bacon's message is clear: 
philosophy "fails from no cause more than from curious and premature meddling 
and impatience. "142 He laments: 
We need more meticulous care and handpicked trials, not to mention 
funding and the utmost patience besides. For it has ruined everything in the 
experimental field that right from the beginning men have continually 
aimed at Experiments of Fruit not ones of Light, and have devoted their 
energies entirely to producing some splendid work, not to revealing nature's 
oracles, which is the work of works [opus operum] and encompasses in 
itself all power. 143 
As Bacon interprets the fable of Orpheus, Orpheus (Bacon's figure for universal 
philosophy) lost Eurydice because "in the impatience of love and anxiety" he looked 
back before he reached the light. 144 The Interpreter must refrain from the temptation 
of works until he reaches the light of forms. Only knowledge of forms will shake out 
the magnalia of nature - secrets "such as to elude and mock the imagination and 
thought of men. "145 The Interpretation of Nature (the means to discover forms) 
requires experimenta lucifera. Therefore those who devote themselves to seeking out 
experimenta lucifera will "be liberally recompensed in the end. "146 Thus Bacon has 
arranged the hierarchy of experimental practices perfectly in accordance with human 
character. Bacon's message is clear: great inventors (greedy Daedaluses) should 
aspire to experimenta lucffera. 
141 Bacon, DSV, SEH, VI, 744, cf. 668. 
142 Bacon, DSV, SEH, VI, 722, cf. 648. 
143 Bacon, PhU, OFB, VI, 5. 
144 Bacon, DSV, SEH, VI, 720, cf. 647. 
145 Bacon, CV, BF, 96, cf. SEH, III, 615. The phrase "elude and mock" refers to the inability of the imagination to grasp the possibilities presented by Baconian inquiry, which promises unprecedented 
nova. I discuss this further in Chapter 5. 
146 Bacon, VT, SEH, III, 247. 
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In addition to extending the experimental history, experientia literata 
functions as a "ministration to memory. "147 In Novum organum Bacon explains that 
Natural and Experimental History is so various and scattered that it may 
bewilder and distract the intellect unless it be set down and presented in 
suitable order. So we must fashion Tables, and Structured Sets of Instances 
[Coordinationes Instantiarum], marshalled in such a way that the intellect 
can get to work on them. 143 
Experientia literata presents the mother history in a suitable form for the intellect. 
"The great help to the memory, " Bacon says, "is writing. "lag Moreover, "this is 
particularly the case in inductive philosophy and the interpretation of nature; for a 
man might as well attempt to go through the calculations of an Ephemeris in his 
head without the aid of writing, as to master the interpretation of nature by the 
natural and naked force of thought and memory, without the help of tables duly 
arranged [tabulas ordinatas]. "5° The tables digest the mother history before the 
intellect gets to work on it. This is the force of a familiar aphorism: 
Those who have dealt with the sciences have either been empirics or 
dogmatists. The empirics, in the manner of the ant, only store up and use 
things; the rationalists, in the manner of spiders, spin webs from their own 
entrails; but the bee takes the middle path: it collects its material from the 
flowers of field and garden, but its special gift is to convert and digest it. 
The true job of philosophy is not much different, for it depends not only or 
mainly on the powers of the mind, nor does it take the material gathered 
from natural history and mechanical experiments and store it unaltered in 
the memory [in Memorid integram]but lays it up in the intellect changed 
and elaborated [sed in Intellectu mutatam & subactam reponit]. 151 
This aphorism is often misinterpreted. 152 For example, Perez Zagorin states: "The 
business of philosophy, [Bacon] said, is to imitate the bee; and in the method of 
147 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 215. 
148 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 215. 
149 Bacon, DAS, N, 435, cf. I, 647. 
150 Bacon, DAS, IV, 435, cf. I, 647. 
151 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 153. 
152 For an accurate interpretation see Rossi, "Ants, spiders, epistemologists, " in Francis Bacon: 
terminologia e fortuna nel XVII secolo, ed. Marta Fattori (Rome: Edizioni dell'Ateneo, 1984), 245- 
260, esp. 255. However, even Rossi does not elaborate on the significance of the digestion of 
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discovery he presented in his treatise he strove to do so by showing how the power 
of the mind could digest the evidence it derived from natural history and 
experiments and transform it into a knowledge of forms and the mastery of 
nature. "153 In fact, Bacon is making precisely the opposite point. The bee collects its 
material from "the flowers of field and garden" which signifies the natural and 
experimental history. The special function of philosophy is "to convert and digest" 
the material gathered from the mother history, but this does not depend "only or 
mainly on the powers of the mind. " Rather, the mother history is "changed and 
elaborated" in tables before being worked on by the intellect. The mother history is 
not laid up in the memory whole (integrum). 154 The intellect, in Bacon's view, is not 
capable of digesting "a farrago and mass" of mother history; the tables therefore 
perform a "first digestion. " 55 As Rawley puts it, experience "must be broken and 
grinded, and not whole, or as it groweth. " 56 Experientia literata ministers to the 
memory in two ways. First, it functions as a "storehouse of things ... for the work of 
the Interpreter, which comes next "157 Second, the arrangement of the mother history 
into topics and tables stops the intellect from being distracted by the dizzying array 
of things. Bacon refers to this as "a kind of cutting off of infinity of search. "158 As he 
puts it, 
experience (see below). See also R H. Bowers, "Bacon's Spider Simile, " Journal of the History of 
Ideas, 17 (1956), 133-135. 
153 Perez Zagorin, Francis Bacon (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1998), 101. 
154 In DAS Bacon explains that "The sense, which is the door of the intellect, is affected by 
individuals only. The images of those individuals - that is, the impressions which they make on the 
sense - fix themselves in the memory, and pass into it in the first instance entire [integrcz] as it were, 
just as they come" (SEH, IV, 292-293, cf. 1,494-495. ). The tables alter the intellectual process by 
performing a first digestion so that the images do not pass into the intellect integrcz. I discuss this 
further in Chapter 5. 
155 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 75,155. 
156 Rawley, SEH, II, 336. 
157 Bacon, PAH, OFB, XI, 459. 
158 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 436, cf. I, 648 
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When a man desires to recall anything into his memory, if he have no 
prenotion or perception of that he seeks, he seeks and strives and beats 
about hither and thither as if in infinite space. But if he have some certain 
prenotion, this infinity is at once cut off, and the memory ranges in a 
narrower compass; like the hunting of a deer within an enclosure. And 
therefore order also manifestly assists the memory; for we have a prenotion 
that what we are seeking must be something which agrees with order. 159 
Here we see the beginnings of directed inquiry, as opposed to casual observations. 
Order circumscribes the range of questions so as to focus the inquisition., The 
inquirer must know two things: 1) that the answers, although not yet known, are 
possible; 2) that the questions are framed so as to elicit the sought for answers. 160 
Nature of course has the answers to all possible questions, but the mind, as Bacon 
says, is unsuited for going to and fro "to the remote and heterogeneous instances" of 
the mother history. In order to prevent the intellect striving and beating about hither 
and thither, the observations and experiments of the mother history are "marshalled 
and drilled by appropriate tables"161 
In brief, Bacon conceives of the mother history as a dense forest (Sylva 
sylvarum). Experientia literata offers some "direction and order in experimenting. " 
Rather than groping in the dark, one is led by the hand. 162 Moreover, the first 
digestion of the mother history into titles and tables is a ministration to memory for 
the work of the Interpreter which follows. 
159 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 436, cf. I, 648. 
160 In his Critique, Kant (commenting on Bacon) says: "Reason must not allow itself to be kept ... in 
nature's leading strings, " but must devise experiments to "[constrain] nature to give answers of 
reason's own determining, " preface to the Second Edition, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman 
Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan & Co., 1956), 20. 
161 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 161. 
162 In his letter prefaced to Bacon's Sylva sylvarum, William Rawley says that the attentive reader 
will find that the particulars "have a secret order" (SEH, II, 337). Sylva sylvarum is organised in such 
a way as to hint at axioms and causes so that "men's minds ... would not think themselves utterly lost in a vast wood of experience" (SEH, II, 336-337). 
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III. Physics and mechanics 
This section focuses on the "transition from experiments to axioms, or from axioms 
to experiments, " which belongs to Novum organum. 163 The transition from 
experiments to axioms is the domain of physics and metaphysics; the transition from 
axioms to experiments is the domain of mechanics and magic. Chapter 5 will 
examine Bacon's doctrine of forms (metaphysics) and his operative science of 
magic. Here I will focus on the role of physics and mechanics in the ascension to 
primary axioms (forms). 
Baconian knowledge ascends through a series of axioms of expanding 
generality. According to Bacon, "all true and fruitful [solida et fructuosa] Natural 
Philosophy has a double scale or ladder [duplicem scalam], ascendant and 
descendent. " 164 Bacon states time and again that his "route is not laid on the flat but 
goes up and down - ascending first to axioms, and then descending to works. "165 We 
saw in Part H that experientia literata extracts "works from works, or experiments 
from experiments. "166 In contrast, the Interpretation of Nature extracts "from works 
and experiments causes and axioms, and in turn from causes and axioms new works 
and experiments. "167 The Interpretation of Nature begins with works and 
experiments, viz., the mother history and the ever-increasing experimenta lucifera 
supplied by experientia literata. Physics (we will see below) supplies "new 
163 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 413, cf. I, 624. 
164 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 343, cf. I, 547. 
165 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 161. 
166 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 175. 
167 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 175. 
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experiments of a higher light, more penetrating into nature. "168 On the basis of this 
"powerful underpinning of experiments of light, " the Interpreter ascends to 
axioms. 169 This is the scala intellectus. 170 However, every ascent of the mind to an 
axiom must be followed by a descent via experimentation to things, thereby 
guaranteeing the continual union of the mind and things. It is only through a 
retention of this union that the inquiry is guaranteed to terminate in the science of 
magic. The role of Bacon's science of mechanics - by its continual descent from 
axioms to experiments - is to sustain that union. Oddly, the crucial role of 
mechanics has been entirely overlooked in the secondary literature. 171 
In Novum organum Bacon explains that physics proceeds by way of 
"concrete bodies as we find them in nature in her ordinary course. "172 We saw in 
Chapter 2 that, for Bacon, this world is no more than a subset of possibilities. 
However, nature as it presents itself is the Interpreter's only point of departure: 
inquiry must begin with natura naturata in order to discover the manner in which 
possibilities have been actualised (natura naturans). Natural history and physics 
focus on the ordinary course of nature in all its phenomenal fecundity, in which the 
human mind is immersed. But there is a great difference between the engagement 
with nature at the level of natural history and the engagement with nature at the level 
of physics, viz., physics deals with things that do not strike the senses. As Bacon 
puts it, "up to now we cool our heels in the antechambers of nature and are not 
168 Bacon, NA, SEH, III, 165. 
169 Bacon, HIDA, OFB, XIII, 229. 
170 Bacon, DO, OFB, XI, 26. 
171 For example, Jardine refers to "mere mechanic - practical activity for its own ends, or to 
implement the findings of physics, " Francis Bacon, 147. 
172 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 207. In DAS (but not AL or NO), Bacon divides the doctrine of physics into 
concrete physics and abstract physics. See Rees, Table 1, OFB, XI1I, xxxviii. I deal with abstract 
physics and metaphysics in Chapter 5. 
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granted access to her sanctuary. "173 Because of the limitations of the senses, an 
intermediary or interpreter is required if nature's oracles (its manifest effects) are to 
be fully understood in terms of matter's hidden motions. According to Bacon, "the 
sense is by nature a weak and wandering thing ... 
but all truer interpretation of 
nature is accomplished by means of instances, and apt and appropriate experiments, 
where the sense judges only the experiment while the experiment judges nature and 
the thing itself. "174 Physics investigates what Bacon calls "latent schematism" and 
"latent process. "175 Because these things are hidden, they must be accessed via 
experiments of light. 176 
Latent process refers to the "unbroken process" of motions "which for the 
most part evades the sense. "177 Bacon stresses, "we do not mean certain visible 
degrees, marks or stages of a process in bodies"178 As we saw in Chapter 2, the 
scholastics (in Bacon's view) deal only with observable changes (generation, 
corruption etc. ) and regard these as expressions of motion. Cataloguing the 
173 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 211 
174 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 87. In DO Bacon states: "I set little store by the immediate and peculiar 
perception of the sense, but carry the matter to the point where the sense judges only the experiment 
whereas the experiment judges the thing. Hence I believe that I present myself as high priest of the 
sense (from which all natural knowledge should, unless we prefer madness, be derived), and learned 
interpreter of its oracles; so that whereas others merely claim to watch over and cherish the sense, I 
do so in fact" (DO, OFB, XI, 35). The term "interpreter of nature" is used by Pico della Mirandola 
who states: "I was not satisfied by the many assertions made by many men concerning the 
outstandingness of human nature: that man is ... the 
interpreter of nature ... ," On the 
Dignity of Man, 
trans. Charles Glenn Wallis, Paul J. W. Miller and Douglas Carmichael (Indianapolis: The Bobbs- 
Merrill Company, 1965), 3. 
175 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 201. 
176 Bacon discusses helps for the senses in Novum organum under the heading "Instances of the 
Lamp" There are five classes of prerogative instance that support the senses: "the first ones 
strengthen, enlarge and correct the immediate actions of the sense; the second reduce [deducunt] the 
imperceptible to the perceptible; the third show up the continued processes or successive stages of 
those events and motions which generally go unnoticed except when they finish or reach the end of a 
cycle [latent process]; the fourth provide substitutes for the sense when it fails altogether; the fifth 
attract the attention and notice of the sense, and at the same time limit the subtlety of things" (Bacon, 
NO, OFB, 343). On prerogative instances see Chapter 5. 
177 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 209 
178 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 209 
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observable properties, the end points of change, is merely a description of nature's 
effects. In contrast, the investigation of latent process examines "the ways and 
means of ... mutations and transformations" of things. 
179 For example, one 
investigates 
from what beginnings, by what means and by what process [ex quibus 
initys, & quo modo, & quo processu] gold or any other metal or stone is 
generated, starting with its first menstrua or rudiments, all the way up to the 
finished mineral; or, in the same way, by what means plants are generated, 
starting with the first concretions of juices in the earth, or with seed, and 
ending up with the mature plant, after the whole run of motions 
[successione Motüs] and the various protracted travails of nature; or 
likewise of the orderly unfolding [explicata] of the generation of animals, 
from conception to birth; and likewise for other bodies. 180 
The investigation of latent process is not only directed "towards generations of 
bodies, but also towards other motions and works of nature [opificia Natura, ]. "l8t 
Whereas latent process investigates bodies in motion, latent schematism 
investigates a body's internal consistency when it is quiescens - when the simple 
motions are locked in a state of dynamic tension. 182 For example, Bacon says 
in every body we must investigate how much of it is spirit and how much 
tangible matter; and whether the spirit itself is plentiful and swelling or 
scanty and starved; whether thinner or thicker; more airy or fiery; active or 
idle; robust or insubstantial; advancing or retreating; cut off or continuous; 
agreeing or disagreeing with external and ambient bodies, etc. And likewise 
the tangible essence (which has no fewer differences than the spirit) - 
together with its hairs and fibres and all kinds of textures; as well as the 
distribution of spirit through the mass of the body, with its pores, passages, 
veins and cellules, and the rudiments or tentative beginnings of an organic 
body - comes under this same investigation. 183 
Bacon acknowledges that "human effort has not been entirely in abeyance" in this 
respect, "for tending towards this very thing is the separation of bodies by 
179 Bacon, CDNR, SEH, V, 424, cf. III, 19. 
180 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 207. 
191 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 207. For example, Bacon says "the investigation takes place in the case of 
the whole run and continued actions of nourishing, from the first taking in of food to complete 
assimilation" (NO, OFB, XI, 207-209). 
182 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 200. 
183 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 213. On Bacon's concept of spiritus see Chapter 5. 
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distillation and other modes of dissolution to make plain the dissimilarity of a 
compound body by causing like parts to move to like. "184 However, this too often 
produces fallacious results "because many natures ascribed and imputed to 
separation, as if they were things pre-existing in the compound, are in fact newly 
implanted and superinduced by fire and heat, and by other modes of opening up. "185 
Hence distillations and other modes of dissolution are limited in what they can 
achieve: they mistakenly present the investigator not with a separation of the 
constituents of latent schematisms but with newly derived latent schematisms - not 
with analytic constituents but with new syntheses. 186 Regardless of potential errors, 
for Bacon the investigation of latent process and latent schematism is valuable 
insofar as it supplies experimenta lucifera which feed back into the mother history. 
However, he regards these studies "as night work on account of our small but 
constantly shining lamp"187 Only the discovery of the primary axioms (forms) will 
cast "a true and undimmed light' 'on nature's hidden recesses. 188 
184 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 211. 
185 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 211. Heat as a mode of operation is problematic because "the subtler 
schematisms of things are ruined and brought to confusion" (NO, OFB, XI, 431). William Newman, 
Promethean Ambitions: Alchemy and the Quest to Perfect Nature (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago, 2004) quotes a passage from Sylva sylvarum which, he says, demonstrates Bacon's debt to 
alchemical procedures: "And therefore it is well said by an obscure writer of the sect of the chemists, 
that there is no such way to effect the strange transmutations of bodies, as to endeavour and urge by 
all means the reducing of them to nothing" (SS, SEH, II, 383-384). On this basis Newman argues that 
"It would not be an exaggeration to say that the art of chymistry was for Bacon the model upon which 
he built his concept of experiment pushing nature to the limit so that it would reveal its deepest 
secrets, " Promethean Ambitions, 265. While Bacon's debt to alchemical procedures is manifest, his 
concept of experiment extends far beyond the chemical laboratory. It would be more accurate to say 
that Bacon commends the alchemical procedure of driving matter "to extremities" because of his 
prior commitment to the doctrine of the indestructibility of matter (see Bacon, DSV, SEH, VI, 726, cf. 
652). 
186 On the wide range of views expressed in the chemical literature of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries concerning the validity of fire analysis, see Allen G. Debus, "Fire Analysis and the 
Elements in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, " Annals of Science 23 (1967), 127-147. 
187 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 361. 
188 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 213. 
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The significance of Bacon's claim that full knowledge of latent schematism 
depends upon discovery of forms has been missed. For example, Jardine argues that 
Despite the fact that the superior study of the metaphysics of forms is 
supposed to give man complete control over nature, knowledge of latent 
process and latent configuration is an essential part of the application of 
forms in order to transform bodies. This is a fundamental weakness in 
Bacon's programme for the growth of human power over nature, and one 
which remains completely unresolved. Because Bacon fails to work out the 
relation between latent process and configuration, with their spirits, 
expansions and contractions, and the metaphysics of forms with its 
vocabulary of fundamental properties, the gap between operative and 
contemplative knowledge remains as broad in his scheme of knowledge as 
in any of the more conventional theories which he criticises. 189 
But according to Bacon, knowledge of forms gives man complete control over 
nature precisely because it gives him complete knowledge of latent process and 
latent schematism. In fact, Bacon is very clear about the relation between latent 
process and schematism and the metaphysical doctrine of forms. The investigation 
of latent process and schematism supplies powerful experiments of light which feed 
back into the mother history. The discovery of forms (as well as lower and middle 
axioms in physics) hinges upon these luciferous experiments. Because 
commentators have failed to grasp the role of experimenta lucifera in physics, they 
have failed to find any connection between physics and metaphysics. For example, 
Kennington (like Jardine) argues that "physics and metaphysics are disjunctive of 
one another. "190 He criticises Mary Hesse who rightly argues that "the real 
distinction between physics and metaphysics for Bacon is the distinction between 
the lower and higher axioms of the inductive ladder. "191 According to Kennington, 
189 Jardine, Francis Bacon, 143. 
190 Richard Kennington, On Modern Origins: Essays in Early Modern Philosophy, ed. Pamela Kraus 
and Frank Hunt (New York: Lexington Books, 2004), 12. 
191 Mary Hesse, "Francis Bacon's Philosophy of Science, " in Essential Articles for the Study of Francis Bacon ed. Brian Vickers (Connecticut: Archon Books, 1968), 118. However, Hesse fails to 
appreciate the significance of the physics-metaphysics distinction. 
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latent process and schematism "lack any essential connection with laws. "192 
Common sense dictates that this simply cannot be the case; a ladder of axioms -a 
scala intellectus as Bacon calls Part IV of his Instauratio - cannot be disjunctive. 193 
As Bacon says, 
We should hope for better things from the sciences only when we ascend 
the proper ladder by successive, uninterrupted or unbroken steps [per 
Scalam veram, & per gradus continuos, & non intermissos, auf hiulcos], 
from particulars to lower axioms, then to middle ones, each higher than the 
last until eventually we come to the most general. 194 
A true ladder of the intellect has no interrupted or disconnected steps. Bacon 
explains that the primary axioms (forms) are limited by the intermediate axioms of 
physics. 195 As Fowler puts it, "the axiomata media are particular cases" of laws. 196 
This directly contradicts Kennington's claim that "latent process and latent 
configuration are not less general versions of the laws studied by metaphysics. " 197 
We will see in Chapter 5 that Bacon considers the rules of physics to be limitations 
of the laws unifying natura naturata. 
The investigation itself of latent process and latent schematism only gives us 
more knowledge of latent process and latent schematism. None of this is axiomatic: 
it is merely providing physical information about the ordinary course of nature. 
Axioms belong to mens not res; they are not simply given by physics as if they were 
a constituent among things, rather they must be educed on the basis of what physics 
has investigated. Experimenta lucifera (supplied by physics) further illuminate 
192 Kennington, On Modern Origins, 41. 
193 However, there a good reasons why a number of commentators argue that physics and 
metaphysics are disjunctive. I address these in Chapter 5. 
194 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 161. 
195 See Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 160: "At media sunt Axiomata illa vera, & solida, & viua, in quibus 
humane res, & fortune, site suet; & supra haec quoque, tandem ipsa illa generalissima; talia scilicet, 
quae non abstracta sint, sed per haec media verb limitantur. " 
196 Thomas Fowler, Bacon's Novum Organum (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1889), 308. 
197 Kennington, On Modern Origins, 41. 
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causes so that the Interpreter can ascend to axioms. For example, "by careful noting 
of the first beginnings and rudiments or attempts of life [tentamentorum vitae] in 
animalcules born of putrefaction, " Bacon extracts "the great axiom of 
vivification. "198 Namely, "there must be heat to dilate the spirit of the body; an 
active spirit to be dilated; matter viscous or tenacious to hold in the spirit; and that 
matter to be put forth and figured. "199 We saw in Chapter 3 that "the understanding 
is endowed by nature with an evil impulse to jump from particulars to the highest 
axioms"200 "This impulse, " Bacon says, "must be held in check; but generalisations 
lying close to the facts may first be made, then generalisations of a middle sort, and 
progress thus achieved up the successive rungs of a genuine ladder of the 
intellect. "201 In Novum organum Bacon speaks of the need to supply the 
understanding "with leaden weights to curb all jumping and flying up. "202 In 
practice, these weights take the form of further luciferous experiments. 
According to Bacon, every ascent of the mind to an axiom must be followed 
by a descent via experimentation to things, thereby guaranteeing the continual union 
of the mind and things. It is precisely for this purpose that mechanics seeks out 
experimenta lucifera. By introducing the concept of experimenta lucifera, Bacon 
effectively redefines the science of mechanics. Its goal is no longer works 
(experimenta fructifera). It must now concern itself solely with experimental testing 
198 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 351; SS, SEH, II, 559. 
199 Bacon, SS, SEH, II, 559. 
200 Bacon, CV, BF, 99, cf. SEH, III, 618. 
201 Bacon, CV, BF, 99, cf. SEH, III, 618. Rees points out that Bacon failed to hold his own 
understanding in check. According to Rees, "in the Novum Organum, Bacon is living dangerously, 
trying to advertise elements of his world system without compromising the principles of his method, " 
"Francis Bacon's Semi-Paracelsian Cosmology and the Great Instauration, " Ambix 1975,167. 
However, Bacon makes no secret of the fact that he is flouting his own methodological rules. Rather, 
he says he does not "in any way wish to be obliged ... to hang on to everything" he propounds (PA, OFB, XIII, 263). 
202 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 163. 
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for the purpose of establishing axioms. This continual movement between the mind 
and things is the core of Bacon's criterion of truth. Its essential feature 
is that it 
incorporates error and negativity as the cybernetic means of control over inquiry. 
The inquisition into nature is completely dependent on this feedback epistemology 
where questions are designed to elicit answers that determine further questions and 
where the feedback loop can eliminate error. This is why Bacon thinks his proposed 
procedures lead to certainty. 203 
Bacon's originality rests on his notion that he knows the true goal of 
philosophy. This, thinks Bacon, is the difference between him and all who have 
gone before. "The end and scope of knowledge, " he says, "hath been generally 
mistaken. "204 According to Bacon, those who have sought knowledge have 
"propounded to themselves a wrong mark, namely satisfaction (which men call 
truth) and not operation. "205 He points out that "in the inquiring of causes and 
reasons it is much easier to find out such causes as will satisfy the mind of man and 
quiet objections, than such causes as will direct him and give him light to new 
203 The grounds for Bacon's doctrine of certain truth have been ignored in attempts to reduce the so- 
called method to the formal procedures of eliminative induction or some form of hypothetico- 
deduction. Defending the latter, Peter Urbach objects to this central Baconian assumption, viz., that 
certainty is guaranteed, Francis Bacon's Philosophy of Science: An Account and a Reappraisal (La 
Salle: Open Court, 1987). Urbach tries to elevate what he calls Bacon's provisional fallibility to a 
fixed methodology of fallibility per se. However, Bacon's understanding of fallibility is pragmatic 
and provisional, and (as shown above) is principally a procedure of error-correction. In Chapter 3, I 
detailed Bacon's doctrine of error and his account of the genetic source of the mind's declination. 
Experiment realigns the mind through the signs and marks provided by nova. Error is sustained in 
demonstrative systems because of the lack of direction or guidance through nature's tortuous 
labyrinth. Bacon makes no attempt to substitute novel formalisms for existing ones, given that 
operative direction requires a feedback strategy which cannot be predetermined but is responsive to 
specific contexts. This, for Bacon, is precisely what is absent in traditional systems of dialectic. Thus 
commentators should be cautious in translating Baconian inquiry into more familiar but ill-fitting 
formalised or methodical moulds. 
204 Bacon, VT, SEH, III, 231. 
205 Bacon, VT, SEH, III, 232. Bacon repeatedly returns to the image of Scylla, "a fair woman 
upwards in the parts of show, but when you come to the parts of use and generation, Barking 
Monsters. " Like the scholastic philosophy, she "hath the curse of barrenness, and is courtesan-like, 
for pleasure, and not for fruit" (VT, SEH, III, 232-233). As discussed, the mind's acquiescence in 
theoretical satisfaction is a consequence of nature's dazzling and bewildering power. 
195 
experiences and inventions. "206 As Bacon sees it, men "have put themselves in way 
without foresight or consideration of their journey's end: n07 In his terms, "a man 
may wander in the way, by rounding up and down. But if men have failed in their 
very direction and address that error will never by good fortune correct itself. "208 
Bacon corrects this error by defining the true goal of philosophy: 
It is not the pleasure of curiosity, nor the quiet of resolution, nor the raising 
of the spirit, nor victory of wit, nor faculty of speech, nor lucre of 
profession, nor ambition of honour or fame, nor inablement for business, 
that are the true ends of knowledge ... to speak plainly and clearly, 
it is a 
discovery of all operations and possibilities of operations from immortality 
(if it were possible) to the meanest mechanical practice 209 
The true end of knowledge is "discovery of particulars not revealed before 
for the better endowment and help of man's life. '210 This notion relates to Bacon's 
doctrine of the unexploited potentiality of matter. For Bacon, the goal is the 
actualisation of nova - the shaking out of nature's hidden folds. Nova provide the 
Baconian inquirer with a determinable direction, and function as his criterion of 
truth. As he explains, 
In nature practical results are not only the means to improve well-being but 
the guarantee of truth [veritatis pignora]. The rule of religion, that a man 
should show his faith by his works, holds good in natural philosophy too. 
Science also must be known by works. It is by the witness of works, rather 
than by logic or even observation, that truth is revealed and established. 
206 Bacon, VT, SEH, III, 232. For Bacon, this is the meaning of the fable of Sphinx: "Sphinx proposes 
to men a variety of hard questions and riddles which she received from the Muses. In these, while 
they remain with the Muses, there is probably no cruelty; for so long as the object of meditation and 
inquiry is merely to know, the understanding is not oppressed or straitened by it, but is free to wander 
and expatiate [intellectus non premitur, nec in arcto ponitur, sed vagatur et expatiatur], and finds in 
the very uncertainty of conclusion and variety of choice a certain pleasure and delight; but when they 
pass from the Muses to the Sphinx, that is from contemplation to practice, whereby there is necessity 
for present action, choice, and decision, then they begin to be painful and cruel; and unless they be 
solved and disposed of, they strangely torment and worry the mind, pulling it first this way and then 
that, and fairly tearing it to pieces" (DSV, SEH, VI, 756, cf. 679). 
207 Bacon, VT, SEH, III, 232. 
208 Bacon, VT, SEH, III, 231-232. 
209 Bacon, VT, SEH, III, 222. 
210 Bacon, VT, SEH, III, 233. 
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Whence it follows that the improvement of man's mind and the 
improvement of his lot are one and the same thing. 211 
This is the meaning of the well known claim that "ipsissimce Res sunt ... Veritas & 
Vtilitas. "212 Rossi points out that this phrase has been wrongly translated and offers 
an accurate rendering: "the very things themselves are ... 
both truth and utility. "213 
But even Rossi fails to grasp that Bacon is here expressing his criterion of truth. 
According to Rossi, the import of this phrase is that only adoption of the method 
guarantees the coincidence of truth and utility. 214 However, Rossi has inverted the 
meaning of this phrase. Bacon is not saying that the method guarantees the 
coincidence of truth and utility, but that the coincidence of truth and utility (his 
criterion of truth) guarantees the success of the method. This is clear when we return 
the phrase to its original context in Novum organum. Bacon states: 
Itaque ipsissimae Res sunt (in hoc genere) Veritas & Vtilitas: atque Opera 
ipsa pluris facienda sunt, quatenüs sunt veritatis pignora, quäm propter vitae 
commoda. 215 
And the things themselves are (in this case) truth and utility: and works 
themselves give much more as pledges of truth, than as comforts of life (my 
trans. ). 
That is, truth and utility correspondently reside in res; they are not made by mens, 
but are discovered. Bacon is once again prioritising experimenta lucifera above 
experimenta fructifera. At the level of mechanics, experimenta lucifera (new 
particulars) function as pledges of truth. 
The Interpreter ascends to an axiom; if the axiom is true it will specify new 
particulars - it will extend to the discovery of nova. An axiom (for Bacon) is a way 
211 Bacon, CV, BF, 93, cf. SEH, I, 612. 
212 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 186. 
213 Rossi, "Bacon's Idea of Science, " in The Cambridge Companion to Bacon, ed. Markku Peltonen 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 37; idem., Philosophy, Technology and the Arts in 
the Early Modern Era (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), 157-160. 
214 Rossi, Philosophy, Technology and the Arts, 161. 
215 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 186. 
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of expressing nature's fecundity in philosophical doctrine. Because nature "acts 
according to law, " its modes of operation can be expressed in doctrine. 216 An axiom 
is a rule or law unifying nature's behaviour. The greater the generality of the rule, 
the more effects it explains. The effects are an explication (explicatio) of the rule, 
that is, a description of nature's unfolding. This is clear in Historia vitce et mortis 
where each of the canones mobiles ("provisional rules") is followed by an explicatio 
which details the various effects which flow from the rule (and whence the rule is 
derived). 217 At the level of physics we are dealing with "the particular and special 
habits of nature, " which can be expressed as rules. 218 The rules of physics are lower 
or middle axioms. Lower axioms hardly differ from bare experience; they therefore 
have little operative value. Middle axioms, however, are "fuller and more extensive" 
- hence they will specify new particulars. 219 As Bacon explains, 
In setting up axioms with this form of induction, we must check and see 
whether the axiom so set up be appropriate and made only to the measure of 
the particulars whence it is derived, or whether it is fuller and more 
extensive. Now if it is fuller and more extensive, we must see whether that 
amplitude and latitude be confirmed, as if by a kind of guarantee [quasi 
fide-iussione quddam], by the specification of new particulars, lest we either 
cling only to things known already, or perhaps with slacker grasp catch hold 
of shadows and abstract forms, and not of things solid and bound in 
matter. 220 
Because a Baconian axiom is an expression of natura naturans, it will not only 
explain "the particulars whence it is derived, " but also specify new particulars. In 
other words, a Baconian axiom unifies actual and potential works. The science of 
mechanics tests whether an axiom does in fact discover new particulars. Bacon 
216 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 203. 
217 Bacon, HVM, SEH, V, 320-335, cf. II, 212-226. 
218 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 209. 
219 Bacon says "A valid axiom, in his view, should not be narrowly cut to the measure of the facts from which it is drawn. It should have a more ample scope, permitting the inclusion of new facts 
under it by which its final limits would be fixed" (CV, BF, 99-100, cf. SEH, III, 618). In other words, 
a valid axiom will fulfil his criterion of truth. 
220 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 163-165. 
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conceives of these new particulars as pledges of truth - confirmations which give 
encouragements and direction, helping to set up provisional axioms221 However, the 
discovery of new particulars does not mean that an axiom is certainly true - it 
merely indicates that we are possibly on the right path. Although we ought to pay 
heed to affirmatives, "in the true setting up of every axiom, the power of the 
negative instance is actually greater. "222 
Bacon has an asymmetrical criterion of truth which incorporates negativity in 
an error-correcting procedure. He states: 
The discovery of new works and active directions not known before, is the 
only trial to be accepted of, and yet not that neither, in case where one 
particular giveth light to another; but where particulars induce an axiom or 
observation, which axiom found out discovereth and designeth new 
particulars. That the nature of this trial is not only upon the point, whether 
the knowledge be profitable or no, but even upon the point whether the 
knowledge be true or no; not because you may always conclude that the 
Axiom which discovereth new instances is true, but contrariwise you may 
safely conclude that if it discover not any new instance it is in vain and 
untrue. 223 
According to Bacon, the failure to produce a novel particular is a sign that the 
inquiry has been diverted from its goal. Whenever there is successful production of 
nova, although this is no guarantee that the axiom is true, it signifies that the 
direction should be maintained. We can now see the force of the negative instance; 
when used in a cybernetic epistemology, the negative instance excludes useless 
pursuits and redirects the inquiry back onto a fruitful course. Bacon has devised a 
way of making sure axiomatic generalisation stays in contact with reality. The 
feedback from the experimental testing in mechanics is the guarantee that the 
investigation is still pursuing its target in nature. Baconian inquiry involves - at 
221 An axiom indicates, that is, it offers direction to potential new particulars. On Bacon's concept of 
axiom, see G. W. Kitchin, Novum organum: sive indicia vera de interpretatione naturce (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1855), 341-344. 
222 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 85. On Bacon's use of the negative instance, see William Sessions, 
"Francis Bacon and the Negative Instance, " Renaissance Papers (1970), 1-9. 
223 Bacon, VT, SEH, M, 242. 
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every step of the axiomatic ladder - descent to works to ensure that the mind is still 
in contact with things. The science of mechanics extracts experiments from axioms. 
These experiments feed back into the inquiry in a continual play of error correction 
that produces a cybernetic epistemology. 224 Inquiry fails when men "sever and 
withdraw [divellere et abstrahere] their thoughts too soon and too far from 
experience and particulars. "225 Bacon's dialectical zigzagging between 
generalisations and feedback (experimental testing) stops men severing their 
thoughts from particulars. In this way, the intellect is kept on a tight leash and does 
not "exceed due degrees of certainty. "226 Bacon frequently states that a closer 
alliance of the experimental and rational faculties is required. In Baconian inquiry 
this alliance takes the form of the repeated ascent to axioms (in physics) and descent 
to experiments (in mechanics). 
This relationship is illustrated in figure 4.3. On the basis of a powerful 
underpinning of experimenta lucffera (the mother history supplemented by the 
experiments of experientia literata and physics), the mind ascends to an axiom. This 
axiom specifies new particulars. Mechanics subjects the axiom to experimental 
testing. If these experiments discover new particulars (pignora veritatis), the mind 
can safely ascend to a higher axiom. If these experiments do not discover new 
particulars, the axiom is void and the process begins again. In this manner, "Physic 
224 While axioms are undergoing refinement, they belong to Part V of Bacon's Instauratio magna. 
As Bacon explains to Father Fulgentio, "In the fifth place will follow the book which I have entitled 
the `Precursors of the Second Philosophy, ' which will contain my discoveries concerning new 
axioms, suggested by the experiments themselves [ab experimentis ipsis excitata]" (LL, XIV, 1625, 
533, cf. 532). As axioms are refined by experimenta lucifera (pledges of their truth), their "degree of 
certainty" increases until they are at last admitted to Part VI - "Philosophia Secunda, siue Scientia Actiud' (NO, OFB, XI, 53; DO, OFB, XI, 26). 
225 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 361, cf. I, 566. 
226 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 261. 
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advances farther and farther every day and develops new axioms. 'n27 This process of 
ascending to axioms and descending to experiments continues until the mind reaches 
the most general axioms (forms). We will see in Chapter 5 that the descent from 
forms to works constitutes Bacon's science of magic. 
Mens 
6 
1. experimenta lucifera 
2. lower axiom 
3. new particulars (experimenta lucifera) 
4. middle axiom 
5. new particulars (experimenta lucffera) 
6. primary axiom / form 
7. magical effects (experimenta fructifera) 
Fig. 4.3. The double ladder 
227 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 371, cf. I, 578. 
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IV. Conclusion 
I would like to conclude with Bacon's vivid description of his way of inquiry in 
Scala intellectus (the preface to Part IV of his Instauratio). He describes how the 
journey begins in "the woods of nature, both obscured and darkened by an infinite 
variety of experiments as though by foliage and entangled by subtlety of 
observations as though by undergrowth and brambles"228 This is the mother history. 
Bacon's notion of experientia literata allows us to "penetrate and pass by the woods 
of nature. "229 "And now, " he says, "we have come to matters perhaps more open but 
yet more arduous, from the woodlands, that is to say, to the base of the 
mountains. "230 At this point, the ascent to axioms (the Interpretation of Nature) 
begins. According to Bacon, 
He who endures with true and unflagging patience to suspend judgement 
and gradually to ascend and surmount the ridges of things, as though of 
mountains, first one and then another and then again another, he will reach 
betimes the summits and peaks of nature where there is both a serene 
stopping place and a most lovely view out over things, and a descent by a 
gentle slope leading to all practical things231 
As described in figure 4.3, the Interpreter repeatedly ascends to axioms and 
descends to experiments. But each ascent reaches higher, to a more general axiom, 
until the Interpreter finally reaches forms ("the summits and peaks of nature"). From 
there the science of magic descends "by a gentle slope" to the magnalia of nature. 
228 My trans., Bacon, SI, SEH, II, 688-689. 
229 My trans., Bacon, SI, SEH, II, 689. 
230 My trans., Bacon, SI, SEH, II, 689. 
231 My trans., Bacon, SI, SEH, II, 689. 
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This chapter has described how Baconian inquiry "leads from history to 
universals by a certain and constant path. "232 I have argued (contra Jardine et al. ) 
that Bacon does not "adopt two conflicting strategies for dealing with the single 
problem of scepticism concerning access to knowledge of natural phenomena, " viz., 
"the machinery of the new organon" and "the techniques of experientia literata. 21233 
Rather, he adopts a single strategy, viz., experiment. Experiment is the clue that 
guides the interpreter through nature's labyrinth. Baconian inquiry with its emphasis 
on experiment keeps men's minds close to things. 
In this chapter Baconian experiment has emerged as analytically far more 
complex than existing commentary gives us to understand. We see rather a 
meticulously graduated scheme of experiment, incorporating three distinct phases: 
natural history, experientia literata and physics/mechanics. At the level of physics 
and mechanics, experiment devolves around ascent to, or descent from, 
appropriately posed axiomatisation. We shall see in the following chapter that the 
ascent (and descent) continues in abstract physics and metaphysics. No particular 
Baconian experiment may be understood without first grasping its schematic 
placement, nor without realising its relational position in an elaborately phased 
process. No general notion of Baconian experiment may be fully grasped without 
realising its fundamental intent, which is to provide the operative union of res and 
mens. 
232 My trans., Bacon, SI, SEH, II, 689. 
233 Jardine, "Experientia literata or Novum Organum? " 60-61. 
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Chapter 5 
Metaphysics and Magic 
Metaphysic ... enfranchises the power of men to the greatest 
liberty, and 
leads it to the widest and most extensive field of operation. For Physic 
carries men in narrow and restrained ways, imitating the ordinary flexuous 
courses of nature [per angustos et impeditos calles humanam operam 
dirigit, natura, ordinarice f exuosos tramites imitata]; ... But whosoever knows any Form, knows also the utmost possibility of superinducing that 
nature upon every variety of matter [in omnigenam materiam], and so is 
less restrained and tied in operation ... which kind of knowledge Solomon likewise, though in a more divine sense, elegantly describes, "Thy steps 
shall not be straitened, and when thou runnest thou shalt not stumble; " 
meaning thereby that the ways of wisdom are not much liable either to 
straitness or obstructions. 1 
In Chapter 2I argued that Bacon's vision was nothing less than a harnessing of 
nature's appetitive power in order to create nova opera (new works) by discovering 
new ways of binding nature, restricting its inherent power, and thereby causing it to 
transform itself into new schematisms. Matter is self-organised into conglomerations 
of motions through the fashioning power of forms. For Bacon, the science of magic 
is nothing other than a goading and restraining of these sums of motions. The artful 
manipulation of bodies is achieved through the superinduction of new natures. This 
chapter explains Bacon's concept of forms and their role in the systematic constraint 
of matter to produce magnalia of nature. Forms are limitations (constraints) on 
matter's primordial power and responsible for the production of the current system 
of nature. Knowledge of forms enables the Baconian Magus to reconfigure the 
bonds underpinning the present order of nature, thereby (re)creating a new nature - 
I Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 362-363, cf. I, 568; Cicero, Tusc. Quast., N, 26; Prov., N, 12. 
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an "alternative universe ... of things. "2 Commentary on Baconian 
forms is 
bewildering and reflects Bacon's dense and almost impenetrable account. The core 
principle of his account suggests a dynamic relationship between freedom and 
constraint both in ontological and operative terms. To derive the knowledge of 
forms, the operator is obliged to discover the original constraining processes that 
gave rise to the unfolding of nature free. Nature free is a limitation of matter's 
potency, but knowledge of forms leads to freedom of operation. 
It should be noted at the outset that a Baconian form is neither a recipe nor 
an arrangement of material minimal parts. These are common and misleading 
perceptions. A Baconian form refers to the bond or law which limits or constrains 
matter's extraordinary power, thereby generating what Bacon calls "simple 
natures. "3 The summary law of nature is the apex of a hierarchy of forms 
corresponding to nature's unfolding (the explication of the summary law). The first 
unfolding gives rise to the "Forms of the First Class" which we experience as 
simple natures (dense, rare, hot, cold, etc. ) .4 Further unfoldings give rise to the 
whole variety of simple natures (colour, volatility, etc. ). These simple natures are 
dynamic nodes of motions whose emanations register on the organs of the senses. 
Hence inquiry into forms begins with phenomenal appearances (simple natures), 
searching for the causes of qualities. In the pursuit of operative power, "the work 
and aim of human knowledge" is to discover how these simple natures originate (the 
forms of simple natures). 5 "The work and aim of human power, " says Bacon, is to 
2 Bacon, PAH, OFB, XI, 455. 
3 On simple natures, see Chapter 3. 
4 Bacon, DAS, SEH, N, 361, cf. I, 568 (italics in original). 
5 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 201. 
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recapitulate the cosmogonical processes through the superinduction of new natures. 6 
Magic is nature "bound and constrained" into fashioning novel conglomerations of 
simple natures (and forms).? Exegesis of Bacon's doctrine of forms is notoriously 
difficult. This chapter will focus on the early aphorisms of Book 2 of Novum 
organum. I offer a reinterpretation of these aphorisms in the light of preceding 
discussions. 
6 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 201. 
7My trans., Bacon, DSV, SEN, VI, 652. 
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I. Mechanics: restricted operation 
The analysis of Baconian forms necessitates an examination of the restricted nature 
of physics and its corresponding operative rules in mechanics. According to Bacon, 
"The precept [Prceceptum] or axiom concerning the transformation of bodies is of 
two kinds. "8 There are mechanical precepts (rules of operation) deduced from the 
axioms of physics and there are magical precepts deduced from the axioms of 
metaphysics. We have already encountered the physical axiom which "turns on the 
discovery of latent process, " and proceeds by way "of concrete bodies as we find 
them in nature in her ordinary course. "9 The axioms of physics "have to do with 
natures concrete or bound together and embodied in a structure; and bear on the 
particular and special habits of nature"10 According to Bacon, 
By the knowledge of Phisicall causes, there cannot faile to followe, many 
indications and designations of new particulers, if men in their speculation 
will keepe one eye vpon vse & practise. But these are but Coastings along 
the shoare, Premendo littus iniquum, For it seemeth to me, there can hardly 
bee discouered any radicall or fundamentall alterations, and innouations in 
Nature, either by the fortune & essayes of experiments, or by the light and 
direction of Phisical causes. '1 
In Chapter 4,1 explained how the axioms of physics give rise to new 
particulars. But, says Bacon, these will be "new discoveries in materials to some 
8 My trans., Bacon, NO, OFB, 205. Bacon consistently uses the term prceceptum to signify a rule of 
operation. For Bacon, precepts must be deduced from axioms. Hence he identifies prceceptum and 
deductio (NO, OFB, XI, 204). 1 discuss Bacon's notion of deduction below. 
9 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 207 (italics in original). 
10 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 209. 
11 Bacon, AL, OFB, N, 89. As Kiernan notes, the reference ("Premendo littus iniquum") is Horace, 
Odes, II, x, 3 (see OFB, N, 284). The passage states: "Licinius, to live wisely shun The deep sea; on 
the other hand, Straining to dodge the storm don't run Too close in to the jagged land" (trans. 
Wright). In the final stanza of this Ode, Licinius is advised to act courageously and not run for the 
coast. This calls to mind the image of the ship sailing beyond the Pillars of Hercules. 
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degree alike and made ready. "12 That is, they will not be "radicall or fundamentall 
alterations. " This is because "Physical causes, " according to Bacon, "give light and 
direction to new inventions in similar matter. "13 The axioms of physics are tied to 
concrete bodies, therefore the mechanic is likewise "tied in operation, either to the 
basis of the matter or to the condition of the efficient "14 In other words, although it 
may be possible to perform an operation on a wide variety of bodies and in a wide 
variety of ways, the narrow scope of the axiom will "restrict or tie" the mechanic "to 
certain means and certain specific modes of operating. "15 Because an axiom of 
physics relates to the material and efficient cause (latent schematism and process) in 
concrete bodies, the corresponding rule of operation will be confined to "materials to 
some degree alike and made ready. "16 
Consequently, if the mechanic is "not ... able conveniently to get hold of or 
lay hands on the means in question, " he will not be able to perform the operation. '? 
As Bacon explains, "if there be other means and modes (besides the one 
recommended) for producing a particular nature, there will perhaps be some among 
them which lie within the operator's power but from which he is shut out by the 
narrow scope of the precept, so that he does not derive any advantage. "18 In other 
words, he may "have power and not attempt. "19 Baconian operation is invariably 
aimed at widening the scope or latitude of axioms and their corresponding precepts. 
12 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 203. 
13 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 362, cf. I, 568. 
14 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 362, cf. I, 568. 
15 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 205. 
16 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 203. 
17 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 205. 
18 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 205. 
19 Bacon, VT, SEH, III, 236. 
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The following example from Sylva sylvarum illustrates the narrow scope of physical 
axioms and the limitations of the corresponding rules of transformation. 
Bacon describes how one would make gold on the basis of physical 
axioms 2° He begins by listing his physical "axioms of maturation": 
The first is, that there be used a temperate heat; for they are ever temperate 
heats that digest and mature: wherein we mean temperate according to the 
nature of the subject; for that may be temperate to fruits and liquors, which 
will not work at all upon metals. The second is, that the spirit of the metal 
be quickened, and the tangible parts opened: for without those two 
operations, the spirit of the metal wrought upon will not be able to digest 
the parts. The third is, that the spirits do spread themselves even, and move 
not subsultorily; for that will make the parts close and pliant. And this 
requireth a heat that doth not rise and fall, but continue as equal as may be. 
The fourth is, that no part of the spirit be emitted, but detained: for if there 
be emission of spirit, the body of the metal will be hard and churlish. And 
this will be performed, partly by the temper of the fire, and partly by the 
closeness of the vessel. The fifth is, that there be choice made of the 
likeliest and best prepared metal for the version: for that will facilitate the 
work. The sixth is, that you give time enough for the work; not to prolong 
hopes (as the alchemists do), but indeed to give nature a convenient space to 
work in. 21 
Bacon then proceeds to "derive a direction of trial" out of these physical axioms and 
his knowledge of the latent schematisms of metals. 22 He states: 
Let there be a small furnace made, of a temperate heat; let the heat be such 
as may keep the metal perpetually molten, and not more; for that above all 
importeth to the work. For the material, take silver, which is the metal that 
in nature symbolizeth most with gold; put in also with the silver, a tenth 
part of quicksilver, and a twelfth part of nitre, by weight; both these to 
quicken and open the body of the metal; and so let the work be continued 
by the space of six months at the least. I wish also, that there be at some 
times an injection of some oiled substance; such as they use in the 
recovering of gold, which by vexing with separations hath been made 
churlish; and this is to lay the parts more close and smooth, which is the 
main work. For gold (as we see) is the closest (and therefore the heaviest) 
of metals; and is likewise the most flexible and tensible. Note, that to think 
to make gold of quicksilver, because it is the heaviest, is a thing not to be 
20 I use the term "physical axioms" to refer to the axioms of physics (cf. metaphysical axioms). 
However, all Baconian axioms are physical in the sense of pertaining to nature. 
21 Bacon, SS, SEH, II, 449-450. On Bacon's concept of spiritus, see below. 
u Bacon, SS, SEH, II, 450. We saw in Chapter 4 that Bacon says "no one can endow a given body 
with a new nature or successfully and appropriately convert it into a new body unless he has acquired 
a good understanding of the body to be altered or transformed. If not he will run headlong into means 
that are futile or at least difficult and misguided, and not suited to the nature of the body he is 
working on" (NO, OFB, XI, 211). Bacon terms this "the investigation and discovery of the latent 
schematism in bodies" (ibid. ). 
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hoped; for quicksilver will not endure the manage of the fire. Next to silver, 
I think copper were fittest to be the material. 23 
This trial demonstrates the problem with physical axioms. When it comes to making 
gold, the mechanic is confined to specific ways and means of operating. Although it 
may be possible to transmute a wide range of bodies into gold, and although there 
may be many possible modes of operating, these are beyond the reach of the 
mechanic. He is confined to using a material similar to gold, namely, silver. He 
cannot use quicksilver because it will not endure the fire. He may possibly be able to 
use copper but this is as far as his choice of material extends. Likewise, his mode of 
operation is confined to imitating the latent process whereby gold is naturally 
produced. 24 Consequently, mechanics (which derives its precepts from physical 
axioms) "extends and enlarges operation beyond the ones usually found in nature to 
certain operations which are closer to hand or not very far off. '25 As Bacon puts it, 
"Physic carries men in narrow and restrained ways, imitating the ordinary flexuous 
courses of Nature. "26 Mechanical operations have relatively slight powers to alter 
embodied structures; they merely imitate the productions of nature free. 
This brings us to the status of imitationes naturce in Bacon's programme. 
This issue needs resolution before the Baconian doctrine of forms can be fully 
explicated. Following Perez-Ramos, William Newman argues that producing such 
imitations as the artificial rainbow and artificial gold "is the foundation of Bacon's 
famous maker's knowledge, for it is the identity of the natural and the artificial 
product that allows man to certify his knowledge of the former's causes by creating 
23 Bacon, SS, SEH, II, 450. 
24 We saw in Chapter 4 that physics investigates "by what means and by what process gold ... is 
generated, starting with its first menstura and rudiments, all the way up to the finished mineral" (NO, 
OFB, XI, 207). It seeks to know "under what climates, in what earth, and to what depth individual 
metals are generated" (NO, OFB, XI, 437). 
25 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 209. 
26 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 362, cf. I, 568. 
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the latter. "27 Similarly, Peter Zetterberg argues that Bacon's goal was the production 
of imitations of nature. According to Zetterberg, "Rossi is incorrect in asserting that 
Bacon rejected `the doctrine of art as imitatio naturae' itself. 'n8 On Zetterberg's 
reading of Bacon, "science in its theory and art in its work should reflect or echo or 
imitate nature. "29 But for Bacon, imitations mark a stage in inquiry, viz., the 
discovery of latent process and schematism. In contrast, Baconian magic brings forth 
the magnalia of nature. In the New Atlantis we are told that these "excellent works 
... since you 
have not seen ... 
it were too long to make descriptions of them; and 
besides, in the right understanding of those descriptions you might easily err. "30 
These unseen works are the magnalia, secrets "such as to elude and mock the 
imagination and thought of men. "31 True nova cannot be described because they are 
"things that have never been done before, " things which "human thought can barely 
grasp. "32 We saw in Chapter 2 (figure 2.3, p. 80) that the inventions of 
physics/mechanics (imitationes naturce) generally fall into the light grey area of 
overlap. However, it is the unshaded part of the diagram which Bacon is interested 
in - the majority of artificial bodies which cannot "exist except 
by human 
intervention" (my emphasis) 33 Without man's intervention, these bodies will never 
come into being. As I discuss below, only knowledge of metaphysical axioms 
(forms) will shake out nature's hidden folds. 
27 Newman, Promethean Ambitions, 261. 
28 Zetterberg, "Echoes of Nature in Salomon's House, " Journal of the History of Ideas 43 (1982), 
179-193, on 180. 
29 According to Zetterberg, "Salomon's House ... 
is an artificial world carefully fashioned and 
crafted in imitation of the natural world, " "Echoes of Nature in Salomon's House, " 187. Although 
Solomon's House does produce imitations, these are described as "the preparations and instruments 
we have for our works" - they are not the works themselves (Bacon, NA, SEN, III, 156). 
30 Bacon, NA, SEH, III, 166. 
31 Bacon, CV, BF, 96, cf. SEH, III, 615. 
32 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 207. 
33 Bacon, ANN, OFB, XIII, 219. 
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II. Abstract physics 
We have seen that Baconian inquiry unifies knowledge. As Bacon puts it, 
Knowledges [Scientice] are as pyramids, whereof history and experience are 
the bases. And so of Natural Philosophy the basis is Natural History; the 
stage next the basis is Physic; the stage next the vertical point is Metaphysic 
... these three are the true stages 
[contabulationes] of knowledge 34 
Each phase of inquiry is more abstracted from particulars. In order to facilitate the 
transition from physic to metaphysics, Bacon has an intermediary doctrine which he 
calls abstract physics (see figure 5.1). He explains: 
But Physic diffused, which touches on the variety and particularity of 
things, I will again divide into two parts: Physic concerning things 
Concrete, and Physic concerning things Abstract; or Physic concerning 
Creatures, and Physic concerning Natures. The one (to make use of logical 
terms) inquires concerning substances, with every variety of their accidents, 
through every variety of substances. For example, if the inquiry be about a 
lion, or an oak, these support many different accidents; if contrariwise, it be 
about heat or gravity, these are found in many different substances. But as 
all Physic lies in a middle term between Natural History and Metaphysic, 
the former part [Physica de Concretis] (if you observe rightly) comes nearer 
to Natural History, the latter [Physica de Abstractis] to Metaphysic 35 
In Chapter 4, we saw that concrete physics takes the operator a stage beyond natural 
history. As Bacon says, "Natural History investigates and relates the fact, whereas 
Physic likewise examines the causes. "36 Concrete physics investigates latent process 
and schematism (material and efficient causes) in concrete bodies and on the basis of 
these discoveries - which feed back into the mother history - proceeds to axioms. 
Concrete physics is therefore "subject to the same division as Natural History; being 
conversant either with the heavens or meteors, or the globe of earth and sea, or the 
greater colleges, which they call the elements, or the lesser colleges or species 
[Nature Free], as also with pretergenerations [Nature Erring] and mechanics [Nature 
34 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 361-362, cf. I, 567. 
35 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 347, cf. I, 551. 
36 Bacon, DAS, SEN, IV, 347, cf. I, 551. 
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Bound]. "37 In other words, its axioms are derived from the material of the mother 
history. They pertain to "concrete bodies as we find them in nature in her ordinary 
course. "38 
Fig. 5.1. The pyramid of sciences 
37 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 347, cf. I, 551. 
38 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 207. 
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In contrast, abstract physics looks on bodies as conjunctions of simple 
natures while still remaining at the level of embodied structures. It does not extend 
to metaphysics: it examines bodies from the perspective of substratum. In De 
augmentis Bacon explains that "the true Physic of Abstracts" considers the 
following schematisms of matter, in so far as they are expressed in concreted bodies: 
Dense, Rare; Heavy, Light; Hot, Cold; Tangible, Pneumatic; Volatile, 
Fixed; Determinate, Fluid; Moist, Dry; Fat, Crude; Hard, Soft; Fragile, 
Tensile; Porous, Close; Spirituous, Jejune; Simple, Compound; Absolute, 
Imperfectly Mixed [imperfecte Mistum]; Fibrous and Venous, Simple of 
Structure, or Equal; Similar, Dissimilar; Specific, Non-Specific; Organic, 
Inorganic; Animate, Inanimate. 39 
These simple natures are further abstracted and re-addressed in Metaphysics, "which 
considers chiefly the simple forms of things. "40 For example, many bodies are dense 
but they all have different schematisms. However, the form of density is common to 
all dense bodies. Whereas "Physic handles that which is most inherent in matter and 
therefore transitory, " Metaphysic deals with that "which is more abstracted and 
fixed"41 We will see in Part III that abstract physics considers simple natures from 
the point of view of substratum, whereas metaphysics considers simple natures from 
the point of view of potency. This distinction is crucial if we are to understand the 
nature of a Baconian form and its connection with the final stage of operative power. 
While concrete physics mirrors the divisions of the mother history, abstract 
physics and metaphysics require a reordered history mirroring the change in 
perspective from concretes to simples. This reordered history deals with "the 
Cardinal Virtues in nature, " which Bacon says "clearly constitute the primordia of 
nature and, indeed, the primary passions and desires of matter, viz. Dense, Rare, 
39 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 356, cf. I, 560. 
40 Bacon, DAS, SEH, N, 362, cf. I, 568. 
41 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 346, cf. I, 550. 
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Hot, Cold, Consistent, Fluid, Heavy, Light, and quite a few others besides. "42 He 
conceives of this as natural history with its face turned towards philosophy. 43 
According to Bacon, "it is not properly history but a middle term, so to speak, 
between history and philosophy. "44 Bacon's Historia densi & rari is an example of 
such a history. Abstract physics mirrors the divisions of the history of cardinal 
virtues 45 This reordering of natural history signifies a crucial stage in Baconian 
inquiry. As Malherbe rightly says, 
He [Bacon] entertains an evolutive concept of method: order changes 
according to the degree of abstraction. A first order can collect the data and 
it will be empirical, immediately drawn from things, as they appear. Such a 
history is still mainly narrative. But ... the mind can set down a second 
order, which will be no longer the order of sensible things, but the order of 
qualities (what Bacon calls natures); and after some labor, this order of 
concrete natures will be changed into the order of abstract natures, an order 
much more informative about the causes producing phenomena. 46 
Having taken the inquiry as far as concrete physics can go, the mother history is 
reordered and the process begins again. This illustrates the cybernetic (or 
evolutionary) nature of Baconian method. The transition from concrete physics to 
abstract physics is the transition from a first order of concrete bodies to a second 
order of simple or abstracted natures (see Appendix 2 where Bacon conceives of this 
in terms of what he calls a movement from an exterior to an interior vein). The 
reordering of the mother history takes the operator a step closer to knowledge of the 
true "divisions and veins of nature. "47 As Bacon puts it, 
He who has not mixed, confused and reduced to a mass the whole 
distinction of things which is manifest in species popularly established, or 
42 Bacon, DO, OFB, XI, 39; PAH, OFB, XI, 473. 
43 See Bacon, PhU, OFB, VI, 15. 
44 Bacon, DGI, OFB, VI, 109-111. Rees points out, "this study was to be (at least at the start) one of 
Bacon's special and exclusive responsibilities, " OFB, XI, Ixx. See Bacon, PAH, OFB, XI, 473. 
45 According to Rees, Bacon's Abecedarium nouum naturcw "maps out the territory of what the De 
augmentis calls abstract physics, " OFB, XIII, xxxxviii. 
46 Malherbe, "Bacon's method of science, " in The Cambridge Companion to Bacon, 75-98, on 85-86. 
47 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 257. 
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even in the names bestowed, will not see the unity of nature, nor the 
legitimate lines of things, <and> he will not be able to interpret 48 
The history of cardinal virtues moves away from species. The mind has now 
ascended a step closer to perceiving "the unity of nature, " and moves towards its 
union with things (res). 
Abstract physics continues to ascend through a series of axioms of expanding 
generality. This process is described in Valerius terminus where Bacon gives an 
example of an inquiry into the simple nature "whiteness. "49 This example helpfully 
documents Bacon's notion of increasing freedom through the removal or exclusion 
of restraints. He states: 
Let the effect to be produced be Whiteness; let the first direction be that if 
air and water be intermingled or broken in small portions together 
whiteness will ensue, as in snow, in the breaking of waves of the sea and 
rivers, and the like. This direction is certain, but very particular and 
restrained, being tied to air and water. 50 
At the outset, the rules of abstract physics are tied to specific concrete bodies. Bacon 
continues: 
Let the second direction be, that if air be mingled as before with any 
transparent body, such nevertheless as is uncoloured and more grossly 
transparent than air itself, that then &c. as glass or crystal, being beaten to 
fine powder, by the interposition of the air becometh white; the white of an 
egg being clear of itself, receiving air by agitation becometh white, 
receiving air by concoction becometh white; here you are freed from water, 
and advanced to a clear body, and still tied to air. 51 
The third direction "exclude[s] or remove[s] the restraint of an uncoloured body. "52 
"The fourth direction exclude[s] the restraint of a body more grossly transparent 
than air. "53 These four directions are still tied to air. The fifth direction states that "if 
any bodies, both transparent but in an unequal degree, be mingled as before, 
48 My trans., Bacon, DIN, SEH, III, 785. 
49 Bacon, VT, SEH, III, 236-239. 
50 Bacon, VT, SEH, 111,236. 
51 Bacon, VT, SEH, III, 236. 
52 Bacon, VT, SEH, III, 236. 
53 Bacon, VT, SEH, III, 236. 
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whiteness will follow. "54 According to Bacon, "Now are you freed from air, but still 
you are tied to transparent bodies. "" 
Crucially, Bacon identifies the process of exclusion with the removal of 
restraints on the operator. Moreover, in terms of matter's hidden virtues, it can now 
be seen how Bacon's way of exclusion (the via negativa), his cosmogony, and the 
twin goals of knowledge and power are related. Matter's cosmogonical story depicts 
the move from darkness and chaos to light and system. The operator begins from the 
terminus of matter's unfolding (natura naturata) and retraces the only possible route 
back to "the innards of operation" (natura naturans). 56 The contraction of matter's 
power is effectively a primordial "operation. " The subsequent production of a 
cosmology commits Bacon, in ontological terms, to a conception of human 
operation as a repetition of the primordial limitations and exclusions. Primordial 
matter limits its extraordinary power in producing the ordinary course of nature. In 
its self-contracting and organising mode other possibilities are perforce excluded. 
What the operator seeks is the knowledge of the limiting or constraining forces 
which gave rise to this particular world, as the means to (re)create other worlds. The 
move from natura naturata to natura naturans is perfectly represented in the 
pyramid of sciences (see figure 5.1). 
Bacon posits cosmogonical bonds resulting from matter's shaking out its 
folds. These bonds constitute dynamic nodes of motions (forms of the first class) 
which "by combining and transplanting" gave rise to the branching termini of the 
variety of things in nature. 57 The discovery of the form of a simple nature entails a 
rejection or exclusion of all other restraints that are not brought to bear in the 
54 Bacon, VT, SEH, III, 236. 
55 Bacon, VT, SEH, III, 236. 
56 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 181. 
57 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 360, cf. I, 565. 
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production of the given form. In operation each exclusion throws light on the 
constraining forces that produced the form - in the above case, the form of 
whiteness. Every exclusion takes the inquirer a step closer to discovering the form. 
Bacon conceives of the "Formula of Interpretation" as "The Light of Nature" and the 
"truth of things" or forms as "Nature Illuminated. "58 Although matter's origins are 
shrouded in darkness, the via negativa with its exclusionary processes throws light 
on nature's cosmogonical beginnings. Moreover, every exclusion/removal of a non- 
contributory restraint entails an increase in operative power because the operator is 
less tied and restricted in his operations. 
The significance of the operational force of the via negativa has enormous 
consequences for Baconian magic and has not been adequately addressed. 
Exclusions are proportionally tied to increasing latitude and freedom of operation. 
The slogan "knowledge is power" has obscured this crucial component of the 
Baconian method: it is nothing less than Bacon's identification of the way of truth 
(the via negativa) with the way of power. In Aphorism! et consilia Bacon states: 
The way and perfection of truth and power is the same ... so that the forms 
of things may be discovered: from whose acquaintance follows true 
contemplation and free operation 59 
The ascension through the intellectual scale (by means of increasing levels of 
abstraction) furthers knowledge of matter's cosmogonical beginnings and our 
perception of the unity of nature. Operation approximates more and more to matter's 
absolute potency (natura naturans). The more we abstract from concrete bodies (by 
excluding restraints), the less restricted is our the power to (re)create. Although 
commentators like Rossi and Malherbe have noted that Bacon's forms fulfill the 
criteria of freedom and certainty (the rule of truth and the rule of prudence), the 
58 Bacon, TPM, BF, 61, cf. III, 528. See also AC, SEH, III, 793; Appendix 2. 
59 My trans., Bacon, AC, SEH, III, 794. 
218 
operational significance of this connection has been overlooked. 60 Ellis astutely 
notes that this process "is the exact counterpart of the Exclusiva of the Novum 
Organum. "61 But in Valerius terminus Bacon refrains from ascending further up the 
scale. He explains that this 
would open that which in this work [Valerius terminus] I determine to 
reserve; for to pass through the whole history and observation of colours 
and objects visible were too long a digression; and our purpose is now to 
give an example of a free direction, thereby to distinguish and describe it; 
and not to set down a form of interpretation how to recover and attain it 62 
Further ascension on the ladder of the intellect requires the key of interpretation 
(Novum organum). I shall examine Bacon's use of the via negativa in Novum 
organum (and its connection to the freeing of a direction) in Part III. 
60 In Valerius terminus Bacon states: "Neither do I contend but that this motion which I call the 
freeing of a direction, in the received philosophies (as far as a swimming anticipation could take 
hold) might be perceived and discerned; being not much other matter than that which they did not 
only aim at in the two rules of Axioms before remembered [the rule of truth and the rule of prudence], 
but more nearly also in that which they term the form or formal cause, or that which they call the true 
difference; both which nevertheless it seemeth they propound rather as impossibilities and wishes 
than as things within the compass of human comprehension" (Bacon, VT, SEH, III, 239). 
61 Ellis, SEH, I, 42. 
62 Bacon, VT, SEH, III, 237. 
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III. Metaphysics: the doctrine of forms 
Having traversed the various stages of Baconian inquiry, we arrive at Baconian 
metaphysics, which Bacon characterises as the knowledge of forms. This is the 
highest attainable degree of abstraction from concrete structures. The terms 
metaphysica, physics and forma are heavily weighted with Aristotelian and Platonic 
connotations, and refusal to part with these associations is a contributory factor in 
the problems surrounding exegesis on Baconian forms. As Kennington points out, 
"These familiar terms [physics and metaphysics] have to be scrubbed clean of their 
classical meanings and encoded with their new, Baconian ones. "63 Bacon is quite 
candid regarding his appropriation and subversion of traditional terminology. In De 
augmentis he states, "I desire men to observe that I use the word metaphysic in a 
different sense from that which is commonly received. "64 He explains that although 
his "conceptions and notions are novel and differ from the ancient, " he intends "to 
retain with scrupulous care the ancient terms ... hoping well that ... the clear 
explanation which [he] give[s] of everything will prevent the words ... from being 
misunderstood. "65 For Bacon, metaphysics "is itself a part of Physic, or of the 
doctrine concerning nature. "66 Specifically, "the investigation of forms, eternal and 
immutable as they are ... constitutes Metaphysics"67 As mechanics is the practical 
part of physics, so magic is the practical part of metaphysics. Because metaphysics 
63 Kennington, On Modern Origins, 40. 
64 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 344, cf. I, 548. 
65 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 344, cf. I, 548. 
66 Bacon, DAS, SEH, N, 404, cf. I, 613. In a letter to Father Redemptus Baranzano, Bacon refers to 
metaphysics as "true Physics. " He states: "Be not troubled about the Metaphysics. When true Physics 
have been discovered, there will be no Metaphysics. Beyond the true Physics is divinity only" (LL, 
XIV, 375,377). 
67 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 215. 
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is a high physics, Bacon (in the marginalia of Advancement of Learning) refers to 
natural magic as "Physica Operatiua Major" (the Major Operative Physics). 68 
The principal distinction outlined in this chapter rests on the difference 
between minor operative physics (mechanics) and major operative physics (magic). 
For Bacon, what distinguishes magic from mechanics is its "greater dominion over 
nature. "69 Whereas "Phisicke carrieth men in narrow and restrained waies, subiect to 
many accidents of impediments, imitating the ordinarie flexuous courses of Nature, " 
Metaphysic "doth enfranchise the power of Man vnto the greatest libertie, and 
possibilitie of workes and effects. "70 The Baconian Magus (unlike the mechanic) is 
empowered "to identify and bring about things of the kind which neither the 
vicissitudes of nature, nor hard experimenting, nor pure accident could ever have 
actualised, or human thought dreamed of. "71 Bacon believed knowledge of forms 
would "enfranchise the power of Man unto the greatest libertie, and possibilitie of 
workes and effects. "72 I argue that the key to understanding the relation between 
Bacon's doctrine of forms and his science of magic is his identification of a "free 
direction" with form. But although this general principle seems relatively 
transparent, the details are notoriously opaque. 
Thomas Fowler comments that "What Bacon precisely means by this word 
`Form, ' is one of the first questions which must occur to ever reader of the Novum 
organum, and it is probably one of the last difficulties which will be cleared from his 
path. "73 I concur with Fowler here and I argue that much of the confusion 
68 Bacon, AL, OFB, N, 89. 
69 My trans., Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 214. 
70 Bacon, AL, OFB, N, 85. 
71 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 203. 
72 Bacon, AL, OFB, IV, 85. 
73 Thomas Fowler, Bacon's Novum Organum, 54. 
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surrounding Baconian forms stems from a lack of understanding of Bacon's 
cosmogony and a failure to consider carefully the purpose of Baconian inquiry (viz., 
the union of res and mens). To many commentators, Bacon's doctrine of forms 
appears "radically incoherent. "74 In its simplest expression, a Baconian form 
identifies "a [simple] nature that is unseparable from the [simple] nature you inquire 
upon. "75 That is, a form describes a relation between two simple natures. For 
example, when investigating the simple nature heat, the aim is to find another simple 
nature which cannot (under any circumstances) be divorced from heat. As Bacon 
puts it: 
The form of any nature is such that if it be in place the given nature 
invariably follows. Thus it is constantly present when that nature is present, 
and universally asserts it, and inheres in the whole of it. The same form is 
such that if it departs, the given nature infallibly disappears. Thus it is 
always absent when the nature is absent, and always withholds it, and 
inheres it not at all. 76 
The question then arises: How canforma - defined here by Bacon as a partnership 
between two simple natures - refer also (as Bacon claims) to fops emationis, natura 
naturans, true difference, law of pure act and free direction (to name but a few)? As 
Brian Copenhaver puts it, 
Obviously, the Baconian form is not the Peripatetic abstraction, but its exact 
contours are obscure -a generative force, a defining essence, a taxonomic 
distinction, a natural law, a material quality, an alchemical additive, any of 
these will answer to Bacon's description?? 
Thus prima facie, Bacon's doctrine of forms appears incoherent and impenetrable. 
According to J. R. Milton, 
74 Milton, "Laws of Nature, " in The Cambridge history of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, ed. 
Daniel Garber and Michael Ayers, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 686. 
75 Bacon, VT, SEH, III, 240. 
76 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 205. 
77 Copenhaver, "Astrology and Magic, " in The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, ed. C. 
B. Schmitt and Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 264-300, on 299- 
300. Similarly, Michael Hattaway, says that Bacon's "notion of scientific law is a development of Aristotle's formal cause, with, however, a strange mixture of ultimately theological notions derived 
from alchemical and cabbalistic sources, " "Bacon and `Knowledge Broken, "' 188-189. 
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Despite much effort, no one has ever succeeded in subsuming everything 
that Bacon said about laws and forms into a single coherent account, and 
one may reasonably suspect that the enterprise is impossible. Instead 
historians should try to understand why it is that his theory is so radically 
incoherent. One explanation is that Bacon's natural philosophy is a system 
in transition 78 
Likewise, Virgil Whitaker criticises Ellis for "assuming that Bacon had an elaborate 
and consistent philosophic doctrine of `forms. "179 Whitaker "propose[s] to argue 
for 
a much simpler explanation by assuming that Bacon used somewhat uncritically a 
variety of ideas current in his age and failed to achieve a philosophically coherent 
system. "80 This is at odds with everything I have argued in this thesis and makes 
nonsense of Bacon's programmatic vision. The confusion results because 
commentators treat the concept of form independently of a consideration of the full 
range of Bacon's natural philosophical principles. In the following section, I shall 
attempt to subsume Bacon's various comments regarding laws and forms into a 
single coherent account. In the process, I shall relate Bacon's doctrine of forms to 
his cosmogony, the union of res and mens, the via negativa and his science of 
magic. I follow Ellis's suggestion that, "As Bacon uses the word [forma] in his own 
sense, we must endeavour to interpret the passages in which it occurs by means of 
what he has himself said of it"81 Thus I will interpret key passages of Novum 
organum in the light of other aspects of Bacon's natural philosophical programme. 
78 Milton, "Laws of Nature, " in The Cambridge history of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, ed. 
Daniel Garber and Michael Ayers, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 686. 
79 Whitaker, "Bacon's Doctrine of Forms: A Study of Seventeenth Century Eclecticism, " Huntington 
Library Quarterly 33 (1970), 209-216, on 209. 
80 Whitaker, "Bacon's Doctrine of Forms, " 209-210. According to Whitaker, "this assumption is 
itself consistent with Bacon's own repeated enunciations of his distrust of building systems and with 
his choice of the aphorism as the basic principle structure in the Novum Organum to avoid any 
appearance of erecting the vast philosophic systems characteristic of some of his predecessors and 
contemporaries, " 210. Writing several years before Rees, Whitaker says Bacon's "distrust of building 
a whole cosmology on very inadequate foundations was certainly commendable, " 210. 
81 Ellis, SEH, I, 28. 
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A. The potency-substratum distinction (II) 
To begin the analysis of Baconian forms, I draw attention to how the transition from 
physical to metaphysical axioms (forms) indicates a crucial change in perspective. 
We saw in Chapter 4 that, although Bacon holds that we must ascend the scala 
intellectus "by successive, uninterrupted or unbroken steps, " many commentators 
argue that physics and metaphysics are disjunctive. 82 For example, Jardine argues 
that Bacon's failure to work out the relation between physics and metaphysics is "a 
fundamental weakness in Bacon's programme for the growth of human power over 
nature, and one which remains completely unresolved. "83 In contrast, I argue that the 
problem of the relation between physics and metaphysics is resolved when we 
consider Bacon's dual perspective on matter, viz., the potency-substratum 
distinction. Physics considers matter from the perspective of substratum, whereas 
metaphysics considers matter from the perspective of potency. Thus, physics and 
metaphysics are not disjunctive; an understanding of their interdependence requires 
attending to the change in perspective. Ellis unwittingly (and somewhat confusedly) 
picks up on the potency-substratum distinction: 
Such phenomena as the rising of cream, the subsidence of the lees of wine, 
the clinging of gold leaf round the finger, &c., were to be explained in the 
first instance by the instincts and appetites of portions of matter, and 
afterwards to receive a deeper and more fundamental explanation when 
these instincts and appetites were themselves shown to result from the site, 
form, and configuration of the ultimate particles of which all bodies are 
composed. 84 
82 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 161. 
83 Jardine, Francis Bacon, 143. 
84 Ellis, SEH, I, 55. 
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But according to Bacon, and contra Ellis, physics investigates phenomena in terms 
of configuration of particles (substratum). 85 To gain the requisite increase in 
abstraction, the same phenomena are then investigated in metaphysics in terms of 
the fundamental appetites and motions of bodies (potency). It is the latter 
perspective that offers the deeper and more fundamental explanation. In Novum 
organum Bacon discusses this change in perspective in terms of two kinds of axioms 
of transformation. The axioms of physics, as already explained, proceed by way "of 
concrete bodies as we find them in nature in her ordinary course. "86 In contrast, 
Metaphysics 
looks on [intuetur] a body as an array or conjugation [turmam siue 
coniugationem] of simple natures; for instance, in gold these things come 
together: that which is yellow; that which is heavy up to such and such a 
weight; that which can be beaten or drawn out to such and such an extent; 
that which cannot become volatile, or lose mass by fire; that which can flow 
to such and such a degree; that which can be separated or dissolved by this 
or that means; and so on for the rest of the natures which come together 
[concurrunt] in gold. Thus an axiom of this sort brings the matter down to 
the forms of simple natures [rem deducit ex Formis Naturam simplicium]. 87 
Bacon's notion that we can look on bodies as conjunctions of simple natures is 
pivotal. Causes (forms) are abstractions, not structures. For Bacon, forma refers to 
matter's unfolding powers, not to concrete configurations. Bacon habitually alludes 
to "the error in propounding chiefly the search of causes in productions of things 
concrete, which are infinite and transitory, and not of abstract natures, which are few 
and permanent. "88 These natures, says Bacon, "are as the alphabet or simple letters, 
whereof the variety of things consisteth; or as the colours mingled in the painter's 
85 As I argued in Chapter 2, Bacon does not think we can arrive at knowledge of "the ultimate 
particles" (the atom). 
86 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 207. 
87 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 205-207. 
88 Bacon, VT, SEH, III, 243. 
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shell, wherewith he is able to make infinite variety of faces or shapes"89 By viewing 
bodies as conjugations of simple natures, we move a step away from natura 
naturata towards natura naturans. As Bacon explains, "I, engaging purely and 
unceasingly with things, do not abstract my intellect further from them than to allow 
(as with sight) their images and rays to come into focus [Intellectum longiu, sa Rebus 
non abstrahimus, quäm vt rerum imagines, & rady (vt in sensu fit) coire possint]. "90 
Through the various stages of inquiry in which the intellect compares and contrasts 
bodies, simple natures are abstracted sufficiently to allow the "rays to come into 
focus. " This leads ultimately to a perception of the unity of nature ("the summits and 
peaks of nature"). 91 Through abstraction, the operator takes a step back from nature 
in its phenomenal appearances to perceive the commonalities underlying its 
fecundity. 
We saw in Chapter 2 that the unity of nature is a reflection of the primary 
impulse or desire of materia prima to cohere. This is why Bacon can chart the return 
journey to a terminus in forms: individuals are never truly separated from that unity. 
The move from the one to the many, characterised by the pyramidal figure, results 
from a successive unfolding and fashioning of the absolute power of materia prima. 
The constraint of nature's absolute potency entails a concomitant outward expansion 
of generative power. The purpose of Bacon's method is to discover the means of 
restraint in order to reconfigure simple natures in novel conglomerations. 
Metaphysics investigates the cardinal powers that gave rise to the current order of 
nature (nature free). In other words, metaphysics considers nature from a 
cosmogonical perspective. It searches out the primordial constraints on nature's 
89 Bacon, VT, SEH, III, 243. 
90 Bacon, IM, OFB, XI, 21. 
91 My trans., Bacon, SI, SEH, II, 689. 
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potency that gave rise to this world. Hence, Bacon's forms describe limitations on 
matter's potency that resulted in the generation of simple natures (heat, light, death 
etc. ). In inquisitional terms, the operator moves from bondage to phenomenal things, 
through an increasing freedom of action, by means of abstracting and disentangling 
composites, until he reaches the form. Thus Baconian inquiry inverts the primordial 
emanation from unity to multiplicity The following section elaborates on the 
relationship between form and cosmogony. 
B. Form and cosmogony 
We saw in Chapter 2 that in Bacon's cosmogony, all motions and virtues stem from 
the atom by means of a process of unfolding. Nature emerges from a point in a 
pyramidal expansion that ends in multiplicity and variation. The reverse of this in 
inquisitional terms is to begin with natural history, ascend through a hierarchy of 
axioms, terminating in the lex summaria 92 My main claim here is that "form, " in its 
Baconian sense, refers to the constraints or limitations whereby matter's absolute 
power is unfolded and organised into simple natures. As Bruno says, "potency is not 
the same as act, since act is not absolute but limited. "93 This is precisely the 
Baconian position: Bacon's forms are laws of pure act. This becomes clearer if we 
re-examine Bacon's investigation of the form of heat in Novum organum. In treating 
what he calls "The First Vintage concerning the Form of Heat, " Bacon concludes 
that "Each and every Instance indicates that the nature of which heat is a limitation 
is motion. "94 He then proceeds to describe the "true Differences which limit motion 
92 Bacon, DSV, SEH, VI, 655. 
93 Bruno, Cause, Principle and Unity, ed. and trans. Richard J. Blackwell and Robert de Lucca 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 66. 
94 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 263 (italics in original). 
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and establish [constituunt] it as the form of heat. "95 It is this differential in potency 
(typically ignored in Baconian commentary) that constitutes the form of heat 96 
Bacon states: 
Now from this First Vintage, the form or true definition of heat (i. e. of heat 
relative to the universe and not just relative to the sense) is, put briefly, this: 
that Heat is an expansive motion, but restrained and struggling [cohibitus, 
& nitens] by way of the lesser parts. But the expansion is modified 
[Modificatur], so that in expanding all round, it nevertheless tends to rise 
upwards. The struggle [Nixus] by way of the parts is also modified 
[Modificatur], so that it is not altogether sluggish but driven on and with 
some vigour to it. 97 
Thus the form of heat refers to motion (nature's potency) limited or restrained in 
specific ways. This contraction produces an expansion of generative power which 
brings forth the simple nature heat. In the case of heat, spirit expands but is 
restrained by the tangible parts so that a struggle (Nixus) ensues 98 Bacon's notion of 
form as a limitation of act explains the following passage: 
From what I have said concerning motion (namely that it is like a genus to 
heat's species), I do not mean that heat begets motion or that motion begets 
heat (though in some cases these things are true) but that the very heat itself 
or Quid ipsum of heat is motion and nothing else; but this conclusion is 
limited by Differences which I shall give 99 
95 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 265 
96 Rees refers to commentators' "tunnel vision" when it comes to aspects of Novum organum. This 
applies even to Bacon's infamous form of heat. Commentators have seized on Bacon's statement that 
the "Quid ipsum of heat is motion" but paid very little attention to his claim that "this conclusion is 
limited by Differences" (NO, OFB, XI, 263). 
97 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 271 (italics in original). 
98 It is not generally recognised that when Bacon refers to "an expansive motion, " he is referring to a 
dilation of spirit. There is a struggle between spirit and tangible matter ("the lesser parts"). The 
reasons for this oversight are clear. Consider Mary Horton's claim that, "In stating that the essence of 
heat is motion, he [Bacon] anticipates Rumford and Davy's refutation of the caloric theory of heat, 
and their conclusions that heat is a form of motion, by about 175 years. In addition, if we consider the 
`true difference' and make the assumption that particles that were not the minutest but of tolerable 
dimensions might be an intuitive description of molecules, it could be suggested that in embryo form 
Bacon's Theory of Heat anticipates the Kinetic Theory of Matter, " "In Defence of Francis Bacon: A 
Criticism of the Critics of the Inductive Method, " Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 4 
(1973), 241-278, on 255. Michael Hattaway is correct when he says "Bacon's notion of form is 
virtually inseparable from the notion of spirit, " "Bacon and `Knowledge Broken, "' 190. We will see 
below that Bacon designates spiritus the source of "that rich and fruitful supply of active power" 
(DSV, SEH, VI, 759, cf. 681). Baconian magic works by constraining spiritus. However, Bacon does 
not, as Hattaway claims, blur "the distinctions between, cause, form, and spirit, " ibid. 
99 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 263 (italics in original). 
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Bacon's form must not be confused with the efficient cause - that which produces 
heat in a particular concrete body. Efficient and material causes are specific to 
embodied structure, but the form is fixed, independent of all embodiment, and 
present universally in bodies where motion is restrained in the specific and requisite 
manner. That is, the form heat is the simple nature per se, and is invariably 
connected with the presence of another simple nature. 
To further illustrate Bacon's dense account, it is helpful to consider his 
retention of the language of genus and species, which strikes many commentators as 
odd. For example, Malherbe comments that "Remarkably, Bacon borrows from 
Aristotle the species/genus structure. "loo To the best of my knowledge, no 
commentator appreciates the function that Bacon's subversion of this doctrine 
performs. '°' As Kennington points out, "From the start Bacon ... challenged 
Aristotle on a fundamental issue: how is a natural being to be understood? The 
difference is from the start a difference of standpoint: Bacon seeks to understand a 
being in terms of how it initially came to be, in order that its production can be 
reproduced by man. "102 Ellis also seems to grasp this point when he says, "Natural 
philosophy considered from [Bacon's] point of view, is therefore only an answer to 
the question, How does Nature work in the production of phenomena? When, to take 
100 Malherbe, "Bacon's Method of Science, " in The Cambridge Companion to Bacon, 95. 
101 In a recent paper Angus Fletcher argues that "Bacon's apparently awkward inclusion of the term 
"genus" is ... not a reference to 
Aristotle; rather, it is a manifestation of a Ramist approach to 
definition that views complex substances in terms of the addition of a specific form to a more abstract 
genus, " "Francis Bacon's Forms and the Logic of Ramist Conversion, " Journal of the History of 
Philosophy 43 (2005), 157-169, on 164-165. Fletcher's account is confused because his interpretation 
of Bacon's genus is based on the latter's investigation of whiteness in Valerius terminus. Fletcher 
fails to realise that Valerius is concerned with abstract physics, whereas Novum organum is 
concerned with metaphysics. The two accounts are not therefore interchangeable. Bacon's notion of 
"convertible" natures is not "Raurist in origin" but relates to his notion of enfolded matter, 161. 
102 Kennington, On Modern Origins, 9. For an alternative reading see Robert E. Larsen, "The 
Aristotelianism of Francis Bacon's Novum Organum, " Journal of the History of Ideas 23 (1962), 
435-450. According to Larsen, the Aristotelian conception of form "is the basis of Bacon's view of 
`form, "' 443. 
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a trivial example, she superinduces yellowness on the green leaf, or silently and 
gradually transforms ice into crystal, we ask how are these changes brought 
about? "103 The retention of the terms is best explained by the complicatio-explicatio 
concept. For Bacon, genus refers to matter complicatio, and species to matter 
explicatio. In the case of heat, the genus (motion) is complicatio whereas the species 
(heat) is explicatio. Conversely, species by "continual gradations are contracted 
[contrahuntur] into more universal generalities, " i. e. genera. '°4 Thus a species is 
produced through an explicatio of a genus. Contraction (complicatio) increases 
power and expansion (explicatio) increases organisation. We can now make sense of 
the following passage: 
A true form is such that it draws up the given nature [the species] from 
some source of being [the genus] which inheres in many other things, and is 
(as they have it) better known to nature than the form itself [vt Naturam 
datam ex Ponte aliquo Essentice deducat, quce finest pluribus, & notior est 
Naturre (vt loquuntur) quäm ipsa Forma]. Thus for a true and perfect axiom 
for knowing, the prescription [pronuntiatum] and precept is this: that there 
be discovered another nature which is convertible with the given nature, but 
which is nevertheless a limitation of one better known to nature like a true 
genus. 105 
Because the genus is complicatio, it potentially inheres in many other things, and is 
not necessarily in specific things. This means that matter can unfold in many 
different ways, and what applies to heat applies to all forms. When Bacon says that 
the genus is better known to nature than the form itself, he means that the genus is a 
more primordial in nature - it is a "radical and formative" nature. 106 In the case of 
the form of heat, motion is the genus because it is more original than heat: it is freer 
and less restricted and so closer to the extraordinary power of natura naturans. The 
genus is the source (tons) from which the species is drawn up (deducere). As Rom 
103 Ellis, SEN, I, 59. 
104 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 321, cf. I, 525. 
105 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 205 (italics in original). 
106 Bacon, VT, SEH, III, 241. 
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Harre points out, deducere would "in this period, have been understood in the 
physical sense of `leads out' or `produces' rather than the logical sense of `implies' 
or 6 entails. "'107 The limitation/constraint of the genus draws up the simple nature: it 
is this constraint or limiting force (vis) active in matter's unfolding into organisation 
which is the Baconian form. The two inseparable natures are convertible because, as 
Bacon says in De principiis atque originibus, "the nature of a principle is that things 
should resolve themselves into it as readily as they should be produced out of it [ut 
res in illud solvantur, quam ut res ex illo gignantur]. "108 However, the form is 
always a limitation of a more primordial nature better known to nature (notior 
Natura; ). We will see below that this has operative consequences. 
We are now in a position to resolve a problem that has plagued Baconian 
commentary. Many commentators argue that Bacon's notion of form has two 
irreconcilable meanings, viz., essence and cause. Fowler argues that Bacon's 
account of form in Novum organum can be "ranged under two classes, according as 
the word `Form' may be replaced by words like essence, differentia, definition, &c. 
or by words like law, cause, &c"tog However, Fowler notes that "there is one 
passage (i, 75) in which the two meanings are brought together. " I 10 Fowler attempts 
(unsuccessfully) "to reconcile or bring into any connexion these two apparently 
divergent meanings. ""' Similarly, Ellis comments, "It will be observed that the two 
modes in which Bacon speaks of the Form, namely as ipsissima res and as a law, 
107 Rom Harrte, "A Note on Ms. Horton's Defence of Bacon, " Studies in the History and Philosophy 
of Science 5 (1974), 305-306, on 306. 
10 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 223. 
109 Fowler, Bacon's Novum Organum, 57. 
110 Fowler, Bacon's Novum Organum, 57, n. 38. 
111 Fowler, Bacon's Novum Organum, 58. 
231 
differ only, though they cannot be reconciled, as two aspects of the same object. "112 
The confusion over the apparent irreconcilability of these terms arises because 
Bacon describes his forms as laws of pure act: "When I speak of forms, I mean 
nothing other than those laws and determinations of pure act which regulate and 
constitute [ordinant & constituunt] any simple nature, like heat, lumen, weight, in 
every kind of matter [in omnimodd materiä] and susceptible subject"113 We saw in 
Chapter 2 how Bacon identifies matter's appetitive power with the summary law of 
nature. This law, he states, is nothing other than the original force (vis) impressed on 
the atom "that fashions all things out of matter [qua' ex materia omnia ... 
effingit]. " 4 The above confusion can be resolved if we recognise that in its self- 
organisation matter is conceived as originally "fashioned" by a primary law. In that 
case all subsequent forms are "clauses" of this "summary" law. In regarding forms 
as laws it follows that just as the summary law is a force (vis), so the unfolded 
hierarchy of forms are also "forces, " fashioning and constraining matter (explicatio) 
to limit its absolute power (complicatio). This is why nature behaves in accordance 
with laws and why forms are fixed and universal. Moreover, forms describe an 
active process, not a static configuration. Hence they are the source of operative 
power. As Bacon puts it, 
For although nothing really exists in nature besides individual bodies, 
carrying out pure, individual acts according to law [ex lege], yet in the 
sphere of doctrine, this very law, and the investigation, discovery and 
explanation [explicatio] of it, is the very foundation of knowing as it is of 
operating. It is this law then, and its clauses, that I understand by the name 
of forms. 115 
112Ellis, SEH, I, 31. 
113 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 255. 
114 Bacon, DSV, SEH, VI, 729, cf. 655. 
115 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 203. Cf. Bruno: "the potency is always limited to a single act, because it 
never has more than one, specific and particular being, " Cause, Principle and Unity, ed. and trans. 
Richard J. Blackwell and Robert de Lucca (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 66. 
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Nature's acts are explications of the summary law of nature (matter's appetitive 
power). Through forms matter is constrained and channelled into a network of 
simple natures. Hence, Bacon's concept of a law of nature is intimately related to his 
concept of an appetitive matter. The derivation of all things from a single source (the 
atom) implicates them in this law. The lex summaria is the unity underlying the 
fabrica of nature. Matter unfolds itself according to the lex summaria and the 
resulting chain of causes is ultimately explicable in terms of this same law. For 
Bacon, forms are explications of the lex summaria. Hence he states, "forms are 
fictions of the human soul, except when you want to call those laws governing the 
act forms. "' 16 When we consider nature from the point of view of causes, the motion 
of the atom is causa causarum; when we consider nature from the point of view of 
its modus operandi (natura naturans), the unfolding from a single source 
corresponds to the fixed chains of causation determined by the summary law of 
nature. 117 And from that perspective forms are laws. This is clear when Bacon states: 
The fabric of nature contains in her own lap and bosom every event 
whatever ... and 
developes them in due season by a fixed law [fabrica ipsa 
naturce suo sinu et gremio omnem eventum ... complectatur, et suo tempore 
certa lege prodat]. 11 s 
Considered from a cosmogonical perspective, there is a fixed relationship between 
genus and species, a contraction or limitation of nature's potency with a concomitant 
increase in generative power. This generative act is an explication of the lex 
summaria. The form is the law governing the act, the limitation or constraint of 
matter's potency which we experience as a given simple nature. This is what law 
does - it limits action. As Bacon says, "lex and ligantia come both a ligando. "119 In 
116 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 89. 
117 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 198; NO, OFB, XI, 200. 
118 Bacon, DAS, SEH, N, 321, cf. I, 524. 
119 Bacon, LL, X, 330. 
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operative terms, as we saw in Chapter 4, each of Bacon's canones mobiles 
("provisional rules") is followed by an explicatio which details the various effects 
which flow from the rule. An axiom is a rule or law unifying nature's behaviour. 
The greater the generality of the rule, the more effects it explains. The effects are an 
explication (explicatio) of the rule, that is, a description of nature's unfolding. 
120 
Having now shown how nature's unfolding from a single source can be expressed 
in 
terms of laws of act, we can reconcile Bacon's notion of form as law and essence. 
Forms are explications of nature's "fundamental and everlasting laws" expressed 
in 
terms of the relation between genus and species. 121 
Because forms are unifying laws, they reveal the commonalities underlying 
nature's infinite variety. According to Bacon, "he who knows forms grasps the unity 
beneath the surface of materials which are very unlike. "122 Bacon expands on this 
idea in the following passage: 
But if any man thinks that our forms too smack of abstraction in that they 
mix and conjoin things unrelated [heterogenea] - for the heat of the 
heavens and of fire seem not to be alike; neither do the fixed red of a rose 
and so on, and the apparent red of a rainbow or rays from an opal or 
diamond; nor again do death from drowning, burning, the sword, apoplexy, 
or atrophy; yet these things agree in the nature of heat, redness and death 
respectively - such a man must learn that custom, the unanalysed 
appearances of things, and mere opinion enslave his intellect. For it is 
absolutely certain that these things, however unlike and foreign to each 
other, come together [coire] in the form or law which governs [ordinat] 
heat, redness, or death; and that human power can never throw off the 
shackles of nature in its ordinary course, and stretch out and lift itself to 
new efficients and new modes of operation [nec emancipari posse 
potentiam humanam, & liberari a Naturre cursu communi, & expandi & 
exaltari ad Efficientia noua, & Modos operandi nouos], unless it does so by 
unmasking and discovering forms of this kind. 123 
120 In Historia sympathies, et antipathies; rerum, Bacon speaks of "unravelling [enucleando] the law of 
nature, and interpreting the relations of things" (SEH, HAS, V, 204). 
121 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 215. 
122 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 203. 
123 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 257. 
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Because forms unify nature, they promise a huge expansion in operative power and 
emancipation from nature's ordinary course. Confusion regarding the unifying 
power of forms can be traced as far back as Mill. Mill misunderstood entirely 
Bacon's position that every phenomenal appearance must be traced to a fixed cause 
or form. Unsurprisingly, later commentators have concurred with Mill. For example, 
Fowler states: 
The whole of the enquiry into Form, and, consequently, the Method of 
Exclusions, proceeds on the assumption that every phenomenon has only 
one cause, that is to say, is due to only one set of conditions. Of the `simple 
natures' there is some one, and one only, which, if it could be found, is the 
`Form' of the `natura data' ... But the same event, as 
is so often and so 
justly insisted on by Mr. Mill, whenever he has occasion to speak of what 
he terms `Plurality of Causes, ' may be due to one set of conditions at one 
time and to a different set of conditions at another ... Hence, though it is 
invariably true that the same cause is always followed by the same effect, 
the converse proposition that the same effect is always due to the same 
cause would frequently be misleading. 124 
However, Mill confused latent process (the plurality of causes giving rise to the 
natura data in a particular concrete body) and form (the unique cause of the natura 
data in all bodies). He conflates efficient cause (vehiculumformce) and form. 125 The 
former belongs to physics, but the latter belongs to metaphysics. Mill's error arises 
from an ignorance of Bacon's cosmogony underlying the doctrine of forms. Unless 
we are clear that form refers to a restriction of nature's potency, which in the process 
of unfolding produces the natura data, we cannot understand how Bacon could be 
"absolutely certain that things ... unlike and foreign to each other, come together in 
the form. " Without the concept of complicatio-explicatio supporting his doctrine of 
forms, Bacon's foundational metaphysical assumption of the unity of nature and the 
124 Fowler, Bacon's Novum Organum, 62. See Mill's Logic, V, ch. 3,7. 
125 Bacon warns against this very error in Novum organuni: "I warn you some danger lurks in these 
[migratory] instances, i. e. they can restrict the form too much to the efficient, and take over the 
intellect or rather, from contemplating the efficient narrow it to a false opinion of the form. However, 
I always maintain that the efficient is nothing other than the vehicle or carrier of the form [vehiculum, 
siue deferens Formce]. But carrying out the Exclusive process properly is an effective cure for this ill" 
(NO, OFB, XI, 275-277). 
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necessary presence of the unique form is incoherent. For example, speaking of the 
form of light in De augmentis Bacon writes: 
Men ought to have sunk their speculations for awhile, and inquired what 
that is which is common to all lucid bodies; in other words, into the Form of 
Light. For what an immense difference of body there is (if they be 
considered according to their dignity) between the sun and rotten wood, or 
even the putrefied scales of fish? ... What connexion with 
fire and lighted 
matter have glowworms and fireflies, and the Indian fly, which lights up a 
whole room; or the eyes of some animals in the dark; or sugar while it is 
being scraped or broken; or the sweat of a horse, hard-ridden on a hot night; 
and the like? ... Men 
have not from particular instances elicited the 
Common Forms of natures; which I have laid down as the proper subject of 
Metaphysic. 126 
The form is the commonality underlying nature's phenomenal variety. Forms unify 
the most disparate phenomena. As Bacon puts it in De interpretatione natura; 
sententice xii, "things, although they seem most unlike, nevertheless conceal a 
genuine likeness known to the interpreter. " 127 This genuine likeness concealed 
beneath nature's bewildering variety is the form. In Historia vitce et mortis Bacon 
says "it is convenient to know the character and form of old age; which will be done 
best by making a careful collection of all the differences in the state and functions of 
the body between youth and old age, that by them you may see what it is that 
branches out [frondescent] into so many effects"128 Bacon's use of the verb 
frondescere (to become leafy, to put forth leaves, to shoot out) vividly captures the 
relationship between his cosmogony and his doctrine of forms. He is trying to 
discover what it is that branches out or unfolds into so many effects; this unifying 
factor is the form. Moreover, the notion of branching and channelling into a 
profusion of seams and lines in matter captures the idea that a form is a fashioning 
and constricting force. This also leads to a demolition of the idea of fixed kinds of 
things. The only commentator seriously to address this aspect of Bacon's doctrine of 
126 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 403-404, cf. I, 612-613. Cf. SS, SEH, II, 456-457. 
127 My trans., Bacon, DIN, SEH, III, 788. 
129 Bacon, HVM, SEH, V, 222, cf. II, 110. 
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forms is Kennington and I am indebted to his insightful account. In particular, 
Kennington highlights the following important point: 
The concepts of physics are kind-related, or intrinsic to kinds; the concepts 
of metaphysics cut across the kinds. Thus there are no laws of nature that 
are laws peculiar to one kind; there are no laws, for example, that are 
peculiar to the human species. Conversely, the concepts peculiar to physics, 
latent process and latent structure or configuration, do not cut across 
species, but are inherent in species. 129 
We will see below that it is this property of laws to cut across kinds that promises 
the expansion in operative power and the emancipation from nature's ordinary 
course. Without acknowledging the concept of unity, a form will consistently be 
taken as signifying the efficient cause in concrete bodies. However the goal of 
Baconian magic is to return to the point prior to embodiment in concrete structures, 
to access the forms responsible for imposing organisation and cohesiveness. 
C. Form and the union of res and mens 
We saw in Chapter 4 that the purpose of Bacon's method is to make the pyramid of 
knowledge (mens) a perfect reflection of the pyramid of nature (res) (see figures 4.1 
and 4.2, p. 160). For Bacon, 
The true philosophy ... echoes most faithfully the voice of the world itself, 
and is written as it were from the world's own dictation; being indeed 
nothing else than the image and reflexion [simulacrum et reflexio] of it, 
which it only repeats and echoes, but adds nothing of its own. "130 
I have also noted that Baconian inquiry inverts the primordial emanation from unity 
to multiplicity. Thus whilst the multiplicity of nature (natura naturata) displays a 
bewildering fecundity, Baconian operative power relies on a limited set of 
underlying simple forms identified with natura naturans (the supreme potency of 
matter). Baconian inquiry proposes to unite mens and res: to lead the mind "to the 
129 Kennington, On Modern Origins, 40. 
130 Bacon, DSV, SEH, VI, 714, cf. 640. 
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things themselves [ad res ipsas]. "131 Although Baconian forms are abstracted from 
bodies, Bacon says "I never withdraw or abstract from the things themselves [a 
rebus ipsis]. "132 This shows clearly that the term res does not refer to phenomenal 
things but to the hidden virtues and powers of matter. For Bacon, the form is 
attained as a consequence of the perfect union of res and mens. In Novum organum 
he says "the form or true definition [Definitio vera] of heat" is "heat relative to the 
universe and not just relative to sense [eius, qui est in ordine ad Vniuersum, non 
relatiuus tantummodö ad Sensum]"133 Baconian science "emerge[s] not just from the 
nature of the mind but from the very nature of things [vt non solüm ex Natura 
Mentis, sed ex Natura Rerum quoque]. "134 Hence Bacon's forms are, in so far as 
they contribute to operative power, determined by the union of the mind and things. 
Yet many commentators treat Bacon's forms as material entities existing in matter. 
For example, Stephen Gaukroger states: 
Although there is some variation in the way in which Bacon characterises 
Forms, the Form of something seems to be, above all, its basic material 
structure, the way in which its constituent material parts are disposed. This 
is, of course, a traditional atomist concept. 135 
Similarly, Anthony Quinton writes that forms are "the hidden states of the fine 
structure of things by reference to which their straightforwardly observable 
properties can be explained. "136 Form is "a latent structural property of the particles 
of which matter ... is composed ... an arrangement or configuration of matter, not a 
131 Bacon, IM, OFB, XI, 21. 
132 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 255-257. 
133 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 271. 
134 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 443. 
135 Stephen Gaukroger, Francis Bacon and the Transformation of Early-Modern Philosophy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 140. 
136 Anthony Quinton quoted in Vickers, "Francis Bacon and the Progress of Knowledge, " Journal of the History of Ideas 53 (1992), 495-518, on 504. 
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thing in its own right "137 We have already seen that Bacon quite clearly 
distinguishes between latent schematism (material cause) and form. The idea that 
form is identical to latent structure is contradictory. Structure is specific to concrete 
bodies whereas form is universal. The former considers bodies from the point of 
view of substratum, the latter from the point of view of potency. Quinton's statement 
reveals that it is the relationship between simple nature and form which leads him to 
the conclusion that form must refer to "the fine structure of things. " However, as we 
saw in Chapter 3, Bacon explains our perception of simple natures in terms of 
radiative matter. The form is the fons emanationis giving rise to a simple nature. Our 
perception of the simple nature is a product of consent between the organs of the 
senses and the forms and schematisms of matter. 
In Chapter 2, I explained how ordinary macroscopic bodies are nodes of 
complicated motions which have attained relative stability. Apparent rest occurs 
when nodes of simple motions are locked in a state of dynamic tension. The 
schematisms of matter are products of these dynamic tensions. Schematismus is a 
descriptive term for matter which can keep its form because the simple motions are 
locked in a state of dynamic tension. We have already examined (in abstract 
physics) the schematisms of matter which are the material causes of simple natures. 
From the point of view of potency (i. e. metaphysics), schematisms are locked nodes 
of simple motions. The schematisms of matter emanate simple motions. Bacon's 
forms describe the stable nodes of simple motions - islands of stability - which 
consent with the organs of the senses, giving rise to a particular simple nature. When 
discussing the form of heat, Bacon says 
As far as sense goes, heat is a respective thing, and relative to man, not to 
the universe [Calidum ad sensum, res Respectiua est, & in ordine ad 
137 ibid. 
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Hominem, non ad Vniuersum]; and it is rightly set down that heat is just its 
effect on the animal spirits. The effect is moreover intrinsically variable, 
since the same body can (according to the sense's condition) induce the 
perception of heat or of cold. 138 
The inquiry into Baconian forms goes beyond what is relative to the sense, in order 
to discover what it is in nature which gives rise to the simple nature. What is it that 
impinges on the animal spirits? This is res (the thing itself) and should not be 
confused with the simple nature. Bacon states: 
The form of the thing is the very thing itself, and the thing does not differ 
from the form in any other way than appearance from existence, external 
from internal, or that relative to man from that relative to the universe [Cüm 
enim Forma rei sit ipsisima Res; neque d ferat Res a Forma, aliter quäm 
d fferunt Apparens & Existens, auf Exterius & Interius, auf in ordine ad 
Hominem & in Ordine ad Vniuersum]. 139 
On the face of it, this aphorism seems incongruous because Bacon describes the 
form as "in ordine ad Hominem, " whereas elsewhere he describes it as "in ordine ad 
Vniuersum, non relatiuus tantummodd ad Sensum" ("relative to the universe and not 
just relative to the sense"). 140 However, this aphorism cannot be divorced from its 
context and is crucially important as it highlights the relationship between form and 
res. Res is in (radiative) matter and it impinges on our senses. In other words, res is 
"existence, " "external, " "relative to the universe. " Yet the form is "the very thing 
itself' and should therefore share the attributes of res. Considered from the 
standpoint of man, the form is "appearance, " "internal, " "relative to man, " but not in 
the same way as the simple nature is merely relative to the sense. This is clear if we 
bear in mind that the purpose of Bacon's method is to make the pyramid of 
knowledge (mens) a perfect reflection of the pyramid of nature (res). 141 As Bacon 
138 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 263. 
139 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 237. 
140 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 270. 
141 Those who argue that Bacon is here merely presenting the primary/secondary quality distinction 
are overlooking the goal of inquiry. There is no operative counterpart in the traditional distinction. 
See, for example, Maxwell Primack, "Francis Bacon's Philosophy of Nature" (unpubl. Ph. D. diss., 
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puts it, "the truth of being, and the truth of knowing are one, differing no more than 
the direct beame, and the beame reflected. "142 Because the purpose of inquiry is to 
unite res and mens, Bacon can state (without contradicting himself) that the form "is 
the very thing itself' and "does not differ from the form in any other way than 
appearance to existence. " The form is the reflection of the thing itself in the levelled 
mirror of a mind, no longer mingling its own nature with the nature of things. The 
true form is a true reflection of things. Rossi picks up on this when he says that "the 
central theme of Bacon's philosophy ... [is] an "expurgatio intellectus" which 
is to 
transform the human mind - compared to an "enchanted mirror" - into a clear 
mirror capable of reflecting the structures of natural reality. "143 
D. Form and the via negativa 
We have already seen that Bacon utilises the via negativa in abstract physics as the 
means to climb the scala intellectus. This exclusionary method continues right up to 
the discovery of the form in metaphysics. In Novum organum Bacon famously 
considers "the investigation of the form of heat by way of example. "144 The term 
"example" needs emphasising and it should be noted that Bacon does not claim to 
have discovered the form of heat. On the contrary, he states quite clearly that no 
forms "have yet been discovered"las Aphorisms 11-20 of Book 2 describe the 
process whereby one draws up tables of discovery in order to identify the form. The 
investigator 
Johns Hopkins University, 1962); Jardine, Francis Bacon: Discovery and the Art of Discourse, 112- 
113. 
142 Bacon, AL, OFB, IV, 26. 
143 Rossi, Philosophy, Technology, and the Arts in the Early Modern Era, 159. 
144 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 217. 
145 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 303. 
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must find, on Submission of every last one of the instances, a nature which 
is such that it is always present or absent when the given nature is, and 
increases or diminishes with it, and is ... a limitation of a more general 
nature [Naturce magis communis]. 146 
According to Kennington, "Bacon posits a one-to-one correspondence between a 
form ... and a nature. The 
double condition ... can now be stated: if the form ... is 
present, the nature is present, and if the form is absent, the nature is absent "147 This 
statement is typical in Baconian commentary but is not precise enough for our 
purposes. More correctly, Bacon posits a one-to-one correspondence between one 
simple nature and another more general (i. e. primordial) simple nature. Returning to 
a cosmogonical perspective, this relation exists between genus and species, between 
a contraction or limitation of nature's potency and a concomitant increase in 
generative power - in other words, an unfolding in accordance with the laws of 
nature. When the more primordial simple nature is limited, we experience this as the 
superinduction of a new nature. Thus Bacon's form refers to the relation between 
either two simple natures, or between genus and species. It describes how the genus 
(a more primordial simple nature) is limited in order to give rise to the species (the 
given nature). 
Hence, the final stage of inquiry seeks to discover a "constant [fidum] and 
indissoluble" partnership between two simple natures. 148 The investigator proceeds 
by way of rejection or exclusion. The "Exclusive process" filters out all the natures 
which erroneously appear to be in partnership with the simple nature under 
investigation but are in fact merely "proprieties, effects, circumstances, 
concurrences, or what else you shall like to call them, and not radical and formative 
146 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 253 (italics in original). 
147 Kennington, On Modern Origins, 36. 
148 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 321. 
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natures towards the nature supposed"149 Bacon conceives of this as a "thorough 
solution and separation of Nature, not in fact by fire, but with the mind. " 50 He 
explains, "once we have performed Rejection and Exclusion in the right ways, the 
residue left, after all volatile opinions have been driven off as fumes, will be a form 
affirmative, solid, and both true and well defined. "IS' In Aphorismi et consilia he 
summarises this process: 
The discovery of forms, which proceeds through the exclusion or rejection 
of natures, is simple and unique. For all natures, which either are absent 
when the given nature is present, or present when the given nature is absent, 
are not of the form; and after rejection or negation has been completed, the 
form and affirmation remains. For example, if we inquire into the form of 
heat, and we find hot water is not bright, reject light: if we find tenuous air 
is not hot, reject tenuity. 152 
This is the simple principle at the heart of Baconian metaphysics -a process of 
rejection or exclusion which finally terminates in an affirmation (the form). We 
reject or exclude all simple natures which are not of the form (i. e. all simple natures 
which "either are absent when the given nature is present, or present when the given 
nature is absent"). The exclusionary process is complete when we are left with a 
single "[simple] nature that is unseparable from the [simple] nature you inquire 
upon. " For example, we might think (as Telesio did) that heat and brightness form 
an indissoluble partnership. However, the exclusionary process will reject or exclude 
light because of the negative instance "hot water is not bright. " As Bacon puts it, 
"every contradictory instance wrecks a conjecture regarding a form"153 At every 
phase of inquiry, Bacon's criterion of truth incorporates error and negativity. Every 
time we establish what the form is not, we are a step closer to discovering what the 
149 Bacon, VT, SEH, III, 241. 
150 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 255. 
151 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 255. 
152 My trans., AC, SEH, 111,794. 
153 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 257 (italics in original). 
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form is. As we saw in Chapter 3, "if the mind tries to proceed by affirmative 
instances from the start (which it always does when left to itself) the result will be 
phantasms. " 54 Hence Bacon states that men "are allowed only to proceed by 
Negatives at first, and then to finish up with Affirmatives after making every sort of 
exclusion [post omnimodam exclusionem]. " 55 But, as Bacon says, "all this is soon 
said but it is only to be achieved by long and involved processes. "56 In practice this 
requires the drawing up of "the three tables of first Submission" set out in Novum 
organum. 157 
This aspect of the Baconian method has received a great deal of attention in 
the secondary literature and I cannot do better than quote Malherbe's account. 
However, it must be emphasised that metaphysics (like physics) requires 
experiments lucifera. Bacon is quite clear that the key of interpretation will work 
only if the tables comprise the right kinds of instances. Hence he devotes most of 
Book 2 of Novum organum to a discussion of "the prerogatives of instances" 
(derived from the highest kind of experimenta lucifera). According to Bacon, "these 
Instances singled out and endowed with Special Powers are like the soul amongst 
the ordinary instances submitted; and ... a 
few of them can stand in for many of the 
others, so when we construct Tables they should be investigated with complete 
attention and written up. "158 (For a breakdown of the Prerogative Instances see 
154 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 253. 
155 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 253 (italics in original). 
156 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 255. 
157 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 261 (italics in original). 
158 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 445 (italics in original). Unfortunately, limitations of space preclude a full 
discussion of the prerogatives of instances. Rees points out that commentators have completely 
overlooked Bacon's treatment of "Instances with Special Powers, " which accounts for "70 per cent of 
Book II, " Rees, OFB, XI, lxxvii. For a summary of the purpose of each class of ISP (Rees's 
abbreviation) in inquiry, see Appendix 3. In De interpretatione nature sententice xii Bacon instructs 
the interpreter to "watch for the pre-eminences of instances which have the most efficacy for 
abridging the work" (my trans., DIN, SEH, III, 787). In a letter to Father Redemptus Baranzano, 
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Appendix 3). The experiments of physics and mechanics feed back into the mother 
history, prerogative instances are "sought out and as it were tracked down, " the 
charts are reordered and the final stage of inquiry (metaphysics) begins. '59 Whereas 
physics is the "inferior" machine of the intellect, metaphysics is the "superior. "160 
The superior machine proceeds by means of "the three tables of first Submission. " 
Malherbe correctly summarises this process as follows: 
There are three tables: the first one, which still pertains to natural history, 
exhibits the quality or given nature (for instance, heat, whiteness) that is 
studied in the common experience of things: the given nature appears as the 
quality of various substances which will be as dissimilar as possible to 
enlarge the range of the inquiry. This is the table of presence where the 
ontological status of substances is still empirical. In order to move from this 
to the table of absence, it is necessary to break with the Aristotelian notion 
that a quality is an accident of the substance or something which belongs to 
its essence. By an abstraction, a quality is correlated with another quality, 
which is always present or absent when the first quality is present or absent 
... As for the third table, the table of comparison, 
it confirms the results of 
the previous ones, varying the degrees of presence and absence in the two 
natures henceforth related, the given nature and the invented nature (the 
form). 161 
However, Malherbe fails to appreciate the significance of Bacon's identification of 
the process of exclusion with the removal of restraints on the operator. The changing 
recursive responses of the operator seems absent in most accounts. As we saw 
above, Bacon identifies "the way of truth" (the via negativa) with "the way of 
power. " Every time we establish what the form is not, we are freed from an 
operational restraint. There is a correlative increase in operative power. As Bacon 
puts it, 
The utterance of words in the contemplative or operative matter does not 
differ. For when you say this, "Light is not of the form of heat"; it is the 
Bacon says "the Prerogatives of Instances ... will diminish the multitude of them [Instances] very 
much, " LL, XIV, 375-377. 
159 Bacon, PAH, OFB, XI, 465. 
160 Bacon, ILM(CS), SEH, III, 625. See Appendix 2. Cf. NO, OFB, XI, 201, Aphorism 1. 
161 Malherbe, "Bacon's Method of Science, " The Cambridge Companion to Bacon, 75-98, on 88. 
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same as if you say, "In producing heat it is not necessary that you also 
produce light "162 
Because "light is not of the form of heat, " the operator is not tied to light bodies 
when he wants to produce heat, that is, he can superinduce heat on dark bodies. As 
Bacon expresses this thought in Novum organum: "when (for example) in 
investigating the form of heat I say reject tenuity, or tenuity is not the form of heat, 
that is like saying that man can superinduce heat on a dense body or, conversely, 
that man can remove or keep heat from a tenuous body. "163 Hence knowledge and 
operative freedom go hand in hand. This brings us to Bacon's operative counterpart 
to the form of heat. The significance of the following passage for Bacon's science of 
magic has been entirely overlooked. Bacon states: 
But when the operative part is taken into consideration, the same applies. 
For the specification [designatio] is this: If in any natural body you are able 
to spark off a motion of self-dilation or expansion, and to repress 
[reprimere] the motion and turn it back on itself in such a way that the 
dilation does not go forward smoothly but is now given its head and now 
forced to retreat, then without doubt you will generate heat: regardless of 
whether that body be elementary (as they have it) or impressed by the 
heavenly bodies, luminous or opaque, tenuous or dense, expanding locally 
or keeping to its original dimensions, tending to dissolution or staying in its 
original state, animal, vegetable or mineral, water, oil, or air, or any other 
substance whatever that is susceptible to the motion just mentioned. IM 
The first half of the passage states that if the operator can "spark off a motion of 
self-dilation or expansion" (in spirit) and repress/constrain the motion in the way 
described, he will certainly generate heat. But commentators seem unable to get 
beyond the first half of the passage. This is unfortunate because the second half of 
the passage explains why it is that Bacon's doctrine of forms promises extraordinary 
operative freedom. The form tells the operator that he can superinduce heat on "any 
... substance whatever that 
is susceptible to the motion ... mentioned" (my 
emphasis). In other words, "Each and every one of the [rejected] natures ... 
has 
162 My trans., Bacon, AC, SEH, III, 794. 
163 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 257 (italics in original). 
164 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 271-273 (italics in original). 
246 
nothing to do with the form of heat. And man is free of the lot of them in his 
operations on heat. "165 Unlike mechanics where the operator is restricted to 
superinducing natures on very few bodies, metaphysics lays before the operator the 
widest possible range of ways and means of operating. The widest possible latitude 
of operation is identified with Baconian magic. 
165 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 261. 
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IV. Magic: free operation 
Thus far, I have laid down Bacon's route from the limitations of physical axioms 
(which give rise to imitationes naturce) to metaphysical axioms (forms) which are 
most abstracted from particulars. In Novum organum, Bacon expresses concerns 
over the abstraction of forms. He says that, "because of the vicious and inveterate 
custom of meddling with abstractions, it is safer to raise and organise the sciences on 
foundations which align themselves with the active department so that this may set 
its imprint and bounds upon the speculative department. " 166 Thus, "we should 
consider, for the purpose of generating or superinducing any nature on a given body, 
what precept, direction or procedure someone would most wish for; and put that in 
the most simple and least recondite terms. "167 To continue this account of Baconian 
forms, it is therefore necessary to deal in depth with aphorism 5 of Book 2 of Novum 
organuni. Bacon states: 
For example, if someone wanted to superinduce on silver the yellowish 
colour of gold, or (in compliance with the laws of matter) an increase in 
weight, or transparency on some stone lacking it, or tenacity on glass, or 
vegetation on something lacking it, we must (I say) consider what precept 
or procedure [prceceptum, auf deductionem] he would most like to have. 
Now in the first place, someone will doubtless want to be shown something 
of a kind that will not let him down in operation or deceive him in the 
experiment. Secondly, he will want to have something laid down for him 
which will not restrict him or tie him to certain means and certain specific 
modes of operating. For perhaps he may lack or not be able conveniently to 
get hold of or lay hands on the means in question. But if there be other 
means or modes (besides the one recommended) for producing 
[progignendce] a particular nature, there will perhaps be some among them 
which lie within the operator's power but from which he is shut out by the 
narrow scope of the precept, so that he does not derive any advantage [a 
quibus nihilominüs per angustias prcecepti excludetur, necfructum capiet]. 
Thirdly, he will want to be shown something which is not as difficult as that 
166 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 203. 
167 ibid. 
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very operation he is investigating, but something that is handier for practice 
[sed propiüs accedat ad praxin]. 168 
On this basis, he concludes: 
Thus in the matter of a true and perfect precept for operating [prcecepto 
vero & perfecto operand: ], this would be the prescription [pronuntiatum]: 
that it be certain, unrestricted, and arranged or lined up for action [vt sit 
certum, liberum, & disponens, siue in ordine ad actionem]. And this very 
prescription [pronuntiatum] goes for the discovery of a true form. For the 
form of any nature is such that if it be in place the given nature invariably 
follows. Thus it is constantly present when that nature is present, and 
universally asserts it, and inheres in the whole of it. The same form is such 
that if it departs, the given nature infallibly disappears. Thus it is always 
absent when that nature is absent, and always witholds it, and inheres in it 
not at all. Lastly, a true form is such that it draws up the given nature from 
some course of being which inheres in many other things, and is (as they 
have it) better known to nature than the form itself [Postremö, Forma vera 
talis est, vt Naturam datam ex fonte aliquo Essentice deducat, quce inest 
pluribus, & notior est Naturre (vt loquuntur) quäm ipsa Forma]. Thus for a 
true and perfect axiom for knowing, the prescription and precept 
[pronuntiatum & prceceptum] is this: that there be discovered another 
nature which is convertible with the given nature, but which is nevertheless 
a limitation of one better known to nature like a true genus [vt inueniatur 
Natura alia, qua, sit cum Natura data conuertabilis, & tarnen sit limitatio 
Naturce notioris, instar generis verj. And these two prescriptions 
[pronuntiata], the active and contemplative, are the same thing; for what is 
most useful in operating, is most true in knowing [& quod in operando 
vtilissimum, id in sciendo verissimum]. 169 
The relationship between these two passages provides an insight into how form and 
operation cohere. It is clear that Bacon's practical criteria map onto his criteria for a 
true form: both are certain, free, and "in ordine ad actionem. " Because the form is 
certain (the given nature is always present when the genus is limited in the way 
described), the operator who deduces a precept from the form will not be let down in 
operation. 170 Because the form is free, the operator is not restricted "to certain means 
and certain specific modes of operating. " 
Returning to the relation between magic and Bacon's notion of a free 
direction, I draw attention to De augmentis where Bacon identifies "two respects" in 
168 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 205. 
169 ibid. 
170 As discussed above (n. 8), Bacon consistently uses the term prceceptum to signify a rule of 
operation. A precept is a deduction from a primary axiom (form). 
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which metaphysic is "most excellent "171 The first relates to freedom of operation. 
According to Bacon, "this way of operating (which looks at simple natures though 
only in a concrete body) proceeds from the things in nature which are constant, 
eternal, and catholic, and opens up paths to human power so broad that (as things 
stand now) human thought can barely grasp or imagine them. "172 This notion of 
"broad paths" is central to Bacon's conception of magic. In Novum organum, Bacon 
terms the practical part of metaphysics, "magic" "on account of the broad paths it 
opens up and its greater sway over nature. "173 In De augmentis he says that Solomon 
("though in a more divine sense") elegantly describes metaphysical knowledge when 
he says, "Thy steps shall not be straitened, and when thou runnest thou shalt not 
stumble"' meaning thereby that the ways of wisdom are not much liable to straitness 
or obstructions [angustiis nec obicibus]"174 According to Bacon, 
Metaphysic ... enfranchises the power of men to the greatest 
liberty, and 
leads it to the widest and most extensive field of operation [quodpotestatem 
humanam emancipet maxime et liberet, eamque in amplissimum and 
apertissimum operandi campum educat]. For Physic carries men in narrow 
and restrained ways, imitating the ordinary flexuous courses of nature [per 
angustos et impeditos calles humanam operam dirigit, natura, ordinance 
flexuosos tramites imitata]; but the ways of the wise are everywhere broad 
[sed latce undique sunt sapientibus via, ]; to wisdom (which was anciently 
defined to be the knowledge of things divine and human) there is every 
abundance and variety of means. 175 
Bacon continues, "whosoever knows any Form, knows also the utmost possibility of 
superinducing that nature upon every variety of matter [qui Formam aliquam novit, 
novit etiam ultimam possibilitatem superinducendi naturam i11am in omnigenam 
materiam]. "176 This is a key statement and it explains why Bacon designates his 
171 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 361, cf. I, 567. 
172 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 207. 
173 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 215. 
174 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 363, cf. I, 568; Prov., IV, 12. 
175 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 362, cf. I, 568; Cicero, Tusc. Qucest., IV, 26. 
176 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 362, cf. I, 568. 
250 
operative science "magic. " Because forms (or primary axioms) unify nature, they 
have the widest operative scope. They specify the cause of a simple nature in 
"omnigena materia. " Consequently, the operator comprehends all ways and means 
of operation. In this way, Bacon's forms remove "a limitation rather potential than 
actual, which is when the effect is possible, but the time or place yieldeth not the 
matter or basis whereupon man should work. "177 If the operator is not able "to get 
hold of or lay hands on" certain means, he is no longer "shut out by the narrow 
scope of the precept, so that he does not derive any advantage. " Because he has 
"abundance and variety of means, " he can find a means or mode of operation which 
lies within his power. Again, regarding Bacon's third practical criterion, viz., that 
the operator "will want to be shown something which is not as difficult as that very 
operation he is investigating, but something that is handier for practice, " Bacon's 
notion of form fulfils this criterion. Because the form "comprehendeth all the means 
and ways possible, " the operator can discover how to superinduce the given nature 
on the widest variety of bodies in the widest variety of ways - from the least 
difficult to the most difficult. 178 As Bacon says, "the ways of wisdom are not much 
liable to straitness or obstructions. " In brief, the Baconian form is not tied "either to 
the basis of the matter or the condition of the efficient "179 Consequently, the 
operator is not tied to "certain means and certain specific modes of operating. " 
Bacon's account here is contrary to the dominant interpretation of a 
Baconian form in the secondary literature. The vast majority of commentators assert 
177 Bacon, VT, SEH, III, 223. 
178 Bacon, VT, SEH, III, 223. He does this by deducing middle axioms (rules of operation) from the 
form (see below). 
179 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 362, cf. I, 568. 
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that, according to Bacon, a form is a recipe. '8° For example, Antonio Perez-Ramos 
says that "what Bacon has called `Form' is all at once a statement purporting to 
unveil the quiddity or essence of a phenomenon by redescribing it in a lawlike 
manner and a recipe for the successful operation or reinstantiation of it on the basis 
of the pragmatic effectiveness of that law. "181 According to Perez-Ramos, "if the 
knower/agent manipulates the relevant variables using the Form as a recipe or 
`direction for action, "' the desired effect can be achieved. 182 Therefore, "to know 
how means to be able to rearrange Nature's parts so that the sought-for 'effect' 
could be achieved at will in accordance with natural regularities ... To know, in 
brief, means to make. "183 And yet, as we have seen, the whole point of Bacon's 
doctrine of forms is to move away from recipes (a notion that certainly fits the rules 
of physics) towards the fundamental laws of metaphysics. The claim that a form is a 
recipe is easily refuted. A recipe, to use William Eamon's definition, "prescribes 
specific ingredients and an ordered sequence of events to be followed in preparing 
them, often specified in exact quantities and measured lengths of time. "184 In other 
words, a recipe prescribes specific ways and means of operation - ways and means 
that are tied to both "the basis of the matter" and "the condition of the efficient. " A 
recipe is therefore the antithesis of the Baconian form. Bacon only uses the term 
"recipe" on two occasions - both in Valerius terminus. The context makes it 
180 See Peter Dear, "What Is the History of Science the History Of? Early Modem Roots of the 
Ideology of Modem Science, " Isis 96 (2005), 390-406, on 396; Jardine, Francis Bacon: Discovery 
and the Art of Discourse, 111; Perez Ramos, "Bacon's Forms and the Maker's Knowledge 
Tradition, " in The Cambridge Companion to Bacon, 99-120, on 109-110; idem., Francis Bacon's 
Idea of Science, 131; Rees, OFB, XI, lxxi; Mary Hesse, "Francis Bacon's Philosophy of Science, " in 
Essential Articles for the Study of Francis Bacon, 125. 
181 Perez Ramos, "Bacon's Forms and the Maker's Knowledge Tradition, " 109. 
182 Perez Ramos, Francis Bacon's Idea of Science, 131. 
183 Perez Ramos, Francis Bacon's Idea of Science, 292. 
184 William Eamon, Science and the Secrets of Nature: Books of Secrets in Medieval and Early Modern Culture (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), 132. 
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perfectly clear that he is not talking about forms; recipes are new works framed upon 
middle axioms. Bacon is perfectly aware that forms per se do not give sufficient 
direction for works. As he puts it, 
For we see that too remote generalities (unless they be deduced) give little 
information, and do but offer knowledge to the scorn of practical men; 
being of no more avail for practice, than an Ortelius's universal map is to 
direct the way between London and York. 185 
And yet commentators have persisted in criticising Bacon for coming up with 
"nothing but a vague and useless formula. "186 As W. M. Dickie puts it, 
To us it appears very doubtful if a knowledge of forms has the practical 
value which Bacon claims for it. Can I produce whiteness more readily if I 
know the form of whiteness than if I know only certain efficient causes of 
whiteness? Assuredly not. The form of whiteness is the principle of 
corpuscular structure upon which whiteness depends, and to say, "Produce 
whiteness by producing the form of whiteness, " is practically the same as 
saying, "Produce whiteness by producing it. "187 
Commentators - in their rush to assume that Bacon's doctrine of 
forms is merely 
inconsistent and incoherent - have misinterpreted him on this fundamental point. 
Nowhere in the Baconian corpus does Bacon identify forma with recipe. 
The key to solving the alleged gap between forms and operative magic is 
Bacon's use of the term deducere in the Ortelius passage cited above. Natural magic, 
Bacon states quite clearly, is "the Deduction of Forms to Works. "188 In Chapter 4 we 
185 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 453-454, cf. I, 668 
186 Whewell, 1831, quoted in Perez Ramos, "Bacon's Forms and the Maker's Knowledge Tradition, " 
115. 
187 W. M. Dickie, "`Form' and `Simple Nature' in Bacon's Philosophy, " Monist 33 (1923), 428-437, 
on 434. Likewise Fowler states: "Bacon seems to have thought that, if we could once discover the 
`form, ' we could superinduce the corresponding `nature' on any given body, but this consequence by 
no means necessarily follows. Suppose we knew the exact `form' of the `natures' which are 
predicable of and constitute gold, could we superinduce these on silver, or could we eliminate the 
`natures' which characterise silver and substitute those which characterise gold? " Bacon's Novum 
Organum, 343. Jardine goes so far as to try to "tentatively reconstruct" a recipe for hot milk on the 
basis of Bacon's preliminary investigations of the forms of heat and whiteness, Francis Bacon: 
Discovery and the Art of Discourse, 118. 
188 Bacon, DAS, SEH, V, 121, cf. I, 838 (italics in original). 
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saw that Baconian magic descends "by a gentle slope" (deduction) to all practical 
things. 189 And in Chapter 1,1 stated Bacon's definition of magic as: 
The science which applies the knowledge of hidden forms to the production 
of wonderful operations; and by uniting (as they say) actives with passives, 
displays the wonderful works of nature [Nos vero eam illo in sensu 
intelligimus, ut sit scientia quip cognitionem Formarum Abditarum ad opera 
admiranda deducat; atque, quod dici solet, activa cum passivis 
conjungendo magnalia natura manifestet]. 190 
Magic "leads down [deducat] cognition of hidden forms to works to be admired. "191 
In Aphorism 21 of Book 2 of Novum organum Bacon states that Book 7 of that work 
will deal with `Bringing things down to Practice or what is relative to man [de 
Deductione ad Praxin, siue de eo quod est in Ordine ad Hominem]. "192 
Unfortunately, this book was never written. However, it is clear that Bacon thought 
knowledge of forms of itself was insufficient for works. In the case of transmutation 
of gold discussed at the beginning of this chapter, Bacon derives a trial out of 
physical axioms. This is followed in Sylva sylvarum by an "Experiment solitary 
touching the nature of gold. "193 This experiment is intended to illustrate the 
difference between physical and metaphysical axioms: 
Gold hath these natures; greatness of weight, closeness of parts, fixation, 
pliantness or softness, immunity from rust, colour or tincture of yellow. 
Therefore the sure way (though most about) to make gold, is to know the 
causes of he several natures before rehearsed, and the axioms concerning 
189 My trans., Bacon, SI, SEH, II, 689. 
190 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 366-367, cf. I, 573. The phrase "Nos vero" indicates Bacon's emphasis on 
the necessary condition for magical power, viz., the discovery of forms. The phrase "uniting actives 
with passives" is typically used to describe operative power in natural magic. Della Porta speaks of 
"the mutual and fit application of one thing to another, " Natural Magick, Thomas Young and Samuel 
Speed: London, 1658, facsim. repr. (New York: Basic Books, 1957), 2. Bacon knows precisely how 
to structure his project in these terms, especially given the success of the natural magic literature. 
191 My trans., Bacon, DAS, SEH, I, 838. 
192 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 273. Rees notes that "This part of the Novum organum would ... have been 
central to Bacon's ideas on the means of converting knowledge into power, and on the role of 
instrumentation in that process" (Rees, OFB, XI, xciv). 
193 Bacon, SS, SEH, II, 450 
254 
the same. For if a man can make a metal that hath all these properties, let 
men dispute whether it be gold or no. 194 
It is clear that knowledge of forms is not sufficient to make gold. This is even clearer 
in Advancement of learning where Bacon states: 
For it is a thing more probable, that he that knoweth well the Natures of 
Waight, of Colour, of Pliant, and fragile in respect of the hammer, of 
volatile and fixed in respect of the fire, and the rest, may superinduce vpon 
some Mettall the Nature, and forme of Gold by such Mechanigue as longeth 
to the production of the Naturs afore rehearsed, then that some graynes of 
the Medecine proiected, should in a fewe Moments of time turne a Sea of 
Quick-siluer or other Materiall into Gold. 195 
Likewise in Novum organum, Bacon says "he who knows the forms and means of 
superinducing yellow, weight, ductility, fixity, fluidity, dissolution and the rest 
in 
their proper degrees and amounts, will see to it that these can be conjoined in a 
particular body to bring about its transformation into gold. "196 We have already seen 
that knowledge of latent schematism and latent process (material and efficient cause) 
is the domain of physics. Bacon's prioritisation of mechanics throughout the method 
(see Chapter 4) means that inquiry is always "in ordine ad actionem. "197 However, 
194 Bacon, SS, SEH, II, 450 (my emphasis). 
195 Bacon, AL, OFB, IV, 89 (italics in original & my emphasis). 
196 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 207 (my emphasis). 
197 It should be noted that, according to Bacon, the "investigation of nature turns out best when 
physics is given definition by mathematics" (NO, OFB, XI, 213). Bacon stipulates that when 
collecting the natural history "every thing to do with natural phenomena, be they bodies or virtues, 
should (as far as possible) be set down, counted, weighed, measured and defined. The same is true in 
Physics: we are after works not speculations, and, indeed, a good marriage of Physics and 
Mathematics begets practice" (PAH, OFB, XI, 465). In De augmentis Bacon designates mathematics 
"both in Physics and Metaphysics and Mechanics and Magic, as appendices and auxiliaries to them 
all" (DAS, SEH, N, 370, cf. I, 576). These Appendices deal with "the measurements of motions; 
namely what is the effect of the how much or dose in nature; what of the distance, which is not unfitly 
called the orb of virtue or activity; what of rapidity or slowness; what of short or long delay; what of 
the force or dulness of the thing; what of the stimulus of surrounding things" (DAS, SEH, IV, 357, cf. 
I, 561). The measurements of motions are given detailed treatment in Novum organum where they 
form part of the prerogative instances (see Appendix 3). According to Bacon, "for the most part 
operation lets you down ... by inaccurate 
determination and measurement of the powers and actions 
of bodies ... and unless [the measures of motions] have been well and carefully weighed up, the 
sciences will perhaps be pretty as speculation, but fall flat in practice" (NO, OFB, XI, 367). Clearly - 
as Rees argues - mathematics plays a crucial role in Bacon's programme. Without the union of 
physics and mathematics there can be no science of magic. As Bacon explains, "as Physic [the 
doctrine concerning nature] advances farther and farther every day and develops new axioms, it will 
require fresh assistance from Mathematic in many things" (DAS, SEH, IV, 371, cf. I, 578). In fact, 
one particular type of magical instance depends entirely upon measures of motions (see NO, OFB, 
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observation 999 of Sylva sylvarum states that "in the practical part of knowledge, 
much will be left to experience and probation, whereunto indication cannot so fully 
reach. "198 Knowledge of forms brings knowledge of "the utmost possibility of 
superinducing that nature upon every variety of matter. " Bacon apparently thinks 
that middle axioms can be deduced from primary axioms (forms). This is because 
metaphysics "collect[s] and unite[s] the axioms of sciences into more general ones, 
and such as may comprehend all individual case. "199 Conversely (Bacon thinks), 
middle axioms can be drawn out of or deduced from primary axioms (forms). But 
ultimately the sagacity of the mechanic will play a crucial role in transmutation. 
This brings us to the second respect in which metaphysic is "most excellent. " 
According to Bacon, "it is the duty and virtue of all knowledge to abridge the 
circuits and long ways of experience (as much as truth will permit), and to remedy 
the ancient complaint that `life is short and art is long. "'200 Bacon repeatedly states 
that the work of interpretation "is to abridge experience and to make things as 
certainly found out by Axiom in short time, as by infinite experiences in ages. "20' In 
Novum organum he writes: 
We should have every hope that nature's recesses still contain many secrets 
of excellent use which are quite unrelated to and unparalleled by anything 
already discovered, but stand well off the beaten track of fancy and are still 
undiscovered. These very things will also no doubt come to light some day 
after the lapse of long ages ... but by the route of which I now speak they 
can be speedily, suddenly and simultaneously anticipated and made 
manifest? 02 
XI, 443). On the role of mathematics in Bacon's programme see Rees, "Quantitative Reasoning in 
Francis Bacon's Natural Philosophy, " Nouvelles de la rdpublique des lettres (1985), 27-48; idem., 
Mathematics And Francis Bacon's Natural Philosophy, " Revue internationale de philosophie 40 
(1986), 399-426. 
198 Bacon, SS, SEH, II, 672. 
199 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 361, cf. I, 567. 
200 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 361, ef. I, 567. 
201 Bacon, VT, SEH, III, 247. 
202 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 167-169. 
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According to Bacon, "nothing anticipates or gets ahead of chance (whose custom is 
to work only over long ages) except the discovery of forms. "203 Primary axioms 
(forms) indicate all possible inventions. With knowledge of forms comes power to 
effect "all things possible. "204 Hence in Valerius terminus Bacon describes his goal 
as "discovery of all operations and possibilities of operations. "205 We have seen that, 
according to Bacon, "the fabric of nature contains in her own lap and bosom every 
event whatever ... and 
developes them in due season by a fixed law. "206 Forms 
describe the explications of this law, thereby permitting man to produce them 
spontaneously rather than waiting for nature to "develope them in due season. " As 
Bacon explains elsewhere, the method "contain[s] within itself the potentiality of all 
particular inventions. "207 This is because matter contains within itself the potentiality 
of all particular inventions. This brings us back to the metaphysics/physics 
distinction. As Maxwell Primack points out, 
Physics as conceived by Bacon is concerned with the ordinary course of 
nature, i. e., matter as it is organized. Metaphysics (as the study of the forms 
of simple natures) is concerned with the exceptionless laws of nature, the 
existence of which is suggested to Bacon by his conception of matter as 
distinct from the world order 208 
In other words, metaphysics considers nature from a cosmogonical perspective. 
Primack rightly argues that "On the basis of the distinction that he makes between 
matter and the world, Bacon distinguishes two kinds of uniformities in nature: (1) 
uniformities that hold only for the most part, or which could conceivably have 
exceptions ... ; 
(2) uniformities that hold without exception and would hold for any 
203 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 303. 
204 Bacon, NA, SEH, III, 156. 
205 Bacon, VT, SEH, III, 222. 
206 Bacon, DAS, SEH, N, 321, cf. I, 524. 
207 Bacon, CV, BF, 92, cf. SEH, III, 611. 
208 Maxwell Primack, "Outline of a Reinterpretation of Francis Bacon's Philosophy, " Journal of the 
History of Philosophy 5 (1967), 123-132, on 127. 
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world composed of the same matter as ours "209 As we have seen, the rules of 
physics are confined to concrete bodies - permitting only superficial deflections 
from nature's ordinary course. In contrast, the exceptionless laws of metaphysics cut 
across all possible species. Hence man can spontaneously bring forth true nova. As 
Bacon explains, "Such works are called Epistemides, that is, daughters of 
knowledge, which do not come into actuality otherwise than through knowledge and 
pure interpretation. "210 In the following section I examine how, according to Bacon, 
magic (which he terms "primary action") could recapitulate the original 
cosmogonical binding of matter. 211 
209 Primack, "Outline of a Reinterpretation of Francis Bacon's Philosophy, " 125. 
210 My trans., Bacon, DDV, SEM, 111,788. 
211 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 207. 
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V. Re-creation ex chao 
The proposed resolution of the Baconian doctrine of forms offered here is consistent 
with an explication of Baconian magic. Knowledge of forms ("laws of pure act") is 
knowledge of the fashioning and governing of matter's behaviour. 212 The ubiquitous 
presence in the Baconian corpus of the concept of binding highlights the central role 
of Bacon's cosmogony in his science of magic. 213 Baconian magic recapitulates (at 
the level of operation) the primordial binding of matter's inordinate potency. For 
Bacon, there is no ontological distinction between imitations and nova. This 
distinction reflects the different scope of physical and metaphysical axioms. 
Freedom of operation (magic) depends on knowledge of forms. Physics operates 
without knowledge of forms, hence it is confined to imitating nature's ordinary 
course. The hierarchy of Baconian forms is active at all levels of reality from the 
primordial down to the local levels of change observable in nature free. Because 
forms are universal active internal agents, they provide the Baconian Magus with the 
key to a recapitulation of matter's cosmogonical unfoldings. Baconian magic is a re- 
creation: it replicates experimentally by a reduction of existing bodies to chaos (or 
putrefaction) in order to superinduce new natures. To understand how Baconian 
magic is a re-creation, it is necessary to consider Bacon's use of the terms 
compositio and mistio. 
212 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 119-121. 
213 It is noteworthy that Bacon (like Bruno) retains the notion of magic as the power to bind. Kirby 
Flower Smith writes, "Possession or obsession ... 
is a constraint, any form of metamorphosis ... is a 
constraint, fascinatio in all its numerous forms is a constraint. The ancients habitually associate the 
processes of magic with the ideas of binding, tying up, nailing down, and their opposites. A magic act 
is a icatäöcagog, a icartäScatu a defixio, a devinctio; the removal of its effect is 661um;, a solutio, 
and the corresponding verbs are, e. g., Kata&t0 , defigo, Mw, solvo, " in Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1915), 279. 
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Compositio refers to the operator's physical uniting of bodies and mistio to the 
outcome of union where a new form obtains: the former is the work of man and the 
latter is the work of nature. In describing the compositio-mistio distinction, Bacon 
notes its general use: 
The difference is excellent which the best observers in nature do take 
between compositio and mistio, putting together and mingling: the one 
being but a conjunction of bodies in place, the other in quality and consent: 
the one the mother of sedition and alteration, the other of peace and 
continuance: the one rather a confusion than an union, the other properly an 
union. Therefore we see those bodies which they call imperfecte mista last 
not, but are speedily dissolved [... ] So as the difference between compositio 
and mistio clearly set down is this; that compositio is the joining or putting 
together of bodies without a new form: and mistio is the joining or putting 
together of bodies under a new form. For the new form is commune 
vinculum [a common bond], and without that the old forms will be at strife 
and discord 214 
Bacon is clear that "for works man can do nothing except bring natural bodies 
together or put them asunder; nature does the rest from within. '215 By means of 
compositio, Bacon hopes to achieve the conflation of simple motions: the result is 
mistio. When mistio takes place, fusing motions in dynamic tension, a new form is 
superinduced. Hence mistio requires a commune vinculum, otherwise the body will 
dissolve. However, Bacon expressly maintains that a common bond will form only if 
the bodies brought together consent. As shown in Chapter 2, the term "consent" 
refers to the tendency of bodies to unite willingly. When this occurs the compositio 
of consenting bodies results in mistio. The operator has no direct power over mistio. 
Although he understands forms, he only provides favourable conditions by bringing 
together consenting bodies. It is matter alone that produces the new form. The 
following passage elaborates on this idea: 
214 Bacon, A Brief Discourse Touching the Happy Union of the Kingdoms of England and Scotland, LL, XI, 93-94. In Chapter 6, I return to Bacon's letter to James in relation to the Baconian unity of the 
sciences. 
215 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 65. 
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The natural philosophers say well, that compositio is opus hominis, and 
mistio opus natura. For it is the duty of man to make a fit application of 
bodies together, but the perfect fermentation and incorporation of them 
must be left to Time and Nature ... So we see, after the grift 
is put into the 
stock and bound, it must be left to Nature and Time to make that continuum, 
which was at first but contiguum216 
Opus naturce refers to matter as potency (natura naturans), that is, to the form 217 
The resulting body, from the point of view of substratum, is a schematism (or fabric) 
which keeps its form because it is subject to a common bond. In this case, the 
body 
is a genuine mistio. The converse of this is that novel schematisms will always 
be 
novel bodies bound by a common bond, and hence Baconian nova are mistio218 The 
operative governance of mistio is nothing less than a key to Cupid's secret 
primordial power over the elements. When found, this key will permit, at the level of 
individual bodies, a recapitulation of the original creation ex chao. 219 
The successful production of mistio (or nova), rather than simple compositio is 
facilitated by an inquiry into motion: 
We should investigate those appetites and inclinations of things by which 
all that variety of effects and changes which we see in the works of nature 
and art is made up and brought about [conflatur et emergit]. And we should 
try to enchain Nature, like Proteus; for the right discovery and distinction of 
the kinds of motions are the true bonds of Proteus. For according as 
motions, that is incentives and restraints, can be spurred on or tied up [Nam 
prout motuum, id est, incitationum et cohibitionum, stimuli et nodi 
adhibentur], so follows conversion and transformation of matter itself. 220 
The phrase "incentives and restraints" is an apt and succinct description of both the 
primary appetitive power of Cupid and of magical operation. Cupid holds the key 
216 Bacon, A Brief Discourse Touching the Happy Union of the Kingdoms of England and Scotland, 
LL, X, 98. 
217 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 201. 
218 Consequently, Bacon rejects some traditional formulations of the compositio-mistio relationship - 
for example, Galen's claim that man has no power over mistio. Instead he states emphatically that 
knowledge of consenting bodies will permit man to govern mistio. William Newman identifies the 
exact source of Bacon's criticism viz., Galen's De temperamentis, see Promethean Ambitions, 259. 
219 In Historia densi & rari Bacon speaks of this "power of the keys, which binds and loosens" 
(HDR, OFB, XIII, 129). See also Matt. 16: 19,18: 18. 
220 Bacon, CDNR, SEH, V, 425, cf. III, 20-21 
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because he understands how to excite and goad, and how to restrain and hold back 
stabilised structures (schematisms). Likewise, magic provokes and restrains sums of 
simple motions. The simple motions are the locus of all power because change 
supervenes on motion. Discovery of the "true bonds of Proteus" (simple motions) is 
the key to nature's metamorphic potential. Hence Bacon describes "the 
transformation or metamorphosis of bodies" as "a really noble and rare sum [of 
simple motions] ... a most powerful effect 
in nature and one by which human power 
is ... raised to the highest degree. "221 Knowledge of forms is the key to matter's 
appetitive power. The "laws of pure act' 'that fashion and govern matter's behaviour 
are laws of motions. 222 This terminus of knowledge can be seen in the following 
passage: 
For the principles, fountains, causes, and forms of motions, that is, the 
appetites and passions of every kind of matter, are the proper objects of 
philosophy; and therewithal the impressions or impulses of motions, the 
restraints and reluctations, the passages and obstructions, the alternations 
and mixtures, the circuits and series [catence]; in a word, the universal 
process of motions223 
Bacon's science of magic is nothing less than a complete understanding and control 
of motions so that it becomes possible 
by proper methods and a course of application suitable to nature [ministerio 
natura convenientr], to acquire the power of exciting, restraining, 
increasing, remitting, multiplying, and calming and stopping any motion 
whatever in a matter susceptible of it; and thereby to preserve, change, and 
transform bodies. 224 
This is the real import of the purported Baconian phrase "knowledge is power. "225 
The simple motions and their hidden possibilities constitute the material basis of 
221 Bacon, ANN, OFB, XIII, 209. 
222 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 119-121. 
223 Bacon, CDNR, SEH, V, 426, cf. III, 21-22. 
224 Bacon, CDNR, SEH, V, 426, cf. III, 22. 
225 In Novum organum, Bacon says, "Human knowledge and power come to the same thing, for ignorance of the cause puts the effect beyond reach" (OFB, XI, 65). 
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Bacon's programme: "it is most certain, " he says, "that by how much the more 
simple motions are discovered, by so much will the power of man be increased'226 
The binding power, required by the Baconian magician, belongs principally to 
the form of tenuous matter which Bacon calls "attached" (devinctus) spirit. 227 Spirit, 
as the "rich and fruitful supply of active power, " is the principle by which material 
transformation occurs 228 Human agents cannot access this capacity to bind directly: 
an operator can only arrange things so that spirit's transformative power is directed 
to particular ends. The operator harnesses spirit's binding power by constraining it. 
In Historia densi et rari Bacon describes a simple experiment to illustrate this 
principle. He instructs the operator to fill a strong iron cube up to the brim with pure 
water. He must then "put an iron lid on top no less strong than the sides of the 
container, and seal it up ... so that it 
is as tight as a drum and can withstand ... 
fire. ', 229 The container should then be placed among the coals for some hours, but 
removed periodically and allowed to cool down. Bacon explains that he has 
chosen the experiment of pure water for this reason: that water is the 
simplest of bodies, lacking colour, smell, taste, and other qualities. And 
therefore, if the spirit of the water ... were not given off but were provoked 
and attenuated by heat of this sort to turn itself on the grosser parts of the 
water and could so dispose and change them into a new schematism 
(namely, one less simple and more unequal) until it either took on some 
colour, smell, taste, a kind of oiliness, or some other remarkable alteration 
... then no doubt an extraordinary thing would be accomplished 230 
Spirit is provoked because matter is eternal, and therefore resists all attempts at its 
destruction. But no schematism is immune from dissolution and there are no bonds 
226 Bacon, CDNR, SEH, V, 426, cf. III, 22. 
227 Bacon, HDR, OFB, XIII, 61-63. On Bacon's concept of inanimate spirit see Rees, esp. OFB, VI, 
lix-lxv; D. P. Walker, "Francis Bacon and Spiritus, " in Science, Medicine, and Society in the 
Renaissance: Essays to Honour Walter Pagel, ed. A. G. Debus (New York: Science History 
Publications, 1972), 121-130; idem., "Spirits in Francis Bacon, " in Francis Bacon: terminologia e 
Fortuna nel XV1I secolo, ed. Marta Fattori (Rome: Edizioni dell'Ateneo, 1984), 315-327. 
228 Bacon, DSV, SEH, VI, 759; cf. 681. 
229 Bacon, HDR, OFB, XIII, 101. 
230 Bacon, HDR, OFB, XIII, 103. 
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which do not tend to disruption. Without this absolutely foundational principle 
Baconian magic would be impossible. Bacon's claim in the above experiment is that 
we witness the binding or fashioning power of spirit. So long as it is present spirit 
exercises its organisational capacity. It is this administrative feature of spirituous 
matter which prevents putrefaction -a return to chaos at the local level. But when 
spirit is vexed this governing power is temporarily overruled and putrefaction 
follows231 For this reason, Bacon pays very close attention to the processes of 
dissolution, corruption and putrefaction. Counteracting the inherent tendency of 
bodies to dissolve, spirit acts as the principal source of restraint in composite things: 
For as long as ... 
bodies are filled with a nimble spirit which, like the very 
lord of all, orders and controls their particular parts of whatever kind, so 
long the control stops homogeneous things coming together, but once that 
spirit evaporates or cold smothers it, then the parts, freed from the control, 
come together according to their natural inclination. And so it comes about 
that all bodies containing a sharp spirit ... 
last without separating out 
because of the permanent, durable control exercised by the dominant and 
mastering spirit 232 
In striking governmental metaphors, Bacon outlines the almost bureaucratic function 
of spirituous matter. 233 Without spirit's capacity for organisation and internal 
workmanship there would be no individual coherence. This is why dissolution and 
putrefaction are so important for Bacon: they exhibit spirit's countervailing 
generative power whose motions are the source of the common bond. Its governing 
and executive role is brought out in Bacon's reference to the motion of spirit as the 
231 In Century IV of Sylva sylvarum Bacon discusses putrefaction. He says "it is an inquiry of 
excellent use to inquire of the means of preventing or staying putrefaction; for therein consisteth the 
means of conservation of bodies: for bodies have two kinds of dissolutions; the one by consumption 
and desiccation, the other by putrefaction" (SS, SEH, II, 453). I suggest that the cube experiment 
induces putrefaction. 
232 My trans., Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 394-396. 
233 Bacon elaborates on this in De sapientia veterum. Proserpina (who signifies spirit) is "Mistress or 
Queen of Dis: for the spirit does in fact govern and manage everything in those regions, without the 
help of Pluto [Bacon's figure for tangible matter], who remains stupid and unconscious" (DSV, SEH, 
VI, 759, cf. 681). 
264 
"Royal or Political Motion. "234 It orders the parts of a body, he explains, "not 
according to their own desires but to the well-being of the governing part, such that 
the ruling part exercises a kind of Government or Political Power over the subject 
parts"235 "This motion, " Bacon continues, "is eminently conspicuous in the spirits 
of animals, where, as long as it is in vigour, it tempers all the motions of the other 
parts"236 For Bacon, magic is ultimately control of the controller, that is, control of 
spirit. Magical effects are brought about by constraining spirit: through either 
"simple imprisonment and violence" (as in the iron cube) or "administering [per 
ministrationem] some suitable aliment" so that "the spirit is' detained willingly. "237 
In the latter case, the Baconian operator uses "motions that are in [his] power" (i. e. 
the associating and disassociating of natural bodies) to "excite inward motions [of 
spirit] that are not in [his] power, by consent "239 Because "man can do nothing 
except bring natural bodies together or put them asunder, " he must entice nature into 
doing "the rest from within. " For Bacon, 
Strife and friendship in nature are the spurs of motions and the keys of 
works. Hence are derived the union and repulsion of bodies, the mixture 
[mistio] and separation of parts, the deep and intimate impressions of 
virtues, and that which is termed the junction of actives with passives; in a 
word, the magnalia naturce239 
Elsewhere he calls "the individual and particular friendships and quarrels or 
sympathies and antipathies of bodies ... motion of the minor congregation. "240 The 
operator must use his knowledge of consents to excite motion of the minor 
234 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 409. 
235 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 409. 
236 Bacon, NO, SEH, IV, 228, cf. OFB, XI, 408. 
237 Bacon, DSV, SEH, VI, 760, cf. 681; HVM, SEH, V, 329, cf. II, 220. On magical effects brought 
about via consent see NO, OFB, XI, 443. 
238 Bacon, SS, SEH, II, 367. 
239 Bacon, Historia sympathim et antipathice rerum, SEH, V, 203, cf. II, 81. 
240 Bacon, ANN, OFB, XII, 197. 
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congregation. We can now see why Bacon defines magic as "the science which 
applies the knowledge of hidden forms to the production of wonderful operations; 
and by uniting (as they say) actives with passives, displays the wonderful works of 
nature. 'na 1 
Bacon identifies putrefaction (the dissolution of the old form) with "anarchy" 
because it results from the loss of spirit's governing power. 242 For Bacon, 
"dissolution of the old form, i. e. that very coming together of like to like, precedes 
the putrefaction which paves the way for generation of the new. Now if nothing gets 
in the way of the process simple dissolution occurs; but if different obstacles are 
encountered putrefaction set in and these are the rudiments of new generation. 11243 
The cube experiment (Bacon anticipates) will display the "inception of putrefaction 
as in water corrupted, which has a kind of fatness or oil. "244 The point of 
putrefaction is chaos or "anarchy" but it is also the point at which a new form may 
be superinduced. The Baconian operator must therefore have detailed knowledge of 
the optimal point (the mid-point) at which dissolution is recoverable but the body is 
still fluid enough to fashion "marvellous metaschematisms. "245 Thus the precise 
relationship between putrefaction (dissolution or chaos) and creation is of central 
importance in Baconian operative science. As he puts it in De sapientia veterum: 
241 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 366-367, cf. 1,573 
242 Bacon, Commentarius solutus, LL, XI, 71 
243 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 397, cf. ANN, OFB, XIII, 205. This coming together of like parts to like 
parts is due to motion of the minor congregation. According to Bacon, this motion is brought into 
play "both with regard to adjacent and neighbouring bodies as well as within [bodies'] own parts" 
(ANN, OFB, XIII, 197). In Novum organum Bacon discusses "government of motion when one body 
meeting another checks, repels, releases or directs the other's spontaneous motion" (NO, OFB, XI, 
435). He says "this generally consists in the shapes and positions of vessels. For an upright beak in 
alembics helps vapours condense, whereas one pointing down in receiving vessels helps sugar get 
deposited. However, sometimes you need a coiled one, or one that is broad and narrow by turns, and 
so on" (ibid. ). The vessels supply obstacles to motions. 
244 Bacon, SS, SEH, II, 460. 
245 Bacon, HDR, OFB, XIII, 103. 
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The full and legitimate time ... for completing and bringing forth the 
species out of matter already duly prepared and predisposed ... is the 
middle point between the first rudiments of them and their declination. And 
this we know from the sacred history to have been in fact at the very time of 
the creation. 246 
The reference to creation ought not to be taken lightly and directly impinges on the 
idea that magical power is a recreation ex chao. Bacon draws a comparison between 
the work of the six days in Genesis and the potential for human re-creation. In 
Novum organum he states, "Discoveries are ... 
like new Creations [quasi novice 
Creationes] ... and imitations of 
God's handiwork. "247 It is no coincidence that the 
natural-philosophical "Order or Society" in Bacon's New Atlantis "is sometimes 
called ... the College of the Six Days 
Works. 'n48 What is even more significant, 
especially given Bacon's concept of a powerful and fecund matter as the unique 
causa causarum, is his use of Lucretius' phrase, "And RECREATED life, " to 
illustrate this process. 249 Bacon's notion of man as a second creator derives from his 
concept of a plenipotentiary matter and his materialism should be recognised as a 
fundamental constituent of his natural philosophy notwithstanding the theological 
issues this raises. 
246 Bacon, DSV, SEH, VI, 726, cf. 651. The importance of corruption and chaos cannot be overstated. 
As Bacon puts it, "The inducing and accelerating of putrefaction is a subject of a very universal 
inquiry: for corruption is a reciprocal to generation: and they two are as nature's two terms or 
boundaries [being and non-being]; and the guides to life and death" (SS, SEH, II, 451). 
247 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 193. 
248 Bacon, NA, SEH, III, 146. 
249 Lucretius, De rerum natura, 6,3 cited in Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 193. 
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VI. Conclusion 
Nature free (natura naturata) is only the lazy and habitual expression of natura 
naturans filtered through a hierarchy of constraints or bindings. Matter's underlying 
irrepressible fecundity will eventually find expression in all possible transformations 
of which it is capable, over the long course of ages as part of the vicissitude of 
things. Baconian magic is essentially the abridgement of time and Bacon illustrates 
its power when he says that "even in Divine miracles, accelerating of the time 
is 
next to the creating of matter. "250 Forms are the key to this process and the term 
"recipe" is highly inappropriate. I have also rejected the view that Baconian magic is 
covered by the terms imitationes and "maker's knowledge. " The science of magic, 
in Bacon's view, possesses the power to alter nature "radically and shake it to its 
depths. "251 To shift nature from its otiose condition, the Baconian operator 
recapitulates the original binding of matter. The relationship of Bacon's cosmogony 
to the experimental replication of chaos is not addressed in current Baconian 
commentary. 252 
According to Bacon, the primordial Chaos "is without form. 253 His critique 
of Telesio (as we saw in Chapter 2) is aimed partly at his ignoring the importance of 
the Chaos, because without chaos there is no possibility of "changes in the Great 
250 We have already seen the connection between miracles, the abridgement of time and magical 
operations. Sylva sylvarum Century N is largely devoted to explaining how "divine miracles" can be 
imitated by the acceleration (or retardation) of time (SS, SEH, II, 442). Bacon remarks, "acceleration 
of time may be esteemed inter magnalia naturae" (ibid. ). The Sylva is replete with discussions on 
ways and means to accelerate and retard physical processes: germination (Experiments 401-412 and 
413-421 respectively); putrefaction (Experiments 329-340 and 341-351); birth (Experiment 353); 
stature (Experiment 354); maturation (Experiments 312-324). 
251 Bacon, DGI, OFB, VI, 103. 
252 For an alternative discussion of chaos, see Graham Rees, "Introduction, " OFB, VI, xlix. 
253 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 209. 
268 
Schematism. 254 A philosophy that ignores chaos is, says Bacon, "a frivolous 
product of the limitations of the human mind. "255 I have argued that without the 
reduction to chaos, Baconian magic cannot create nova. This underscores the scale 
of the Baconian project, viz., to establish a systematic new science whose function is 
the discovery of forms, and whose sole purpose is to re-organise matter's occult 
powers256 When in place, this science of magic will actualise benefits of 
unimaginable novelty and too numerous to comprehend. 
To appreciate the extraordinary extent of the Baconian vision and to underline 
the distinction between physics and metaphysics, I shall contrast a passage from 
Cicero's De natura deorum with a passage from Bacon. In Cicero's dialogue, 
Balbus proclaims: 
254 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 251. 
255 Bacon, DPAO, OFB, VI, 251. 
256 Baconian commentary is blind to Bacon's vision of transformative power because it cannot locate 
a practical systematic account of transmutation and its causes. I suggest that Sylva sylvarum in 
presenting itself as "a high kind of natural magic" fulfils the required system (SS, SEH, II, 378). If 
one considers the list of Magnalia Natura appended to the New Atlantis, it is evident that all, or 
virtually all, the topics in this long list are covered, often at length, in the Sylva. The operational goal 
of Baconian science (defined at the opening aphorism of Book 2 of Novum organum as the 
superinduction of forms), which I have argued in this chapter is quintessentially a magical procedure, 
is handled in the Sylva under the terms "version, " "conversion, " "perfect concoction, " and 
"maturation" (a degree of concoction), and absolute conversions are distinguished into assimilation 
and transmutation (SS, SEH, II, 613-614). Thus the Sylva could certainly be considered as a kind of 
manual of Baconian magic. The preface to Sylva sylvarum also claims that there is a "secret order" 
and that "he that looketh attentively into [these particulars] shall find [it]" (SS, SEH, II, 337). Without 
a full investigation it is unwise to pre-empt any intricate patterning that might be discovered in 
Bacon's movement from "experiment" to "experiment" throughout the course of the Sylva. My 
proposal for the overall order to the Sylva is one which suggests that posthumous publication was no 
accident. This is purely tentative and requires a great deal of exegetical attention, but I propose that 
the Sylva is Bacon's contribution to the genre of hexameral commentary, though it takes the form of 
an anti-Genesis, or at least a counter-Genesis. It follows, in general terms, the sequence of the six 
days works, but handles the topics demystified and naturalised. As Rawley says, "for his lordship's 
course is to make wonders plain, and not plain things wonders" (II, SEH, 336). Moreover, the motto 
on the engraved title is Genesis 1: 7, "Et vidit Deus lucem quod esset bona. " Furthermore, the 
prefatory phrase "an ill-digested heap of particulars" echoes the opening lines of Ovid's 
Metamorphoses in its description of the original chaos as a "rude and undigested heap" (trans., F. J. 
Miller 1,5-7). It also echoes Della Porta's 20" chapter of Natural Magick, which he calls "Chaos" 
because it contains materials "heaped ... altogether confusedly, " and interestingly he begins with the 
same experiment on the separation of the waters that Bacon uses in his opening to Sylva. (Genesis 
opens with the spirit of God moving "on the face of the deep" and the separation of the waters). See 
Della Porta, Natural Magick, 395; Genesis 1: 2,1: 6. I have already noted the correspondences 
between Genesis and features of the New Atlantis. 
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The entire command of the commodities produced on land is vested in 
mankind. We enjoy the fruits of the plains and of the mountains, the rivers 
and the lakes are ours, we sow corn, we plant trees, we fertilize the soil by 
irrigation, we confine the rivers and straighten or divert their courses. In 
fine, by means of our hands we essay to create as it were a second world 
[quasi alteram naturam] within the world of nature. 257 
On the face of it, there is a striking similarity between this passage and the following 
passage from Bacon: 
Then at last as it were another nature [veluti altera Natura] will establish its 
manifoldnesses [plerumquitates] whose wanderings are to be as marvels. 258 
In both cases, there is the notion of altering the realm of nature (the current universe) 
so that it becomes "as it were another nature. " Whereas Cicero is describing man's 
limited dominion (the equivalent of Baconian physics) over the current world, 
Bacon envisages the production of an "alternative ... universe of things" (the realm 
of Baconian metaphysics and its operative counterpart magic). In the fable of 
Atalanta, Bacon underlines the distinction between imitationes and nova. He glosses 
Atalanta's distractedness as a waste of operative power in the pursuit of profit, 
whereas the investigation into forms would succeed in outstripping nature and, he 
says bluntly, "according to the agreement and condition of the contest put her 
[Nature] to death or destroy her. '259 Nature destroyed is nature shifted entirely from 
its ordinary course; the means of achieving this is the experimental evocation of the 
dormant powers of natura naturans. Inducing nature to deviate itself from its 
accustomed paths is summed up in the Baconian aphorism that "nature is not 
conquered save by obeying it: n60 Baconian magic is radically transformative "since 
many of the things we seek from the fountains of nature [exfontibus rerum] fail to 
257 Cicero, De natura deorum 2,60 in De natura deorum and Academica, trans. H. Rackham, Loeb 
Classical Library (London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1933) 267-269. 
258 My trans., Bacon, DIN, SEH, III, 787. 
259 Bacon, DSV, SEH, VI, 744, cf. 668. 
260 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 65. 
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flow in the usual channels. "261 This is not a destruction of nature per se: destruction 
of matter and its irrepressible productive power is impossible. This is figured in the 
Proteus myth where the binding of Proteus is analogous to the primal constraints 
imposed on the absolute power of matter. In the iron cube, the power of heat causes 
"distillation in close" and provokes the "Proteus of matter" to "turn and change into 
many metamorphoses. "262 Under constraint, matter transforms itself into multiple 
forms -a chaos of forms - because of the "impossibility of annihilation: n63 The re- 
creation from chaos is possible at the experimental level because it recapitulates 
Chaos and the emanation of forms at the primordial level. In brief, the doctrine of 
forms is Bacon's operational key to a science of magic which recapitulates the 
original cosmogonical binding of matter. 
261 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 165. 
262 Bacon, SS, SEH, II, 383. 
263 Bacon, SS, SEH, II, 383-384. The cube experiment restates Bacon's foundational doctrine of the 
"impossibility of annihilation". In this experiment the effect of heat is to cause "a great work wrought 
in nature, and a notable entrance made into strange changes of bodies and productions" (SS, SEH, II, 
383). He then repeats the concept of the abridgment of time when he says fire can do "in small time, 
[what] the sun and age do in long time" (ibid. ). 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
But indeed the chief business of the Persian magic (so much celebrated) 
was to note the correspondences between the architectures and fabrics of 
things natural and things civil. Neither are these only similitudes (as men of 
narrow observation may perhaps conceive them to be), but plainly the same 
footsteps of nature [vestigia auf signacula] treading or printing upon 
different subjects and matters. 1 
Throughout this thesis I have argued against fragmenting Bacon's programme. In 
Chapter 1, I accounted for the neglect of Baconian magic on two grounds: the failure 
to engage with Bacon's substantive natural philosophy, and his characterisation as a 
transitional figure. As a corrective to ill-conceived historical categories and to 
refocus on Bacon's self-understanding, I suggested an historiographical shift 
prioritising textual exegesis over a contextual approach. I also suggested that instead 
of representing Bacon's system as eclectic it was more fitting to describe it as a 
synthesis. Regarding Bacon's efforts as a synthesis leads to a consideration of the 
unity of the sciences. Chapter 2 located the foundation of Bacon's synthesis in the 
cosmogonical unfolding of an appetitive and radiative matter. As causa causarum, 
matter's inherent powers of explication organise cosmological structures terminating 
in the ordinary course of nature. Bacon's goal is to discover what nature can be 
made to do. Chapter 3 dealt with neglected aspects of Baconian inquiry and the 
therapeutic reduction of the mind to ignorance and humility. I argued that Bacon 
exposed the mind's spellbound fascination with ersatz systems. In response to 
matter's inaccessible darkness and the fecundity of its phenomenal productions, the 
1 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 339, cf. I, 542-543. 
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mind finds solace in fantastic explanations. Bacon undertakes a therapeutic regime 
of the mind and I argued that this was much more than a reflection of cultural 
dissatisfaction with Aristotelian syllogistic logic. The removal of impediments and 
the provision of assistance ensure that the human mind is capable of the requisite 
union with things. Nature itself, in its apparently random deviations from its habitual 
productions, discloses other possibilities. Systematic deviations from nature's habits 
are visible in the science of mechanics and the artificial products of human industry. 
In Chapter 4I examined the complexities of Baconian experimentation and the role 
of mechanics in Bacon's inquiry. In Chapter 5I analysed the relationship between 
forms and the systematic deviation from nature free (magic). I concluded that the 
doctrine of forms is the basis of unlimited possibility but must be explicated against 
the background of Bacon's cosmogony. Moreover, the doctrine of forms culminates 
in the union of res and mens, and guarantees the success of Baconian magic. 
Bacon's expansive cosmogony seems all inclusive, thus raising the question 
of the extent of Bacon's unique material principle and the boundaries of his 
synthesis. Does the unity of matter impact on areas traditionally exempt from natural 
philosophical concerns? By way of conclusion, I shall explore the question of 
Bacon's conception of the unity of knowledge in terms of his materialism and his 
self-representations. Some of what follows are tentative proposals for future 
projects. But notwithstanding the tentative nature of this discussion, it supports the 
main claims of this thesis - namely, that Baconian reform was unique, all 
encompassing, a restoration of the science of magic and a promissory note for 
ultimate governing power based on a supreme knowledge. I shall concentrate on the 
moral and civic sciences, concluding with a brief look at Bacon and religion. 
Baconian reform is not constrained by boundaries and there is no area of 
knowledge or operation which it leaves untouched. Though in the Advancement of 
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learning and De augmentis Bacon gives a classification of knowledge, it is in the 
context of an inventory and I suggest it is more heuristic than definitive: 
And generally let this be a Rule, that all partitions of knowledges, be 
accepted rather for lines & veines, then for sections and separations: and 
that the continuance and entirenes of knowledge be preserued. For the 
contrary hereof hath made particular Sciences, to become barren, shallow, 
& erronious: while they haue not bin Nourished and Maintained from the 
common fountain? 
The "entirenes" of knowledge suggests control in religious, moral and civic domains 
just as much as in the natural. It appears to extend Bacon's materialism to 
inappropriate domains. For example, Bacon characterises the Socratic injunction 
"know thyself' as "a portion of Naturall Philosophy in the continent of Nature. "3 
Robert McRae rightly argues that "the basis for Bacon's conception of the unity of 
the sciences is a thorough-going philosophical materialism, for Nature consists of a 
wholly self-determinate matter. 14 McRae appears to echo Bacon's claim when he 
maintains that Baconian inductive procedures are not limited to the science of 
nature, but are equally applicable to the science of the passions and appetites, such 
as anger, fear, shame, etc. 5 The naturalisation of all knowledge intimates hidden 
coherences among its multiple branches. The unity of knowledge is linked to the 
2 Bacon, AL, OFB, IV, 93 (italics in original). Bacon's classification of the sciences in Advancement 
of learning and De augmentis is well known. The system is traditionally presented in diagrammatic 
form based on a Ramistic dichotomising. This should not be taken as a literal transposition of 
Bacon's discussion. Bacon criticises the Ramistic method of distributing "everything into two 
members" because it "produces empty abridgements" (DAS, SEH, IV, 448-449, cf. I, 663). Bacon's 
conception of knowledge is not restricted by any pre-ordained method. This is why he distinguishes 
between the "Magistral and the Initiative": the former distributes and disposes the known into distinct 
categories, the latter "intimates, " inquires and extends its domain by removing boundary lines (DAS, 
SEH, IV, 449, cf. I, 663). For the diagram see Kusukawa, "Bacon's Classification of Knowledge, " in 
Peltonen, The Cambridge Companion to Bacon, 69. 
3 Bacon, AL, OFB, IV, 93 (italics in original). 
4 Robert McRae, The Problem of the Unity of the Sciences: Bacon to Kant (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1961), 31. 
5 However, McRae argues for a Baconian "absolute separation of the divine from the natural, " The 
Problem of the Unity of the Sciences, 33. But accepting unquestioningly Bacon's separation does not 
address the extent to which Bacon incorporates into natural philosophy functions traditionally 
belonging to the supernatural. 
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unity of matter. In that case, Baconian materialism has operative consequences for 
the governance of human action in political, moral and religious spheres. 
In Chapter 2 we saw how composite bodies are sums of simple motions and 
how interaction among bodies is caused by fundamental appetites and aversions .6 In 
the multiple alterations and reconfigurations among things, matter retains its 
essential unitary nature. Material composites retain signs or marks of this unity and 
(as we saw in Chapter 3) correspondences and conformities exist even among the 
most diverse things. Hence a moral action, a passion, political control and physical 
processes have fundamental elemental structures in common. Bacon's goal of a 
reunification and synthesis of the sciences reflects this unity of matter. As Bacon 
puts it, the "true office" and primary function of wisdom resides in "displaying the 
unity of nature. '17 
Bacon's subversive synthesis of traditional knowledge is demonstrated by 
his reinterpretation of the traditional Aristotelian concept of philosophia prima as 
Persian magic. 8 Persian magic, according to Bacon, was the science that registered 
"the correspondences between the architectures and fabrics of things natural and 
civil [architecturas et fabricas rerum naturalium et civilium]. "9 Bacon maintains 
6 The best discussion of the relationship between the senses, the passions and appetites is still 
Wallace, Francis Bacon on the Nature of Man, 40-54. 
7 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 339, cf. I, 543. 
8 There is no adequate commentary on the relationship between Bacon's restoration of Persian magic 
and his concept of the unity of all sciences. There is some commentary on how his theory of matter 
supports that unity. See Robert McRae, The Problem of the Unity of the Sciences: Bacon to Kant, 
Laurence Berns, "Francis Bacon and the Conquest of Nature, " Interpretation: A Journal of Political 
Philosophy 7 (1978), 1-26; Johann Mouton "`The Summary Law of Nature': Revisiting Bacon's 
Views on the Unity of the Sciences, " in William Sessions, Francis Bacon's Legacy of Texts, 139- 
150; Julian Martin, Francis Bacon, the State, and the Reform of Natural Philosophy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992), 141-143. 
9 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 339, cf. I, 542. Della Porta says of the Persians: "This doth Plato seem to 
signifie in his Alciabiades, where he saith, That the Magick of Zoroastres, was nothing else, in his 
opinion, but the knowledge and study of Divine things, wherewith the Kings [sic] Sons of Persia, 
amongst other princely qualities, were endued; that by the example of the Common-wealth of the 
whole world, they also might learn to govern their own Common-wealth, " Natural Magick, 2 (italics 
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that these "correspondences" are not "similitudes, " as "men of narrow observation 
may perhaps conceive them to be. "10 They are, he says, "plainly the same 
footsteps 
of nature treading or printing upon different subjects and matters. "11 Because the 
laws of matter generate the primordial paradigm for the laws of government and the 
moral law, Bacon seeks a universal science with the capacity to register axioms of 
the broadest latitude. No one, he says, "has yet collected one; though it is a thing of 
excellent use for displaying the unity of nature; which is supposed to be the true 
office of Primitive Philosophy. "12 Such axioms, says Bacon, would demonstrate a 
"great affinity and consent between the rules of nature, and the true rules of policy: 
the one being nothing else but an order in the government of the world, and the other 
an order in the government of an estate. "13 According to Bacon, "the Persian Magic, 
which was the secret literature of their kings, was an observation of the 
contemplations of nature and an application thereof to a sense politic; taking the 
fundamental laws of nature, with the branches and passages of them, as an original 
and first model, whence to take and describe a copy and imitation for 
government "14 To fully grasp Bacon's overarching proposals for the incorporation 
of the moral and civic sciences, it is necessary to be clear on how the unity of the 
sciences can be identified with Persian magic, or universal "sapience. "1S I suggest 
in original). Porta cites Cicero's Divination: "amongst the Persians no man might be King, unless he 
had first learned the Art of Magick, " 2 (italics in original). 
10 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 339, cf. I, 543. 
11 ibid. 
12 ibid. 
13 Bacon, LL, X, 90. See below for further discussion of Bacon's A brief discourse touching the 
happy union of the kingdoms of England and Scotland. 
14 Bacon, LL, X, 90. In De augmentis Bacon notes that "among the Persians magic was taken for a 
sublime wisdom, and the knowledge of the universal consents of things; and so the three kings who 
came from the east to worship Christ were called by the name of Magi" (DAS, SEH, IV, 366, cf. I, 
573). 
15 On the Renaissance understanding of sapientia see Cesare Vasoli, "The Renaissance Concept of 
Philosophy, " The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, 57-74, on 61. 
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that Baconian magic is the operative science whose theoretical base is constituted by 
such unificatory axioms, and that the latter is identical with what Bacon calls 
philosophia prima. "16 Thus if magic is a science of control through knowledge of 
forms, then knowledge of the forms of civil, moral and religious actions should lead 
to governance of human appetites, the soul, the state, the imagination, etc. Hence 
Bacon proposes to "compile history and tables of discovery concerning anger, fear, 
shame and so on, and also ones to do with examples of civil business, no less than to 
do with the mental motions of memory, composition and division, judgement, and 
the rest, just as much as ... of hot and cold, or light, or vegetation, or the like"17 
In spite of Bacon's desired integration of knowledge, there is confusion 
surrounding the question of how his political and moral agenda are linked to the 
underlying principles of Baconian inquiry. This confusion arises from the fact that 
Bacon left no political or administrative guidelines that obviously reflect elements of 
his natural inquiry. 18 Markku Peltonen, for example, suggests a complete lack of 
coherence between Bacon's civil knowledge and his method. The following passage 
is quoted at length because it summarises several mistaken readings of Baconian 
themes that I wish to pursue here: 
Despite his claims of the universality of his new induction and of his hope 
to unite theoretical (contemplative) and practical (operative) parts of [the] 
sciences, Bacon's civil knowledge lacks the theoretical part. In natural 
philosophy the operative element was termed natural prudence or wisdom, 
but in civil knowledge Bacon called every single part "wisdom. " There was 
no theoretical part of civil philosophy, no "civil science" and consequently 
no "inquisition of causes" in civil knowledge. Even though Bacon 
16 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 345-346, cf. I, 549-550. 
17 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 191. 
18 This is seen in the way commentary on the New Atlantis invariably concentrates on the institutional and bureaucratic functions and not on the way its structures model politics as a science of 
nature. See Judah Bierman, "Science and Society in the New Atlantis and Other Renaissance 
Utopias, " Publications of the Modern Language Association 78 (1963), 492-500; Cf. Stephen A. 
McKnight, "The Wisdom of the Ancients and Francis Bacon's New Atlantis, " in Reading the Book of Nature: The Other Side of the Scientific Revolution, ed. Allen G. Debus and Michael T. Walton (Kirksville, MO: Sixteenth Century Journal Publishers, 1998), 91-109. 
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emphasized that the theoretical and active parts of science were inseparable, 
it seems as if the idea of a theoretical part of civil philosophy did not even 
occur to him ... There 
is not a single clue as to what this theoretical part of 
civil knowledge would have looked like. 19 
Peltonen is incorrect both in his reading of the method and in his representation of 
Bacon's account of the unity of the sciences. Drawing attention to Bacon's comment 
that "in Ciuile matters there is a wisedome of discourse, and a wisedome of 
direction, " Peltonen says this statement has been "withdrawn" in De augmentis, 
concluding that it reflects Bacon's failure to produce a theory of politics 
20 In 
contrast, I maintain that government is a natural philosophical concern and that 
Bacon's civic and moral wisdom rests on Baconian sapience, the knowledge 
contained in his philosophia prima. Peltonen's reading of Bacon illustrates the point 
that no understanding of Bacon's account of political or moral control is possible in 
the absence of an understanding of Baconian matter and of Bacon's way of inquiry. 
Moreover, without investigating the function of Persian magic, as a science that 
controls minds as well as bodies, there is little to be gained from, for instance, 
analysing the hierarchical structure of the New Atlantis as a model for a social and 
political scientific utopia. 21 Thus the more significant point is that the laws of matter 
19 Markku Peltonen, "Bacon's Political Philosophy, " in The Cambridge Companion to Bacon, 283- 
310, on 294. There seems to be a lack of basic historiographical understanding of the distinction 
between what Bacon proposed and what he achieved. B. H. G. Wormald, in spite of citing the 
relevant passages on Bacon's proposals for a prima philosophia, says this "would not succeed under 
Bacon's guidance in establishing that all sciences are parts of natural science. " Wormald attributes to 
Bacon the segregation of man's body from his mind and so has difficulties in reconciling how Bacon 
can talk of appetites in human nature and appetites in nature, Francis Bacon: History, Politics and 
Science, 1561-1626 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 30-31,169-171. 
20 Bacon, AL, OFB, IV, 80. 
21 Rawley's preface to the New Atlantis has been the focus of conflicting interpretations among 
commentators. According to Rawley, "His Lordship thought also in this present fable to have 
composed a frame of Laws, or of the best state or mould of a commonwealth; but foreseeing it would 
be a long work, his desire of collecting the Natural History diverted him, which he preferred many 
degrees before it" (SEH, III, 127). Historians of science have taken this dismissive attitude to New 
Atlantis at face value. For example, Gaukroger argues that "for Bacon, it is the sovereign who, in the 
image of Solomon, the philosopher-king, directs the work - and ... it is the sovereign, rather than 
those who perform this directed work, who is the natural philosopher par excellence, " Francis Bacon 
and the Transformation of Early-Modern Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001), 131. However, he dismisses the New Atlantis, stating that Bacon has "no real idea" on how to 
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and the laws of policy derive from the same source and hence optimum political and 
moral power resides in that source. 22 The science of magic provides the principles of 
control and they must reflect the lines and interconnections of Baconian matter. 
Amidst infinite fragmentation, these lines retain the coherence of their source and 
this is reflected in the Baconian system of the sciences. 
Bacon conceives of the unification of knowledge as a restorative venture, a 
return to an originary state of primordial wisdom. He presents an historical narrative 
of the fragmentation of the sciences that signals his programme for the restoration of 
Persian magic. In Valerius terminus he cites Cicero's complaint against Socrates' 
severing of philosophy and rhetoric. 23 This was tantamount to the divorce of "matter 
and words" and a rupture in "universal Sapience, " a science of both matter and 
words: 
"proceed in the organisation of natural philosophy at a national level, " 131. Echoing the views of 
Peltonen, he states that "the lack of any practical or theoretical sense of how one might set up a large- 
scale communal investigation in natural philosophy is nowhere more evident than in his [Bacon's] 
scientific utopia, New Atlantis. We are given particulars of everything from the placing of windows in 
the streets to the dress of the Fathers of Solomon's House, right down to the colour of their 
underwear (white); but we are given no details of any of the mechanisms by which political and civil 
processes operate, " 165. In contrast, political philosophers such as Lampert argue that "one ought to 
hesitate before taking one of Bacon's valets as the guide to his work; as Howard White said, `One 
may not be perfectly understood by one's chaplain"' Nietzsche and Modern Times, 27; White, Peace 
Among the Willows, 15. 
22 In many ways the older historiography is closer, in programmatic terms, to capturing the extent of 
Bacon's vision. Johann Mouton quotes Harold Fisch's remarks on Bacon's aim as one of a "limitless 
expansion of human power. " Mouton also refers to Oskar Kraus's accusation that Bacon's life was 
dedicated to the "cult of power. " Mouton is defending Bacon against "this line of attack" which he 
identifies with the neo-Marxist Frankfurt School and recent anti Enlightenment work in the history of 
science such as Brian Easlea's, Witch-hunting, Magic and the New Philosophy: An Introduction to 
Debates of the Scientific Revolution 1450-1750 (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1980). See Mouton, "`The 
Summary Law of Nature': Revisiting Bacon's Views on the Unity of the Sciences, " in Francis 
Bacon's Legacy of Texts, 139-150, quoted remarks, 139. What is interesting about Mouton's defence 
of Bacon against the above charges, as it relates particularly to this thesis, is his distinction between a 
"therapeutic power" (bold in original) to restore man's prelapsarian perfection and a "manipulative 
or exploitative power, " 140. Here I have attempted to show how on the basis of the union of res and 
mens there is no distinction. I will return to Mouton's paper below as he deals admirably with 
Bacon's matter theory and moral good. 
23 Bacon, VT, SEH, III, 228. Cicero's dictum that a single sapientia contained the "knowledge of all 
things human and divine" was commonly cited in renaissance discussions on the nature of 
philosophy. See Cesare Vasoli, "The Renaissance Concept of Philosophy, " in Cambridge History of 
Renaissance Philosophy, 57-74,61. For a general discussion on the union of philosophy and rhetoric 
and the Ciceronian move to recombine these sciences see J. E. Seigel, Rhetoric and Philosophy in 
Renaissance Humanism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968). 
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before his [Cicero's] time the same professors of wisdom in Greece did 
pretend to teach an universal Sapience and knowledge both of matter and 
words, Socrates divorced them and withdrew philosophy and left rhetoric to 
itself, which by that destitution became but a barren and unnoble science. 
And in particular sciences we see that if men fall to subdivide their labours, 
as to an oculist in physic, or to be perfect in some one title of the law, or the 
like, they may prove ready and subtile, but not deep or sufficient, no not in 
that subject which they do particularly attend, because of that consent which 
it hath with the rest 24 
The Socratic partitioning produces specialised sciences that are "subtile" but not 
"deep. " In this way (as we saw in Chapter 4 when discussing the role of experientia 
literata), the "consent" and mutual cross-fertilisation of the sciences is lost. 
Specialities have narrowed their focus so that they have "respect to but a few 
things. "25 The analogy with nature is compelling; particulars display the subtlety of 
nature but not the deep underlying connections of things. Hence the central 
importance of a restoration of unified knowledge to disclose the depths of matter's 
elemental unity. This can be seen in Bacon's reference to the term "Circle 
Learning": 
And it is a matter of common discourse of the chain of sciences how they 
are linked together, insomuch as the Grecians, who had terms at will, have 
fitted it of a name of Circle Learning. Nevertheless I that hold it for a great 
impediment towards the advancement and further invention of knowledge, 
that particular arts and sciences have been disincorporated from general 
knowledge, do not understand one and the same thing which Cicero's 
discourse and the note and conceit of the Grecians in their word Circle 
Learning do intend. 26 
After "disincorporation" the sciences lost their usefulness to one another. 27 To 
restore a mutual illumination, the currently discrete sciences need to be re-united in 
24 Bacon, VT, SEH, III, 228. 
25 Bacon, VT, SEH, 111,231. 
26 Bacon, VT, SEH, III, 228. Bacon's departure from the Greeks undoubtedly refers to his 
incorporation of the operative sciences among the contemplative and discursive. Based on a 
comparison between passages in Cogitata et visa (CV, BF, 86-87) and Novum organum, Lampert 
argues that Bacon consistently held the view that "a superior wisdom preceded the Greeks, " 
Nietzsche and Modern Times, 25, n. 5. 
27 It is interesting that Bacon here is not arguing for what we typically regard as "use" such as the use 
made of geometry in navigation, but use for "light and information" (VT, SEH, III, 229). In this way 
the concept of "use" incorporates sciences as widely separated as optics and law. 
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a "universal knowledge" supplying "full" and "true" axioms covering the widest 
possible range of instances 28 Furthermore, in spite of the current institutional 
disintegration of knowledge, there exists a homologous relationship between the 
unity-in-multiplicity of matter and the unity of the sciences. Socrates sundered an 
already existing unity analogous to the way the primordial unity of matter emanates 
into the multiplicity of the phenomenal world. Knowledge and matter retain that 
primordial unity but it is obscured in diversity. Multiplicity is superficial and 
philosophia prima discovers, or uncovers, the hidden lines of connection. Bacon's 
philosophia prima is therefore a summary science under which the major generic 
divisions of the sciences of "Man ," "God" and "Nature" are subsumed. 29 
The historical narrative in the story of Socrates above illustrates how 
Bacon's aim is a restoration of universal knowledge. Repeating the Ciceronian 
formula, Bacon comments that wisdom was `formerly [olim] defined as the 
knowledge of things divine and human. "30 The priority of the universal science is 
analogous to the priority of a mother to her offspring, and to the manner in which the 
unity of matter is prior to its multiple emanations. Bacon's restoration of 
philosophia prima is a recovery of a science that formerly displayed the analogies of 
nature. This knowledge expresses the common root of all things: 
But since the divisions of knowledge are not like several lines that meet in 
one angle; but are rather like branches of a tree that meet in one stem [in 
uno trunco] (which stem grows for some distance entire and continuous, 
before it divide itself into arms and boughs); therefore it is necessary before 
we enter into the branches of the former division, to erect and constitute one 
universal science, to be as the mother of the rest, and to be regarded in the 
progress of knowledge as a portion of the main and common way, before 
we come where the ways part and divide themselves. This science I 
28 Bacon, VT, SEH, III, 230. 
29 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 337, cf. I, 540. He states: "The object of philosophy is threefold - God, Nature, and Man. " 
30 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 337, cf. I, 540 (my emphasis). He says, "To this [science] no other is opposed; for it differs from the rest rather in the limits within which it ranges than in the subject 
matter; treating only of the highest stages of things. " 
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distinguish by the name of Philosophia Prima, primitive or summary 
philosophy; or Sapience, which was formerly defined as the knowledge of 
things divine and human. 31 
Commentators overlook the importance of "recovery" mainly as a result of apparent 
ambiguities in Bacon's classification of the sciences. The precise relationship 
between philosophia prima, metaphysics and natural philosophy presents exegetical 
difficulties. Jardine points out how "in scholastic classifications of knowledge 
philosophia prima is a synonym for metaphysics"32 However, Bacon states: 
I intend Primitive or Summary Philosophy [Philosophia Prima] and 
Metaphysic, which heretofore have been confounded as one, to be two 
distinct things. For the one [Philosophia Prima] I have made a parent or 
common ancestor to all knowledge; the other [Metaphysic], a branch or 
portion of Natural Philosophy 33 
Jardine remarks that Bacon believed in "some general principles which recur and 
stand out in so many separate sciences that they may be immediately judged to be 
universally true"34 This, she points out, "is a standard Aristotelian view. "35 
However, as Jardine notes, this position entails that the method is superfluous. She 
therefore concludes that "despite Bacon's claims that the inductive method rests on 
experience alone, it appears that the investigator is to be armed with knowledge of 
philosophia prima at the outset "36 I suggest that Jardine is approaching the problem 
in reverse. Philosophia prima, in Bacon's sense, does not refer to an a priori system. 
On the contrary, things themselves exhibit the possibility of this universal science, 
31 Bacon, DAS, SEH, N, 337, cf. I, 540 
32 Jardine, Francis Bacon: Discovery and the Art of Discourse (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1974), 104, n. 1. For a detailed account of the Renaissance and early modem discussions on 
"first philosophy" and on the debates over the remit of the science of metaphysics see Charles H. 
Lohr, "Metaphysics, " in The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, 537-638. 
33 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 345-346, cf. I, 549. 
34 Jardine, Francis Bacon: Discovery and the Art of Discourse, 101. 
35 ibid. 
36 ibid., 108. Quite apart from the discussion here, I have already discussed Bacon's metaphysical 
assumptions. Bacon nowhere argues that experience alone could lead an investigator into matter's 
hidden structures. However, his view of the relationship between the organs of the senses and 
matter's radiative powers demonstrates that he is still philosophising according to the senses. Sense is 
always the arbiter of the true and the false. 
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that is to say, Bacon's sapience rests on ontological, not epistemological grounds 37 
Moreover, I maintain that for Bacon philosophia prima and natural philosophy are 
synonyms: the term "metaphysics" is now defined as a "branch or portion of natural 
philosophy. "38 Given his subversion of traditional categories, it is not surprising that 
Bacon is less than candid about his naturalising of the full range of human 
knowledge 39 To reconcile the apparent confusion, we have to acknowledge that 
Bacon's "first philosophy" is not metaphysics in the Aristotelian sense. For Bacon, 
philosophia prima is a way of reintegrating and synthesising the sciences, under the 
direction of natural philosophy. 
The confusion arises mainly, as McRae and Jardine point out, because Bacon 
designates both philosophia prima and natural philosophy as the "mother" science. 
In De augmentis he uses the same expressions to refer to philosophia prima as he 
elsewhere (particularly in Novum organum) uses to describe natural philosophy. 
McRae, however, comments correctly that the differences in Bacon's accounts 
contain "a basic consistency underlying the theory of philosophia prima and the 
forthright naturalism of the Novum Organum. "40 The inconsistency disappears when 
it is realised that Bacon's philosophia prima refers to a mode of thinking "in which 
37 Bacon's use of logical examples to illustrate philosophia prima has led to its identification with 
axiomatic principles in the sense of propositions that are intuitively true. See Wallace for an account 
of Bacon's concept of the intellect (intellectus) and its function in apprehending comparisons and 
distinctions in the natural history tables in order to "abstract, " Francis Bacon on the Nature of Man: 
The Faculties of Man's Soul, 100-101. This is not "intuitionism" as McCanles argues, "From Derrida 
to Bacon and Beyond, " in Francis Bacon's Legacy of Texts, 25-46. 
38 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 346, cf. I, 549. 
39 A very close reading of the key passages in De augmentis is required here. McRae is correct on the 
relationship between philosophia prima and metaphysics, The Unity of the Sciences, 30. Moreover, 
caution should be exercised when dealing with Bacon's divisions of the sciences in De augmentis. 
Bacon is devious and ambiguous when dealing with terms and definitions. When we consider the 
ramifications of his claim for morality and religion, for example, Bacon's reasons for obfuscation and 
concealment are clear. 
40 McRae, The Unity of the Sciences, 30 
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all knowledge is restricted to nature as its object. "41 As we saw in Chapters 4 and 5, 
natural philosophy is the only science whose function is the production of high level 
axioms. These axioms touch upon the universalities of things and from these 
primary axioms, the axioms of all other arts and sciences are connected to the 
mother science. Hence natural philosophy (the ascent from physics to metaphysics) 
is the "mother philosophy" that gives birth to and vitally sustains all other sciences. 
Philosophia prima is in that sense a "receptacle" for the high level axioms of natural 
philosophy. 42 
Thus we return to my earlier question, how extensive is the science of natural 
philosophy? Bacon's goal for the human sciences is to derive axioms of politics, 
ethics and theology that mirror the axioms of natural philosophy. Philosophia prima 
should expand the traditional boundaries of natural philosophical axioms so that they 
incorporate the science of human things. In the deduction of middle axioms (the 
provenance of particular sciences) from primary axioms, Bacon insists that the unity 
of nature must be kept in view, primarily to avoid repetitions and correct errors. This 
is what Bacon intends when he speaks of "latitude" of knowledge: 
There still remain two limitations of propositions, besides that for making 
them convertible; the one regarding their extension, the other their 
production. Certainly sciences, if a man rightly observe it, have, besides 
profundity, two other dimensions, namely latitude and longitude. The 
profundity relates to their truth and reality; for it is they which give solidity. 
As to the other two, the latitude may be accounted and computed from one 
science to another [philosophia prima]; the longitude from the highest 
proposition to the lowest in the same science [physics and metaphysics]. 
The one contains the true bounds and limits of sciences, that the 
propositions thereof may be handled properly, not promiscuously, and 
repetition, excursion, and all confusion may be avoided; the other prescribes 
41 ibid. 
42 Bacon's claim that philosophia prima is a "receptacle" diverts attention away from its powerful 
function. For an explanation of how it "should tend primitively and summarily to the advancement of 
the sciences, " see DAS, SEH, IV, 339, cf. I, 543. 
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how far and to what degree of particularity the propositions of a science 
should be deduced 43 
Philosophia prima, therefore, discovers how far the latitude of the axioms of natural 
philosophy extends. Moreover, to ensure that fragmentation does not reoccur, all 
axioms of the particular arts and sciences feed back into the mother philosophy. This 
guarantees a continual process of error correction and (I suggest) is Bacon's reason 
for appropriating the pre-Socratic term "Circle Learning. " It is the business of 
natural philosophy to penetrate the hidden depths of matter. The restoration of "the 
great mother of the sciences" is intended to add depth to specific sciences that 
currently "skate over the surface and variety of things. "44 The reason why the 
sciences of ethics and politics are currently not conceived in natural terms is that 
their "roots" are not sunk deeply in matter. 45 In the same way that experientia 
literata functions to draw connections across low-level artisanal crafts, so the 
axioms of the different sciences should inform and throw light on each other. Bacon 
is emphatic that 
These are no allusions but direct communities, the same delights of the 
mind being to be found not only in music, rhetoric, but in moral philosophy, 
policy, and other knowledges, and that obscure in the one, which is more 
apparent in the other, yea and that discovered in the one which is not found 
at all in the other, and so one science greatly aiding to the invention and 
augmentation of another. And therefore without this intercourse the axioms 
of sciences will fall out to be neither full nor true 46 
Philosophia prima, for Bacon, contains the augmented knowledge of the discrete 
sciences. 
As the following passage demonstrates, natural philosophy is the directing 
science. Bacon uses the axioms of physics as a guide to correct the axioms of other 
sciences: 
43 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 453, cf. I, 668. 
44 Bacon, NO, OFB, XL 127. 
45 ibid. 
46 Bacon, VT, SEH, III, 230. 
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Things are preserved from destruction by bringing them back to their first 
principles, " is a rule in Physics; the same holds good in Politics [eadem 
valet in Politicis] (as Macchiavelli rightly observed), for there is scarcely 
anything which preserves states from destruction more than the reformation 
and reduction of them to their ancient matters. "Putrefaction is more 
contagious before than after maturity, " is a rule in Physics; the same is 
eminently true in Morals [eadem insignis etiam in Moralibus], for the men 
who are most wicked and profligate produce less corruption in the public 
manners than those who appear to have some soundness and virtue in them, 
and are only partly evil. "Whatever is preservative of a greater Form is 
more powerful in action, " is a rule in Physics; for that connexion of things 
should not be severed, nor a vacuum (as they call it) admitted, tends to 
preserve the fabric of the universe; whereas the collection of heavy bodies 
towards the mass of the earth tends to preserve only the region of dense 
bodies; and therefore the first motion overcomes the last. The same holds in 
Politics [Eadem tenet in Politicis]; for whatsoever contributes to preserve 
the whole state in its own nature, has greater power than that which only 
benefits the particular members of that state. It holds likewise in Theology 
[Similiter eadem locum habet in Theologia]; for of the theological virtues, 
charity, which is the virtue most communicative of good, excels all the 
rest 47 
Each example begins with a rule in physics. Following the statement of this rule, 
Bacon's repeated use of the term eadem shows that he is in fact cross-mapping the 
axioms of physics onto the rules of politics and theology. Thus the axioms of 
politics and theology are, for Bacon, expressions of natural philosophical truths. As 
Bacon says to James, we must "reflect this light of Nature upon Matter of Estate. "48 
The axioms of physics (or metaphysics) illuminate political and theological actions. 
The relationship between metaphysics and philosophia prima now becomes clear. 
Metaphysics supplies natural philosophical axioms and these axioms (along with 
axioms from all other sciences) are placed in the receptacle of philosophia prima. 
This permits the recursive correction of axioms from the particular sciences. 
Consequently there is no contradiction when Bacon refers in Novum organum to 
natural philosophy as the "great mother of the sciences. " He states: 
Let no one hope for great progress in the sciences (especially in the 
operative department) unless natural philosophy be extended to the 
particular sciences, and these in turn reduced [reductc3J to natural 
47 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 338, cf. I, 541-542. 
48 Bacon, LL, X, 94. 
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philosophy. For hence it comes about that astronomy, optics, music, many 
of the mechanical arts, and medicine itself, and (which may surprise you) 
moral and political philosophy, and the science of logic have practically no 
depth but skate over the surface and variety of things; because once these 
are dispersed and set up as particular sciences, they are no longer nourished 
by natural philosophy; which could have given them new strength and 
growth at source and from a true knowledge of motions, rays, sounds, 
textures and schematisms of bodies, affections, and intellectual 
apprehensions. Since, therefore, the sciences have been cut off from their 
roots, it is no wonder that they do not grow. 49 
The direct dependence of the political sciences on natural philosophy, and the 
potential benefits for political control based on knowledge of matter's virtues is 
clearly seen in Bacon's A brief discourse touching the happy union of the kingdoms 
of England and Scotland dedicated in private to James. This tract offers a further 
illustration of how Persian magic and a theory of matter cohere in Bacon's universal 
sapience. 50 The document is an extraordinary discussion of radiative matter and its 
astrological import; the concept of union and consent; and the distinctions between 
compositio and mistio. In advising James on the union of Scotland and England, 
Bacon applies flawlessly his materialist cosmogonical principles to policy. Although 
familiar, the opening comments are worth quoting in full: 
I do not find it strange (excellent King) that when Heraclitus, he that was 
surnamed the obscure, had set forth a certain book which is not now extant, 
many men took it for a discourse of nature, and many others took it for a 
treatise of policy and matter of estate. For there is a great affinity and 
consent between the rules of nature, and the true rules of policy: the one 
being nothing else but an order in the government of the world, and the 
other an order in the government of an estate. And therefore the education 
and erudition of the kings of Persia was in a science which was termed by a 
name then of great reverence, but now degenerate and taken in ill part; for 
the Persian Magic, which was the secret literature of their kings, was an 
49 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 127. Designating Bacon's way of inquiry as a cybernetic epistemology 
seems highly apposite here since it specifies how natural philosophy flows into the particular sciences 
and they in turn flow back into natural philosophy. The sciences are nourished by natural philosophy 
(their roots) - natural philosophy supplies true knowledge of motions etc. The sciences then feed 
back their findings (experimenta lucifera) into natural philosophy so that it continues to grow. 
50 Julian Martin reads Bacon as associating the laws of nature with God's laws. According to Martin, 
this explains the "resemblance" between the world of government and the natural world. Although 
Martin cites the passages referring to Persian magic, he overlooks the all important physical examples 
given by Bacon and so avoids dealing with the foundational role of natural philosophy in the kinds of 
advice the Persian Magi gave their kings, Francis Bacon, the State, and the Reform of Natural 
Philosophy, 142. 
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observation of the contemplations of nature and an application thereof to a 
sense politic; taking the fundamental laws of nature, which the branches and 
passages of them, as an original and first model, whence to take and 
describe a copy and imitation for govennment. 5' 
Whilst identifying his role with that of the Magi, Bacon proceeds (in a series of 
natural examples taken from astronomy, meteorology, astrology and mechanics) to 
illustrate how the principles of nature should underpin policy and the principles of 
government. 52 He introduces the material notions of consent and union, and divides 
their moral and civic application into two categories: as they pertain respectively to 
individual good and to cooperative good. According to Bacon, even though in nature 
all things have "private and particular affection and appetite, " for the sake of "the 
more general and common" good "they forsake their own particularities ... and 
aspire to uphold the public [good]. "53 To focus the correspondence between the 
natural and the political, Bacon outlines "the grounds of nature touching the union 
and commixture of bodies. "54 Bacon's natural philosophical explanation is based on 
the principle that things conspire with their like, thereby enhancing their vigour - as 
he puts it, "vis unitafortior. "55 For example, he describes in naturalised astrological 
51 Bacon, LL, X, 90. In the prefatory remarks to Bacon's A brief discourse touching the happy union 
of the kingdoms of England and Scotland, Spedding raises the issue of Bacon's derivation of "his idea 
of the nature of the Persian Magic" and suggests "a remark in Plato, " LL, X, 89. Elsewhere he 
expands on this: "The first idea of the connexion between the Persian magic and the art of 
government was suggested by the circumstance mentioned in the Alcibiades of Plato - that the 
princes of Persia were by the same persons instructed in politics and magic" (SEH, 1,542-543, n. 4). 
52 For an alternative discussion see Martin, Francis Bacon, the State, and the Reform of Natural 
Philosophy, 143-145. 
53 Bacon, LL, X, 91. Bacon says, "So we see the iron in small quantity will ascend and approach to 
the loadstone upon a particular sympathy: but if it be any quantity of moment, it leaveth his appetite 
of amity with the loadstone, and like a good patriot falleth to the earth, which is the place and region 
of massy bodies. " 
54 Bacon, LL, X, 92. This could be called a "doctrine of connaturals" and is a consequence of 
Bacon's cosmology which describes the separation and bonding of similarities, the light from the 
heavy, the hot from the cold, etc. This is why at a certain stage in cosmological development different 
regions settle out into discrete and antagonistic zones. For a discussion of Bacon's cosmology see 
Rees, OFB, VI, xlii-xlvi. 
55 Similar remarks are found in Bacon's essay "On Friendship. " He says: "So that it is, in Truth of 
Operation upon a Mans Minde, of like virtue, as the Alchymists use to attribute to their Stone, for 
Man's Bodie; That it worketh all contrary Effects, but still to the Good, and Benefit of Nature. But 
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terms how the radiative power of the stars gains strength in certain conjunctions, 
thus illustrating the "force of union. "56 The manner of union can be voluntary or 
enforced and Bacon concentrates on the former. This leads to his central concern, 
viz., the distinction between compositio and mistio. I discussed this 
distinction in 
Chapter 5 where we saw that compositio is a union without a new form whereas 
mistio superinduces a form. 
Because the forms of natural and political union come from the same source, 
Bacon concludes that the "light of Nature" reflects "upon Matter of Estate. "57 In the 
one case (compositio), there is a sovereignty where "the ancient forms [are] still 
severed, " and in the other, where pains have been taken "to superinduce a new 
form 
agreeable and convenient to the entire estate, " there is mistio. 58 This satisfies the 
natural philosophical principle that the good of the greater overrides individual or 
particular good. Bacon has therefore illustrated that the union of states is as much an 
experimental production of mistio as the production of a new form in natural 
experimentation: in both cases a new form is superinduced. Therefore, Bacon 
argues, if the principles of nature are followed, the union of Scotland and England 
will entail mistio and not merely compositio. The new form will supply the 
commune vinculum - the common bond (charity or brotherhood) that binds it into a 
fixed entity. 59 
yet, without praying in Aid of Alchymists, there is a manifest Image of this, in the ordinarie course of 
Nature. For in Bodies, Union strengthneth and cherisheth any Naturall Action; And, on the other side, 
wealmeth and dulleth any violent Impression: And euen so it is of Minds" (Ess, OFB, XV, 83-84). 
56 Bacon, LL, X, 93. 
57 ibid., 94. 
58 ibid., 94. 
59 ibid. Bacon says the new form is "commune vinculum" and without it there is "strife and discord" 
among the elements of the union, (ibid. ). He refers to the Roman Empire as the exemplar of mistio to 
illustrate its superiority over compositio (see LL, X, 94-95). In this way Bacon as Magus has supplied 
his king with the natural philosophical principles supporting a policy decision. 
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In De augmentis Bacon applies identical reasoning and the same natural 
principles to morals. In his critique of the moral philosophers he intimates the source 
of good and evil in matter when he says the "inquiry concerning the roots of good 
and evil, and the strings of those roots" has not been dealt with. 60 Bacon proposes to 
"open and cleanse" the "fountains" of morality before he comes to a discussion of 
how good and evil are implemented in his "Georgics of the Mind. "61 According to 
Bacon, "there is formed and imprinted in everything an appetite toward two natures 
of good. "62 And here he repeats the explanation given to James: the double nature of 
"good" is in so far as a thing is a "substantive to itself' and "as part or member of a 
greater body. "63 The latter, he says, is "worthier" because it tends to "conservation 
of a more general form. "M Bacon labels these respectively, "Individual or Self- 
good" and the "Good of Communion. "65 Good of communion is, he says, "much 
more engraven upon man, if he be not degenerate. "66 Whereas in the tract dedicated 
to James the topic is policy, in Book 7 of De augmentis Bacon's topic is moral 
character. There his desideratum is: 
[the] several features and simple lineaments of which [the characters of 
man] ... are composed, and by the various combinations and arrangements 
of which all characters whatever are made up, showing how many, and of 
what natures these are, and how connected and subordinate one to another; 
that so we may have a scientific and accurate dissection of the minds and 
characters and the secret dispositions of particular men may be revealed; 
and that for the knowledge thereof better rules may be framed for the 
treatment of the mind. 67 
In his proposed segmenting of character, Bacon hopes to discover 
60 Bacon, DAS, SEH, V, 6, cf. I, 716. 
61 Bacon, DAS, SEH, V, 6, cf. I, 717. 
62 Bacon, DAS, SEH, V, 7, cf. I, 717. 
63 ibid. 
64 ibid. 
65 ibid. 
66 ibid. 
67 Bacon, DAS, SEH, V, 22, cf. I, 734. 
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how affections are kindled, and excited, and how pacified and restrained, 
and how again contained from act and further degree; how they disclose 
themselves, though repressed and concealed; how they work; how they 
vary; how they are enwrapped one within another; how they fight and 
encounter one with another. 68 
His depiction of the motions of character is identical to his account of how natural 
experiment investigates the hidden virtues of matter in order to disclose the 
relationships among simple motions. In morals, experiment discloses the motions of 
the passions and appetites. In both cases, the object is control and manipulation of 
simple motions. Bacon's project is how to make use of this discovery of the analogy 
of simple motions, whether of the passions and appetites in natural, moral, civil, or 
theological action. As he puts it, the exercise is intended for the setting of "one 
faction against another" so as to "bridle" and control both the internal factions of the 
mind as much as the external factions in government. 69 The language used by Bacon 
is identical to that used in binding and constraining matter towards the 
superinduction of new forms. Mouton comments, "whereas earlier writers, and in 
particular the heathen poets, made the mistake of juxtaposing the moral law and the 
laws of nature, Bacon wishes to show that they are in fact identical how could it be 
otherwise since God is the author of both. "70 
However, in agreement with McRae, I suggest that for Bacon matter is the 
author of both moral law and the laws of nature. The laws in Bacon's account of 
moral and political action are laws of appetitive matter, which determine that an 
increase in potency is observed when like is gathered to like. Mouton argues that 
configurations of motions account for the specific desires and aversions of matter. 
He makes the further observation that one can understand the unity of nature only by 
dealing with Bacon's concept of simple motions. However, using Rees's work on 
68 Bacon, DAS, SEH, V, 23-24, cf. I, 736. 
69 Bacon, DAS, SEH, V, 24, cf. I, 737. 
70 Mouton, "The Summary Law of Nature, " in Francis Bacon's Legacy of Texts, 144. 
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Bacon's cosmology, he states that Bacon's theory of simple motions "is embedded 
in a moral theory of goods. "71 This, I argue, has inverted Bacon's argument and 
Mouton is quite wrong to read the connection from the moral to the natural 72 The 
Persian magicians, according to Bacon, knew the laws (or forms) of nature and so 
knew the laws and forms of political and moral harmony. If there is a form of 
statecraft then it is imperative to discover it, and its discovery is the business of 
natural philosophy - the science that deals with actions and the 
discovery of forms. 
This governing science applies its principles to the forms of heat and death, no 
less 
than the forms of anger and political union. 
The coherence between Bacon's materialism, the science of magic and the 
extent of natural philosophical explanation, although touched on by commentators, 
has not had adequate close commentary. This is mainly due to the fragmented 
approach to the Baconian corpus. Peltonen makes the assumption that a civic science 
or a science of politics would obviously be a political or moral theory. This demand 
is inappropriate and I suggest this is where commentators are largely misled. I 
suggest that Bacon's science of human beings, in so far as they act and are acted 
upon, is not anything political or ethical; it is a natural philosophical science. 
Furthermore, according to Bacon, politics is a subject "secret and retired, " and we 
are told in De augmentis that the secrets of policy, philosophy and religion must be 
conveyed in fable. Unsurprisingly, the secrets of policy are not recorded by Bacon 
71 Mouton, "The Summary Law of Nature, " 142. Mouton calls Bacon's language "anthropomorphic" 
based on Bacon's use of the language of antipathies or sympathies. Thus inanimate bodies express 
"love" and "hate. " This is quite in keeping with Bacon's notion of appetite but the direction is from 
matter to human passions. Mouton correctly says that the most important aspect is the rule that states 
sympathy and attraction occur between like, and antipathy and repulsion between unlike and that this 
translates into love and hate in human behaviour. 
72 Martin likewise inverts the priority when discussing the "affinity between the laws of nature and 
those of the civil policy"; he attributes to Bacon "the primacy of discovering the latter, " Francis 
Bacon, the State, and the Reform of Natural Philosophy, 145. 
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and his praise of Machiavellian strategies adds to the suspicion that such knowledge 
should be guarded and confined. 
Having concentrated thus far on the philosophical unity of Bacon's 
theoretical and operative programme, it might prove useful to review what Rees 
refers to as Bacon's self-presentation. 73 This proposal is made on the basis that 
Bacon's self-portrayal reflects the radical nature of his project. In this way perhaps 
the vastness of Bacon's enterprise can be resurrected. Furthermore, more exhaustive 
attention to Bacon's self-representation would go some way towards uniting the 
fragmented "Bacons" that now populate Baconian scholarship. 74 Any discussion of 
Bacon's self-presentations is bound to turn at some point to his religious persona. 
This is certainly pertinent here in view of my continually prioritising his 
materialism. Again my comments here are suggestive. 
Lampert argues that to complete Bacon's fragmented writing "requires an 
interpretation that accords with the whole of the Baconian project"75 He calls Bacon 
"the progenitor of a utopian dream, the founder of the modem faith in the 
technological conquest of nature as the means to prolong our lives and make them 
easy. "76 Lampert alerts us to Bacon's self-perception when he says that Bacon 
altered radically "the way human beings look at things. "77 Bacon's "realism- led him 
to believe in the need for a new belief' and the "establishment of that faith requires a 
73 Rees comments that Bacon "does not shrink from likening himself to Alexander the Great and 
Christopher Columbus, and from sketching his own view of his originality, " OFB, XI, lxii. 
74 Martin remarks "the most interesting and continuing feature of Baconian scholarship is that it has 
produced several Francis Bacons, none of whom significantly overlap ... To my knowledge there has been almost no interest in reintegrating these partial images, " Francis Bacon, the State, and the 
Reform of Natural Philosophy, 2. 
75 Lampert, Nietzsche and Modern Times, 20. 
76 ibid. 
77 ibid. 
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holy war on its behalf. "78 For Lampert, the "holy war" is aimed at current obsessions 
enslaving men's minds, especially theology and its purveyors the theologians. 
79 
According to Lampert's Nietzschean assessment of Bacon's enterprise, it consists of 
"novel teachings" that "go against custom, " and that "overthrow a whole way of 
life. "80 In the preceding chapters, I presented Bacon's regeneration of the human 
mind in the language of via negativa spirituality, and Bacon's texts are littered with 
classical, biblical and theological allusions. In what sense then was Bacon going 
against custom, and what were his self-perceptions of this radical turn? Furthermore, 
if Lampert's characterisation of Bacon is correct, then why, for the most part, have 
Bacon's self-perceptions and his substantive views been relegated to the history of 
scientific methodology, or to a contextual presentation which diminishes their 
radical nature through interminable comparison and association? 
In presenting himself as the new Columbus, Bacon intimates something of 
the scale and scope of his project, whilst mitigating its improbability through linking 
it to the self-evidence of experimental confirmation: 
Before his epic voyage across the Atlantic ... he [Columbus] gave reasons 
why he believed he could discover new lands and continents beyond those 
known then, reasons which, though rejected at first, were afterwards 
vindicated by his experiment, and were the origin and cause of events of 
vast consequence. 81 
On the one hand, this coheres with Bacon's frequent claim to be only a guide, a 
trailblazer or pioneer who indicates the goal. On the other hand, this self-image 
should be compared to his more strident comments: "I will undertake not only to 
78 ibid., 68. 
79 Lampert reads Bacon's Advertisement Touching an Holy War as "warfare against sovereign 
religion, " ibid., 68. Lampert also adheres to a Straussian reading of Bacon that highlights Bacon's 
circumspection and duplicity in matters politic and religious. This interpretation focuses on the 
esoteric and acroamatic styles of writing promoted by Bacon. See Leo Strauss, Persecution and the 
Art of Writing (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1952). 
80 Lampert, Nietzsche and Modern Times, 20-21 
81 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 151. 
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survey these territories in my mind as seers do when consulting the omens, but enter 
them as generals do when bent on annexing them. "82 Consider too his self-depiction 
in quasi-messianic terms, "I am come in very truth leading to you Nature with all her 
children to bind her to your service and make her your slave. "83 A similar 
ambivalence between Baconian modesty and aggressive expansionism can be 
gleaned from Bacon's invocation of the empire-building of Alexander. In the 
Advancement of learning both Alexander and Caesar are lauded as men of wit, 
wisdom and virtue. Bacon claims that he and Alexander hold in common "nothing 
other than the nerve to despise foolish fears. "84 This fits with Bacon's claim that in 
time to come he will be seen to have done "nothing great, but only made less of 
things thought to be great. "85 The phrase "things thought to be great" could bear 
multiple references, especially considering his castigations of institutional learning 
and superstition. In his castigation of current magic he also presents himself as 
Caesar when he characterises natural magic: 
It [popular natural magic] is as far differing in truth of nature from such a 
knowledge as we require, as the story of King Arthur of Britain, or Hugh of 
Bordeaux, and such like imaginary heroes, differs from Caesar's 
Commentaries in truth of story. For it is manifest that Caesar did greater 
things in reality than those imaginary heroes were feigned to do, but he did 
them not in that fabulous manner. 86 
In religious terms, Bacon presents himself as "a high priest of the sense 
(from which all natural knowledge should, unless we prefer madness, be derived) 
and learned interpreter of its oracles. "87 His recurrent use of the image of nature's 
82 Bacon, DO, OFB, XI, 29. 
83 Bacon, TPM, BF, 62, cf. SEH, III, 528. 
84 Bacon, TPM, BF, 62, cf. SEH, III, 528. 
85 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 155 (italics in original). 
86 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 367, cf. I, 573. 
87 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 35. 
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oracles is grounded on the doctrine that the ultimate source of matter's potency is 
inscrutable and must be accepted on faith as something "positive" Its explicator 
must perforce be an interpreter. As a lawyer and judge whose professional function 
was to interpret the positive "Placets of Law, " it is unsurprising that Bacon should 
present himself in this guise. However, he chooses the image of "high priest, " which 
carries overtones of mystery and secrecy associated with elite cults and societies. 
Moreover, there is a clear suggestion in Temporis partus masculus and Redargutio 
philosophiarum that Bacon considered the setting up of an elite society of chosen 
disciples as a vehicle for promoting his project. 88 In Chapter 31 showed how 
consistently and completely he constructs his programme as a parallel of 
conventional religious themes and practices. These parallels also extend to scripture 
and revelation. The comparable Baconian sacred book is the primary history, which 
is "to be written up with the most religious care" as "another kind of Holy Writ. "89 
This natural revelation is the path to the relief of man's estate 90 This is achieved by 
striving "to renew and increase the empire of humanity itself over the whole 
universe of things"91 Bacon also equates the "light of nature" with the Interpretation 
of Nature 92 As he frames it, "for the light itself [Lumen ipsum] ... is to be sought 
from the Interpretation of Nature, or the New Organon. "93 This is the "new light" he 
fears he may "be prevented by death to propound and reveal. "94 It is "the light of 
88 See CV, BF, 101, cf. SEH, III, 620; RPh, BF, 103-105, cf. SEH, III, 557-560. His "tables" were to 
play the role of the inner teaching or reserve doctrine "communicated ... only to a few" (CV, BF, 101, cf. SEH, III, 620). 
89 Bacon, PAH, OFB, XI, 469. 
90 Bacon, VT, SEH, III, 222. 
91 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 195. 
92 "Lumen Naturae: seu formula Interpretationis" is the second book of Temporis partus masculus 
(SEH, III, 528). 
93 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 413, cf. 1,623. 
94 Bacon, VT, OFB, III, 233. 
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Nature ... which springeth 
from Reason, Sense, Induction, Argument, according to 
the lawes of heauen and earth. "95 The parallels between religious and natural themes 
abound and can only be overlooked through inattention. 
Linked with the above is Bacon's continual invocation of the king and 
prophet Solomon, whose aphoristic writings he cites throughout and who succeeded 
in writing "a natural history of all that is green from the cedar to the moss ... and 
also of all that liveth and moveth. "96 And just as the compilation of such a history is 
"a mighty work fit ... for a 
king, " so too the interpretation of nature is a kingly task: 
Salomon the king affirmeth directly that the glory of God is to conceal a 
thing, but the glory of the king is to find it out ... for in naming the 
king he 
intendeth man, taking such a condition of man as hath most excellency and 
greatest commandment of wits and means ... 
97 
This is conventionally read solely as an enticement to King James. In Book 1 of 
Novum organum, having invoked Solomon's dictum, Bacon goes on to approve the 
just judgement of the ancients in awarding divine honours to the discoverers of 
things 98 Moreover, he mentions how the difference in developments of the arts 
among the inhabitants of the New World and Europe is great enough to justify the 
remark that man (as inventor) is a God to man. He adds, no doubt in terms of his 
self-perception, "how much more noble will it seem to discover something to enable 
everything else to be rapidly discovered by means of it? "99 Furthermore, the New 
Atlantis exhibits all of the above themes relating to Bacon's self-perception as the 
restorer of monarchical empire aided by an elite priesthood. '00 These motifs, 
95 Bacon, AL, OFB, N, 183. 
96 Bacon, VT, SEH, III, 220. 
97 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 171; VT, SEH, III, 220. 
98 See Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 195. 
99 Bacon, NO, OFB XI, 195-197. 
100 The New Atlantis is governed by a ceremonial monarchy whose true power resides with the 
revered "Fellows of Salomon's House" (the College of the Six Days Works), a brotherhood that 
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redolent of Renaissance images of magical and elite societies, appear prima facie to 
be at odds with the naturalising tenor of Baconian magic. However, the power to 
effect this Baconian vision comes from a science of restored ancient magic, rooted 
in a radical materialism, a vociferous defence of the senses, and a scathing attack on 
mystical obscurantism. This melange of apparently contradictory elements 
permeates Bacon's writings. 
On the basis of the above discussion, an emphasis on Bacon's materialism 
can hardly avoid a confrontation with the issue of Bacon's religious sincerity, a 
notoriously divisive theme in Bacon scholarship. For example, what is one to make 
of Bacon's astute and adroit deployment of scriptural motifs and citations, and his 
prefatory and concluding prayers that seem to reflect the Reformation piety of a 
regenerate Christian. '0' Others consider these merely dissimulation for atheistic 
materialism. Stephen McKnight takes the former view and attacks those such as 
Howard White and Jerry Weinberger who argue for Bacon's impiety. Expanding on 
his earlier article arguing for the influence of the prisca theologia on Bacon, 
McKnight emphasises and takes seriously Bacon's religious self-presentation. He 
focuses on the apocalyptic aspects of "instauration" in relation to overcoming the 
consequences of the Fall, the omnipresent role of Providence in Bacon's scheme, 
"Bacon's understanding of his vocation as a prophet and as a priest of nature, " and 
the pre-eminent role of Christian charity. 102 Attending to McKnight's arguments is 
dispenses blessings and donatives. The "Brethren" are the keepers of secrets (even from the state), 
masters of deceits and their actions include the artificial production of "miracles" (NA, SEH, III, 146). 
101 In Novum organum Bacon states, "I am no founder of sects"(OFB, XI, 175). In his Life of Bacon Rawley says, "This lord was religious ... He repaired frequently, when his health would permit him, 
to the service of the church, to hear sermons, to the administration of the sacrament of the blessed 
body and blood of Christ; and died in the true faith, established in the church of England" (SEH, I, 
14). 
102 Stephen McKnight, The Religious Foundations of Francis Bacon's Thought (Columbia: 
University of Missouri Press, 2006), 151. 
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important in establishing the extent of Baconian reform and the extent of the unity of 
knowledge in terms of its incursion into the religious sphere. 
Unfortunately, despite McKnight's claim that his approach to the Baconian 
corpus "involves close textual analysis, " his commentary is often not anchored in the 
texts. 103 For example, - and this is especially pertinent to the question of natural 
philosophy's remit - much of his argument rests on Bacon's use of light symbolism. 
According to McKnight, Bacon makes it clear that "true knowledge comes through 
divine illumination ... Bacon's new epistemology establishes the procedures for 
enlightenment. " 104 The trouble with McKnight's account is that it completely 
ignores Bacon's materialist cosmogony and never once addresses the importance of 
Baconian matter. Bacon is implacably hostile to talk of spiritual illumination; he 
repeatedly states that the light of creation is the light of sense. He points out that the 
lack of "investigation" into "the Form of light" is "an astonishing piece of 
negligence. "los He says unmistakably that the manner in which "Light and its 
causes" has been handled is "somewhat superstitious, as if it were a thing half way 
between things divine and things natural. "lob Light as a subject of inquiry must be 
"handled physically and according to sense. "107 In that case light will, as Bacon puts 
it, come "at once to questions of radiation"108 It is not possible to grasp Bacon's 
conception of light in the absence of an understanding of his radiative matter. 
Furthermore, as we have seen, in the concluding chapter of De augmentis Bacon 
demands that the soul be subject to physical investigation. Thus, although "Light" is 
103 McKnight, The Religious Foundations of Francis Bacon's Thought, 2. 
104 ibid., 86. 
105 Bacon, DAS, SEH, IV, 403, cf. I, 612. 
106 ibid. 
107 ibid. 
108 ibid 
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frequently mentioned in Bacon's texts, this alone tells us little about Bacon's attitude 
towards it. 
McKnight also draws attention to the way Bacon uses the doctrine of the 
Fall, which was, not due to the pursuit of "the pure knowledge of nature and 
universality" but to the pursuit of "the proud knowledge of good and evil" that 
would let men "become as gods. "109 Yet McKnight has paid no attention to Bacon's 
concept of the unity of the sciences, or to his urging for a deeper investigation 
"concerning the Rootes of Good and euill, and the Strings of those Rootes" through 
inquiry into nature. 110 It is particularly regrettable that he makes no attempt to show 
that the key Baconian concept of "charity, " whose importance McKnight rightly 
emphasises, has any Christian theological content whatsoever. I have argued above 
that there is a "bond" of union which in terms of cohesion and community is again 
traceable to matter's virtues. "' I suggest that McKnight's historiography fails to 
distinguish between the de facto presence of materials and their usage in specific 
arguments. 
It is undeniable that as a shrewd politique, Bacon regards religion as an 
indispensable element of a stable state. As he says, "Religion, custom and fear serve 
as keepers of the law, since the wills of men are moved by faith and opinions, 
customs and examples, or by affections. " 112 Moreover, materialism is no barrier to 
either religious fervour as seen in the example of Bruno, or to piety and virtue, 
109 McKnight, The Religious Foundations of Francis Bacon's Thought, 86. 
110 Bacon, AL, OFB, IV, 136. 
111 in its standard use in Bacon "charity" clearly coincides with the classical Stoic virtue of 
philanthropia. On the relationship of philanthropy to Bacon's programme see Masao Watanabe, 
"Francis Bacon: Philanthropy and the Instauration of Learning, " Annals of Science 49 (1992), 163- 
173. As for the prisca theologia, Bacon was more preoccupied with the "thrice excellent" prophet 
Proteus than Thrice-Great Hermes (Bacon, DSV, SEH, VI, 725, cf. 651). 
112 From aphorism 20 of the Aphorismi de jure gentium maiore, sive de fontibus justiciae et juris, 
quoted in D. R Coquillette, Francis Bacon (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1992), 242. 
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typified by Boyle's later promotion of a sanitised and Christianised version of 
ancient materialism. Moreover, the either/or framing of the question of Bacon's 
religious outlook bespeaks a crude historiography and in those terms it is likely to 
remain undecidable. What is incontestable is Bacon's self-image as critic of a 
degenerate intellectual milieu. Bacon believed he lived in an age of deep-rooted and 
widespread cultural insanity. 113 Central to the contemporary institutions of learning, 
both of church and state, was the Organon of Aristotle. In Bacon's terms "an art or 
manual of madness ... [that] made us slaves of words. 
" 114 Bacon's regenerative 
project includes the replacement of the Aristotelian Organon by his Novum organum 
because without it, he says, "all our choice meditations, speculations and 
controversies are mere madness, except there is no one to tell us so. " Bacon's 
association of madness with philosophical decadence indicates that contemporary 
religion rests on insecure grounds and so is not exempt from the taint of insanity. 
However, certain scholars such as McRae have taken very seriously Bacon's 
statement that "all knowledge is to be limited by religion. "116 In view of Bacon's 
extreme naturalising of all knowledge, what possible limits could be imposed by 
religion? What is excluded from Bacon's philosophia prima? McRae suggests a 
domain utterly distinct from physical investigation. But that excludes only those 
things that do not require investigation, not divine things tout court because Bacon 
includes them in his philosophia prima. If Bacon is taken at face value then 
"religion" must have some clear-cut, definable sense. The excluded region, Bacon's 
sacred and inspired Divinity, "is grounded onely vpon the word & oracle of God, 
113 See Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 55. 
114 Bacon, TPM, BF, 63, cf. SEH, III, 530. 
115 Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 67. 
116 Bacon, VT, SEH, III, 218 (italics in original). 
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and not vpon the light of nature. "117 On the other hand, he states that "the vse 
notwithstanding of Reason in spirituall things, and the latitude thereof 
is very great 
and generall: for it is not for nothing, that the Apostle calleth Religion our 
reasonable seruice of God. "118 Furthermore, he says: 
there is allowed vs an vse of Reason, and argument, secondarie and 
respectiue; although not originall and absolute: For after the Articles and 
principles of Religion are placed and exempted from examination of reason: 
It is then permitted vnto vs to make deriuations and inferences from, and 
according to the Analogie of them, for our better direction. In Nature this 
holdeth not, for both the principles are examinable by Induction, though not 
by a Medium or Sillogisme: and besides those principles or first positions, 
haue noe discordance with that reason which draweth downe and diduceth 
the inferiour positions. 119 
However, even here Bacon turns the question into one of inquiry. The "true limits 
and vse of reason in spirituall things, " he says, has not been "sufficiently enquired 
& handled"120 Ultimately, all rests upon "the true and sound Interpretation of the 
Scriptures. " 121 One sort of interpretation - the "Methodical" - he rejects as divinity 
"reduce[d] ... into an Art. "122 The other - 
"Solute, or at large" - he favours and it 
bears an odd resemblance to the recursive and cybernetic approach that he applies to 
inquiry generally. 123 He tells us: "I doe much condemne that Interpretation of the 
Scripture, which is onely after the manner as Men vse to interprete a prophane 
booke. "124 The Scriptures 
are not to be interpreted only according to the latitude of the proper sense of 
the place, and respectiuely towardes that present occasion, whereupon the 
wordes were vttered; or in precise congruitie or contexture with the wordes 
before or after, or in contemplation of the principall scope of the place, but 
117 Bacon, AL OFB, IV, 182. 
118 ibid. (italics in original). 
119 ibid., 184. 
120 ibid. (italics in original). 
121 ibid., 186. 
122 ibid., 186-187. 
123 ibid., 186. 
124 ibid., 189. 
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haue in themselves not onely totally or collectiuely, but distributiuely in 
clauses and wordes, infinite springs and streames of doctrine to water the 
Church in euerie part. 125 
In brief, the interpretation of the oracle of God's Word is to deliver the sense most 
appropriate to "whereof the Church hath most vse. "126 In this way there is no 
conflict between right reason (ratio recte) and sound religion and as in any other 
sphere of knowledge both mutually adapt and grow in consequence of the growth of 
the art of discovery with discovery. Thus scriptural interpretation is a recursive art 
tending to utility and the practical requirements of ecclesiastical governance. 
All these themes undergo a curious convergence in the closing paragraph of 
Sylva sylvarum. Here Bacon speaks of men's susceptibility to be influenced by what 
others say and think, which leads them to take delight variously "in popularity, 
fame, honour, submission and subjection of other men's minds, wills, or 
affections. " 127 These are in themselves "grateful and agreeable to the nature of 
man, " which suggests (Bacon thinks) that "all spirits and souls of men came forth 
out of one divine limbus. "128 He continues: 
The best temper of minds desireth good name and true honour: the lighter, 
popularity and applause: the more depraved [minds], subjection and 
tyranny; as is seen in great conquerors and troublers of the world [such as 
the formerly praised Alexander and Caesar]; and yet more in arch-heretics 
[such as the antichrist figure of Aristotle]; for the introducing of new 
doctrines is likewise an affectation of tyranny over the understandings and 
beliefs of men. 129 
It therefore seems reasonable to assume that the role of arch-heretic is the last of his 
self-personations. 
125 ibid. 
126 ibid. 
127 Bacon, SS, SEH, II, 672. 
128 ibid. 
129 ibid. Rawley's letter to the reader preceding the Sylva informs us that Bacon was not serving "the 
glory of his own name" (SS, SEN, II, 335). 
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In terms of self-representation, I should note that the final paragraph in 
which he presents himself as "arch-heretic" is the culmination of the century dealing 
with "immateriate virtues, and the force of imagination. " 130 Bacon has at least two 
reasons for choosing to focus on the powers of imagination. First, as explained in 
Chapter 3, the imagination, supported by philosophical and spiritual authority and 
embodied in cultural institutions, is the source of the madness all around him. By 
drawing forensic attention to its modes and manner of working, he may provoke the 
reader to reflect on how men's minds came to be "bound and, as it were, maleficiate 
by the charms of deceiving notions and theories, and thereby made impotent for 
generation of works. "131 Second, imagination is the trigger for all voluntary action: 
"the insecta have voluntary motion, and therefore imagination. "132 Thus a tyrant 
over men's minds, such as Bacon perceives himself to be, should be fully acquainted 
with the potency of the imagination if governance and control of minds and bodies is 
to be achieved. I suggest that Sylva sylvarum is yet another Baconian labyrinth and 
should be read as dispersed writing. By noting such clues as the casual way in which 
manna is referred to as a normal herbal exudation, or how the spirit of man, formerly 
the lamp of God, has undergone a demotion or transformation in the Sylva, one can 
learn to navigate it and even come to recognise the forest despite the density of 
trees. 133 
The inexplicable neglect of Sylva sylvarum is evidence for the over- 
contextualisation of current scholarship in the history of science. In Baconian 
scholarship the Sylva is regarded as an embarrassing farrago of borrowings. Nothing 
130 Bacon, SS, SEH, II, 640 (italics in original). 
131 Rawley, SEH, II, 335. 
132 Bacon, SS, SEH, II, 560. 
133 Bacon states: "But we ... 
hold firm to the works of God, and to the sense, which is God's lamp, 
(lucerna Dei spiraculum hominis) ... " (SS, SEH, II, 641). 
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could be further from the truth and the concept of borrowings has yet again 
sidetracked attention away from Bacon's texts. Commentators have failed to grasp 
the significance of Rawley's comment that the Sylva "may seem an indigested heap 
of particulars. " 134 1 have already cited and defended the importance of the Sylva 
several times in this thesis. In lieu of the full and detailed commentary which is a 
future project, I offer the following brief comments. I suggest that as the New 
Atlantis can be seen as the summation of Bacon's political doctrine appropriately 
expressed in the guise of a fable, so Sylva sylvarum is an illustrative epitome of 
Bacon's natural philosophy. It foregrounds the omnipresent working of spirits 
throughout the entire natural realm, including of course the human world. 
Pneumatical explanation is applied equally to the mineral, vegetable, animal and 
human realms of physical nature. Viewing Sylva sylvarum as an array of disparate 
particulars is inexplicable, as throughout the text Bacon explains the transformations 
of bodies in terms of the all-pervading activities of attenuated material spirits. Thus 
as a final comment, I suggest that the Sylva demonstrates beyond doubt that 
thorough and detailed exegesis of the Baconian corpus is essential to fully grasp the 
radical nature of Baconian reform. 
134 Paw1ey, SEH, II, 335 (my emphasis). 
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Appendix 1 
Francis Bacon 
De Interpretatione Naturce Sententice XII 
A note on the translation 
De Interpretatione Naturre Sententie XII is transcribed from a first edition of Scripta 
in natvrali et vniversali philosophia published in 1653.1 The Scripta was printed 
from a transcription of certain Bacon manuscripts in an edition prepared by the 
Dutch scholar Isaac Gruter (1610-80)? This work was not translated by Bacon's 
nineteenth-century editors even though James Spedding describes it as "most 
remarkable for weight, condensation, and comprehensiveness"3 
This is intended to be a word-for-word translation. I have chosen to translate 
the text this way to enable the reader to detect the intricacies of the original. This 
work is written in what Bacon later referred to as aphorisms. Each sententia is 
extremely dense and requires unfolding. Elsewhere Bacon discusses his remarkable 
ingenuity in contracting and reducing his intentions "almost to singular words. "4 He 
hoped this mode of delivery would enable him to "as it were single and adopt his 
reader. "5 The only clues Bacon gives his readers take the form of particular terms 
which function as signposts - enabling the interpreter to navigate the labyrinth of his 
philosophy. When these threads are traced through the whole range of his works and 
the relevant passages juxtaposed, a coherent programme begins to emerge. The only 
way the translator can preserve these signposts in translation is, as Allan Bloom 
says, "by a slavish, even if sometimes cumbersome literalness - insofar as possible 
always using the same English equivalent. "6 Thus I have endeavoured to render the 
same Latin word by the same English word. 
1 Copy in Brotherton Collection, University of Leeds (shelfmark Sc BAC). For a bibliographical 
description of the Scripta see OFB, VI, 451-459. De Interpretatione Natura Sententice X11 is 
forthcoming in OFB, III. Spedding is unable to determine when the piece was composed, SEH, III, 
783. Judging by the style and content, it was probably composed between 1600 and 1605. 
2 For details of the manuscripts' transmission from Bacon to William Boswell, from Boswell to 
Gruter, and from manuscript to print see OFB, VI, lxx-xcv. 
3 SEH, III, 783. 
4 My trans., TPM (OFB abbreviations are used for the titles of Bacon's works, parts of works and 
plans), SEH, III, 536-537. 
VT, SEH, III, 248; cf. DIN, 7. Even Bacon's mother despaired of his enfolded writing. In a letter to 
Anthony Bacon dated 18 April 1593 she writes: "I send herein your brother's [Francis'] letter. 
Construe the interpretation. I do not understand his enigmatical folded writing, " LL, VIII, 245. 
6 The Republic of Plato, ed. and tr. Allan Bloom, 2°d edn. (Paris: Harper Collins, 1991), xi. 
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De 
INTERPRETATIONE 
NATURE 
SENTENTLIE XII 
De Conditione Hominis. 
I. HOMO Naturae minister & Interpres tantum facit auf intelligit, quantum de 
Naturaa ordine re vel mente observabit, ipse interim Naturaa legibus obsessus. 
II. Terminus itaque humanx potentiae ac scientiae in dotibus quibus ipse 
praeditus est ä natura ad movendum & percipiendum turn etiam in statu 
rerurn praesentium. Ultra enim has bases illa instrumenta non proficiunt. 
III. Dotes hm per se tenues & ineptae, rite tarnen & ordine administratae tantum 
possunt, ut res ä sensu & actu remotissimas judicio & usui coram sistant, 
majoremque & operum difficultatem & scientiae obscuritatem superent, 
quam quis adhuc optare didicerit. 
IV. Una veritas, una Interpretatio: Sensus autem obliquus, animus alienus, res 
importuna, ipsurn tarnen Interpretationis opus magis declinans quarr 
difficile. 
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TWELVE SENTENCES 
ON 
THE INTERPRETATION 
OF NATURE 
Concerning the condition of man. 
1. Man, the minister and interpreter of nature, does or understands only as 
much as he shall observe, in actuality or in the mind, ' concerning the order of 
nature, being himself in the meantime hemmed in by the laws of nature. 
2. And so the limit of human power and knowledge <is>" in the endowments 
with which he himself is provided by nature for moving and perceiving, then 
also in the state of present things. For beyond these bases those instruments 
are of no avail. 
3. These endowments though in themselves slight and inept, yet, duly and in 
order administered, have so much power that they set things most remote 
from sense and action before judgement and experience, and overcome a 
difficulty of works and an obscurity of knowledge greater than anyone 
hitherto could learn to wish for. 
4. <There is> one truth, one interpretation, but the sense is aslant, the mind"` is 
mad, the thing is awkward, yet the work of interpretation is itself more 
elusive than difficult. 
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De impedimentis Interpretationis. 
V. Quisquis dubitationis impos, & asserendi avidus principia demum statuet 
probata (ut credit) concessa & manifesta, ad quorum immotam veritatem 
caetera ut pugnantia vel obsecundantia recipiet vel rejiciet, is res cum verbis 
rationem cum insania, Mundum cum fabula commutabit, interpretari non 
potent. 
VI. Qui omnem rerum distinctionem, quae in constitutis vulgo speciebus, vel 
etiam inditis nominibus elucescit, non miscuerit, confuderit, & in massam 
redegerit, non unitatem Naturae, non legitimas rerum lineas videbit, non 
interpretari potent. 
VII. Qui primum & ante alia omnia animi motus humani penitus non explorarit, 
ibique Scientiae meatus & errorum sedes, accuratissime descriptas non 
habuerit, is omnia larvata et veluti incantata reperiet, fascinum nI solvent, 
interpretari non potent. 
VIII. Qui in rerum obviarum & compositarum causis exquirendis veluti flammae, 
somnii, febris, versabitur, nec se ad natural simplices conferet, ad istas 
primo, quae populari7 ratione tales sunt; deinde etiam ad eas, quae arte ad 
veriorem simplicitatem reductae sunt & veluti sublimatae, is fortasse si caetera 
non peccat, addet inventis quaedam non spernenda, et Inventis proxima. Sed 
nil contra maj ores rerum secularitates movebit, nec Interpres dicendus erit. 
7 populari] populare / silently emended thus in SEH, III, 786. 
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Concerning the impediments to interpretation. 
5. Whoever, unable to control doubt and eager of assertion, will then establish 
principles proved (as he believes) conceded and manifest, in respect of 
whose immovable truth he will accept or reject other things as conflicting or 
complying, that man will exchange things for words, reason for insanity, the 
world for a fiction, <and> he will not be able to interpret. 
6. He who has not mixed, confused and reduced to a mass" the whole 
distinction of things which is manifest in species popularly established, or 
even in the names bestowed, will not see the unity of nature, nor the 
legitimate lines of things, ' <and> he will not be able to interpret. 
7. He who first and before all other things has not thoroughly examined the 
motions of the human mind, and has not painstakingly described the paths of 
knowledge and the seats of errors there, that man will find all things masked 
and as it were enchanted, <and> unless he breaks the spell he will not be able 
to interpret. 
8. He who busies himself with inquiring into the causes of things which are 
obvious and composite, for instance flame, dream, fever, and who does not 
betake himself to simple natures, to those first of all which in popular 
thinking are such, then also to those which have been reduced and as it were 
sublimated by art to a truer simplicity, that man perhaps if he does not go 
astray in other respects will add to things invented certain things not to be 
disparaged and similar to things invented. But he will move nothing against 
the greater secularities of things, "` nor will he deserve to be called an 
interpreter. 
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De moribus Interpretis. 
IX. Qui ad interpretandum accesserit, ita se comparet & componat; sit nee 
novitatis, nee consuetudinis, vel Antiquitatis sectator, nee contradicendi 
licentiam, nee authoritatis servitutem amplectatur. Non affirmandi sit 
properus, nee in dubitationem solutus, sed singula gradu quodam probationis 
insignita provehat. Spes ei laboris, non otii author sit; Res non raritate, 
difficultate, auf laude, sed veris momentis aestimet. Privata negotia 
personatus administret, rerum tarnen provisus subvenerans. Errorum in 
veritates, & veritatum in errores subingressus prudenter advertat, nihil 
contemnens auf admirans. Naturae sum commoditates norit. Naturae aliorum 
morem gerat, cum nemo lapidi impingenti succenseat. Uno veluti oculo 
rerum naturas, altero humanos usus pererret. Verborum mixtam naturam & 
juvamenti & nocumenti inprimis participem distincte sciat. Artem Inveniendi 
cum Invento adolescere statuat. Sit etiam in scientia, quarr adeptus est, nee 
occultanda nee proferenda vanus, sed ingenuus & prudens, tradatque Invents 
non ambitiose, auf maligne, sed modo primum maxime vivaci & vegeto, id 
est ad injurias temporis munitissimo, & ad scientiam propagandam 
fortissimo, deinde ad errores pariendos innocentissimo, & ante omnia, qui 
sibi legitimum lectorem seponat. 
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Concerning the conduct of the interpreter. 
9. He who has undertaken to interpret, let him prepare and compose himself in 
the following manner. Let him not be an admirer of novelty, nor of custom or 
of antiquity, and let him not embrace the licence of contradiction nor the 
servitude of authority. Let him not be hasty in affirmation, nor dissolved into 
doubt, but let him advance particulars distinguished by a certain degree of 
testing. Let him have hope of work, let him not be the author of idleness. Let 
him determine the worth of things not according to rarity, difficulty or fame, 
but true moments. " Let him administer his personal affairs masked, "1" but 
with some small consideration for the provisions of things. 'x Entering a little 
into the truths of errors and the errors of truths, let him take prudent note, 
despising or admiring nothing. Let him know the good points of his nature. ' 
Let him humour the nature of others, since no one gets angry with a stone 
which bumps into one. " Let him with one eye, as it were, survey the natures 
of things, with the other human practices. "' Let him know with due 
distinction the mixed nature of words, which above all shares in helping and 
hindering. Let him resolve that the art of invention grows with invention. Let 
him also not be boastful but ingenuous and prudent in hiding and bringing 
forward the knowledge which he has attained, and let him impart his 
discoveries not fulsomely or stingily, but in a way which is in the first place 
particularly lively and vigorous, that is, well fortified against the injuries of 
time and most powerful for propagating knowledge, then most innocent as 
regards engendering errors, and above all which selects for itself the 
legitimate reader. "". 
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De officio Interpretis. 
X. Ita moratus & comparatus Interpres ad hunc modum procedat. Conditionem 
hominis reputabit, impedimenta Interpretationis removebit, turn ad opus 
accinctus Historiam parabit & ordinatas chartarum sequelas, unaque usus, 
coordinationes, occurrentias & Schedulas instituet. Rerum solitudinem & sui 
similitudinem repraesentabit. Quin & rerum delectum habebit, quaeque 
maxime primitivae sunt vel instantes, id est vel rerum aliarum inventioni; g vel 
humanis necessitatibus praecipue conducunt, prcordinabit. Instantiaruin etiam 
prceminentias observabit, quae ad opens compendium plurimum possunt. 
Atque ita instructus reordinationes demum, & chartas novellas ac ipsam 
Interpretationem facilem jam & sponte sequentem, imo mente fere 
praereptam mature & feliciter aggredietur & perficiet. Quod ubi fecerit, 
continuo veros aeternos & simplicissimos Naturae motus, ex quorum ordinato 
& calculatissimo progressu infinita haec turn presentis turn omnis nevi 
varietas emergit, pura et nativa luce videbit & numerabit. Interimque ab 
initio opens humanis rebus multa & incognita, veluti feenus, assidue recipere 
non omittet. Sed hinc denuo totus in humanos usus rerumque praesentium 
staturn conversus & intentus, omnia diversa via & ad actionem ordinabit & 
disponet. Naturis secretissimis alias declaratorias, & absentissimis alias 
superinductorias assignabit. Et deinde tandem veluti alters Natura 
plerumquitates condet, quarum errores pro monstris sint, salva etiam tarnen 
sibi Artis praerogativa. 
8 inventioni] inventione / silently emended thus in SEH, III, 787. 
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Concerning the office of the interpreter. 
10. Conducting himself and having prepared himself in this way, let the 
interpreter advance in this fashion. He will think over the human condition, 
he will remove impediments to interpretation, then, equipped for the work, 
he will prepare a history and ordered sequences of charts and at the same 
time he will begin work on uses, co-ordinations, occurrences and 
schedules. "' He will set forth the uniqueness of things and the likeness of 
things to one another. Moreover he will make a selection of things and will 
arrange first those things which are most primordial or urgent, that is, which 
contribute especially either to the invention of other things or to human 
needs. He will also watch for the pre-eminences of instances which have the 
most efficacy for abridging the work. " And, so prepared, he will only then 
speedily and felicitously embark upon and accomplish the reorderings and 
the new charts and the interpretation itself which is easy now, following 
instinctively, nay, more or less seized by the mind in advance. 
When he has done this he will at once see and count in their pure and 
native light the true, eternal and most simple motions of nature, from whose 
ordered and most calculated progress this infinite variety of both the present 
age and of every age emerges. "' And meanwhile, from the beginning of the 
work, he will not omit to take in constantly, as it were in interest, many 
things unknown to human affairs. "' But from here, turning anew and intent 
entirely on human practices and the state of present things, he will order and 
arrange all things by diverse ways and for action. "' To most hidden natures 
he will assign some declaratory, and to most absent natures he will assign 
others superinductory" x And then at last as it were another nature? ' will 
establish its manifoldnesses whose wanderings are to be as marvels; yet with 
the prerogative of art also retained for itself. " 
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De provisu rerum. 
XI. Tu autem spe & studio languidis haec hauris (fili) mirarisque si tanta supersit 
operum fructuosissimorum et prorsus incognitorum ubertas, ea non ante hac, 
auf jam subito esse inventa, simul etiam, cujusmodi ea sint, nominatim 
requiris, visque tibi auf immortalitatem, auf Indolentiam, auf voluptatem 
transportantem promitti. Verum tu tibi largire (fili) spemque ex Scientia 
aucupabere, ut ex ignorantia desperationem cepisti. 9 An etiam Arte 
adoptandum est opus? At dubitationi tux quoad licet satisfaciam, moremque 
tibi geram. Quod haec subito nota sint, nil mirum (fili). Scientia celeris, 
tempus tardi partus est. Etiam nobilia, quae ante hcc invents sunt, non luce 
prioris cogitationis sensim, sed casu (ut loquuntur) affatim inventa sunt. In 
Mechanicis autem est quaedam rei jam inventae extensio, sed novae 
inventionis nomen non meretur. Non longum (fili) sed ambiguum est fiter. 
Quod autem haec non ante hoc tempus in conspectum se dedisse aisl°, An tibi 
compertum est quantum omni Antiquitati, vel omnibus in regionibus, vel 
etiam singulis hominibus innotuerit? Sed fere assentior tibi (fili) teque altius 
manu ducam. Non dubitas quin si homines non forent, multa eorum qua: Arte 
(ut loquuntur) facta sunt, defutura fuissent, ut statuarn marmoream, 
stragulam vestem. Age vero & homines an non habent & ipsi suos motus 
quibus obtemperant? Sane (fili) magis subtiles, & difficilius ä scientia 
comprehensos, sed aeque certos. Profecto, inquies, homines Voluntati parent. 
Audio, sed hoc nihil est. Qualis causa est fortuna in Vniverso, talis est 
Voluntas in homine. Si quid ergo nec sine homine producitur, & jacet etiarn 
extra hominis vias, an non nihilo aequale est? Homo etiam in quaedam veluti 
occurrentia impingit, alia fine praeviso & mediis cognitis exequitur. 
Mediorum tarnen Notitiam ex obviis sumit. Quo igitur in numero reponentur 
ea, quae nec effectum obvium, nec operations modum & lucem ex obviis 
sortiuntur. Talia opera Epistemides vocantur id est scientiae filiae, quae non 
alias in actum veniunt, quam per scientiam et Interpretationem meram, cum 
nihil obvii contineant. Inter haec autem & obvia quot gradus numerari putas? 
Tene Ohl et obsigna. 
cepisti] ccepisti / emended thus in SEH, III, 787. 
10 ais] ajo / emended thus in SEH, III, 788. 
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Concerning the provision of things: "' 
11. But you, my son, 7O"" drink these things in with faint hope and zeal and you 
marvel, if there be remaining so great an abundance of works most fruitful 
and utterly unknown, that those things have not been invented before now or 
have now suddenly been invented; at the same time also you inquire of what 
kind those things are by name and you wish to have promised to you either 
immortality or freedom from pain, or transporting pleasure. "' But do you 
give generously to yourself, my son, and hunt for hope from knowledge as 
you have captured despair from ignorance. ' Or is the work to be striven 
after even by art? But I will satisfy your doubt as far as I may, and I will 
humour you. That these things have suddenly become known is not 
surprising, my son. Knowledge is swift; time is of slow birth. Even noble 
things which have been invented before these, were not invented gradually 
by the light of prior cogitation but by chance, as they say, at once. On the 
other hand in things mechanical there is a sort of extension of a thing already 
invented but it does not merit the name of a new invention. " The way is not 
long, my son, but winding. But as for your saying that these things have not 
presented themselves to the gaze before this time, I ask you whether you 
have ascertained how much was known to the whole of antiquity, whether in 
every region or even to individual men? "' But I largely agree with you, my 
son, and I will lead you deeper by the hand. tm111 
You do not doubt that if men did not exist many of those things 
which are made by art (as they say) would have been lacking, as for example 
marble statues or coverings of tapestry. Come now, do not men also 
themselves have their own motions to which they submit? To be sure, my 
son, <motions> more subtle and comprehended with more difficulty by 
science but equally certain. Indeed, you will say, men obey the will. That is 
granted, but this is nothing. Just as fortune is the cause in the universe, so the 
will is the cause in man. If anything therefore is not brought forth without 
man and also lies outside the ways of man, is it not equal to nothing? Man 
also stumbles across certain things that lie in his way as it were , 
'°' other 
things he pursues foreseeing the end and recognizing things intermediate. 
But the awareness of things intermediate he acquires from things obvious. In 
what number therefore shall those things be placed which are allotted neither 
an obvious effect nor a mode and light of operation from things obvious? 
Such works are called Epistemides, that is, daughters of knowledge, which 
do not come into actuality otherwise than through knowledge and pure 
interpretation since they comprise nothing obvious. But between these things 
and things obvious how many steps do you think are counted? Remember, 
my son, and seal! m 
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XII. Postremo loco tibi consulo (fiH) quod facto inprimis opus est, hoc est ut 
mente illuminata & sobria interpretationem rerum divinarum & naturalium 
distinguas, neve has ullo modo inter se committi patiare. Satis erratum est in 
hoc genere. Nihil hic nisi per rerum inter se similitudines addiscitur. Qum 
licet dissimillimae videantur, premunt tarnen similitudinem germanam 
interpreti notam. Deus autem sibill tantum similis est absque tropo. Quare 
nullam ad ejus cognitionem hint lucis sufficientiam expecta. Da fidei, quae 
fidei sunt. 
11 Bibi] tibi / emended thus in SEH, III, 788. 
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12. In the final place I advise you, my son, of what needs above all to be done, 
namely that, with mind illumined and sober, you separate the interpretation 
of things divine and natural and do not allow these in any way to be joined 
together. There has been enough error in this respect. Nothing here is learned 
additionally except through the likenesses of things amongst themselves. 
Which things, although they seem most unlike, nevertheless conceal a 
genuine likeness known to the interpreter. " But God is like only to himself, 
without trope. Therefore expect no sufficiency of light from here for learning 
about him. Give to faith those things which are faith's. 
'A similar formulation is found in aphorism 1 of NO: "Homo Naturaa minister, & Interpres, tantum 
facit, & intelligit, quantum de Naturaa Ordine, re vel mente, obseruauerit, nec ampliüs scit, auf potest" 
(NO, OFB, XI, 64). Robert Ellis notes that this is "perhaps the most often quoted sentence in the 
Novum organum" (SEH, I, 88). DO (OFB, XI, 44) and AC (SEH, III, 793) have "Opere" instead of 
`Ye: ' 
G. W. Kitchin (commenting on NO) observes that this aphorism "has been usually spoiled in 
translations, " Novum organum: sive indicia vera de interpretatione naturce (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1855), 8, n. 3. The meaning of "re vel mente" has proved particularly problematic. 
Kitchen suggests that because DO substitutes "opera" for "re, " the "re vel mente" distinction is 
"between our observation of things, facts, effects in the Universe, and our mental operations on them: 
`re' by observation, `mente' by contemplation" (ibid. ). Similarly, Benjamin Farrington renders the 
clause in the first aphorism of NO "practice or theory, " adding that "the word re is unclear, " The 
Philosophy of Francis Bacon (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1964), 54. He goes so far as to 
state that "A. Lipschutz, Tres Medicos Contemporaneos, Buenos Aires, 1958,198, is surely right in 
treating re as a mistake of transcription" (ibid. ). This is highly unlikely given that the phrase "re vel 
mente" occurs in both NO and DIN. Thomas Fowler acknowledges an alternative reading of the 
passage: the distinction is either between "the observation of facts and the subsequent process of 
meditation or reflexion on such observation" or between "the observation of the external world and 
that of our own minds, " Bacon's Novum Organum, ed. Thomas Fowler, 2°d edn. corrected and 
revised (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1889), 191. Graham Rees with Fowler favours the first alternative 
(OFB, XI, 502). Hence he renders aphorism 1 of NO: "Man, the servant and interpreter of nature, 
does and understands only as much as he has observed, by fact or mental activity, concerning the 
order of nature; beyond that he has neither knowledge nor power" (OFB, XI, 65). For other 
translations see Novum organum with other parts of the Great Instauration, tr, and ed. Peter Urbach 
and John Gibson (Chicago and La Salle: Open Court, 1994), 43; The New Organon, ed. Lisa Jardine 
and Michael Silverthorne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 33. 
Sententia 1 is a paradigmatic instance of Bacon's enfolded writing - it sets out the problem 
which Novum organum proposes to solve. The "re vel mente" clause is intended to be incongruous. 
Why is it there? Why does Bacon distinguish between what is observed in actuality and what is 
observed in the mind? He is drawing attention to the mind's failure to observe anything in actuality, 
and hence to observe anything concerning the order of nature. The res/mens antithesis is the obstacle 
which must be overcome in order for Bacon's goal of dominion over nature to be realized. 
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According to Fowler, "though the precise meaning of the words is obscure, the purport of 
the Aphorism is plain" (op. cit., 191). Given the dense nature of this aphorism, it seems more 
plausible that knowledge of the precise meaning of the words is a prerequisite to comprehending the 
whole. The phrase "de Naturaa ordine" refers to what is "ex analogi3 Vniuersi" and not "ex analogiä 
Hominis" (see DO, OFB, XI, 32; NO, OFB, XI, 80,358). "Re" refers to the ipsissimce res which is 
"existens, " "interius" and "in ordine ad universum" (NO, OFB, XI, 236). Hence Bacon is not talking 
about "the observation of the external world" in the sense of "things, facts, effects in the Universe" 
but the essence of things. This confusion springs from Bacon's use of "opera" in the DO and AC 
formulations. There he substitutes "re" with "apere" because he is making the point - highlighted by 
Paolo Rossi - that "things as they really are, considered ... not 
in relation to man but in relation to the 
universe, offer conjointly truth and utility, " Philosophy, Technology, and the Arts in the Early 
Modern Era, tr. Salvator Attanasio (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), 160. In the same paragraph 
of DO, Bacon states that "human Knowledge and Power, do in fact come together, and lack of 
success with works stems mainly from ignorance of causes" (OFB, XI, 45). In other words, power to 
carry out opera depends upon knowledge of things as they really are (res). As he puts it in sententia 
11: "Talia opera Epistemides vocantur id est scientiar f lice, quae non alias in actum veniunt, quam per 
scientiam et Interpretationem meram. " Both "apere" and "re" are intended to highlight the need to 
observe the essences of things. 
According to Bacon, "testimonium & informatio sensfs semper est ex analogiä Hominis, 
non ex analogiä Vniuersi: atque magna prorsits errore asseritur, Sensum esse mensuram rerum" (DO, 
OFB, XI, 80). He speaks of the need to make clear "what may be assigned to the nature of things and 
what to the nature of the mind" (DO, OFB, XI, 37). Mens - the locus of the intellectual processes - 
must be subjected to thorough examination. As Bacon says in sententia 7 of DIN: "He who first and 
before all other things has not thoroughly examined the motions of the human mind, and has not 
painstakingly described the paths of knowledge and the seats of errors there" will not be able to 
interpret. Man (without Bacon's Novum organum) observes nothing in actuality because "the human 
intellect is to the rays of things like an uneven mirror which mingles its own nature with the nature of 
things, and distorts and stains if, (NO, OFB, XI, 81). 
In order to understand the "re vel mente" clause we must look for other instances of this 
pairing (see IM, OFB, XI, 2,6; DO, OFB, XI, 36; NO, OFB, XI, 270,442; DPAO, OFB, VI, 208; 
RPh, SEH, III, 583; TPM, SEH, III, 538). The opening paragraph of the Instauratio magna states that, 
` Omni ape connitendum existimauit, si quo modo commercium istud Mends, & Rerum ... restitui 
posset in integrum, auf saltem in melius deduci" (OFB, XI, 3). The purpose of Novum organum is to 
unite mens and res so that "non sohlm ex Natura Mentis, sed ex Natura Rerum quoque haec Scientia 
emanet" (NO, OFB, XI, 442). The goal of Bacon's programme - the production of all things possible 
- depends upon knowledge of forms. Bacon's form is "in ordine ad Vniuersum, non relatiuus 
tantummodb ad Sensum" (NO, OFB, XI, 270). In other words, forms are a true reflection of the 
essences of things in the mirror of the mind. From the discovery of forms, which requires a union "of 
the mind and the universe, " will "spring helps for men and a line of discoveries which may to some 
degree subdue and mitigate their needs and miseries" (NO, OFB, XI, 37). 
My translation of sententia I entails an alternative interpretation of the "re vel mente" clause 
which, briefly stated, is as follows: Man does and understands only so much as he observes 
concerning the order of nature. Things observed in actuality are according to the order of nature. But 
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man can only observe things in the mind. Because the mind (in its present state) is estranged, what 
man observes in the mind is not concerning the order of nature, but concerning the order of man. Man 
therefore observes nothing in actuality. Thus he does and understands nothing. Hence the problem is 
how to enable the mind to observe the order of nature. In other words, how to unite the mind with 
things in actuality (res). For a detailed treatment of this topic see Chapter 3. 
"I have used <> to indicate a supplement. 
I have used the English term "mind" to cover both "mens" and "animus" because of the 
indiscriminate latitude of the modem English. 
" Massa refers to a lump of any substance in the raw state and Ovid applies it to Chaos, Fasti, I, 107- 
108 (Loeb Classical. Library), tr. J. G. Frazer, (London and New York: Harvard University Press, 
1931), 10: "ut semel haec rerum secessit lite suarurn / inque novas abiit massa soluta domos"; cf. 
Metamorphoses, I, 69-71, at 70, MS H2C F4LP, P. Ovidi Nasonis Metamorphoses, ed. R J. Tarrant, 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), 4: "uix ita limitibus dissaepserat omnia certis, / cum quae pressa diu 
massa latuere sub ipsa / sidera coeperunt toto efferuescere caelo" On the role of chaos and 
putrefaction in Bacon's natural philosophy see Chapters 2 and 5. 
" This suggests a chemical procedure. In NO Bacon says: "Itaque facienda est corporum separatio & 
solutio, non per ignem cert8, sed per rationem & Inductionem veram, cum Experimentis auxiliaribus; 
& per comparationem ad alia corpora, & reductionem ad Naturas simplices, & earum formas, qua; in 
composito conueniunt & complicantur; & transeundum plane ä Vulcano ad Mineruam, si in animo sit 
veras corporum texturas & Schematismos ... 
in lucem protrahere" (OFB, XI, 212). On Linea see NO, 
OFB, XI, 92,186,358,412. Cf. Plato, Phaedrus 265E, tr. Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff 
(Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1995), 64: "This [other thing which 
it would be quite wonderful to grasp by means of a systematic art] is to be able to cut up each kind 
according to its species along its natural joints, and to try not to splinter any part, as a bad butcher 
might do. " 
"` Ellis suggests that secularitas signifies "popular opinions, or such as flourish in the sceculum or 
world, or through ages, scecula" (SEH, III, 786). Bacon uses the term in TPM where it seems to have 
this sense (SEH, III, 537). In this passage, however, "popular opinions" seems inappropriate. In NO 
Bacon says: "Itaque sperandum omninb est, esse adhuc in Natura; sinu, multa excellentis vsCs 
recondita, qux nullam cum iam Inuentis cognationem habent, auf parallelismum; sed omninb sita 
sunt extra vias phantasix, qum tarnen adhuc inuenta non sunt; quae proculdubib per multos seculorum 
circuitus & ambages, & ipsa quandoqu6 prodibunt, sicut illa superiora prodierant; sed per viam quarr 
nunc tractamus, propere, & subitb, & simul repra; sentari, & anticipari possunt" (my emphasis, OFB, 
XI, 166-168). Similarly, he says in VT that the work of interpretation "is to abridge experience and to 
make things as certainly found out by Axiom in short time, as by infinite experiences in ages" (SEH, 
III, 247). I suggest that Bacon is expressing this thought in sententia 8, in which case "majores 
secularitates" signifies "the greater ages. " 
"' Bacon appears to be thinking of momentum staterce - the moment of a balance, a particle sufficient 
to turn the scales. Momentum here also has the figurative sense of weight, influence. 
"" Ellis renders this phrase "affecting more interest in [personal affairs] than he feels" (SEH, III, 786, 
n. 2). James Spedding says that he does not clearly understand the sentence but thinks "it must refer 
to the necessity of using popular ideas for popular purposes" (ibid. ). He cites RPh: "Servate itaque et 
illam alteram, et prout commodum vobis erit adhibete; atque aliter cum natura, aliter cum populo 
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negotiamini. Nemo enim est qui plus multo quarr alius quis intelligit, quin ad minus intelligentem 
tanquam personatus sit, ut se exuat, alteri det" (my emphasis, SEH, III, 562). On this basis he 
suggests that "there should be a full stop after administret, and a comma after subvenerans" (SEH, 
III, 786). I can see little justification for making this alteration. However, the passage from RPh is 
pertinent. Farrington renders this passage: "Therefore keep your old philosophy. Use it when 
convenient. Keep one [philosophy] to deal with nature and the other to deal with the populace. Every 
man of superior understanding in contact with inferiors wears a mask" (Farrington, op. cit., 108). The 
notion of a mask of philosophy is found in Cicero, Tusculan disputations, V, 73 (Loeb Classical 
Library), tr. J. E. King, rev. edn. (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1945), 
500: according to Marcus Tullius, Epicurus "induit personam philosophi". Farrington adds that he has 
omitted the last five words of the RPh passage - "ut se exuat, alteri det" - because he has been unable 
"to extract a satisfactory sense" from them (Farrington, op. cit., 108, n. 1). I suggest, "laying aside 
himself and giving himself to another. " If this is correct, sententia 9 expresses the same thought viz., 
that the interpreter should not disclose his true self when conducting his personal affairs. This notion 
is found in CDSH: "Prudentia autem Civilis innumeras formas, easque maxime inter se contrarias, 
qua; rebus, personis, temporibus, conveniant, desiderat. Adeo ut mirum minime sit si fabula Protei ad 
viros prudentes transferatur; qui ab occasionibus constricti in omnes formas se vertunt, donec liberi 
ad naturas suas redeant" (SEH, III, 197). The final clause implies that one's true nature is laid aside in 
order to take on other forms. On Bacon and secrecy see John C. Briggs, Francis Bacon and the 
Rhetoric of Nature (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), 246-247. Spedding and 
Farrington fail to mention a second RPh passage where Bacon resolves to deal with his audience 
"simpliciter et absque persona" (RPh, SEH, III, 570). 
ix The meaning of "provisus rerum" is unclear (see sententia 11). Bacon seems to be using the phrase 
in the same way in which he uses "provisions" in VT, where it refers to inventions "further to be 
provided" (SEH, III, 234). Cf. Tacitus, Annals, IV, 38 (Cambridge Greek and Latin Texts), ed. R. H. 
Martin and A. J. Woodman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 56: "rerum uestrarum 
prouidum. " 
" In DAS Bacon discusses the following proverb of Solomon: "Prudens advertit ad gressus suos; 
stultus divertit ad dolos" (SEH, I, 766; see also Ess, OFB, XV, 73). Samuel Reynolds proposes that 
Bacon has in fact conflated two Vulgate passages, Prov. 14: 8 and 15, The Essays or Counsels, Civil 
and Moral, ed. Samuel Harvey Reynolds (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1890), 166. The former states 
"sapientia callidi est intellegere via suam et inprudentia stultorum errans, " and the latter "astutus 
considerat gressus suos. " As Bacon interprets this so-called proverb, "Duce sunt prudentim species; 
altera vera et sana, altera degener et falsa, quarr Salomon stultitice nomine appellare non dubitat. Qui 
priori se dederit, viis et vestigiis propriis cavet; periculis prospiciens, meditans remedia, proborum 
opera utens, contra improbos seipsum muniens; cautus incceptu, receptu non imparatus; in occasiones 
attentus, contra impedimenta strenuus; cum innumeris aliis, quae ad sui ipsius actiones et gressus 
regendos spectant. At altera species tota est consuta ex fallaciis et astutiis ... " (SEH, I, 766). In 
sententia 9 he says: "Errorum in veritates, & veritatum in errores subingressus prudenter advertat, 
nihil contemnens auf admirans. Naturaa suae commoditates norit" (my emphasis; cf. Prov. 14: 8). The 
same thought appears to be expressed here, namely, that the wise man should be well-informed yet 
focused on himself. 
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" The phrase "lapidi impingenti" is obscure. Lapis is a common trope for stupidity, e. g., "egomet 
credidi homini docto rem mandere, is lapidi mando maximo, " Plautus, Mercator III, iv, 47 (Loeb 
Classical Library), 5 vols. (London and New York: Harvard University Press, 1924), III, 70. This use 
of lapis as a term of abuse is found in Johannes Ferrerius of Riva, Historia Abbatum de Kynlos, ed. 
W. D. Wilson (Edinburgh: Bannatyne Club, 1839), 52: "ne alius forte ad hunc lapidem imprudenter 
impingat. " Prof. J. B. Hall kindly checked this reference for me and he tells me that the mise en scene 
is roughly this. One of the abbots has had one of his books stolen (as he sees it) by a former inmate of 
the house and wants it back. The inmate rejoins that it was not his at all. The abbot then proceeds to a 
cautionary account of the affair in detail, "ne alius forte ad hunc [the miscreant] lapidem imprudenter 
impingat. " If Bacon is drawing on this meaning of lapis then the sense is "let him humour the nature 
of others, since no one gets angry with a blockhead who offends one" 
However, I think the remark is unflattering rather than simply abusive. It is strongly 
suggestive of a proverb. Erasmus, Adagia, IV, ii, 23, Opera Omnia Desiderii Erasmi Roterodami: 
recognita et adnotatione critica instructa notisque illustrata, ed. R. Hoven, 9 vols. (Amsterdam and 
New York: North-Holland Pub. Co., 1969-), II, vii, 108) states: "CANIS SAEVIENS IN LAPIDEM. 
K xov sic Töv %i0ov &yavaxcsovßa, id est Canis indignans in lapidem. Competit in eos qui mali sui 
causam imputant non ipsi autori, sed alten cuipiam. Veluti si quis iracundiae vitium iuuentae, non 
stultitiae, attribueret, vnde proficiscitur. Plato libro de Republica quinto damnans eos qui caesorum 
cadauera despoliant, ait hos perindefacere vt solent canes saeuientes in lapidem, eo qui iecit omisso. 
Pacuuius apud Nonium in Armorum iudicio: 
Nam canis, cum est percussa lapide, non tam petit ilium 
Qui se icit, quam eum ipsum lapidem, quo icta est, petit. " 
See Plato, Republic, 5.469E (quoted in Adagia, I, x, 34); Nonius Marcellus 124M; Otto 322; Tilley D 
542. In Bacon's terms, when struck by a stone, it is not the striking stone that one gets angry with. In 
other words, a person (unlike a dog) rightly attributes the cause of their misfortune not to the stone 
but to its source. The implication - as in sententia, 10 and 11 - is that all things, including man, are 
governed by a calculus of motions which exact obedience. This does not mean that Bacon precludes 
the need for praise or blame. Although innate character traits are determined by the laws of matter, 
individuals are capable of moral reformation. 
Cf. DAS, SEH, I, 631. 
Cf. VT, SEH, III, 248; AL, OFB, IV, 90-91; TPM, SEH, III, 529; RPh, SEH, III, 558. 
Cf. NO, OFB, XI, 214. 
Ellis suggests that the pre-eminences of instances are what Bacon later designated prerogative 
instances (SEH, III, 787). Bacon uses the term insignitus to describe the prerogative instances: "Sunt 
enim Instantim Praerogatiuis istis insignitae & donate Animae instar, inter vulgares Instantias 
Comparentia=" (NO, OFB, XI, 444). However, the pre-eminences of instances may be a more general 
preliminary category. The notion of abridging the work ties in with the concept of moving against the 
greater secularities of things (see sententia 8). The purpose of Bacon's so-called method is to short- 
circuit the long revolutions of ages. 
"' To my knowledge this is the only place where Bacon describes creation ex chao without inserting 
a parenthetical reference to God's role. Cf. "Utrum vero Materia illa creata, per longos seculorum 
circuitus, ex vi primo indita, se in illum optimum Schematismum colligere & vertere potuisset, (quod 
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missis ambagibus ex verbi imperio continuo fecit) non inquirendum fortasse est" (DFB, DPAO, VI, 
252). 
"" Cf. "At quinta pars ad tempus tantüm, donec reliqua perficiantur, adhibetur; & tanquim foenus 
redditur, vsque dum sors haben possit" (DO, OFB, XI, 42). Rees argues that "Part V of IM... was to 
have been devoted to Bacon's own system of substantive theories" (OFB, XI, 499). See OFB, VI, 
xviii-xix, xxxv, xxxvi-xxxvii; OFB, XIII, xix-xx, 337. 
""° In NO Bacon describes the form as "disponens, siue in ordine ad actionem" (OFB, XI, 204). The 
notion of "latm vim" recurs throughout his works. For example, NO, OFB, XI, 214; AL, OFB, IV, 85; 
DAS, SEH, I, 568; VT, SEH, III, 235. He refers to the proverb "Latz vndique sunt sapientibus vim" 
which he attributes to Solomon; cf. Prov. 4: 11-12. 
"' Bacon's use of the term superinducere is significant. In a general sense it means to engraft new 
things upon old (see NO, OFB, XI, 76). E. g., "Nature createth Brotherhood in Families, & Arts 
Mechanicall contract Brotherhoods in communalities, & the Anoyntment of God superinduceth a 
Brotherhood in Kings and Bishops" (AL, OFB, IV, 60). The prefix "super" is necessary because the 
new nature is brought in over and above the old natures. Hence in NO Bacon says, "Svper datum 
Corpus nouam Naturam, siue nouas Naturas generare & superinducere, Opus & Intentio est humanx 
Potentia; " (OFB, XI, 200). In NA the "Inoculators" graft new natures upon bodies (SEH, III, 165). On 
the superinduction of forms see Chapter 5. 
' On the face of it, there is a striking similarity between this passage and the following passage from 
Cicero, De natura deorum, II, 60 (Loeb Classical Library), tr. H. Rackham (Cambridge, Mass. and 
London: Harvard University Press, 1933), 270: "Terrenorum item commodorum omnis est in homine 
dominatus: nos campis nos montibus fruimur, nostri sunt amnes nostri lacus, nos fruges serimus nos 
arbores, nos aquarum inductionibus terns fecunditatem damus, nos flumina arcemus derigimus 
avertimus, nostris denique manibus in rerum natura quasi alteram naturam efficere conamur. " Cf. De 
Finibus, V, 74: "consuetudine quasi alteram quandam naturam effici"; Macrobius, Saturnalia, VII, ix, 
7: "consuetudo, quam secundam naturam pronuntiavit usus"; St. Augustine, De Musicd, VI, vii, 19: 
"consuetudo quasi secunda et quasi affabricata natura"; Contra Iulianum (opus imperfectum), I, 69: 
"consuetudinem malam vocabat, quae ab eruditis etiam saeculi dici solet secunda natura"; I, 105: 
"quantum valet nunc in homine uno secunda natura"; IV, 103: "in vi consuetudinis ... quae non 
frustra dicta est a quibusdam secunda natura". According to F. W. Lenz, the notion of habit as a 
second nature derives from Democritus (" EOoc, i cut prl Chüatc: A New Fragment of Democritus? " 
Transactions of the American Philological Association, 73,1942,214-224). On the concept of 
creating a second nature see Clarence J. Glacken, Traces on the Rhodian Shore: Nature and Culture 
in Western Thought from Ancient Times to the End of the Eighteenth Century (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), 116-149. In DAS Bacon says, "Sunt et alia multa qua: 
utiliter praecipi possint de regimine Consuetudinis. Consuetudo enim, si prudenter et perite inducatur, 
fit revera (ut vulgo dicitur) altera natura; quod si imperite et fortuito administretur, erit tantum simia 
naturm; quae nihil ad vivum imitetur, sed incite tantum deformiter" (SEH, I, 738; cf. AL, OFB, IV, 
152). On Bacon's concept of "alters natura" see Chapters 2 and 5. In DAS Bacon remarks that the 
alchemists' saying that "Vulcanum alteram naturam esse; quinetiam id celeriter perficere, quod 
natura per ambages et temporis moral solet" is not a bad one (my emphasis, SEH, I, 547). Magical 
effects are brought about by art which "breui tempore illud facere possit, quod Natura per multas 
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ambages molitur" (OFB, XI, 442). However, in DSV the deformed Erichthonius represents the "opera 
manca" which result from the unskilful use of art. 
'" The concept of "artis praerogativam et vigorem" occurs in DSV (SEH, VII, 668). Atalanta's gift of 
speed is her natural advantage. In Bacon's interpretation, Atalanta's advantage signifies the 
prerogative of art viz., its swiftness. In sententia 10 Bacon is saying that, through the efforts of man, 
another nature will establish itself but this will not require many ages (see sententia 8). Rather, 
knowledge of nature's simple motions will permit man to superinduce new natures directly so that 
things "can be speedily, suddenly and simultaneously anticipated and made manifest" (NO, OFB, XI, 
169). The swiftness of art will be preserved even though the purpose of art (according to Bacon) is to 
bring forth marvels, which are traditionally a product of nature's infrequent "wanderings" According 
to Bacon, the discovery of forms (or simple motions) "repraesentat auf anticipat Casum (cuius mos 
est, vt tanthm per longa saecula operetur)" (NO, OFB, XI, 302; cf. DPAO, OFB, VI, 252). 
"" See above n. ix. Again, the sense seems to be concerning "things to come" or "things further to be 
provided. " 
'°"" This form of writing - "Methodum ad Filios" - is explained in DAS where Bacon distinguishes 
the magistral from the initiative method of transmitting knowledge: "(vocabulum a Sacris mutuantes) 
earn dicimus Methodum Initiativam, qua; ipsa scientiarum mysteria recludat et denudet. Magistralis 
siquidem docet; Initiativa intimat. Magistralis poscit ut fides habeatur its qua; dicuntur; Initiativa vero 
potius ut examen subeant. Altera scientias discentium vulgo; altera tanquam filiis scientiarum tradit" 
(SEH, I, 663-664). According to Ellis, "by [son] we are to understand those who are qualified to be 
disciples" (SEH, I, 664). He notes that "Artefeus records the conservation wherein his master, 
Boemund, transmitted to him the first principles of all knowledge; and it is remarkable that in this and 
similar cases the disciple is called `mi file' by his instructor -a circumstance which shows from what 
source Bacon derived the phrase `ad filios"' (SEH, I, 86). Spedding disagrees - in his view flee. 
alludes "not so much [to] those who are qualified to be disciples, as those who will carry on the 
work" (SEH, I, 664). Thus "Methodum ad Filios" is rendered "Method of Delivery to Posterity" 
(DAS, SEH, I, 664; cf. SEH, IV, 450). Ellis's and Spedding's differing interpretations reflect their 
differing views on Bacon's attitude to secrecy (see SEH, I, 85-87,107-113), Ellis argues that Bacon 
chose to veil his doctrine "in an abrupt and obscure style, such as, to use his own expression, would 
choose its reader, - that is, would remain unread except by worthy recipients of its hidden meaning" 
(SEH, I, 85). Spedding vehemently rejects this claim: "we must not suppose that the process of 
singling [out] and adopting the fit reader was to be effected by any restraint in communication, or any 
obscurity in style, which should exclude others" (SEH, I, 112). For a detailed treatment of this aspect 
of Bacon's writing see Chapter 1. Bacon includes fill/son in parenthesis in TPM and NA; he also 
addresses the "true sons of the sciences" in NO (TPM, SEH, III, 528-530,535-539; NA, SEH, III, 156, 
164,166; NO, OFB, XI, 58). However, I argue that Bacon's writing is always "ad filios, " whether or 
not this is made explicit. 
"°" In chapter 10 of VT where Bacon discusses things that "are to be compassed and procured", he 
speaks of the need to guard against on the one hand "the poverty of experiences and probations", and 
on the other hand "the vanity of credulous imaginations" (SEN, III, 234). Regarding the latter, he says 
"it will be as fit to check and control the vain and void assignations and gifts whereby certain 
ignorant, extravagant, and abusing wits have pretended to indue the state of man with wonders" 
(ibid. ). On false hope see NO, OFB, XI, 136-138. The same thought is expressed in sententia 11: his 
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initiate does not have much interest or enthusiasm in these matters, he is sceptical of his claims of 
undiscovered plenty while at the same time wanting to play name games for things that are as yet 
wholly unknown, asking for the fulfilment of every idle wish he has ever daydreamed of. However, 
hope based on knowledge (acquired via interpretation) is a good thing because it spurs men to action. 
Prolongation of life, mitigation of pain and greater pleasures of the senses are included in the list of 
magnalia natura appended to NA (SEH, III, 167-168). In VT Bacon states that the true end of 
knowledge "is a discovery of all operations and possibilities of operations from immortality (if it 
were possible) to the meanest mechanical practice" (SEH, III, 222). 
' Because well-founded hope is desirable, Bacon tells his initiate to indulge himself: "hunt for hope 
from knowledge as you have captured despair from ignorance. " The phrase "Verum tu tibi largire" is 
obscure. In AL he says, "weigh that quicke and acute reply, which [Alexander] made when he gaue so 
large gifts to his friends, & seruantes, and was asked what he did reserue for himselfe, and he 
answered, Hope: Weigh I say, whether he had not cast vp his account aright, because Hope must bee 
the portion of all that resolue vppon great enterprises" (OFB, IV, 46). This might explain Bacon's use 
of the term largire. The remainder of sententia 11 explains why there are good grounds for hope; cf. 
NO, OFB, XI, 148-172. 
"' Cf. DAS (SEH, I, 627-629) where this "extension of a thing already invented" is discussed under 
the heading of "Literata Experientia, sive Venatio Parris" which treats of methods of experimenting, 
SEH, 1: 623. There Bacon terms the extension of a thing in the mechanical arts "Translatio 
Experimenti. " 
xxvii See NO, OFB, XI, 14: "Neque enim nobis magna ex parte notum est, quid in Scientijs & Artibus, 
varijs saeculis & locis, innotuerit, & in publicum emanärit" 
'°""" Cf. NO, OFB, XI, 58,149,210. 
"' Cf. DO, OFB, XI, 42: "Neque enim finem nostrum ita petimus occa; cati; vt, quae occurrunt in via 
vtilia, negligamus. " " 
' Cf. Lucretius, De rerum natura, II, 581-582 (Loeb Classical Library), tr. W. D. Rouse and ed. M. 
F. Smith, rev. edn. (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1982), 140: "Illud in 
his obsignatum quoque rebus habere / convenit et memori mandatum mente tenere. " This notion of 
keeping something sealed and treasured up in the mind is probably what Bacon has in mind here. 
"Obsigna" may also be a oblique reference to Daniel 12: 4. The Vulgate has: "tu autem Danihel clude 
sermones et signa librum usque ad tempus statutum, pertransibunt plurimi et multiplex erit scientia. " 
Bacon's use of the motto "Multi pertransibunt & augebitur scientia" on the engraved title of 
Instauratio magna is well-known (see OFB, XI, xxxii, 489-490; cf. NO, OFB, XI, 150). See also, 
Isaiah 8: 16: "liga testimonium Signa legem in discipulis meis" By "Tene fib') et obsigna" Bacon 
may intend that the work be reserved for his disciples - the sons of science. In VT he says, "That the 
discretion anciently observed, though by the precedent of many vain persons and deceivers abused, of 
publishing part and reserving part to a private succession, ... is not to be laid aside; both for the 
avoiding of abuse in the excluded, and the strengthening of affection in the admitted" (SEH, III, 248). 
However, Bacon also uses the term obsignare when he speaks of closing up the divine 
realm: "Sensus enim (instar Solis) Globi terrestris faciem aperit, ccelestis claudit, & obsignat" (NO, 
OFB, XI, 22). This idea is found in DSi : "Pentheus cum sacrificiorum Bacchi occultorum, conscensa 
arbore, spectator esse voluisset, furore percitus est. Fuit autem Penthei dementia ejus generis, ut res 
congeminasse existimaret, et duo soles et rursus duce Thebae ei ob oculos versarentur; adeo ut cum 
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Thebas properaret, statim alteris Thebis conspectis retraheretur: atque hoc modo perpetuo et irriquiete 
sursum et deorsum ferretur ... Qui enim ausu temerario, mortalitatis parum memores, per excelsa 
naturae et philosophize fastigia (tanquam arbore conscensa) ad mysteria divina aspirant, his poena 
proposita est perpetum inconstantiae et judicii vacillantis et perplexi. Cum enim aliud sit lumen 
naturae, aliud divinum; ita cum illis fit, ac si duos soles viderent" (SEH, VI, 646). In sententia 12 the 
injunction to keep things divine and natural apart because "Deus ... sibi tanturn similis est absque 
tropo. Quare nullam ad ejus cognitionem hinc lucis sufficientiam expects" immediately follows the 
imperative "obsigna. " 
'°°" This "genuine likeness known to the interpreter" is what Bacon later calls the form. In NO he 
explains: "Quöd si cuiquam videantur etiam Forma! nostrae habere nonnihil abstracti, qubd misceant 
& coniungant heterogenea (videntur enim valde esse heterogenea Calor Ccelestium, & Ignis; tabor 
fixus in rosa, auf similibus, & apparens in Iride, auf radijs Opalij, auf Adamantis; Mors ex 
summersione, ex crematione, ex puncturd gladij, ex Apoplexiä, ex Atrophic; & tarnen conueniunt ista 
in Natura Calidi, Ruboris, Mortis) is se habere intellectum nörit consuetudine, & integralitate rerum, 
& opinionibus captum & detentum. Certissimum enim est, ista, vtcunque heterogenea & aliena, coire 
in Formara, siue Legern earn qua: ordinat Calorem, auf ruborem, auf mortem" (OFB, XI, 256). 
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Appendix 2 
Francis Bacon 
Inquisitio legitima in Commentarius solutus 
A note on the translation 
Commentarius solutus is held at the British Library, Additional Manuscripts 27278, 
folios 16`-17". As James Spedding explains, Inquisitio legitima "is the last of many 
memoranda which appear to have been transferred from an old note-book 
(transportata ex commentario vetere) on the 26th July, 1608 " Inquisitio legitima is 
significant because it demonstrates the cybernetic nature of Baconian inquiry. 
Although Spedding published Inquisitio legitima, he failed to align the numbering 
correctly. 2 The findings of the inferior machine of the intellect (stages 1-15 of the 
inquiry) feed back into the superior machine of the intellect. 
Editorial intervention in the text has been kept to a minimum. All matter 
deleted by Bacon has been restored. These deletions are delimited by «... ». 
Conjectural reconstructions of illegible words are set in square brackets. Illegible 
words for which no conjecture can be supplied are represented thus: [... ]. 
Punctuation has not been emended in the edited text. All contractions have been 
expanded. Initial capitals and lower-case letters have not been emended. All 
marginalia have been positioned in the text and delimited by braces ({}). 
1 Spedding, SEH, III, 625. Speaking of Commentarius solutus, Spedding writes: "As the pages all 
bear a running title of Transportata, that is, notes transferred from a former note-book, I suppose that 
he [Bacon] had looked through all the memoranda of this kind that he had by him, and gathered 
whatever he judged worth keeping into this volume. He would probably alter and add while he 
transcribed, as well as omit; and therefore, though many of the notes may have been of older date, we 
cannot distinguish the old from the new, and must treat them generally as belonging to this period [c. 
1608]. He calls the collection Commentarius solutus, which may be translated a book of loose notes" 
(LL, XI, 21-22). Spedding cites Bacon who describes Commentarius solutus as "like a merchant's 
waste book; where to enter all manner of remembrance of matter, form, business, study, touching 
myself, service, others; either sparsim or in schedules, without any manner of restraint; only this to be 
divided into 2 books: The one transportata ex commentario vetere, containing all manner notes 
already taken in several paper books fit to be retained (except it be such as are reduced to some more 
perfect form); the other Commentarius novus" (LL, XI, 22). Spedding adds that there is no trace of 
the latter book. 
2 For Spedding's edition see SEH, III, 625 and LL, XI, 67. 
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Inquisitio legitima; «de motu. » 
{Sectio ordinis) 
{Nova opera} 
1. Carta electionis et praeoptionis 
2. Sylva, sive Carta Mater 
3. Meta posita, sive Carta terminans. 
4. Loci, sive Carta Articulorum 
5. Vena exterior, sive Carta divisionis primm 
{Apparentia secunda) 
6. Carta assignationis vel collocations «et resolutionis [sue]>> 
{Sectio rerum} 
7.1. Carta Historien ordinatae ad [... ] divisiones primas, et reliquos 
articulos 
8.2. Carta Amanuensis, sive super Instantias 
{Sectio lucis} 
9.1. Carta Analysis motus compositi, vel de spelling 
10.2. <<Cart>> Vena interior, sive Carta divisionis secundae 
11.3. Carta observations, sive axiomatis 
12.4. Carta humans optativa 
13.5. Carta humana activa, sive practica 
14.6. Carta Anticipationis, sive interpretationis sylvestris 
15.7. Carta Indicationis, sive ad cartas novellas 
Nota Interpretationem legitimam non fiert, nee clavem Interpretationis adoperari, 
usque ad reordinationes et cartas novellas finitas, ut duae sint machine Intellectus, 
una Inferior quam descripsimus, altera Superior quae est novellarum. 
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The legitimate inquisition <<concerning motion 
{Section of order} 
{New works} 
1. The chart of election and preoption 
2. The Sylva, or the Mother Chart 
3. The fixed goal or the terminating chart 
4. The loci, or the chart of articles 
S. The exterior vein, or the chart of first division 
{Second appearance} 
6. The chart of assignation or collocation <<and resolution 
{Section of things} 
7.1. The chart of history arranged by [... ] first divisions and the 
remaining articles 
8.2. The chart of the Amanuensis, or upon instances 
{Section of light} 
9.1. The chart of the analysis of composite motion, or concerning 
spelling 
10.2. The interior vein, or the chart of second division 
11.3. The chart of observation, or of axiom 
12.4. The human optative chart 
13.5. The human active or practical chart 
14.6. The chart of anticipation or interpretation of the sylva 
15.7. The chart of indication or with reference to the new charts 
Note that a legitimate interpretation is not made, nor is the key of interpretation 
employed up to the reorderings and the finishing of the new charts, so that there are 
two machines of the intellect, one the inferior which we have described, the other 
the superior which is that of the new charts. 
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Appendix 3 
The Prerogatives of Instances 
Appendix 3 (see foldout in pocket) is a summary of the 27 Prerogatives of Instances 
outlined in Book 2 of Novum organum. l They fall into three main groups: those that 
assist the intellect, those that assist the sense, and those that assist operation. Those 
which are underlined need to be collected at the outset (as part of the mother history) 
rather than waiting until metaphysics. 
I Bacon, NO, OFB, XI, 273-447. 
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